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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

AND

THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms

Signed in Moscow on 31 July 1991

GE.93-60597

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TREATY
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Conscious that nuclear war would have devastating consequences for all humanity, that it cannot be won and must never be fought,

Convinced that the measures for the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms and the other obligations set forth in this Treaty will help to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war and strengthen international peace and security,

Recognizing that the interests of the Parties and the interests of international security require the strengthening of strategic stability,

Mindful of their undertakings with regard to strategic offensive arms in Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons of July 1, 1968; Article XI of the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems of May 26, 1972; and the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I
Each Party shall reduce and limit its strategic offensive arms in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, and shall carry out the other obligations set forth in this Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

ARTICLE II
1. Each Party shall reduce and limit its ICBMs and ICBM launchers, SLBMs and SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, ICBM warheads, SLBM warheads, and heavy bomber armaments, so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter, the aggregate numbers, as counted in accordance with Article III of this Treaty, do not exceed:

(a) 1600, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers, including 154 for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers;

(b) 6000, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers, including:

(i) 4900, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(ii) 1100, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(iii) 1540, for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs.

2. Each Party shall implement the reductions pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article in three phases, so that its strategic offensive arms do not exceed:

(a) by the end of the first phase, that is, no later than 36 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 2100, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 9150, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 8050, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(b) by the end of the second phase, that is, no later than 60 months after entry into force of this Treaty, and thereafter, the following aggregate numbers:

(i) 1900, for deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, and deployed heavy bombers;

(ii) 7950, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers;

(iii) 6750, for warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs;

(c) by the end of the third phase, that is, no later than 84 months after entry into force of this Treaty: the aggregate numbers provided for in paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party shall limit the aggregate throw-weight of its deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs so that seven years after entry into force of this Treaty and thereafter such aggregate throw-weight does not exceed 3600 metric tons.

ARTICLE III
1. For the purposes of counting toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in subparagraphs 1(a), 2(a)(i), and 2(b)(i) of Article II of this Treaty:

(a) Each deployed ICBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit; each deployed SLBM and its associated launcher shall be counted as one unit.

(b) Each deployed heavy bomber shall be counted as one unit.

2. For the purposes of counting deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers and deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers:

(a) Each deployed launcher of ICBMs and each deployed launcher of SLBMs shall be considered to contain one deployed ICBM or one deployed SLBM, respectively.

(b) If a deployed ICBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an ICBM removed from its launcher and located at that ICBM base shall continue to be considered to be contained in that launcher.

(c) If a deployed SLBM has been removed from its launcher and another missile has not been installed in that launcher, such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be considered to be contained in that launcher. Such an SLBM removed from its launcher shall be

located only at a facility at which non-deployed SLBMs may be located pursuant to subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of this Treaty or be in movement to such a facility.

3. For the purposes of this Treaty, including counting ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type shall be considered to be an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

(c) For ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, an assembled missile of a particular type, in its launch canister, shall be considered to be an ICBM of that type.

(d) Each launch canister shall be considered to contain an ICBM from the time it first leaves a facility at which an ICBM is installed in it until an ICBM has been launched from it or until an ICBM has been removed from it for elimination. A launch canister shall not be considered to contain an ICBM if it contains a training model of a missile or has been placed on static display. Launch canisters for ICBMs of a particular type shall be distinguishable from launch canisters for ICBMs of a different type.

4. For the purposes of counting warheads:

(a) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of each existing type shall be the number specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Understanding.

(b) The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of warheads that will be attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of an existing design with multiple reentry vehicles, or to an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with one reentry vehicle, shall be no less than the nearest integer that is smaller than the result of dividing 40 percent of the accountable throw-weight of the ICBM or SLBM by the weight of the lightest reentry vehicle flight-tested on an ICBM or SLBM of that type. In the case of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type with a front section of a fundamentally new design, the question of the applicability of the 40-percent rule to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be subject to agreement within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Until agreement has been reached regarding the rule that will apply to such an ICBM or SLBM, the number of warheads that will be attributed to such an ICBM or SLBM shall be the maximum number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM of that type has been flight-tested. The number of new types of ICBMs or SLBMs with a front section of a fundamentally new design shall not exceed two for each Party as long as this Treaty remains in force.

(c) The number of reentry vehicles with which an ICBM or SLBM has been flight-tested shall be considered to be the sum of the number of reentry vehicles actually released during the flight test, plus the number of procedures for dispensing reentry vehicles performed during that same flight test when no reentry vehicle was released. A procedure for dispensing penetration aids shall not be considered to be a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, provided that the procedure for dispensing penetration aids differs from a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

(d) Each reentry vehicle of an ICBM or SLBM shall be considered to be one warhead.

(e) For the United States of America, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with ten warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The United States of America shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 150 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 150 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(f) For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers, shall be attributed with eight warheads. Each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers shall be attributed with a number of warheads equal to the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which it is actually equipped. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall specify the heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs that are in excess of 180 such heavy bombers by number, type, variant, and the air bases at which they are based. The number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs in excess of 180 such heavy bombers is considered to be actually equipped shall be the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of the same type and variant is actually equipped.

(g) Each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be attributed with one warhead. All heavy bombers not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be considered to be heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, with the exception of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers.

5. Each Party shall have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs only of existing types, up to an aggregate number of 1250 at any one time.

(a) Such aggregate number shall consist of the following:

(i) for the United States of America, the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to the type of ICBM designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman III, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, four multiplied by the number of deployed SLBMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RSM-50, which is known to the United States of America as SS-N-18, plus the reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of no more than two other existing types.

(b) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to Minuteman III ICBMs shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Minuteman III ICBMs to which different numbers of warheads are attributed shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(ii) Any such reductions shall be carried out no later than seven years after entry into force of this Treaty.

(iii) The reentry vehicle platform of each Minuteman III ICBM to which a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(c) Reductions in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs of types other than Minuteman III shall be carried out subject to the following:

(i) Such reductions shall not exceed 500 warheads at any one time for each Party.

(ii) After a Party has reduced the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of two existing types, that Party shall not have the right to reduce the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs or SLBMs of any additional type.

(iii) The number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM shall be reduced by no more than four below the number attributed as of the date of signature of this Treaty.

(iv) ICBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed at the same ICBM base.

(v) SLBMs of the same type, but to which different numbers of warheads are attributed, shall not be deployed on submarines based at submarine bases adjacent to the waters of the same ocean.

(vi) If the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type is reduced by more than two, the reentry vehicle platform of each ICBM or SLBM to which such a reduced number of warheads is attributed shall be destroyed and replaced by a new reentry vehicle platform.

(d) A Party shall not have the right to attribute to ICBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any ICBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph. A Party shall not have the right to attribute to SLBMs of a new type a number of warheads greater than the smallest number of warheads attributed to any SLBM to which that Party has attributed a reduced number of warheads pursuant to subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

6. Newly constructed strategic offensive arms shall begin to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty as follows:

(a) an ICBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, when it first leaves a production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier;

(d) for the purpose of counting a deployed ICBM and its associated launcher, a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when excavation for that launcher has been completed and the pouring of concrete for the silo has been completed, or 12 months after the excavation begins, whichever occurs earlier, and a mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM when it arrives at a maintenance facility, except for the non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs provided for in subparagraph 2(b) of Article IV of this Treaty, or when it leaves an ICBM loading facility;

(e) an SLBM, when it first leaves a production facility;

(f) an SLBM launcher, when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(g) for the purpose of counting a deployed SLBM and its associated launcher, an SLBM launcher shall be considered to contain a deployed SLBM when the submarine on which that launcher is installed is first launched;

(h) a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which components of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber are assembled to produce complete airframes; or when its airframe is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building in which existing bomber airframes are converted to heavy bomber or former heavy bomber airframes.

7. ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers that have been converted to launch an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of a different type shall not be capable of launching an ICBM or SLBM of the previous type. Such converted launchers shall be considered to be launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of that different type as follows:

(a) a silo launcher of ICBMs, when an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of a different type is first installed in that launcher, or when the silo door is reinstalled, whichever occurs first;

(b) a mobile launcher of ICBMs, as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission;

(c) an SLBM launcher, when all launchers on the submarine on which that launcher is installed have been converted to launch an

SLBM of that different type and that submarine begins sea trials, that is, when that submarine first operates under its own power away from the harbor or port in which the conversion of launchers was performed.

8. Heavy bombers that have been converted into heavy bombers of a different category or into former heavy bombers shall be considered to be heavy bombers of that different category or former heavy bombers as follows:

(a) a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, when it is first brought out of the shop, plant, or building where it was equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) a heavy bomber of one category converted into a heavy bomber of another category provided for in paragraph 9 of Section VI of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Items Subject to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or into a former heavy bomber, when the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol is completed or, if such an inspection is not conducted, when the 20-day period provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol expires.

9. For the purposes of this Treaty:

(a) A ballistic missile of a type developed and tested solely to intercept and counter objects not located on the surface of the Earth shall not be considered to be a ballistic missile to which the limitations provided for in this Treaty apply.

(b) If a ballistic missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all ballistic missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(c) If a cruise missile has been flight-tested or deployed for weapon delivery, all cruise missiles of that type shall be considered to be weapon-delivery vehicles.

(d) If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has contained an ICBM or SLBM of a particular type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type. If a launcher, other than a soft-site launcher, has been converted into a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of a different type, it shall be considered to be a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs of the type for which it has been converted.

(e) If a heavy bomber is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all heavy bombers of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, except those that are not so equipped and are distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. If long-range nuclear ALCMs have not been flight-tested from any heavy bomber of a particular type, no heavy bomber of that type shall be considered to be equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Within the same type, a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, and a former heavy bomber shall be distinguishable from one another.

(f) Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber on or before December 31, 1988, shall be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM. Any long-range ALCM of a type, any one of which has been initially flight-tested from a heavy bomber after December 31, 1988, shall not be considered to be a long-range nuclear ALCM if it is a long-range non-nuclear ALCM and is distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Long-range non-nuclear ALCMs not so distinguishable shall be considered to be long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(g) Mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs. Such new launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of existing types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed, and from mobile launchers of ICBMs of other new types of ICBMs with their associated missiles installed.

(h) Mobile launchers of ICBMs converted into launchers of ICBMs of another type of ICBM shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM. Such converted launchers, with their associated missiles installed, shall be distinguishable from mobile launchers of ICBMs of the previous type of ICBM with their associated missiles installed. Conversion of mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out in accordance with procedures to be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

10. As of the date of signature of this Treaty:

(a) Existing types of ICBMs and SLBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, Peacekeeper, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, which are known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Minuteman II, Minuteman III, MX, Poseidon, Trident I, and Trident II, respectively;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, RS-12, RS-16, RS-20, RS-18, RS-22, RS-12M, RSM-25, RSM-40, RSM-50, RSM-52, and RSM-54, which are known to the United States of America as SS-11, SS-13, SS-17, SS-18, SS-19, SS-24, SS-25, SS-N-6, SS-N-8, SS-N-18, SS-N-20, and SS-N-23, respectively.

(b) Existing types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the type of missile designated by the United States of America as Peacekeeper, which is known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as MX;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of missiles designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-22 and RS-12M, which are known to

the United States of America as SS-24 and SS-25, respectively.

(c) Former types of ICBMs and SLBMs are the types of missiles designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, Minuteman I and Polaris A-3.

(d) Existing types of heavy bombers are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of bombers designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52, B-1, and B-2;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of bombers designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95 and Tu-160, which are known to the United States of America as Bear and Blackjack, respectively.

(e) Existing types of long-range nuclear ALCMs are:

(i) for the United States of America, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, AGM-86B and AGM-129;

(ii) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the types of long-range nuclear ALCMs designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RKV-500A and RKV-500B, which are known to the United States of America as AS-15 A and AS-15 B, respectively.

ARTICLE IV

1. For ICBMs and SLBMs:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 250. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed ICBMs for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 125.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs at a maintenance facility of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base. Non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility shall be stored separately from non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at that maintenance facility.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed ICBMs and sets of ICBM emplacement equipment at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs to no more than:

(i) two ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and six sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base; or

(ii) four ICBMs of each type specified for that ICBM base and two sets of ICBM emplacement equipment for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges to no more than 35 during the seven-year period after entry into force of that Treaty. Thereafter, the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test ranges shall not exceed 25.

2. For ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than 110. Within this limit, the number of non-deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 18.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs to no more than two such ICBM launchers of each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(c) Each Party shall limit the number of non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs located at training facilities for ICBMs to no more than 40. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain training models of missiles shall not be located outside a training facility.

(d) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of test launchers to no more than 45 during the seven-year period after entry into force of this Treaty. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 25, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20. Thereafter, the aggregate number of test launchers shall not exceed 40. Within this limit, the number of fixed test launchers shall not exceed 20, and the number of mobile test launchers shall not exceed 20.

(e) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of silo training launchers and mobile training launchers to no more than 60. ICBMs shall not be launched from training launchers. Each such launcher may contain only a training model of a missile. Mobile training launchers shall not be capable of launching ICBMs, and shall differ from mobile launchers of ICBMs and other road vehicles or railcars on the basis of differences that are observable by national technical means of verification.

3. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers to no more than 75.

(b) Each Party shall limit the number of test heavy bombers to no more than 20.

4. For ICBMs and SLBMs used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of space launch facilities to no more than five, unless otherwise agreed. Space launch facilities shall not overlap ICBM bases.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at space launch facilities to no more than 20, unless otherwise agreed. Within this limit, the aggregate number of silo launchers of ICBMs and mobile launchers of ICBMs located at space launch facilities shall not exceed ten, unless otherwise agreed.

(c) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at a space launch facility to no more than the

number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers located at that facility.

5. Each Party shall limit the number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at each deployment area or test range to no more than two for each type of ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that is attributed with one warhead and that is specified for that deployment area or test range, and shall limit the number of such transporter-loaders located outside deployment areas and test ranges to no more than six. The aggregate number of transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed 30.

6. Each Party shall limit the number of ballistic missile submarines in dry dock within five kilometers of the boundary of each submarine base to no more than two.

7. For static displays and ground trainers:

(a) Each Party shall limit the number of ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of ICBMs and SLBMs placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, the number of launch canisters placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20, and the number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers placed on static display after signature of this Treaty to no more than 20. Such items placed on static display prior to signature of this Treaty shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

(b) Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers and former heavy bombers converted after signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers to no more than five. Such items converted prior to signature of this Treaty for use as ground trainers shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, but shall not be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty.

8. Each Party shall limit the aggregate number of storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs to no more than 50.

9. With respect to locational and related restrictions on strategic offensive arms:

(a) Each Party shall locate non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; production facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; repair facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; test ranges; or space launch facilities. Prototype ICBMs and prototype SLBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases or at submarine bases. Non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs may also be in transit. Non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs may also be transferred within an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed SLBMs that are located on missile tenders and storage cranes shall be considered to be located at the submarine base at which such missile tenders and storage cranes are specified as based.

(b) Each Party shall locate non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs only at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs, production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM loading facilities, training facilities for ICBMs, conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs, test ranges, or space launch facilities. Mobile launchers of prototype ICBMs, however, shall not be located at maintenance facilities of ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may also be in transit.

(c) Each Party shall locate test launchers only at test ranges, except that rail-mobile test launchers may conduct movements for the purpose of testing outside a test range, provided that:

(i) each such movement is completed no later than 30 days after it begins;

(ii) each such movement begins and ends at the same test range and does not involve movement to any other facility;

(iii) movements of no more than six rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are conducted in each calendar year; and

(iv) no more than one train containing no more than three rail-mobile test launchers is located outside test ranges at any one time.

(d) A deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range may, at the discretion of the testing Party, either continue to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, or be counted as a mobile test launcher pursuant to paragraph 2(d) of this Article. If a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that relocates to a test range continues to be counted toward the maximum aggregate limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty, the period of time during which it continuously remains at a test range shall not exceed 45 days. The number of such deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three, and the number of such deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at a test range at any one time shall not exceed three.

(e) Each Party shall locate silo training launchers only at ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs and training facilities for ICBMs. The number of silo training launchers located at each ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs shall not exceed one for each type of ICBM specified for that ICBM base.

(f) Test heavy bombers shall be based only at heavy bomber flight test centers and at production facilities for heavy bombers. Training heavy bombers shall be based only at training facilities for heavy bombers.

10. Each Party shall locate solid rocket motors for first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs only at locations where production and storage, or testing of such motors occurs and at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such solid rocket motors may also be moved between these locations. Solid rocket motors with nozzles attached for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall only be located at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and at locations where testing of such solid rocket motors occurs. Locations where such solid rocket motors are permitted shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

11. With respect to locational restrictions on facilities:

(a) Each Party shall locate production facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, repair facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, storage facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, ICBM loading facilities for ICBMs of a particular type, and conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs of a particular type no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any deployment area for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested, any production facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any repair facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, any storage facility for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM, and any training facility for ICBMs at which non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs are located. New facilities at which non-deployed ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs of any type of ICBM may be located, and new storage facilities for ICBM emplacement equipment, shall be located no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, except that existing storage facilities for intermediate-range missiles, located less than 100 kilometers from an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or from a test range, may be converted into storage facilities for ICBMs not specified for that ICBM base or that test range.

(b) Each Party shall locate production facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, repair facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM, and storage facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a particular type of ICBM no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs of that type of ICBM and any test range from which ICBMs of that type are flight-tested.

(c) Each Party shall locate test ranges and space launch facilities no less than 100 kilometers from any ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, any ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and any deployment area.

(d) Each Party shall locate training facilities for ICBMs no less than 100 kilometers from any test range.

(e) Each Party shall locate storage areas for heavy bomber nuclear armaments no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments and any training facility for heavy bombers. Each Party shall locate storage areas for long-range nuclear ALCMs no less than 100 kilometers from any air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, any air base for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, and any training facility for heavy bombers.

12. Each Party shall limit the duration of each transit to no more than 30 days.

ARTICLE V

1. Except as prohibited by the provisions of this Treaty, modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms may be carried out.

2. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy ICBMs of a new type, or increase the launch weight or throw-weight of heavy ICBMs of an existing type;

(b) produce, flight-test, or deploy heavy SLBMs;

(c) produce, test, or deploy mobile launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(d) produce, test, or deploy additional silo launchers of heavy ICBMs, except for silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that replace silo launchers of heavy ICBMs that have been eliminated in accordance with Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, provided that the limits provided for in Article II of this Treaty are not exceeded;

(e) convert launchers that are not launchers of heavy ICBMs into launchers of heavy ICBMs;

(f) produce, test, or deploy launchers of heavy SLBMs;

(g) reduce the number of warheads attributed to a heavy ICBM of an existing type.

3. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBMs other than in silo launchers of ICBMs, on road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or on rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy ICBM launchers other than silo launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Each Party undertakes not to deploy on a mobile launcher of ICBMs an ICBM of a type that was not specified as a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Notification Protocol, unless it is an ICBM to which no more than one warhead is attributed and the Parties have agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to permit deployment of such ICBMs on mobile launchers of ICBMs. A new type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs may cease to be considered to be a type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if no ICBM of that type has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to deploy ICBM launchers of a new type of ICBM and not to deploy SLBM launchers of a new type of SLBM if such launchers are

capable of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types. ICBM launchers of existing types of ICBMs and SLBM launchers of existing types of SLBMs shall be incapable, without conversion, of launching ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, of other types.

6. Each Party undertakes not to convert SLBMs into ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or to load SLBMs on, or launch SLBMs from, mobile launchers of ICBMs.

7. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy transporter-loaders other than transporter-loaders for ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed with one warhead.

8. Each Party undertakes not to locate deployed silo launchers of ICBMs outside ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs.

9. Each Party undertakes not to locate soft-site launchers except at test ranges and space launch facilities. All existing soft-site launchers not at test ranges or space launch facilities shall be eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol no later than 60 days after entry into force of this Treaty.

10. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired or former type from other than test launchers specified for such use or launchers at space launch facilities. Except for soft-site launchers, test launchers specified for such use shall not be used to flight-test ICBMs or SLBMs of a type, any one of which is deployed;

(b) produce ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a retired type.

11. Each Party undertakes not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

12. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) produce, flight-test, or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with more than ten reentry vehicles;

(b) flight-test an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it, or, for an ICBM or SLBM of a retired type, with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the largest number of warheads that was attributed to any ICBM or SLBM of that type;

(c) deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it;

(d) increase the number of warheads attributed to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type.

13. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test or deploy an ICBM or SLBM with a number of reentry vehicles greater than the number of warheads attributed to it.

14. Each Party undertakes not to flight-test from space launch facilities ICBMs or SLBMs equipped with reentry vehicles.

15. Each Party undertakes not to use ICBMs or SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space for purposes inconsistent with existing international obligations undertaken by the Parties.

16. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy systems for rapid reload and not to conduct rapid reload.

17. Each Party undertakes not to install SLBM launchers on submarines that were not originally constructed as ballistic missile submarines.

18. Each Party undertakes not to produce, test, or deploy:

(a) ballistic missiles with a range in excess of 600 kilometers, or launchers of such missiles, for installation on waterborne vehicles, including free-floating launchers, other than submarines. This obligation shall not require changes in current ballistic missile storage, transport, loading, or unloading practices;

(b) launchers of ballistic or cruise missiles for emplacement on or for tethering to the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or for emplacement in or for tethering to the subsoil thereof, or mobile launchers of such missiles that move only in contact with the ocean floor, the seabed, or the beds of internal waters and inland waters, or missiles for such launchers. This obligation shall apply to all areas of the ocean floor and the seabed, including the seabed zone referred to in Articles I and II of the Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil Thereof of February 11, 1971;

(c) systems, including missiles, for placing nuclear weapons or any other kinds of weapons of mass destruction into Earth orbit or a fraction of an Earth orbit;

(d) air-to-surface ballistic missiles (ASBMs);

(e) long-range nuclear ALCMs armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

19. Each Party undertakes not to:

(a) flight-test with nuclear armaments an aircraft that is not an airplane, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, equip such an aircraft for nuclear armaments, or deploy such an aircraft with nuclear armaments;

(b) flight-test with nuclear armaments an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber, but that has a range of 8000 kilometers or more, or an integrated planform area in excess of 310 square meters; equip such an airplane for nuclear armaments; or deploy such an airplane with nuclear armaments;

(c) flight-test with long-range nuclear ALCMs an aircraft that is not an airplane, or an airplane that was not initially constructed as a bomber; equip such an aircraft or such an airplane for long-range nuclear ALCMs; or deploy such an aircraft or such an airplane with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

20. The United States of America undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 20 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

21. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics undertakes not to equip existing or future heavy bombers for more than 16 long-range nuclear ALCMs.

22. Each Party undertakes not to locate long-range nuclear ALCMs at air bases for

heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

23. Each Party undertakes not to base heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, or heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments at air bases at which heavy bombers of either of the other two categories are based.

24. Each Party undertakes not to convert:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if such heavy bombers were previously equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(b) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs;

(c) training heavy bombers into heavy bombers of another category;

(d) former heavy bombers into heavy bombers.

25. Each Party undertakes not to have underground facilities accessible to ballistic missile submarines.

26. Each Party undertakes not to locate railcars at the site of a rail garrison that has been eliminated in accordance with Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, unless such railcars have differences, observable by national technical means of verification, in length, width, or height from rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or launch-associated railcars.

27. Each Party undertakes not to engage in any activities associated with strategic offensive arms at eliminated facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of a new facility at the same location has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Strategic offensive arms and support equipment shall not be located at eliminated facilities except during their movement through such facilities and during visits of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers at such facilities. Missile tenders may be located at eliminated facilities only for purposes not associated with strategic offensive arms.

28. Each Party undertakes not to base strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of this Treaty outside its national territory.

29. Each Party undertakes not to use naval vessels that were formerly declared as missile tenders to transport, store, or load SLBMs. Such naval vessels shall not be tied to a ballistic missile submarine for the purpose of supporting such a submarine if such a submarine is located within five kilometers of a submarine base.

30. Each Party undertakes not to remove from production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, solid rocket motors with attached nozzles for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for:

(a) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages;

(b) the removal of such motors as part of assembled ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters; and

(c) the removal of such motors as part of assembled first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, for the purpose of technical characteristics exhibitions.

ARTICLE VI

1. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in restricted areas. A restricted area shall not exceed five square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another restricted area. No more than ten deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be based or located in a restricted area. A restricted area shall not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of more than one type of ICBM.

2. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs within each restricted area so that these structures shall not be capable of containing more road-mobile launchers of ICBMs than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area.

3. Each restricted area shall be located within a deployment area. A deployment area shall not exceed 125,000 square kilometers in size and shall not overlap another deployment area. A deployment area shall contain no more than one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

4. Deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be based only in rail garrisons. Each Party shall have no more than seven rail garrisons. No point on a portion of track located inside a rail garrison shall be more than 20 kilometers from any entrance/exit for that rail garrison. This distance shall be measured along the tracks. A rail garrison shall not overlap another rail garrison.

5. Each rail garrison shall have no more than two rail entrances/exits. Each such entrance/exit shall have no more than two separate sets of tracks passing through it (a total of four rails).

6. Each Party shall limit the number of parking sites in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each rail garrison shall have no more than five parking sites.

7. Each Party shall limit the number of fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs in each rail garrison to no more than the number of trains of standard configuration specified for that rail garrison. Each such structure shall contain no more than one train of standard configuration.

8. Each rail garrison shall contain no more than one maintenance facility.

9. Deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave restricted areas or rail garrisons only for routine movements, relocations, or dispersals. Deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may leave deployment areas only for relocations or operational dispersals.

10. Relocations shall be completed within 25 days. No more than 15 percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside restricted areas at any one time for the purpose of relocation. No more than 20 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles or five such launchers and their associated missiles, whichever is greater, may be outside rail garrisons at any one time for the purpose of relocation.

11. No more than 50 percent of the total number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles may be engaged in routine movements at any one time.

12. All trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles of a particular type shall be of one standard configuration. All such trains shall conform to that standard configuration except those taking part in routine movements, relocations, or dispersals, and except that portion of a train remaining within a rail garrison after the other portion of such a train has departed for the maintenance facility associated with that rail garrison, has been relocated to another facility, or has departed the rail garrison for routine movement. Except for dispersals, notification of variations from standard configuration shall be provided in accordance with paragraphs 13, 14, and 15 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE VII

1. Conversion and elimination of strategic offensive arms, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and facilities shall be carried out pursuant to this Article and in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Conversion and elimination shall be verified by national technical means of verification and by inspection as provided for in Articles IX and XI of this Treaty, in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, and in the Protocol on Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol.

2. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and support equipment shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated, or otherwise cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

3. ICBMs for silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs shall be subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty until they have been eliminated by rendering them inoperable, precluding their use for their original purpose, using procedures at the discretion of the Party possessing the ICBMs or SLBMs.

4. The elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities, except as provided for in Sections VII and VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Fixed launchers of ICBMs and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to elimination shall be eliminated *in situ*. A launch canister remaining at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in the open *in situ*, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

ARTICLE VIII

1. A data base pertaining to the obligations under this Treaty is set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding, in which data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty are listed according to categories of data.

2. In order to ensure the fulfillment of its obligations with respect to this Treaty, each Party shall notify the other Party of changes in data, as provided for in subparagraph 3(a) of this Article, and shall also provide other notifications required by paragraph 3 of this Article, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, and 6 of this Article, the Notification Protocol, and the Inspection Protocol.

3. Each Party shall provide to the other Party, in accordance with the Notification Protocol, and, for subparagraph (i) of this paragraph, in accordance with Section III of the Inspection Protocol:

(a) notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data;

(b) notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty;

(c) notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Protocol on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight Relating to this Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Throw-weight Protocol;

(d) notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in this Treaty or elimination of facilities subject to this Treaty;

(e) notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification;

(f) notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information;

(g) notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds;

(h) notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to this paragraph, including the rescheduling of activities;

(i) notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities; and

(j) notifications concerning operational dispersals.

4. Each Party shall use the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers, which provide for continuous communication between the Parties, to provide and receive notifications in accordance with the Notification Protocol and the Inspection Protocol, unless otherwise provided for in this Treaty, and to acknowledge receipt of such notifications no later than one hour after receipt.

5. If a time is to be specified in a notification provided pursuant to this Article, that time shall be expressed in Greenwich Mean Time. If only a date is to be specified in a notification, that date shall be specified as the 24-hour period that corresponds to the date in local time, expressed in Greenwich Mean Time.

6. Except as otherwise provided in this Article, each Party shall have the right to release to the public all data current as of September 1, 1990, that are listed in the Memorandum of Understanding, as well as the photographs that are appended thereto. Geographic coordinates and site diagrams that are received pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, shall not be released to the public unless otherwise agreed. The Parties shall hold consultations on releasing to the public data and other information provided pursuant to this Article or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in this Treaty. The provisions of this Article shall not affect the rights and obligations of the Parties with respect to the communication of such data and other information to those individuals who, because of their official responsibilities, require such data or other information to carry out activities related to the fulfillment of the obligations provided for in this Treaty.

ARTICLE IX

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty, each Party shall use national technical means of verification at its disposal in a manner consistent with generally recognized principles of international law.

2. Each Party undertakes not to interfere with the national technical means of verification of the other Party operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.

3. Each Party undertakes not to use concealment measures that impede verification, by national technical means of verification, of compliance with the provisions of this Treaty. In this connection, the obligation not to use concealment measures includes the obligation not to use them at test ranges, including measures that result in the concealment of ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, or the association between ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers during testing. The obligation not to use concealment measures shall not apply to cover or concealment practices at ICBM bases and deployment areas, or to the use of environmental shelters for strategic offensive arms.

4. To aid verification, each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall have a unique identifier as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

ARTICLE X

1. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall make on-board technical measurements and shall broadcast all telemetric information obtained from such measurements. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine which technical parameters are to be measured during such flight test, as well as the methods of processing and transmitting telemetric information.

2. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to engage in any activity that denies full access to telemetric information, including:

(a) the use of encryption;

(b) the use of jamming;

(c) broadcasting telemetric information from an ICBM or SLBM using narrow directional beaming; and

(d) encapsulation of telemetric information, including the use of ejectable capsules or recoverable reentry vehicles.

3. During each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test undertakes not to broadcast from a reentry vehicle telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM.

4. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section I of the Protocol on Telemetric Information Relating to the Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Telemetry Protocol, tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is broadcast during the flight test.

5. After each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, in accordance with Section II of the Telemetry Protocol, data associated with the analysis of the telemetric information.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs 1 and 2 of this Article, each Party shall have the right to encapsulate and encrypt on-board technical measurements during no more than a total of eleven flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs each year. Of these eleven flight tests each year, no more than four shall be flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of each type, any missile of which has been flight-tested with a self-contained dispensing mechanism. Such encapsulation shall be carried out in accordance with Section I and paragraph 1 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, and such encryption shall be carried out in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol. Encapsulation and encryption that are carried out on the same flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall count as two flight tests against the quotas specified in this paragraph.

ARTICLE XI

1. For the purpose of ensuring verification of compliance with the provisions of this

Treaty, each Party shall have the right to conduct inspections and continuous monitoring activities and shall conduct exhibitions pursuant to this Article and the Inspection Protocol. Inspections, continuous monitoring activities, and exhibitions shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol and the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections at facilities to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified for such facilities in the notifications and regular exchanges of updated data provided in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on the numbers and types of items specified in the notifications of new facilities provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections to confirm that covert assembly of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or covert assembly of first stages of such ICBMs is not occurring.

6. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to confirm that such ballistic missiles contain no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to them.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-exercise dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles to confirm that the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that are located at the inspected ICBM base and those that have not returned to it after completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for that ICBM base.

8. Each Party shall conduct or shall have the right to conduct conversion or elimination inspections to confirm the conversion or elimination of strategic offensive arms.

9. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections to confirm that the elimination of facilities has been completed.

10. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections to confirm that facilities, notification of the elimination of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, are not being used for purposes inconsistent with this Treaty.

11. Each Party shall conduct technical characteristics exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type, and each variant thereof, and of a mobile launcher of ICBMs and each version of such launcher for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that technical characteristics correspond to the data specified for these items.

12. Each Party shall conduct distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of:

(a) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such heavy bombers correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; to demonstrate the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and each variant is actually equipped; and to demonstrate that this number does not exceed the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of this Treaty, as applicable;

(b) for each type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers. If, for such a type of heavy bomber, there are no heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a test heavy bomber from which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested shall be exhibited. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that, for each exhibited type of heavy bomber, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, each variant of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, each variant of training heavy bombers, and a former heavy bomber are distinguishable from one another and from each variant of heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and

(c) long-range nuclear ALCMs. The purpose of such exhibitions shall be to permit the inspecting Party to confirm that the technical characteristics of each type and each variant of such long-range ALCMs correspond to the data specified for these items in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding. The further purpose of such exhibitions shall be to demonstrate differences, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, or 15 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

13. Each Party shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, of all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all training heavy bombers, and all former heavy bombers specified in the initial exchange of data provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the

Notification Protocol. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party that such airplanes satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. After a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, the Party conducting the flight test shall conduct baseline exhibitions, and the other Party shall have the right during such exhibitions to conduct inspections, of 30 percent of the heavy bombers of such type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs at each air base specified for such heavy bombers. The purpose of these exhibitions shall be to demonstrate to the inspecting Party the presence of specified features that make each exhibited heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

14. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the number of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs produced.

ARTICLE XII

1. To enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification, each Party shall, if the other Party makes a request in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, carry out the following cooperative measures:

(a) a display in the open of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas specified by the requesting Party. The number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs based at the restricted areas specified in each such request shall not exceed ten percent of the total number of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of the requested Party, and such launchers shall be contained within one ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. For each specified restricted area, the roofs of fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be open for the duration of a display. The road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the restricted area shall be displayed either located next to or moved halfway out of such fixed structures;

(b) a display in the open of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at parking sites specified by the requesting Party. Such launchers shall be displayed by removing the entire train from its fixed structure and locating the train within the rail garrison. The number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs subject to display pursuant to each such request shall include all such launchers located at no more than eight parking sites, provided that no more than two parking sites may be requested within any one rail garrison in any one request. Requests concerning specific parking sites shall include the designation for each parking site as provided for in Annex A to the Memorandum of Understanding; and

(c) a display in the open of all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers located within one air base specified by the requesting Party, except those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be displayed by removing the entire airplane from its fixed structure, if any, and locating the airplane within the air base. Those heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the air base specified by the requesting Party that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations shall be specified by the requested Party in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section V of the Notification Protocol. Such a notification shall be provided no later than 12 hours after the request for display has been made.

2. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers subject to each request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be displayed in open view without using concealment measures. Each Party shall have the right to make seven such requests each year, but shall not request a display at any particular ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, any particular parking site, or any particular air base more than two times each year. A Party shall have the right to request, in any single request, only a display of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a display of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a display of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. A display shall begin no later than 12 hours after the request is made and shall continue until 18 hours have elapsed from the time that the request was made. If the requested Party cannot conduct a display due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol, and the display shall be cancelled. In such a case, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. A request for cooperative measures shall not be made for a facility that has been designated for inspection until such an inspection has been completed and the inspectors have departed the facility. A facility for which cooperative measures have been requested shall not be designated for inspection until the cooperative measures have been completed or until notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section V of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XIII

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles from restricted areas or rail garrisons. Such an exercise dispersal may involve either road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, or both road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Exercise dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(b) An exercise dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(c) Those ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in an exercise dispersal.

(d) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a routine movement from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal.

(e) When an exercise dispersal begins, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles engaged in a relocation from a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that is involved in such a dispersal shall continue to be considered to be engaged in a relocation. Notification of the completion of the relocation shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, unless notification of the completion of the relocation was provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(f) During an exercise dispersal, all deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that depart a restricted area or rail garrison of an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal shall be considered to be part of the dispersal, except for such launchers and missiles that relocate to a facility outside their associated ICBM base during such a dispersal.

(g) An exercise dispersal shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.

(h) Exercise dispersals shall not be conducted:

(i) more than two times in any period of two calendar years;

(ii) during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections;

(iii) from a new ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs until a new facility inspection has been conducted or until the period of time provided for such an inspection has expired; or

(iv) from an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs that has been designated for a data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection, until completion of such an inspection.

(i) If a notification of an exercise dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the other Party shall not have the right to designate for data update inspection or reentry vehicle inspection an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in such a dispersal, or to request cooperative measures for such an ICBM base, until the completion of such a dispersal.

(j) When an exercise dispersal is completed, deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles involved in such a dispersal shall be located at their restricted areas or rail garrisons, except for those otherwise accounted for in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

2. A major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Reciprocal Advance Notification of Major Strategic Exercises of September 23, 1989, shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) Such exercise shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(b) Such exercise shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(c) The air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section II of the Notification Protocol shall be considered to be involved in such exercise.

(d) Such exercise shall begin no more than one time in any calendar year, and shall be completed no later than 30 days after it begins.

(e) Such exercise shall not be conducted during the entire period of time provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) During such exercise by a Party, the other Party shall not have the right to conduct inspections of the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers involved in the exercise. The right to conduct inspections of such air bases shall resume three days after notification of the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers has been provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section II of the Notification Protocol.

(g) Within the 30-day period following the receipt of the notification of the completion of such exercise, the receiving Party may make a request for cooperative measures to be carried out in accordance with subparagraph 1(c) of Article XII of this Treaty at one of the air bases involved in the exercise. Such a request shall not be counted toward the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIV

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct operational dispersals of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, and heavy bombers. There shall be no limit on the number and duration of operational dispersals, and there shall be no limit on the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, ballistic missile submarines, or heavy bombers involved in such dispersals. When an operational dispersal begins, all strategic offensive arms of a Party shall be considered to be part of the dispersal. Operational dispersals shall be conducted as provided for below:

(a) An operational dispersal shall be considered to have begun as of the date and time specified in the notification

provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

(b) An operational dispersal shall be considered to be completed as of the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

2. During an operational dispersal each Party shall have the right to:

(a) suspend notifications that it would otherwise provide in accordance with the Notification Protocol except for notification of flight tests provided under the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988, provided that, if any conversion or elimination processes are not suspended pursuant to subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, the relevant notifications shall be provided in accordance with Section IV of the Notification Protocol;

(b) suspend the right of the other Party to conduct inspections;

(c) suspend the right of the other Party to request cooperative measures; and

(d) suspend conversion and elimination processes for its strategic offensive arms. In such case, the number of converted and eliminated items shall correspond to the number that has actually been converted and eliminated as of the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section X of the Notification Protocol.

3. Notifications suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume no later than three days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. The right to conduct inspections and to request cooperative measures suspended pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Article shall resume four days after notification of the completion of the operational dispersal has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section X of the Notification Protocol. Inspections or cooperative measures being conducted at the time a Party provides notification that it suspends inspections or cooperative measures during an operational dispersal shall not count toward the appropriate annual quotas provided for by this Treaty.

4. When an operational dispersal is completed:

(a) All deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their deployment areas or shall be engaged in relocations.

(b) All deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall be located within their rail garrisons or shall be engaged in routine movements or relocations.

(c) All heavy bombers shall be located within national territory and shall have resumed normal operations. If it is necessary for heavy bombers to be located outside national territory for purposes not inconsistent with this Treaty, the Parties will immediately engage in diplomatic consultations so that appropriate assurances can be provided.

5. Within the 30 day period after the completion of an operational dispersal, the Party not conducting the operational dispersal shall have the right to make no more than two requests for cooperative measures, subject to the provisions of Article XII of this Treaty, for ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs or air bases. Such requests shall not count toward the quota of requests provided for in paragraph 2 of Article XII of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XV

To promote the objectives and implementation of the provisions of this Treaty, the Parties hereby establish the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties agree that, if either Party so requests, they shall meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to:

(a) resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations assumed;

(b) agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty; and

(c) resolve questions related to the application of relevant provisions of this Treaty to a new kind of strategic offensive arm, after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

ARTICLE XVI

To ensure the viability and effectiveness of this Treaty, each Party shall not assume any international obligations or undertakings that would conflict with its provisions. The Parties shall hold consultations in accordance with Article XV of this Treaty in order to resolve any ambiguities that may arise in this regard. The Parties agree that this provision does not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of this Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

ARTICLE XVII

1. This Treaty, including its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding, all of which form integral parts thereof, shall be subject to ratification in accordance with the constitutional procedures of each Party. This Treaty shall enter into force on the date of the exchange of instruments of ratification.

2. This Treaty shall remain in force for 15 years unless superseded earlier by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. No later than one year before the expiration of the 15-year period, the Parties shall meet to consider whether this Treaty will be extended. If the Parties so decide, this Treaty will be extended for a period of five years unless it is superseded before the expiration of that period by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms. This Treaty shall be extended for successive five-year periods, if the Parties so decide, in accordance with the procedures governing the initial extension, and it shall remain in force for each agreed five-year period of extension unless it is superseded by a subsequent agreement on the reduction and limitation of strategic offensive arms.

3. Each Party shall, in exercising its national sovereignty, have the right to withdraw from this Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty have jeopardized its supreme interests. It shall give notice of its decision to the other Party six months prior to withdrawal from this Treaty. Such notice shall include a statement of the extraordinary events the notifying Party regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests.

ARTICLE XVIII

Each Party may propose amendments to this Treaty. Agreed amendments shall enter into force in accordance with the procedures governing entry into force of this Treaty.

ARTICLE XIX

This Treaty shall be registered pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of the United Nations.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

AGREED STATEMENTS ANNEX

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties have agreed as follows:

First Agreed Statement. The Parties agree, in the interest of the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty, not to transfer strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty to third States. The Parties further agree that this Agreed Statement and the provisions of Article XVI of the Treaty do not apply to any patterns of cooperation, including obligations, in the area of strategic offensive arms, existing at the time of signature of the Treaty, between a Party and a third State.

Second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event of the emergence in the future of a new kind of arm that one Party considers could be a new kind of strategic offensive arm, that Party shall have the right to raise the question of such an arm for consideration by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in accordance with subparagraph (e) of Article XV of the Treaty.

Third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 13 of Article V and subparagraph 4(d) of Article III of the Treaty, ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-10, which is known to the United States of America as SS-11, may be deployed with no more than three reentry vehicles, provided that such reentry vehicles are not independently targetable.

Fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in connection with the definition of the term "air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)" provided for in the Annex to the Treaty on Terms and Their Definitions, hereinafter referred to as the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the term is not intended to describe any missile that sustains flight, or any missile the payload of which sustains flight, through the use of aerodynamic lift over any portion of its flight path.

Fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the replacement of silo launchers of heavy ICBMs under the provisions of subparagraph 2(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall only take place in the case of silo launchers destroyed by accident or in the case of other exceptional circumstances that require the relocation of existing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs. If such relocation is required, the Party planning to construct the new silo launcher shall provide the other Party with the reasons and plans for such relocation in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to carrying out such relocation.

Sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that three airplanes of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as 3M, which is known to the United States of America as Bison, have been converted to transport oversized cargo, are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, and are not reconnaissance airplanes, tanker airplanes, or jamming airplanes, and thus do not meet the definition of the term "former heavy bomber" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty. These airplanes are not included within the totals listed in Section IV of, or Annex C to, the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties further agree that all other airplanes of the Bison type will be considered to be former heavy bombers.

Seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Article XIV of the Treaty authorizing operational dispersals, such dispersals shall be conducted only for national security purposes in time of crisis when a Party considers it necessary to act to ensure the survivability of its strategic forces. The Parties further agree that, while there are no limits on the number and frequency of such operational dispersals, in practice they will occur rarely.

Eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) With respect to paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty, the strategic offensive arms of each Party shall be based only within its national territory at permanent bases specified in the Treaty that are equipped to support the long-term operation of strategic offensive arms. The obligations of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not affect the Parties' rights under generally recognized principles and rules of international law relating to the passage of submarines or flights of aircraft, or relating to visits of submarines to ports of third States.

(b) With respect to heavy bombers, the provisions of paragraph 28 of Article V of the Treaty shall not preclude the temporary stationing of heavy bombers outside the territory of a Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty. If a Party stations heavy bombers outside its national territory for a period in excess of 30 days at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party through diplomatic channels before the end of the 30-day period, except that, if a Party has stationed more than 30 heavy bombers outside its national territory at any one time, it shall so inform the other Party within 48 hours.

(c) The Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

Ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 1(b)(a) of Article V of the Treaty, lighter-than-air aircraft such as balloons, drifting aerostats, and dirigibles shall not be flight-tested with, equipped for, or deployed with nuclear armaments.

Tenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that

(a) With respect to B-52 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America will provide no technical data or photographs of heavy bombers of the variants designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F, and will conduct no exhibitions of heavy bombers of such variants pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty or pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty, of July 31, 1991. The Parties further agree that all such heavy bombers shall be located only at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, which is a specified conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and that each such heavy bomber shall not depart Davis-Monthan Air Force Base before it has been eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(b) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol, the conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base shall be subject to a baseline data inspection. If at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, this facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, which shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 2 of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

(c) The procedures for baseline data inspections and data update inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers at the conversion or elimination facility at Davis-Monthan Air Force Base shall be as modified below:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right only to count B-52C, B-52D, B-52E, and B-52F heavy bombers, and to view them *in situ*, as they are found.

(ii) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect other heavy bombers and former heavy bombers in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section II of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol, but only to the extent that the condition of such airplanes allows such procedures to be carried out. A member of the in-country escort shall provide the information on the condition of such airplanes.

(d) If the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future has a conversion or elimination facility where at any time the total number of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have been located at such facility for more than seven days, and upon which the elimination process has not been initiated, exceeds five, such facility shall also be subject to data update inspections, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (c)(ii) of this Agreed Statement.

Eleventh Agreed Statement. The Parties understand that the Conversion or Elimination Protocol does not provide procedures for the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine or for the elimination of heavy bombers that have no tail sections. The Parties agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers shall not be eliminated until the appropriate procedures have been agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties further agree that such ICBMs and such heavy bombers may be otherwise removed from accountability in accordance with the applicable procedures provided for in Section VII or VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Twelfth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the definition of the term "former heavy bomber" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty, the 37 airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D, and all airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-142, which are known to the United States of America as Bear F or Bear J, depending on how a particular airplane is equipped, shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers. The Parties further agree that all airplanes formerly known to the United States of America as Bear E and now known as Bear T, which are designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95U, shall be considered to be training heavy bombers.

Thirteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that engineering models of silos may be located at the repair facility for ICBMs at Hill Air Force Base, Utah, United States of America, the number of which shall not exceed four. Such engineering models of silos shall be subject to the limitations on silo training launchers provided for in subparagraph 2(e) of Article IV of the Treaty, and they shall be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding as a separate category. Such engineering models of silos shall not be subject to inspection. The elimination of such engineering models of silos shall be carried out in accordance with procedures for silo training launchers in Section II of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fourteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 11(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, the existing storage facilities for ICBMs located at Khrizolitovyy and Surovatikha, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall be located no less than 20 kilometers from any deployment area, provided that the distance between such facilities and any restricted area or maintenance facility of an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs is no less than 60 kilometers. Such storage facilities shall not be re-established after they have been eliminated in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

Fifteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the existing training facility for ICBMs at Plesetsk, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, shall not be subject to the locational restriction on training facilities for ICBMs, provided for in

subparagraph 11(d) of Article IV of the Treaty, with respect to any existing test range. No more than 12 non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located at this training facility for ICBMs. After its elimination in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, this training facility for ICBMs shall not be re-established.

Sixteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the provisions of subparagraph 9(d) of Article III of the Treaty, each ICBM launcher or SLBM launcher existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty is capable of launching only an ICBM or SLBM of the type specified for that launcher in the Memorandum of Understanding.

Seventeenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the expression "not equipped" is understood to mean, for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, that such an airplane is not equipped for a particular kind of armament, which shall be confirmed by the necessary distinguishing features. Each Party shall determine the distinguishing features of its heavy bombers and former heavy bombers. If the other Party considers such distinguishing features to be insufficient, it may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Eighteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, as of the date of signature of the Treaty, there are no heavy bombers permanently based at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, and that it therefore has not been specified as an air base for heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties further agree that, if in the future the United States of America permanently bases heavy bombers at Andersen Air Force Base, Guam, all applicable provisions of the Treaty will apply to that facility, including those that provide for listing the facility in Annex C to the Memorandum of Understanding, for new facility inspections and data update inspections, and for notifications concerning the visits of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers.

Nineteenth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in the event either Party wishes to develop mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers, the question could be addressed in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such systems would be allowed, provided that:

(a) Mobile space launchers and the space launch boosters associated with such launchers have differences from ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers and from ICBMs and SLBMs, respectively, observable by national technical means of verification;

(b) Mobile space launchers do not contain an ICBM or SLBM;

(c) The numbers of mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers that are produced and stored do not exceed space launch requirements; and

(d) Mobile space launchers and space launch boosters associated with such launchers are not located at an ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Additional provisions relevant to such systems could also be agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Twentieth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 4 of Article VII of the Treaty:

(a) The United States of America shall have the right to refurbish and reuse, as launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, those launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that remain at a test range or ICBM base after the flight test of such ICBMs.

(b) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the same right, if it decides to change its existing practices for the elimination of such launch canisters.

(c) Notification of the movement of such launch canisters from the place where the flight test occurred to a refurbishment location shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers no later than five days after the completion of the movement.

Twenty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, in providing notifications in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for "each change in data for categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding," only one notification shall be required for each event that results in changed data, notwithstanding the number of categories of data for which data must be changed based on the occurrence of such event.

Twenty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) Issues relating to the concurrent continuous monitoring activities in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty and continuous monitoring in accordance with paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, hereinafter referred to as the INF Treaty, shall be agreed upon, prior to entry into force of the Treaty, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and within the framework of the Special Verification Commission. An agreement on these issues shall not affect substantive rights or obligations of the Parties under either Treaty.

(b) For the purpose of reaching the agreement provided for in subparagraph (a) of this Agreed Statement, the Parties shall proceed as follows:

(i) During the period when continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant, Udmurt Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, is conducted concurrently under the Treaty and under the INF Treaty, the Parties shall ensure the application of continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and of continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty. The engineering site

survey provided for in the Treaty will not be conducted at the Votkinsk facility.

(ii) In cases where continuous monitoring procedures under the Treaty and continuous monitoring procedures under the INF Treaty are identical, those procedures may be performed only once, with the results recorded, as appropriate, in the continuous monitoring report and in the inspection report.

(iii) The Parties shall agree on a list of the specific provisions of the INF Treaty and of the Memorandum of Agreement Regarding the Implementation of the Verification Provisions of the INF Treaty, hereinafter referred to as the Memorandum of Agreement, on issues relating to pre-inspection requirements, notifications, activities beginning upon arrival at the point of entry, and general provisions related to continuous monitoring that shall be suspended upon entry into force of the Treaty at facilities inspected by means of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty. Agreement on such a list shall not be considered to be an amendment to the INF Treaty proper and shall not have the effect of amending the INF Treaty. The provisions of the INF Treaty to be suspended may be suspended by making amendments to the Memorandum of Agreement or by being treated as "measures to improve the viability and effectiveness" of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty. The Parties shall also agree upon a list of the specific provisions of the Treaty that, in connection with the suspension of the above-mentioned provisions of the Protocol Regarding Inspections Relating to the INF Treaty and the Memorandum of Agreement, shall apply from the date of entry into force of the Treaty at such facilities.

(iv) After continuous monitoring activities commence in accordance with paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, continuous monitoring activities under the Treaty and continuous monitoring activities under the INF Treaty at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant shall be conducted by a team of no more than 30 monitors. Issues related to increasing the quota of monitors for maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and replacement of monitors shall be governed by the provisions of the Inspection Protocol to the Treaty.

(v) Equipment used for the purposes of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk Machine Building Plant pursuant to the INF Treaty may be used for continuous monitoring pursuant to the Treaty, including after termination of continuous monitoring pursuant to the INF Treaty, if the purpose of such equipment coincides with the purpose of the equipment under the Treaty. Equipment used exclusively for the purpose of continuous monitoring at the Votkinsk facility and the use of which is not provided for under the Treaty shall be used only pursuant to the INF Treaty. Continuous monitoring equipment for use exclusively under the Treaty may also be sent to, and installed at, the Votkinsk facility in accordance with the Treaty.

(vi) Specific issues that may arise in connection with the concurrent application of continuous monitoring procedures under both Treaties shall be considered within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission and the framework of the Special Verification Commission.

(c) Concurrent inspections under both Treaties may not be conducted at a facility subject to the Treaty and the INF Treaty. An inspection under one of the Treaties at such a facility shall be conducted no earlier than six days after an inspection has been conducted under the other Treaty at that facility.

Twenty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of the prohibition of paragraph 25 of Article V of the Treaty and this Agreed Statement, the term "accessible" means able to be entered by waterborne craft on the surface of the water, while submerged, or while partially submerged. The Parties further agree that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not make the underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet (Kola Peninsula), the Yagel'naya Submarine Base (Kola Peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base (Primorskiy Kray), all of which are used for purposes unrelated to the Treaty, accessible by any waterborne craft of any displacement whatsoever.

Twenty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for the purposes of subparagraph 4(b) of Article III of the Treaty, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have the essential features that are characteristic of any existing design of a front section with multiple reentry vehicles that has been deployed or tested on any ICBM or SLBM as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. In particular, a front section of a fundamentally new design would not have a self-contained dispensing mechanism that dispenses reentry vehicles to different aim points sequentially. In addition, an ICBM or SLBM, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, would not be considered to have a front section of a fundamentally new design. The Parties further agree that the fundamentally new nature of such a design would be verifiable by national technical means of verification.

Twenty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the definition of the term "variant," an ICBM or SLBM of a type, a dimension of which differs from that of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type by more than three percent, but by less than the appropriate new type criteria, shall be considered to be a variant. The Parties further agree that a Party may declare an ICBM or SLBM to be a variant if its dimensions differ by less than three percent from those of another ICBM or SLBM of the same type.

Twenty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraphs 4(b) and 11(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a portion of the territory of an eliminated ICBM base may be declared to be a space launch facility after the following conditions are met:

(a) All strategic offensive arms specified for that ICBM base and all support equipment have been removed and all silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except those located in the portion of the territory of the ICBM base that the Party intends to subsequently declare as a space launch

facility, are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The provisions of that Protocol shall not apply to silo launchers of ICBMs or fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs located in that portion of the territory of the base declared as a space launch facility.

(b) All activity associated with strategic offensive arms shall cease and shall not subsequently resume at the ICBM base.

(c) A close-out inspection shall be conducted at the ICBM base to confirm that the elimination of the base has been completed.

(d) Such eliminated ICBM bases shall not be reestablished.

(e) Nothing in this Agreed Statement shall affect the obligation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to eliminate, no later than seven years after entry into force of the Treaty, 154 silo launchers of ICBMs of the type designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as RS-20, which is known to the United States of America as SS-18. In this regard, no SS-18 silo launchers of ICBMs among the 154 launchers to be eliminated shall be retained for use at a space launch facility.

The Parties further agree that, during a formerly declared facility inspection of the ICBM base, a portion of the territory of which has been declared as a space launch facility, the space launch facility shall not be subject to inspection.

Twenty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the six existing soft-site launchers located at Cape Canaveral, Florida, United States of America, shall be exempt from the provisions of paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until such time that they contain or launch an ICBM or SLBM after the date of signature of the Treaty.

Twenty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile without a launch canister, may be located separate from other stages of such a missile only at a production facility for such ICBMs or SLBMs; a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs or SLBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and for SLBMs, another location where such an ICBM or SLBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs or SLBMs. If, however, such a first stage is located, separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs or SLBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

The Parties further agree that an assembled missile or first stage of an ICBM that is maintained, stored, and transported as an assembled missile in its launch canister may be located outside its launch canister only at a production facility for such ICBMs; for first stages of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, locations specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where solid rocket motors of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs may be tested with or without nozzles attached; for other such ICBMs not subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, a location, specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding, where static testing of first stages occurs; a conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, or, for ICBMs other than ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, another location where such an ICBM is eliminated; or an exhibition site. Such a first stage may be moved between these locations only in connection with an exhibition conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty as well as in connection with the elimination of such ICBMs. If, however, such a missile is located outside its launch canister, or such a first stage is located separate from other stages of such a missile, at a location other than these locations, all ICBMs of that type shall thereafter be considered, for the purposes of the Treaty, to be ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages, unless otherwise agreed.

Twenty-ninth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the STARS booster shall not be considered to be the Polaris A-3 SLBM since that booster has a different number of stages. The STARS booster shall be considered to be a booster used only for research and development purposes, subject to the provisions of paragraph 12 of Article VII of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987.

Thirtieth Agreed Statement. The Parties do not exclude the possibility that the bans on ballistic missiles on waterborne vehicles other than submarines and on launchers of such missiles contained in subparagraph 18(a) of Article V of the Treaty and the ban on air-to-surface ballistic missiles contained in subparagraph 18(d) of Article V of the Treaty shall not apply to launches of ICBMs and SLBMs from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from airplanes, other than heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Should the Parties reach agreement concerning the possibility of using ICBMs and SLBMs for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space from waterborne vehicles other than submarines or from such airplanes, provisions concerning procedures for such launches shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. By this Agreed Statement, the Parties do not waive any of their obligations or rights related to the non-proliferation of missiles and missile technology, stipulated in the Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990.

Thirty-first Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that the provisions of Article X of the Treaty and of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to objects launched by ICBMs or SLBMs used to deliver objects into the upper atmosphere or space, after such objects either are in orbit or have achieved escape velocity.

Thirty-second Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, notwithstanding the provisions of subparagraph 3(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol and paragraph 1 of Section III and paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the Parties shall agree, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, on the procedures for establishing the throw-weight accountability of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type in the event that a Party deploys an ICBM or SLBM of that type prior to its eighth flight test.

Thirty-third Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, for no more than two ballistic missile submarines of the United States of America that are equipped with Poseidon SLBMs and that are modified for use as special purpose submarines, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Such submarines shall be permanently based only at ports that are not submarine bases specified in the Memorandum of Understanding. Such ports shall be specified in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding and shall not be subject to inspection.

(b) In order to demonstrate that the launch tubes on such a submarine do not contain SLBMs, such tubes shall be opened, upon request of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, when such a submarine is located at the port at which it is permanently based, in accordance with the following procedures:

(i) After receipt of a request for the display of special purpose submarines in such a port, the special purpose submarines shall not leave port until the display is completed. If both special purpose submarines are located in the same home port when a request is made, both submarines shall be displayed, and the request shall count as one request for each such submarine.

(ii) Within 24 hours of the receipt of such a request, the decks of the special purpose submarine shall be cleared and all tubes shall be opened for a period of no less than 12 hours.

(c) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall have the right to make two requests per submarine each year pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this Agreed Statement. If the requested Party is unable to conduct such a display because of the absence of such submarine from the port, it shall provide notification to the requesting Party through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers. In such an event, the number of requests to which the requesting Party is entitled shall not be decreased.

(d) Until they are eliminated in accordance with Section IV of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the 16 launchers that are on each special purpose submarine shall continue to count as 16 launchers for such a submarine against the maximum aggregate limit of 1,600 provided for in Article II of the Treaty and to count as 160 against the 6,000 and 4,900 limits also provided therein. When all other launchers of Poseidon SLBMs have been converted or eliminated, except for test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities, the Poseidon SLBM shall be considered to be a retired type of SLBM.

Thirty-fourth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with respect to the criteria contained in subparagraph (f) of the definition of the term "new type" provided for in the Definitions Annex to the Treaty:

(a) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall exceed the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or of a previously declared new type by 21 percent or more. The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be a change in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of the same existing type or the same previously declared new type by five percent or more.

(b) The change in the length of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type in relation to an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be determined in accordance with paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

(c) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type or previously declared new type shall be the accountable throw-weight of this existing type or previously declared new type, specified in the Memorandum of Understanding.

(d) The throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 9,500 kilometers for an SLBM. If an ICBM or SLBM of a type declared to be a new type is not capable of being flight-tested to such a range, it shall be flight-tested to a range of no less than 10,000 kilometers for an ICBM, or a range of no less than 8,500 kilometers for an SLBM.

(e) Should an ICBM of any type be declared to be a new type in relation to the SS-25 ICBM on the basis of an increase of 21 percent or more in throw-weight in conjunction with a change of five percent or more in the length of the first stage, the throw-weight of an ICBM of such a type declared to be a new type shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM of that type to a range of no less than 11,000 kilometers.

Thirty-fifth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, if a Party provides, during any one year, telemetry data tapes for a greater number of flight tests, the other Party shall reimburse the tape-associated costs resulting from the difference in the number of flight tests. The costs associated with the purchase of the tapes and the copying of telemetric information onto the tapes, as well as the procedure for the reimbursement, shall be subject to agreement in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

Thirty-sixth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that, with regard to Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota; and Whiteman Air Force Base, Missouri, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics may conduct no more than one inspection at each of these Air Force Bases of the United States of America at any one time.

Thirty-seventh Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that:

(a) The limitations provided for in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed.

(b) The limitations provided for in subparagraphs 1(d) and 4(c) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to:

(i) ICBMs of retired types other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(ii) SLBMs of retired types; and

(iii) ICBMs or SLBMs of former types.

(c) The locational restrictions provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of Article IV of the Treaty shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(d) ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not be located at ICBM bases or submarine bases.

(e) ICBMs and SLBMs of former and retired types shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding except for the categories of data contained in Annex F for such retired types.

(f) Procedures contained in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol for the elimination or removal from accountability of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall not apply to ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which one warhead was attributed.

(g) The provisions of Section IV of the Notification Protocol shall not apply to ICBMs or SLBMs of former or retired types except for ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs to each of which more than one warhead was attributed.

(h) Notifications concerning data with respect to launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of a former or retired type shall be provided in accordance with Sections I, II, and IV of the Notification Protocol and such launchers shall be subject to the limitations contained in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(b) of Article IV of the Treaty, except as provided for in subparagraph (i) of this Agreed Statement.

(i) The one launcher located at the Vandenberg Air Force Base, California test range, that is equipped for flight testing only the Minuteman I ICBM, shall not be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty. If this launcher is later converted to launch other ICBMs or SLBMs, it will be subject to the provisions provided for in Articles IV and VIII of the Treaty.

Thirty-eighth Agreed Statement. The Parties agree that there are no agreed provisions for establishing reference cylinders as provided for in the provisions in paragraph 23 of Section VI of the Inspection Protocol for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing a first stage equipped with a liquid-propellant main rocket engine. The Parties agree that such procedures will be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to the deployment of such ICBMs.

DEFINITIONS ANNEX

This Annex contains definitions of terms that are used in the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding.

For the purposes of the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum of Understanding:

1. (1) The term **"air base"** means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, a heavy bomber flight test center, or a training facility for heavy bombers, at which heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.

2. (35) The term **"aircraft"** means any manned machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from interaction with the air other than the interaction of the air with the Earth's surface.

3. (118) The term **"aircrew member"** means an individual who performs duties related to the operation of an airplane and who is included on the inspecting Party's list of aircrew members in accordance with the provisions of Section II of the Inspection Protocol.

4. (34) The term **"air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)"** means an air-to-surface cruise missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested from an aircraft or deployed on a bomber after December 31, 1986.

5. (95) The term **"airplane"** means a power-driven, heavier-than-air aircraft that derives its lift in flight chiefly from aerodynamic reactions on surfaces that remain fixed under given conditions of flight.

6. (6) The term **"air-to-surface ballistic missile (ASBM)"** means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers that is installed in an aircraft or on its external mountings for the purpose of being launched from this aircraft.

7. (5) The term **"ballistic missile"** means a missile that is a weapon-delivery vehicle that has a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path.

8. (10) The term **"bomber"** means an airplane of a type, any one of which was initially constructed or later converted to be equipped for bombs or air-to-surface missiles.

9. (30) The term **"category"** means, for heavy bombers, one of the following classifications based on the kind of armament for which they are equipped or on their purpose: heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, test heavy bomber, or training heavy bomber.

10. (53) The term **"continuous monitoring"** means carrying out procedures in accordance with the Inspection Protocol that involve inspection of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles leaving a monitored facility.

11. (21) The term **"continuous monitoring activities"** means activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty, which, in accordance with the Inspection Protocol, include conducting an engineering site survey; establishing, operating, and maintaining a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and conducting continuous monitoring.

12. (46) The term **"conversion or elimination facility"** means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs that remain after static testing;

(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility for the elimination of mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) for SLBM launchers, a specified facility for the conversion or elimination of SLBM launchers;

(d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility for the conversion of heavy bombers, or the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

13. (33) The term **"cruise missile"** means a missile that is an unmanned, self-propelled weapon-delivery vehicle that sustains flight through the use of aerodynamic lift over most of its flight path.

14. (91) The term **"deployed heavy bomber"** means any heavy bomber other than a test heavy bomber, a training heavy bomber, or a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments.

15. (86) The term **"deployed ICBM"** means an ICBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs.

16. (87) The term **"deployed ICBM and its associated launcher"** means a deployed ICBM and the deployed launcher of ICBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed ICBM.

17. (90) The term **"deployed launcher of ICBMs"** means:

(a) any silo launcher of ICBMs other than a silo test launcher, a silo training launcher, or a silo launcher located at a space launch facility; or

(b) any deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.

18. (89) The term **"deployed launcher of SLBMs"** means any SLBM launcher installed on a submarine that has been launched, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

19. (88) The term **"deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs"** means any mobile launcher of ICBMs, other than a mobile test launcher or a mobile launcher of

( ) The number of the term in the Russian text.

ICBMs at a space launch facility, that contains, or is considered to contain, an ICBM.

20. (64) The term **"deployed SLBM"** means an SLBM that is contained, or is considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

21. (85) The term **"deployed SLBM and its associated launcher"** means a deployed SLBM and the deployed launcher of SLBMs that contains, or is considered to contain, the deployed SLBM.

22. (94) The term **"deployment area"** means an area, limited in size, within which routine movements and exercise dispersals of deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are conducted.

23. (68) The term "distinguishable" means different on the basis of the totality of functional and external differences that are observable by national technical means of verification, or, when such observations may be inconclusive in the opinion of the inspecting Party, that are visible during inspection.

24. (13) The term **"each year"** means during a period of 12 months commencing on the date of entry into force of the Treaty or on an anniversary of that date.

25. (29) The term **"encapsulation"** means, for telemetric information, recording and not broadcasting such information during the flight test of a missile, and recovering it subsequently.

26. (122) The term **"encryption"** means, for telemetric information, the reversible transformation of such information that gives it a random character to prevent unauthorized access to such information.

27. (60) The term **"facility"** means an ICBM base, submarine base, air base, rail garrison, maintenance facility, restricted area, parking site, silo launcher group, ICBM loading facility, SLBM loading facility, production facility, repair facility, storage facility, training facility, conversion or elimination facility, test range, heavy bomber flight test center, space launch facility, or static display site.

28. (63) The term **"facility subject to continuous monitoring"** means a facility at which continuous monitoring activities are permitted but continuous monitoring has not yet commenced.

29. (105) The term **"fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs"** means a fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

30. (104) The term **"fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs"** means a unique structure at a parking site for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that can contain a train of standard configuration with rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

31. (103) The term **"fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs"** means a unique structure, within a restricted area, that can contain road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

32. (36) The term **"flight test"** means, for a missile, the launch and subsequent flight of a missile.

33. (12) The term **"former heavy bomber"** means a reconnaissance airplane, tanker airplane, or jamming airplane that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments and:

(a) that was initially constructed on the basis of the airframe of an existing type of heavy bomber and satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol; or

(b) that has been converted from a heavy bomber in accordance with procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or in such a way that it satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

34. (11) The term **"former type"** means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of existing ICBM or SLBM, any one of which had been deployed prior to entry into force of the Treaty, but none of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force and none of which are currently deployed.

35. (17) The term **"front section"** means that portion of the payload of the final stage that contains the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and may, depending on design, include a reentry vehicle platform, penetration aids, and a shroud.

36. (112) The term **"heavy bomber"** means a bomber of a type, any one of which satisfies either of the following criteria:

(a) its range is greater than 8000 kilometers; or

(b) it is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it meets neither criterion (a) nor criterion (b), or if otherwise agreed.

A bomber shall not be considered to be a heavy bomber if it is not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, if it is not a model or modification of an accountable heavy bomber, and if it is tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations. For the purposes of this definition, the term "modification of an accountable heavy bomber" is understood to mean an airplane having a design essentially identical to the design of an accountable heavy bomber.

A bomber of a type, any one of which has an integrated planform area in excess of 310 square meters, but that is not declared by a Party as a heavy bomber, shall be considered to be a heavy bomber unless the deploying Party provides the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission with information demonstrating to the satisfaction of the other Party that this bomber does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (a) and does not meet the criterion provided for in subparagraph (b).

Heavy bombers of the Parties of the types existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty are specified in Article III of the Treaty.

37. (113) The term **"heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments"** means a non-modern heavy bomber that is equipped only for non-nuclear armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for

conversion in accordance with the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

38. (117) The term **"heavy bomber flight test center"** means a facility, other than a production facility for heavy bombers, at which test heavy bombers are based and their operation is supported.

39. (111) The term **"heavy ICBM"** means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms.

40. (110) The term **"heavy SLBM"** means an SLBM of a type, any one of which has a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms or a throw-weight greater than 4350 kilograms.

41. (3) The term **"ICBM base"** means:

(a) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which a rail garrison and one associated maintenance facility are located. Such a maintenance facility may be located either within or outside the rail garrison;

(b) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more restricted areas and one associated maintenance facility are located;

(c) for silo launchers of ICBMs, an area in which one or more groups of silo launchers of ICBMs and one associated maintenance facility are located.

42. (115) The term **"ICBM emplacement equipment"** means equipment used to install an ICBM into a silo launcher of ICBMs.

43. (38) The term **"ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs"** means an ICBM of a type, any one of which has been contained on, or flight-tested from, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or has been declared an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

44. (79) The term **"ICBM launcher"** means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.

45. (42) The term **"ICBM loading facility"** means a facility, outside an ICBM base and outside a test range, where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from mobile launchers of ICBMs.

46. (39) The term **"ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles"** means an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle and has executed a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles during that flight test using a final stage engine; or an ICBM or SLBM that has released during a flight test of that missile a reentry vehicle or a penetration aid prior to termination of main engine thrust of the final stage and is an ICBM or SLBM of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested with more than one reentry vehicle.

47. (37) The term **"in-country escort"** means a group of individuals designated by the inspected Party to accompany and assist inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members throughout the in-country period, as provided for in the Inspection Protocol.

48. (71) The term **"in-country period"** means the period of time from the arrival of the inspection team, monitors, or aircrew members at the point of entry until their departure from the country through the point of entry.

49. (24) The term **"inspected Party"** means the Party to the Treaty whose facilities and locations are subject to inspection or continuous monitoring pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty.

50. (25) The term **"inspecting Party"** means the Party to the Treaty that conducts inspections or continuous monitoring activities.

51. (44) The term **"inspection site"** means a facility or location at which inspections may be conducted in accordance with the Inspection Protocol.

52. (27) The term **"inspection team"** means the group of inspectors assigned by the inspecting Party to conduct a particular inspection.

53. (26) The term **"inspector"** means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct inspections and included on that Party's list of inspectors.

54. (40) The term **"intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)"** means a land-based ballistic missile with a range in excess of 5,500 kilometers.

55. (16) The term **"jamming"** means, for telemetric information broadcast from a missile, creating interference on frequencies used for broadcasting such information.

56. (96) The term **"launch-associated railcar"** means a railcar that is directly associated with a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and that together with it provides for the preparation for launch and launch of a missile.

57. (83) The term **"launch canister"** means a container, directly associated with an ICBM, that can be or has been used for transporting and storing an assembled ICBM, with or without its front section, and from which an ICBM can be or has been launched.

58. (102) The term **"launch weight"** means the maximum weight of a fully loaded ICBM or SLBM at the time of first stage ignition, demonstrated during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of that type.

59. (32) The term **"long-range ALCM"** means an ALCM with a range in excess of 600 kilometers.

60. (58) The term **"long-range non-nuclear ALCM"** means a long-range ALCM that is not nuclear-armed.

61. (123) The term **"long-range nuclear ALCM"** means a long-range ALCM that is nuclear-armed.

62. (61) The term **"maintenance facility"** means a facility that is part of an ICBM base and at which ICBMs and ICBM launchers are maintained and their operation is supported.

63. (72) The term **"missile tender"** means a naval ship that is used for storing, transporting, and loading SLBMs into SLBM launchers.

64. (49) The term **"mobile launcher of ICBMs"** means a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs or a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs.

65. (50) The term "**mobile training launcher**" means a full-scale model of a mobile launcher of ICBMs that is not capable of launching an ICBM.

66. (52) The term "**monitor**" means an individual specified by one of the Parties to conduct continuous monitoring activities and included on that Party's list of monitors.

67. (51) The term "**monitored facility**" means a facility at which continuous monitoring has commenced.

68. (19) The term "**monitoring team**" means the group of monitors specified by the inspecting Party to conduct continuous monitoring activities.

69. (59) The term "**new type**" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, the technical characteristics of which differ from those of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each type declared previously in at least one of the following respects:

(a) number of stages;

(b) type of propellant of any stage;

(c) launch weight, by ten percent or more;

(d) length of either the assembled missile without front section or length of the first stage, by ten percent or more;

(e) diameter of the first stage, by five percent or more; or

(f) throw-weight, by an increase of 21 percent or more, in conjunction with a change in the length of the first stage by five percent or more.

70. (55) The term "**non-deployed ICBM**" means an ICBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of ICBMs.

71. (56) The term "**non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs**" means a mobile test launcher, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs at a space launch facility, or a mobile launcher of ICBMs that does not contain, and that is not considered to contain, an ICBM.

72. (54) The term "**non-deployed SLBM**" means an SLBM not contained, and not considered to be contained, in a deployed launcher of SLBMs.

73. (57) The term "**non-modern heavy bomber**" means a heavy bomber of a type, any one of which was initially based at an air base more than ten years earlier.

74. (124) The term "**nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs**" means, for heavy bombers, nuclear air-to-surface missiles with a range of less than 600 kilometers and nuclear bombs.

75. (77) The term "**parking site**" means a location, within a rail garrison, at which deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs are based and fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

76. (73) The term "**payload**" means, for a stage, all that separates from that stage, excluding the front section shroud and the propellant burned by that stage, beginning at the time when the velocity of the final stage is equal to 1,000 meters per second less than its velocity at the time of termination of main engine thrust of the final stage or at the time of the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid, whichever occurs earlier.

77. (97) The term "**perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system**" means the physical barriers, buildings, and equipment along the perimeter, at the portal, and at the other exits of a monitored facility, that may be established, operated, and maintained by the monitors for purposes of continuous monitoring of such a facility.

78. (93) The term "**perimeter continuous monitoring area**" means the space within which the inspecting Party has the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system and to carry out continuous monitoring.

79. (70) The term "**period of inspection**" means the period of time from completion of the pre-inspection procedures until the commencement of post-inspection procedures.

80. (66) The term "**procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles**" means a maneuver of the self-contained dispensing mechanism or of the final stage of a missile, associated with targeting to an aim point and releasing one or more reentry vehicles, whether or not a reentry vehicle was actually released.

81. (75) The term "**produce**" means build, construct, or manufacture in any quantity, and includes serial production as well as one-of-a-kind manufacturing.

82. (62) The term "**production facility**" means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a facility at which:

(I) ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in their launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of all stages and the loading of such missiles into launch canisters;

(II) ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters, are assembled, including the joining of two or more stages;

(III) first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages are assembled;

(b) for ballistic missile submarines, a facility at which construction of ballistic missile submarines is performed;

(c) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a facility at which the erector-launcher mechanism of a mobile launcher of ICBMs is mounted on the self-propelled chassis, trailer chassis, railcar, or flatcar;

(d) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a facility at which assembly of a complete heavy bomber airframe or complete former heavy bomber airframe is performed.

83. (76) The term "**prototype**" means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, none of which has been attributed with warheads or accountable throw-weight, no more than 20 of which have been flight-tested, and no launchers of which have been deployed.

84. (23) The term **"rail garrison"** means an area in which one or more parking sites are located and an associated maintenance facility may be located.

85. (22) The term **"rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs"** means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on which it is mounted.

86. (20) The term **"range"** means:

(a) for an ALCM, the maximum distance that can be covered by an ALCM of that type in its standard design mode flying until fuel exhaustion, determined by projecting its flight path onto the Earth's sphere from the point of launch to the point of impact;

(b) for a ballistic missile, the maximum distance measured by projecting the flight trajectory on the Earth's sphere between the launch point of a missile of that type, and the point of impact of a reentry vehicle;

(c) for an aircraft, the maximum distance that can be flown, without refueling, by an aircraft of that type when carrying an ordnance load of 7500 kilograms, with a full fuel load in the internal and external fuel tanks and a flight profile optimized to ensure minimum fuel consumption per kilometer. In this connection, the fuel remaining in the fuel tanks after landing shall be no more than five percent of the maximum capacity of the fuel tanks, and the distance covered during climb and descent shall be taken into account.

87. (98) The term **"rapid reload"** means reloading a silo launcher of ICBMs in less than 12 hours or a mobile launcher of ICBMs in less than four hours after a missile has been launched or removed from such a launcher.

88. (8) The term **"reentry vehicle"** means that part of the front section that can survive reentry through the dense layers of the Earth's atmosphere and that is designed for delivering a weapon to a target or for testing such a delivery.

89. (69) The term **"relocation"** means the one-way movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from one declared facility to another declared facility, or from any location following the completion of a dispersal to a declared facility, or from any location during a routine movement to a declared facility other than to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

90. (47) The term **"repair facility"** means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, for the repair or maintenance of ICBMs or SLBMs;

(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, for the repair or maintenance of mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the repair or maintenance of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

91. (67) The term **"residual propellant"** means, when determining the maximum calculated throw-weight of an ICBM or an SLBM, the unusable propellant of a stage and the propellant of a stage reserved for off-nominal missile technical characteristics and missile flight conditions, expressed as a percentage of the total propellant mass of that stage.

92. (65) The term **"restricted area"** means an area within a deployment area, limited in size, in which deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles are based and in which fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs may be located.

93. (99) The term **"retired type"** means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a type of ICBM or SLBM, any one of which was deployed when the Treaty entered into force, but none of which are currently deployed due to the conversion or elimination of all launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type of ICBM or SLBM other than test launchers and launchers at space launch facilities.

94. (18) The term **"road-mobile launcher of ICBMs"** means an erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the self-propelled or trailer chassis on which it is mounted.

95. (64) The term **"routine movement"** means the movement of a deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile for the purpose of training, maintenance, or testing that begins and ends at the same restricted area or rail garrison and does not involve movement to any other declared facility except movement to the maintenance facility associated with that restricted area or that rail garrison.

96. (2) The term **"self-contained dispensing mechanism"** means a device that separates from the final stage of a missile together with the front section and that independently targets and releases the reentry vehicle or reentry vehicles and penetration aids.

97. (120) The term **"silo launcher of ICBMs"** means a fixed launcher of ICBMs in a silo structure located in the ground.

98. (121) The term **"silo training launcher"** means a full-scale silo launcher specified for training purposes.

99. (119) The term **"silo used as a launch control center"** means a silo, other than a silo launcher of ICBMs, that is located at an ICBM base and that is used to control the launch of an ICBM.

100. (78) The term **"SLBM launcher"** means a device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an SLBM.

101. (41) The term **"SLBM loading facility"** means a shore-based facility, outside a submarine base, where SLBMs are loaded onto or unloaded from ballistic missile submarines.

102. (80) The term **"soft-site launcher"** means any land-based fixed launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs other than a silo launcher.

103. (107) The term **"solid rocket motor"** means that part of a stage that consists of the case filled with solid fuel.

104. (43) The term **"space launch facility"** means a specified facility from

which objects are delivered into the upper atmosphere or space using ICBMs or SLBMs.

105. (106) The term **"stage"** means, for ICBMs or SLBMs, a section of a missile that is equipped with a propulsion unit and that can provide its payload with an additional velocity of more than 1,000 meters per second.

106. (31) The term **"storage crane"** means a floating crane that is used to store, transport, and load or unload SLBMs.

107. (48) The term **"storage facility"** means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a submarine base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of ICBMs or SLBMs;

(b) for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base, a test range, or a space launch facility, for the storage of mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a specified facility, outside an air base, for the storage of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers.

108. (4) The term **"submarine base"** means a facility at which ballistic missile submarines are based and that provides shore-based support for such submarines, which may include the assembly, loading, maintenance, and storage of SLBMs, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

109. (7) The term **"submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM)"** means a ballistic missile with a range in excess of 600 kilometers of a type, any one of which has been contained in or launched from a submarine.

110. (15) The term **"support equipment"** means vehicles and mobile or transportable equipment used to support the operation of an ICBM or SLBM.

111. (108) The term **"telemetric information"** means information that originates on board a missile during its flight test that is broadcast or recorded for subsequent recovery.

112. (81) The term **"test launcher"** means an ICBM launcher or an SLBM launcher located within a test range, unless otherwise provided for in the Treaty.

113. (28) The term **"test range"** means a designated land area, other than an ICBM base, from which launches of ICBMs or SLBMs are conducted.

114. (100) The term **"train of standard configuration"** means a train consisting of a specified number of rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and launch-associated railcars.

115. (45) The term **"training facility"** means:

(a) for ICBMs or SLBMs, a specified facility, outside an ICBM base or a submarine base, at which personnel are trained to use, operate, or maintain ICBMs or SLBMs and their launchers;

(b) for heavy bombers, a facility where training heavy bombers are based.

116. (114) The term **"training heavy bomber"** means a heavy bomber used for training that is not equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, and that satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination.

117. (82) The term **"training launcher"** means a silo training launcher or a mobile training launcher.

118. (116) The term **"training model of a missile"** means a full-scale, inert model of an ICBM or SLBM that is not capable of being launched and that differs from an ICBM or SLBM on the basis of external and functional differences that are visible during inspection.

119. (74) The term **"transit"** means the one-way movement from one facility or location to another facility or another location of:

(a) a non-deployed ICBM, other than an ICBM of a retired or former type;

(b) a non-deployed SLBM, other than an SLBM of a retired or former type;

(c) a launch canister that remains after the flight test of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs; or

(d) a non-deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs.

120. (109) The term **"transporter-loader"** means a vehicle that is capable of transporting an assembled ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and from which such an ICBM can be loaded directly onto a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or onto which such an ICBM can be unloaded directly from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, outside facilities where non-deployed ICBMs may be located.

121. (14) The term **"variant"** means:

(a) for heavy bombers, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of airplanes of one type and one category that are distinguishable from other airplanes of the same type and the same category;

(b) for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of items of the same type that are distinguishable from other items of the same type;

(c) for ICBMs and SLBMs, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, of ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type that are distinguishable from other ICBMs or SLBMs of the same type.

122. (92) The term **"version"** means, for mobile launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, a classification, declared by the inspected Party, based on external differences from other such items for a particular type of ICBM or SLBM.

123. (9) The term **"warhead"** means a unit of account used for counting toward the 6000 maximum aggregate limit and relevant sublimits as applied to deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed heavy bombers.

124. (101) The term **"weapon-delivery vehicle"** means, for ballistic missiles and cruise missiles, a missile of a type, any one of which has been flight-tested or deployed to carry or be used as a weapon, that is, as any mechanism or device that, when directed against any target, is designed to damage or destroy it.

PROTOCOL ON PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION OF THE ITEMS SUBJECT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conversion or elimination of the strategic offensive arms limited by the Treaty, as well as fixed structures and facilities.

I. Procedures for Elimination of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Their Launch Canisters

1. Elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection.

2. Prior to the confirmatory inspection pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Section, the inspected Party:

(a) shall remove the missile's reentry vehicle or vehicles;

(b) may remove the electronic and electromechanical devices of the missile's guidance and control system from the missile and its launch canister;

(c) may remove the missile from its launch canister, remove the missile attachment devices from the launch canister, and disassemble the missile into stages;

(d) may remove propellant from stages;

(e) may remove or actuate auxiliary pyrotechnic devices installed on the missile and its launch canister;

(f) may remove penetration aids, including devices for their attachment and release; and

(g) may remove propulsion units from the self-contained dispensing mechanism.

These actions may be carried out in any order.

3. After arrival of the inspection team, and prior to the initiation of the elimination process:

(a) Inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the missiles and their launch canisters to be eliminated by making the observations and measurements necessary for such confirmation. If inspectors are unable to determine the type of the missile in its launch canister, representatives of the inspected Party shall take steps to resolve the problem, including removing the missile from its launch canister, if necessary; and

(b) Inspectors and representatives of the inspected Party shall read the data from and inspect the unique identifier in accordance with Annex 6 to the Inspection Protocol.

After the procedures provided for in this paragraph have been carried out, the inspected Party may remove any remaining elements not subject to elimination pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Section, and the process of the elimination of the missiles and their launch canisters may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

4. Elimination process for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If solid fuel has not been removed from stages, the stages shall be destroyed by explosive demolition or burned;

(b) Rocket nozzles, motor cases, as well as the interstage skirts of a missile remaining after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 2(d) and 4(a) of this Section, or after the completion of static testing provided for in paragraph 3 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion; and

(c) The self-contained dispensing mechanism, as well as the front section, including the reentry vehicle platform and the front section shroud, shall be crushed, flattened, cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or destroyed by explosion.

5. Elimination process for launch canisters of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The body of the launch canister shall be crushed, flattened, or destroyed by explosion; or

(b) If the body of the launch canister is composed of segments, each of the segments shall be cut into two pieces at a location that is not an assembly joint. A launch canister, the body of which is of unitary construction, shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size, or cut into three pieces in such a manner that pieces no less than 1.5 meters long are cut from the ends of the body of such a launch canister.

6. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

7. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

II. Procedures for Elimination of Silo Launchers of ICBMs, Silo Training Launchers, and Silo Test Launchers

1. Elimination of silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers and silo test launchers shall be carried out *in situ* and be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs and silo test launchers, all missiles and shipping containers for ICBMs or ICBM stages, as well as all support equipment, shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each such launcher to be eliminated.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, and silo test launchers as soon as the silo doors have been opened, removed, or eliminated. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

4. A silo launcher of ICBMs in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain a deployed ICBM, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. A silo test launcher or a silo training launcher in the process of being eliminated shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 6 (a) or paragraph 7, respectively, of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

6. Elimination process for silo launchers of ICBMs or silo test launchers:

(a) The silo door shall be removed, dismantled, or destroyed and the silo headworks and the silo shall be destroyed by excavation to a depth of no less than eight meters, or by explosion to a depth of no less than six meters; and

(b) Following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, the silo may be filled to the level of the bottom of the hole created by the excavation or explosion. To enhance safety, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 9 of this Section.

7. Elimination of a silo training launcher shall be accomplished by removing, dismantling, or destroying the silo door and by destroying the silo headworks by excavation or explosion.

8. The elimination process for a silo launcher of ICBMs, a silo training launcher, and a silo test launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such an elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

9. Silos shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period, after which they may be filled with earth.

III. Procedures for Elimination of Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, Mobile Training Launchers and Fixed Structures for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs

1. Elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for mobile launchers of ICBMs and shall be subject to inspection.

2. After arrival of the inspection team and prior to the initiation of the elimination process, inspectors shall confirm the types, and number of each type, of the items listed in paragraph 1 of this Section to be eliminated. After such confirmation, the elimination process may begin. Inspectors shall observe the elimination process.

3. Elimination process for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and road-mobile training launchers:

(a) The erector-launcher mechanism and leveling supports shall be removed from the launcher chassis;

(b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the launcher chassis;

(d) The mountings of the erector-launcher mechanism and of the launcher leveling supports shall be cut off the launcher chassis and each such mounting shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(e) A portion of the self-propelled launcher chassis, at least 0.78 meters in length, shall be cut off aft of the rear axle and that portion shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size; and no component, including those removed in accordance with the procedures provided for in this paragraph, shall be mounted, welded, or attached by any other means to an eliminated launcher chassis so as to increase the length of such a chassis; and

(f) If a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs is not mounted on a self-propelled launcher chassis, the trailer chassis shall be cut at a location that is not an assembly joint into two pieces of approximately equal size.

Upon completion of these elimination procedures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the vehicle may be used only for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty.

4. Elimination process for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and rail-mobile training launchers:

(a) The erector-launcher mechanism shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar);

(b) The framework of the erector-launcher mechanism on which the ICBM is mounted and erected shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size;

(c) Missile launch support equipment, including external instrumentation compartments, shall be removed from the railcar (or flatcar); and

(d) The railcar (or flatcar) shall be cut at locations that are not assembly joints into two pieces of approximately equal size.

5. Upon completion of the above requirements, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the elimination process, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

6. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after completion of the procedures provided for in this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

7. Elimination of fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be carried out *in situ*, shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification, and shall be subject to inspection pursuant to paragraphs 8 and 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

8. Elimination process for fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The superstructure of each fixed structure shall be dismantled or demolished, and removed from its base or foundation; and

(b) The base or foundation of each such structure shall be destroyed by excavation or explosion.

Upon completion of the above requirements, the elimination process for those structures shall be considered to be completed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

9. The destroyed base or foundation of each such fixed structure shall remain visible to national technical means of verification:

(a) for the 90-day period following the completion of the elimination process; or

(b) until an inspection of each such fixed structure at a restricted area or rail garrison is conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty.

10. Upon completion of the inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 or 9 of Article XI of the Treaty or, if such an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 90-day period provided for in subparagraph 9(a) of this Section, the hole resulting from the excavation or explosion of each such structure may be filled and the remains of the destroyed base or foundation of each such structure may be removed from the restricted area or rail garrison.

IV. Procedures for Elimination of SLBM Launchers

1. Elimination of SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for SLBM launchers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for SLBM launchers, all missiles shall be removed from such launchers.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for SLBM launchers as soon as the ballistic missile submarine has been positioned at the conversion or elimination facility with all missile launch tubes empty and launch-tube hatches opened or removed. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

4. SLBM launchers in the process of being eliminated shall be considered to contain deployed SLBMs, and thus to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, until all the missile launch tube hatches and their associated superstructure fairings are removed from the ballistic missile submarine. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Elimination process for SLBM launchers:

(a) The missile section shall be removed from the submarine; or

(b) The missile launch tubes, and all elements of their reinforcement, including hull liners and segments of circular structural members between the missile launch tubes, as well as the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure through which all the missile launch tubes pass and that contain all the missile launch tube penetrations, shall be removed from the submarine. Missile launch tubes that have been removed shall be cut into two pieces of approximately equal size and shall remain in the open in the vicinity of the submarine until completion of the elimination procedures, after which they may be removed from the conversion or elimination facility.

6. The elimination process for SLBM launchers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 5 (a) and 5(b) of this Section shall be completed no later than 270 days and 180 days, respectively, after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

7. A ballistic missile submarine shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. If the elimination process has been carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 5(b) of this Section, then upon its completion, the submarine shall continue to be visible to national technical means of verification until provision of the notification provided for in paragraph 4 of

Section IV of the Notification Protocol and for no less than the ten-day period following the provision of such a notification.

8. Upon completion of the elimination procedures for SLBM launchers, the submarine may be used for purposes not inconsistent with the provisions of the Treaty after:

(a) installing a section without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements; or

(b) replacing the entire portion of the pressure hull, the entire portion of the outer hull, and the entire portion of the superstructure that were removed with portions without SLBM missile launch tubes and penetrations for them, and without SLBM missile launch-tube reinforcements.

Such submarines shall differ from ballistic missile submarines on the basis of external differences observable by national technical means of verification. Submarines that have been modified shall not have vertical launch tubes with a diameter large enough to accommodate the smallest SLBM of that Party.

V. Procedures for Elimination of Soft-Site Launchers

1. Elimination of soft-site launchers shall be carried out *in situ* and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for soft-site launchers, all missiles, launch canisters, and shipping containers for ICBMs or SLBMs or for their stages shall be removed at least 1000 meters from each soft-site launcher to be eliminated.

3. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for soft-site launchers as soon as it has begun implementation of the procedures provided for in subparagraph 4 (a) of this Section. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. A soft-site launcher in the process of being eliminated shall remain subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 2(d) of Article IV and paragraph 9 of Article V of the Treaty until the procedures provided for in subparagraphs 4(a) and 4(b) of this Section have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. Elimination process for soft-site launchers:

(a) All fixed launch and propellant-handling equipment, as well as erecting and handling equipment, and fuel tanks, associated with such a launcher shall be removed at least 1000 meters from the soft-site launcher to be eliminated. "Launch equipment" is understood to mean systems, components, and instruments required to launch missiles;

(b) The entire area, at least 20 meters in diameter and centered on the soft-site launcher, shall be excavated or exploded to a depth of no less than two meters; and

(c) To enhance safety, following completion of the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, the resultant hole may be graded during the 180-day period provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section but not filled with earth until expiration of the 90-day period provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section.

5. The elimination process for a soft-site launcher shall be completed no later than 180 days after its initiation. If grading was performed during the elimination process, notification of the completion of such elimination process shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

6. Soft-site launchers shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process and for the following 90-day period. After the 90-day period has elapsed, the hole may be filled with earth.

VI. Procedures for Conversion or Elimination of Heavy Bombers and Elimination of Former Heavy Bombers

1. Elimination of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Section shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers and shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification and by inspection pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section.

2. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers has been completed, except for those cases when the initiation of the elimination process for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection. If an inspection is conducted, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable.

3. Prior to the initiation of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, engines and equipment that are not part of the airframe may be removed except for the equipment that is necessary to confirm the type and category of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to be eliminated.

4. A Party shall be considered to have initiated the elimination process for a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber as soon as the tail section with tail surfaces has been severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint. After this procedure has been carried out, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. Elimination process for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers:

(a) The tail section with tail surfaces shall be severed from the fuselage at a location obviously not an assembly joint;

(b) The wings shall be separated from the fuselage at any location by any method; and

(c) The remainder of the fuselage shall be severed into two pieces, within the area of attachment of the wings to the fuselage, at a location obviously not an assembly joint.

6. A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall remain visible to national technical means of verification during the entire elimination process. The elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be completed no later than 60 days after initiation. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

7. Upon completion of the elimination process for a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, the remains of its airframe shall remain visible to national technical means of verification at the elimination site for a 90-day period, after which they may be removed. In the case of an inspection conducted to confirm that the elimination of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed, the remains of its airframe may be removed after the completion of such an inspection.

8. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results of the inspection team's observation of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is to be eliminated or that has been eliminated, as applicable, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

9. Conversion of heavy bombers, carried out in accordance with this Section, shall be carried out at conversion or elimination facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, as follows:

(a) Heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of this Section;

(ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10 and 11 of this Section, as applicable; or

(iii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, as applicable;

(b) Heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(i) Conversion of such heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 11 of this Section; or

(ii) Conversion of such heavy bombers into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of this Section, as applicable;

(c) Conversion of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments into training heavy bombers or former heavy bombers shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 12 of this Section.

10. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, all weapons bays equipped to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs. All external attachment joints for long-range nuclear ALCMs and all external attachment joints for pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying long-range nuclear ALCMs.

11. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for nuclear armaments, all weapons bays equipped to carry nuclear armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments. All external attachment joints for nuclear armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for nuclear armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying nuclear armaments.

12. To convert a heavy bomber so that it is no longer equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments, all weapons bays equipped for non-nuclear air-to-surface armaments shall be modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments. All external attachment joints for such armaments and all external attachment joints for pylons for such armaments shall be removed or modified so as to render them incapable of carrying any air-to-surface armaments.

13. Upon completion of the above requirements, the converted heavy bomber shall not be flown, but shall be moved directly to the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol. The converting Party may also provide an additional notification regarding the planned date of arrival of such a heavy bomber at the viewing site. The Party receiving such notification or notifications shall have the right, within the 20-day period beginning on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site, to inspect it to confirm that the procedures provided for in paragraphs 10, 11, and 12 of this Section, whichever are applicable, have been completed. Upon completion of such inspection, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the inspected Party shall have the right to remove the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber from the viewing site.

14. If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm, in a factual written report containing the results

of the inspection team's observation of the converted heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

15. Upon completion of the inspection provided for in paragraph 13 of this Section or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 20-day period, the converted heavy bomber shall begin to be considered to be a heavy bomber of a different category or to be a former heavy bomber depending on the conversion procedures that have been carried out. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

VII. Procedures for Removal from Accountability of ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs as a Result of Flight Tests or Static Testing

1. Removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of flight tests shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Procedures for removal from accountability as a result of flight tests:

(a) Notification shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol; and

(b) The ICBMs shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the flight tests. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. Procedures for removal of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs from accountability as a result of static testing:

(a) The Party that has accomplished static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

(b) If static testing is accomplished through dissection, that is, removal of propellant segments for testing, each time the Party removes such a segment it shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

(c) The remains of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be eliminated in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section I of this Protocol.

VIII. Other Procedures for Removal from or Changes in Accountability

1. ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, their launch canisters, silo launchers of ICBMs, silo training launchers, silo test launchers, mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile training launchers, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, SLBM launchers, soft-site launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, static display items, and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty after the completion of the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 6, or 8 of this Section, as applicable.

2. Accidental loss:

(a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item subject to limitations provided for in the Treaty, that item is lost as a result of an accident, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

(b) The item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty as of the date or assumed date of the accidental loss specified in such a notification.

3. Disablement beyond repair:

(a) If, in the judgment of the Party possessing an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty, that item is disabled beyond repair, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

(b) The disabled item shall be eliminated at the site of disablement, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol, including inspection.

4. Procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of this Section shall be used to change the accountability, as a result of static display, of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers.

5. Static display:

(a) Prior to being placed on static display, an item referred to in paragraph 4 of this Section shall be rendered inoperable and unusable so that it cannot be used for purposes inconsistent with the Treaty.

(b) Upon completion of the requirements in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, an item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, shall be transported to a location where it could be inspected. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

(c) A Party shall have the right, within the 30-day period beginning on the date of receipt of the notification provided in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, to conduct an inspection of such an item.

(d) If an inspection is conducted, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in a factual written report, containing the results of the inspection team's observation of the item specified for static display, that the inspection team has completed its inspection. This report shall be completed in accordance with Section XVIII of the Inspection Protocol.

(e) Upon completion of the inspection provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, or, if an inspection was not conducted, upon expiration of the 30-day period, and after the item to be placed on static display, except for silo launchers of ICBMs, has been transported to and installed at its static display location, it shall be considered to be on static display. Notification thereof shall be provided in

accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

6. If the Party possessing the item removes it from static display, that item shall be eliminated at the site of static display, or at a conversion or elimination facility, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in this Protocol. Upon completion of such procedures, the eliminated item shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(a) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

7. Heavy bombers or former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers:

(a) Procedures for changing accountability of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers as a result of conversion for use as ground trainers:

(I) At least one third of each wing or the entire vertical stabilizer of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber shall be removed; and

(II) Upon completion of the above requirements, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber so converted shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in Article II and in subparagraphs 3(a) and 3(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

(b) Upon the completion of the conversion process, a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall remain visible to national technical means of verification for a 90-day period.

8. A heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer that is no longer used for such purposes shall be eliminated *in situ* or at a conversion or elimination facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, in accordance with applicable procedures provided for in Section VI of this Protocol. Upon the completion of the appropriate elimination procedures, the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer shall cease to be subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(b) of Article IV of the Treaty. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

IX. Procedures for Elimination of Facilities

1. Pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty, each Party shall have the right to verify by inspection that the elimination of facilities provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XII of the Inspection Protocol has been completed. The completion of elimination of all other declared facilities shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification.

2. Any declared facility shall be considered to be eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty as soon as all strategic offensive arms specified for such a facility, and all support equipment, have been removed and all silo launchers and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs are eliminated in accordance with the procedures provided for in this Protocol. Notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PROTOCOL ON INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Article XI of the Treaty.

I. General Obligations

For the purpose of helping to ensure verification of compliance with the provisions of the Treaty, each Party shall facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities by the other Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

II. Provisions Concerning the Legal Status of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members

1. Inspections and continuous monitoring activities shall be conducted by inspectors and monitors. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall be transported to the territory of the inspected Party by inspection airplanes. Inspectors and monitors, as well as aircrew members that operate these airplanes, shall be assigned in accordance with paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 5 of this Section and subject to provisions of the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991.

2. The list of inspectors shall not contain at any one time more than 400 individuals, and the list of monitors shall not contain at any one time more than 300 individuals. The number of individuals on the list of aircrew members shall not be limited. Inspectors and monitors shall be citizens of the inspecting Party. The Parties shall have the right to change, by mutual agreement, the number of inspectors and monitors that each of these lists may contain. For each proposed inspector, monitor, and aircrew member, the lists shall contain first name, middle name or patronymic, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available.

3. Each Party shall have the right to inform the other Party of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector, monitor, and aircrew member proposed, by providing a notification in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol.

4. Subject to the provisions of paragraph 2 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to amend its lists of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members no more than once in each 21-day period, by providing the other Party with a notification in accordance with paragraph 20 of Section III of this Protocol. With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The Party receiving notification of an amendment to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members shall provide notification to the other Party, in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol, of its agreement with or objection to the designation of each such inspector, monitor, or aircrew member.

5. No later than 25 days after entry into force of the Treaty, or no later than 30 days after receipt of a notification of amendments to the lists of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, the Party receiving such lists or proposed amendments thereto shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed, as may be required to ensure that each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may enter and remain in the territory of that Party throughout the in-country period. The inspected Party shall ensure that such visas and appropriate documents shall be valid for a period of at least 24 months, and the inspecting Party shall ensure that persons receiving such visas and appropriate documents shall use them only for the purpose of conducting inspections or continuous monitoring activities in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol.

6. An individual on the list of inspectors may be objected to only if that individual is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or if that individual has been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the Party reviewing the list. An individual on the list of monitors or aircrew members may be objected to if that individual is found unacceptable by the Party reviewing the list. The Party making such an objection shall so notify the other Party in accordance with paragraph 21 of Section III of this Protocol. Individuals who are objected to shall be deleted from the lists. In the event the inspected Party subsequently determines that an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member of the other Party is under indictment for a criminal offense on the territory of the inspected Party or has ever been convicted in a criminal prosecution or expelled by the inspected Party, or has violated the conditions governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities provided for in this Protocol, the inspected Party making such determination may so notify the inspecting Party in accordance with paragraph 22 of Section III of this Protocol. In the event that the inspecting Party is so notified, that Party shall promptly recall that individual from the territory of the inspected Party, if that individual is there at such a time. The

inspecting Party shall also delete the individual from the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members.

7. In order to exercise their functions effectively, for the purpose of implementing the Treaty and not for their personal benefit, the inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the following privileges and immunities:

(a) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the inviolability enjoyed by diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961.

(b) The office premises, except for those in the operations center, and living quarters for monitors shall be accorded the inviolability and protection accorded to the premises of the mission and private residences of diplomatic agents in accordance with Articles 22 and 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(c) The papers and correspondence of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall enjoy the inviolability accorded to the papers and correspondence of diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 30 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(d) Inspection airplanes shall be inviolable. This shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews.

(e) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be accorded the immunities accorded diplomatic agents in accordance with paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations. The immunity from jurisdiction with respect to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member may be waived by the inspecting Party in those cases when it is of the opinion that immunity would impede the course of justice and that it can be waived without prejudice to the implementation of the provisions of the Treaty. Waiver must always be express.

(f) Monitors shall be accorded the exemption from dues and taxes accorded to diplomatic agents in accordance with Article 34 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

(g) Inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members of a Party shall have the right to bring into the territory of the other Party, without payment of any customs duties or related charges, articles for their personal use, with the exception of articles, the import or export of which is prohibited by law or controlled by quarantine regulations.

(h) If the inspected Party considers that there has been an abuse of privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, consultations shall be held between the Parties to determine whether such an abuse has occurred. If it is determined that such an abuse has occurred, the inspecting Party shall take necessary measures to prevent a repetition of such an abuse.

The privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph shall be accorded for the entire time the inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members are within the territory of the other Party, and thereafter with respect to acts previously performed in the exercise of their official functions. During their stay in the territory of the inspected Party, without prejudice to the privileges and immunities provided for in this paragraph, inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be obliged to respect the laws and regulations of the inspected Party, shall be obliged not to interfere in its internal affairs, and shall not engage in any professional or commercial activity for personal profit on the territory of the inspected Party.

III. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications provided for in this Section concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty.

2. Notification of the standing diplomatic clearance number for inspection airplanes shall be provided no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, for the period until the end of the current calendar year, and subsequently no less than 30 days prior to the beginning of each following calendar year, and shall include:

(a) standing diplomatic clearance number; and

(b) calendar year.

3. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, shall be provided no less than 16 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(c) the date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection; and

(d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

4. The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section subject to the following conditions:

(a) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 or 4 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 48 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry.

(b) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 3, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be neither less than four hours nor more than 24 hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry.

(c) For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, the date and time for such designation shall be no more than 48 hours after the notification of the completion of an exercise dispersal of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the

Notification Protocol, or no more than four hours after the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, whichever is earlier.

5. Notification of an intention to conduct an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than 72 hours in advance of the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(c) the inspection site and the type of inspection; and

(d) the names of inspectors and aircrew members.

6. Notification of an intention to replace inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated time of arrival of replacement inspectors at the point of entry from outside the territory of the inspected Party and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry;

(c) the inspection site;

(d) the names of the incoming replacement inspectors and outgoing inspectors being replaced, including the name of the incoming inspection team leader, if such a replacement is planned; and

(e) the names of aircrew members.

7. Notification of an intention to conduct a sequential inspection, as provided for in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be provided in writing through a member of the in-country escort and shall specify:

(a) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, whether the inspection team intends to go directly to the next inspection site or return first to the point of entry; or

(b) for an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the next inspection site.

8. Notification of the date and time for the designation of the next inspection site and the type of inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of Section VI or paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol, shall be made in writing through a member of the in-country escort.

9. The date and time for the designation of the inspection site and the type of inspection shall be specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, subject to the following conditions:

(a) If such notification is provided at the inspection site, the date and time for such designation shall be:

(i) no earlier than 18 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, except for cases where the notification is provided pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section IX of this Protocol;

(ii) no earlier than the completion of post-inspection procedures; and

(iii) no later than 12 hours after the completion of post-inspection procedures.

(b) If such notification is provided at the point of entry, the date and time for such designation shall be no earlier than four hours and no later than 24 hours after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry.

10. Notification of an intention to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring and of an intention to conduct an engineering site survey at such a facility, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry of the monitoring team and engineering site survey equipment and shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility;

(b) the point of entry;

(c) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and

(d) the names of the members of the monitoring team and aircrew members.

11. Noufication of the date of commencement of continuous monitoring at a facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section and of the initial arrival of monitors at that facility to carry out continuous monitoring, shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility;

(b) the date when the procedures for continuous monitoring at that facility will commence;

(c) the point of entry;

(d) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry; and

(e) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

12. Notification containing a request for logistic support for a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section shall include:

(a) the specification of the facility; and

(b) the request for logistic support in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section XVI of this Protocol.

13. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section, shall be made no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present at that facility, and no less than 30 days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry, if no monitors that carry out continuous monitoring are present or have

been present at that facility and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;

(c) the specification of the facility; and

(d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

14. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to replace monitors at a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 or 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;

(c) whether the replacement shall be at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or at the airport associated with such a facility;

(d) the specification of the facility;

(e) the names of the incoming monitors and aircrew members; and

(f) the number of monitors to be replaced.

15. Notification of an intention to enter the territory of the other Party to maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility or facilities specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section, shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of arrival of the monitors at the point of entry and shall include:

(a) the point of entry;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry, and the preferred time of departure for the facility from the point of entry;

(c) the specification of the facility or facilities; and

(d) the names of the monitors and aircrew members.

16. Notification of an intention to move to another facility at which monitors are present, or to leave the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided no less than 48 hours in advance of the preferred time of departure, through a member of the in-country escort at the facility from which the monitors will leave, and shall include:

(a) the preferred time of departure;

(b) the destination;

(c) the names of monitors;

(d) for the movement to another monitored facility, the purpose of travel; and

(e) the equipment and supplies to be transported by the monitors.

17. Notification of an intention to use an inspection airplane in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be provided no less than 20 days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include:

(a) the type of airplane;

(b) the specification of all the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities for which the equipment and supplies are intended;

(c) the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility;

(d) the estimated date of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility;

(e) for each facility specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the approximate number of separate palletized or oversize units of cargo, including modular structures, and the approximate weight and dimensions of each such unit of cargo; and

(f) the type and approximate amounts of hazardous materials carried on the airplane that require special safety measures in transportation and handling.

18. Notification of the confirmation of an intention to use an inspection airplane that has been notified in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section shall be provided no less than seven days in advance of the estimated date of its arrival at the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and shall include:

(a) the number, time, and date of the notification provided earlier in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section;

(b) the date and estimated time of arrival at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility; and

(c) the names of aircrew members.

19. Notification of the response to a request by the inspecting Party contained in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section to land an inspection airplane at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than 72 hours prior to the estimated time of its arrival specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 13, 14, 15, or 18 of this Section, and shall include:

(a) in case the inspected Party permits the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section:

(i) the name of the airport;

(ii) the route for the flight of the inspection airplane to the airport; and

(iii) whether or not an escort crew will be provided and, if provided, a list of the members of that aircrew; or

(b) in case the inspected Party does not permit the airplane to land at the airport associated with the facility specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 17 of this Section, the point of entry associated with the facility.

20. Notification of amendments made to the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section II of this Protocol shall include:

(a) the list or lists to be amended;

(b) if any inspector, monitor, or aircrew member is removed from the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and the passport number, if available, of the person removed; and

(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion in the lists, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available.

21. Notification of agreement with or objection to the designation by the other Party of each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member proposed for inclusion on the lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of this Protocol shall be provided no later than 20 days after entry into force of the Treaty or, with respect to subsequent amendments made to these lists, no later than 20 days after receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 20 of this Section, and shall include:

(a) the corresponding list or lists;

(b) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number, if available; and

(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, agreement with or objection to the designation of that person.

22. Notification of an objection to an inspector, monitor, or aircrew member who is currently on the list of inspectors, monitors, or aircrew members, shall include:

(a) the corresponding list or lists;

(b) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, oblast or state, and country of birth; and passport number if available; and

(c) for each inspector, monitor, or aircrew member, the reason for the objection to that person.

23. Notification of a change or addition to the points of entry to the territory of the inspected Party shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol through diplomatic channels no less than five months prior to the beginning of the use of the new point of entry, and shall include:

(a) the point of entry to be changed, if applicable; and

(b) the new point of entry.

24. Notification containing data concerning the flight plan of an inspection airplane shall be provided no less than six hours prior to the scheduled departure time of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.

25. Notification of the approval of the flight plan of an inspection airplane filed in accordance with paragraph 24 of this Section shall be provided by the inspected Party no less than three hours prior to the scheduled time for departure of such an airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party.

IV. Arrangements for Air Transportation

1. Each Party shall establish on its territory no more than three and no fewer than two points of entry. The points of entry and their associated inspection sites shall be listed in Annex 1 to the Memorandum of Understanding. Each Party may change the points of entry to its territory by providing notification of such a change to the other Party in accordance with paragraph 23 of Section III of this Protocol.

2. The inspected Party shall, for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, identify the airport associated with that facility. Provisions of this Protocol relating to points of entry, except for the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, 4, and 14 of Section V of this Protocol, shall apply to such airports while inspection airplanes or equipment and supplies transported by such airplanes in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section are located there.

3. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of the types specified in paragraph 2 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of inspectors or monitors to the points of entry on the territory of the inspected Party. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting inspectors, carry equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting monitors, carry equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities. The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane transporting inspectors or monitors in accordance with paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, or 15 of Section III of this Protocol.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use inspection airplanes of types specified in paragraph 3 of Annex 10 to this Protocol for the transportation of cargo specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol. Such airplanes may, at the same time that they are transporting such cargo, carry monitors, and equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, and, if such airplanes arrive at the point of entry, also inspectors and equipment intended for inspections. Such airplanes may carry only equipment, only supplies, or both at one and the same time. Flights of such airplanes shall take place only to the points of entry, and, for airplanes not transporting inspectors, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, into airports associated with

facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities. For airplanes making flights into airports associated with facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, the inspected Party shall have the right to provide an escort crew consisting of not more than two individuals (navigator and radio operator or navigator only) who shall board the inspection plane at the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall provide notification of each flight of an inspection airplane for the transportation of cargo in accordance with paragraph 17 of Section III of this Protocol and, if applicable, paragraph 3, 5, 6, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, or 18 of Section III of this Protocol.

5. During an operational dispersal conducted by one of the Parties, each flight of inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 4 of this Section, to transport monitors, and to transport cargo to the territory of the Party that has declared an operational dispersal, and to the territory of the Party that has declared the suspension of inspections in connection with such a dispersal conducted by the other Party, shall be agreed through diplomatic channels.

6. The inspecting Party shall have the right to use airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights to transport inspectors and monitors to those points of entry that are served by such airplanes. The provisions of this Protocol shall not affect airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights that are used for the transportation of inspectors and monitors to points of entry, or their aircrews. Inspectors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment intended for inspections. Monitors arriving on the territory of the inspected Party on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight shall have the right to bring equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities.

7. An inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section may transport equipment and supplies for more than one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility only if all such facilities are associated with the same point of entry and the flight is made to that point of entry.

8. Routes for flights of inspection airplanes to and from the points of entry that are used in accordance with this Section, and are listed in paragraph 10 of Annex 1 to the Memorandum of Understanding shall be the basis for issuing diplomatic clearance numbers. Each Party shall assign alternate airfields in accordance with the rules of the International Civil Aviation Organization.

9. Flight plans for inspection airplanes shall be filed in accordance with the procedures of the International Civil Aviation Organization applicable to civil aircraft. The inspecting Party shall include in the remarks section of each flight plan the standing diplomatic clearance number and the notation: "Inspection airplane. Priority clearance processing required."

10. No less than three hours before the scheduled time for departure of an inspection airplane from the last airfield prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall ensure that the flight plan of the inspection airplane, filed in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, is approved so that the inspection team or monitors may arrive at the point of entry by the estimated arrival time.

11. The call sign "START-XXX" shall be assigned to inspection airplanes. The same odd-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the United States of America (for example, 1XX, 3XX, 5XX) and the same even-hundred call sign shall be assigned to inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (for example, 2XX, 4XX, 6XX).

12. The number of aircrew members for each inspection airplane shall not exceed ten, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of aircrew members by no more than 15 for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of this Section, for the purpose of assisting in the delivery or removal of equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities or, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, for the purpose of conducting non-routine maintenance or repair of inspection airplanes located within the territory of the inspected Party.

13. The inspected Party shall provide parking, security protection, fueling, air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, for inspection airplanes of the inspecting Party at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The cost of parking and security protection for each such airplane shall be borne by the inspected Party. The cost of fueling and air navigation, airport facility, and ground technical and commercial services, as well as additional services as requested, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

14. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the maximum weight of equipment and supplies that may be brought into or taken out by one flight of an airplane transporting monitors through the point of entry in accordance with the provisions of this Section shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. This limitation on weight shall not apply to the cargo specified in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol.

V. Activities Beginning Upon Arrival at the Point of Entry

1. Inspection teams, monitors, and aircrew members shall arrive at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party that is associated with the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. As soon as the airplane lands, the in-country escort shall meet: the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection airplane; or the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled

commercial flight. The in-country escort shall expedite the entry of the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members, their baggage, and equipment intended for inspections, or equipment and supplies intended for continuous monitoring activities, into the territory of the inspected Party and shall accompany the inspection team and assist it in exercising its functions throughout the in-country period. The in-country escort shall have the right to accompany monitors and shall assist them in exercising their functions throughout the in-country period.

2. As soon as an airplane lands, diplomatic personnel of the Embassy or Consulate of the inspecting Party shall meet:

(a) the inspection team or monitors, and aircrew members arriving at the point of entry on an inspection airplane, or

(b) the inspection team or monitors arriving at the point of entry on an airplane making a regularly scheduled commercial flight.

Such diplomatic personnel may accompany inspectors and monitors only during the stay of the inspectors and monitors at the point of entry, but may accompany the aircrew members throughout the in-country period.

3. An inspection airplane arriving at the San Francisco point of entry shall land at Travis Air Force Base. No more than two diplomatic personnel of the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco shall be permitted to travel to Travis Air Force Base for the purpose of meeting inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members arriving there. For that purpose, the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco shall transmit to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, no less than four hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of such an airplane at Travis Air Force Base, a request for each such trip specifying the names of the diplomatic personnel involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved. In such cases, the diplomatic personnel so identified shall not, en route to Travis Air Force Base, be permitted to leave the free movement zone, as that zone is established in the Notes of the United States Department of State of March 18, 1983, and of November 16, 1983, earlier than four hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the inspection airplane. The diplomatic personnel so identified shall be granted access to the base no less than 30 minutes prior to the estimated time of arrival of such airplane.

4. The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for providing transportation to Travis Air Force Base of inspection teams and monitors that arrive at San Francisco International Airport on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights. In such cases, no more than two diplomatic personnel of the Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco shall be permitted to accompany such inspection teams or such monitors onto Travis Air Force Base. The Consulate General of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in San Francisco shall transmit no less than two hours prior to the estimated time of arrival of the inspection team or monitors at San Francisco International Airport a request for each such trip, specifying the names of the diplomatic personnel involved and the registration number of the vehicle involved, to the Department of State of the United States of America in Washington, D.C., by telephone, for the purpose of providing the diplomatic personnel so identified access to Travis Air Force Base in order to accompany inspection teams or monitors.

5. An inspector or monitor shall be considered to have assumed the duties of an inspector or monitor upon arrival at the point of entry on the territory of the inspected Party and shall be considered to have ceased performing those duties after departure from the territory of the inspected Party through the point of entry.

6. Throughout the in-country period, inspectors and monitors shall wear civilian clothes. During their stay at the inspection site, in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, and at other locations, as agreed by the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort, the inspectors and monitors shall wear unique badges provided by the inspecting Party.

7. Each Party shall ensure that equipment and supplies are exempt from all custom duties and are expeditiously processed at the point of entry.

8. Equipment and supplies that the inspecting Party, in accordance with paragraphs 15 and 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, brings into the country in which the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility is located shall be subject to examination each time they are brought into that country. Such equipment and supplies shall be examined by the in-country escort, in the presence of inspectors or monitors, or, for inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, in the presence of aircrew members. The purpose of such examination shall be to ascertain to the satisfaction of each Party that the equipment or supplies cannot perform functions unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities.

9. Equipment and supplies that inspectors or monitors bring on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section IV of this Protocol or on airplanes making regularly scheduled commercial flights shall be examined by the in-country escort at the point of entry. The examination of such equipment and supplies shall be completed prior to the departure of the inspection team or monitors from the point of entry for the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility.

10. Equipment and supplies transported on inspection airplanes used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol shall be examined in accordance with the provisions of Annex 7 to this Protocol.

11. If the inspected Party concludes as a result of an examination conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section that an item of equipment or supplies can perform functions

unconnected with the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspected Party may impound that item of equipment or supplies at the location of the examination. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or the monitored facility shall not be brought to an inspection site or to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party otherwise.

12. If, during the examination of equipment or supplies a member of the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies should not be cleared for use, the member of the in-country escort shall explain the reasons for that conclusion to the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team. If the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of inspections or continuous monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or the authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document and each of them shall retain a copy of the document. The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties.

13. If the inspected Party has not informed the inspecting Party of a different decision, the equipment or supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be removed no later than the departure from the country of the inspection team that brought the impounded equipment or supplies or no later than the next departure of monitors from the country. The impounded equipment or supplies may be removed from the country, at the choice of the inspecting Party, either on an inspection airplane or on a civil aircraft making a regularly scheduled commercial flight. Until such equipment or supplies have been removed from the country, they shall be stored at the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies.

14. Except as provided for in Annex 7 to this Protocol, each Party shall have the right to store equipment and supplies at the points of entry on the territory of the other Party. Storage of such equipment and supplies at each point of entry shall be within a secure structure or room. The inspecting Party may provide containers that are locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party, for storage of such equipment and supplies within the secure structure or room. The storage method used shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies.

15. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader shall, at or before the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, designate in writing to the inspected Party through the in-country escort, of the type of inspection and the inspection site, indicating its name and geographic coordinates. Such a designation of the inspection site shall be made either at the time specified in that notification at the airport of the point of entry, or, prior to that time, at the airport of the point of entry or at another place within the point of entry.

16. For reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, if prior to the departure of the inspection team for the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that there are no deployed ICBMs or SLBMs in all of the restricted areas of the ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the rail garrison or at a submarine base to be inspected, no later than one hour after such notification, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:

(a) inform the member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or of the submarine base shall take place. In this case such inspection shall count against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of Section IX of this Protocol;

(b) designate for inspection an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided in paragraph 15 of this Section or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol;

(c) decline to conduct the inspection and leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections of deployed ICBMs and SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

17. For a data update inspection at an air base for heavy bombers, except for an air base at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested; an air base for former heavy bombers; a training facility for heavy bombers; or a storage facility for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, that has been designated for inspection:

(a) If the number of heavy bombers, other than test heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers that are of types of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers based at the designated facility and that will be located at such facility at any time during the first 20 hours of the period of inspection, is less than 70 percent of the number of such airplanes specified as based at such facility, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site. In such a case, the inspection team leader shall have the right:

(i) to inform a member of the in-country escort that the inspection of the designated facility will proceed; or

(ii) to designate another inspection site; or

(iii) to decline to conduct the inspection. In such a case, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

(b) If the inspection team leader is not so informed, or if the inspection team leader is so informed but decides to continue the inspection, then prior to the departure of the inspection team to the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the name of the airfield within the national territory of the inspected Party at which will be located each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that is specified as based at the facility designated for inspection, and that will be absent from the inspection site but located within the national territory of the inspected Party during the period of the inspection. A member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader of the number and type of test heavy bombers that will be located at the inspection site at any time during the period that pre-inspection restrictions on heavy bombers and former heavy bombers will be in effect.

(c) For sequential inspections, the procedures provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph shall be carried out at the location at which the inspection team leader designates the subsequent inspection site pursuant to paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol.

18. Throughout the in-country period, the inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the inspectors, and aircrew members of the inspecting Party. Costs of all such services shall be borne by the inspected Party.

19. The inspected Party shall provide, or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, transportation, and, as necessary, urgent medical services for the monitors while the monitors are at the point of entry, shall provide or arrange for the provision of transportation in connection with travel between the point of entry or the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, and between the facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities; and, at the request of the inspecting Party, shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services while monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The cost of all services provided for monitors shall be distributed as follows:

(a) The cost of transportation and urgent medical services provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspected Party.

(b) The cost of meals and lodging provided while monitors are at the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(c) The cost of temporary and permanent lodging and work space provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, including utilities and maintenance for such lodging and work space, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(d) The cost of meals, provided at the request of the inspecting Party, while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(e) The cost of transportation of monitors that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 3 or 6 of Section IV of this Protocol, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(f) The cost of transportation of monitors, together with equipment and supplies that do not exceed the weight specified in accordance with paragraph 14 of Section IV of this Protocol, from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to another such facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(g) The cost of transportation of monitors from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party and back, pursuant to paragraph 29 of Section XVI of this Protocol, as well as the provision of transportation, meals, and lodging during such travel, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(h) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the point of entry to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and from such a facility to the point of entry shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(i) The cost of delivering equipment and supplies for continuous monitoring activities that arrive on an airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, and the cost of transporting the monitors that arrive on such an airplane, from the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to such a facility and from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(j) The cost of urgent evacuation of monitors, at the request of the inspecting Party, from the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to the point of entry or airport associated with such a facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(k) The cost of utilities and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including utilities and engineering support for the building for storage of equipment and supplies, shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

(l) The cost of transportation provided for monitors within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol shall be borne by the inspected Party.

(m) The cost of medical and other urgent services provided while the monitors are at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

20. For the goods and services provided by the inspected Party pursuant to paragraphs 18 and 19 of this Section, the following provisions shall apply:

(a) Meals for monitors, inspectors, and aircrew members shall be prepared meals and shall be served either in a dining facility or at a location agreed to by the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort.

(b) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members shall be of the following types:

(i) Lodging for inspectors and aircrew members provided at the point of entry, and for inspectors conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty at facilities where the elimination process occurs continuously or nearly continuously, shall be hotel-type accommodations.

(ii) Lodging for inspectors provided in all other cases shall be sufficient to permit inspectors to sleep. Such lodging need not be separate from the work space for inspectors provided at inspection sites.

(c) Lodging for monitors shall be in buildings built by the inspected Party for the inspecting Party, except that lodging for monitors at the point of entry shall be hotel-type accommodations. Until construction of such buildings is completed the inspected Party shall provide monitors with apartment-type accommodations in existing buildings.

(d) For transportation of inspectors and monitors, the following provisions shall apply:

(i) At the inspection site, the inspected Party shall provide a sufficient number of vehicles to transport the inspection team, and up to five vehicles to transport the subgroups that may be designated by the inspection team leader.

(ii) For monitors at the point of entry and within the zone where monitors may move with the permission of the inspected Party and within the free movement zone that are provided for in paragraph 8 of Section XVI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide vehicles. The drivers of such vehicles shall be considered to be members of the in-country escort.

21. The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for the provision of meals, lodging, work space, transportation, and, as necessary, medical and other urgent services for the escort crew of the inspected Party pursuant to paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol while such escort crew is at or in the vicinity of the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. Costs for all such services shall be borne by the inspecting Party. The inspecting Party shall provide or arrange for transportation of the escort crew to the last airfield from which the inspection airplane will depart prior to entering the airspace of the inspected Party. The cost for such travel shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

22. Coverage of the activities of inspection teams and monitoring teams by representatives of the mass media on the territory of the inspected Party shall be arranged as follows:

(a) at the points of entry the inspected Party shall provide such representatives an opportunity to photograph and televise the arrival and departure of inspection teams and monitoring teams;

(b) the Parties shall agree on a case-by-case basis through diplomatic channels to provide representatives of the mass media an opportunity to interview inspectors and monitors, to include taking photographs and making audio-visual recordings;

(c) the activities of representatives of the mass media shall be arranged so that such activities do not interfere with the conduct of inspections, continuous monitoring activities, or the process of elimination; and

(d) the Parties shall not allow representatives of the mass media to accompany inspectors during inspections or monitors during the conduct of continuous monitoring activities.

VI. General Rules for the Conduct of Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

1. Inspectors and monitors shall discharge their functions in accordance with this Protocol.

2. Inspectors and monitors shall not disclose information obtained during inspections or continuous monitoring activities except with the express consent of the inspecting Party. They shall remain bound by this obligation after their assignments as inspectors or monitors have ended.

3. The boundaries of an inspection site shall be the boundaries of the facility specified on the site diagram that is received pursuant to the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams relating to the Treaty of July 31, 1991, or provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

4. At any facility containing non-contiguous parts of an inspection site that are connected with roads depicted on the site diagram, such roads shall not be considered part of the inspection site. Containers, launch canisters, or vehicles located on such roads shall not be subject to inspection until such containers, launch canisters, or vehicles enter the inspection site during the period of inspection. An item that is transported from one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility shall not be considered to be in transit provided it is transported directly on roads shown on the site diagram.

5. In discharging their functions, inspectors and monitors shall communicate with personnel of the inspected Party only through the in-country escort.

6. Except as provided for in this Protocol, inspectors and monitors shall not interfere with ongoing activities at an inspection site or a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility and shall not hamper or delay the operation of a facility. Inspectors and monitors shall take no actions affecting the safe operation of a facility.

7. In carrying out their activities, inspectors and monitors shall observe safety regulations established at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area including those for personal safety, as well as regulations for the protection of equipment and maintenance of the controlled environment within a facility. The in-country escort shall provide safety briefings in the inspected Party's language. These briefings shall be interpreted by the inspected Party into the inspecting Party's language. The inspected Party shall provide, as necessary, individual protective gear.

8. A member of the in-country escort shall ensure necessary lighting for inspectors and monitors to carry out the procedures provided for in this Protocol.

9. If inspectors or monitors, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the in-country escort may inform the inspection team leader or the monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the in-country escort may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include in the report a response to such a statement.

10. If members of the in-country escort, in discharging their duties, take actions that are not in accordance with the rules and procedures governing the conduct of inspections or continuous monitoring activities, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader, or an authorized representative of such a team, may inform the in-country escort, who shall take appropriate measures to prevent a repetition of such actions. If the questions or ambiguities are not resolved at the site, the inspection team leader or monitoring team leader may include a statement in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report concerning such actions, and the in-country escort may include in the report a response to such a statement.

11. Except as otherwise provided in this Protocol, the movement and travel of inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall be at the discretion of the in-country escort. In case of need for the urgent departure or emergency evacuation of inspectors or monitors from the territory of the inspected Party or urgent travel to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspecting Party shall inform the inspected Party of the need for such such departure, evacuation, or travel and the nature of the urgency or emergency. The inspected Party shall arrange without undue delay such departure, evacuation, or travel. The inspecting Party, may, on a case-by-case basis, with the permission of the inspected Party, evacuate inspectors or monitors, using its own airplane and at its own expense, from the airport closest to the inspection site or the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In all cases, the inspected Party shall determine the means of transportation and routes involved in travel. During each such departure, evacuation, or travel, the inspected Party shall have the right to examine the personal baggage of inspectors or monitors, except papers.

12. At an inspection site, representatives of the inspected facility shall be included among the in-country escort. For continuous monitoring activities, the Parties shall designate, at each of their facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities, an in-country escort. The inspected Party shall ensure that a member of the in-country escort at the facility is continuously available to monitors either in person or by telephone.

13. Throughout the period of stay at the point of entry, at the inspection site, or at the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall ensure that the inspectors and monitors can be in communication with the embassy of the inspecting Party located on the territory of the inspected Party using telephonic communications provided by the inspected Party. Monitors shall also have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 16, 17, and 18 of Section XVI of this Protocol, to use a satellite system for communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party. The inspected Party shall provide means of communication between inspection team subgroups. Such means of communication shall be under the control of the inspected Party.

14. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team from the point of entry to the inspection site no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section III of this Protocol, except that for inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Treaty at ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site no later than 24 hours after that time. If an inspection is conducted after completion of a previous inspection as provided for in paragraph 36 of this Section, the inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the inspection site within the following time periods:

(a) no later than nine hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the point of entry; or

(b) no later than 18 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol, if such a notification is provided at the inspection site.

15. The inspection team shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8 and 9 of Section V of this Protocol, to bring onto the inspection site

documents intended for inspections, as well as equipment, the maximum number of which for any specific item shall not exceed the number specified in Annex 8 to this Protocol for the corresponding item in the list of equipment for any given type of inspection. During its stay at the inspection site the inspection team shall have the right to store the equipment in the work space for inspectors. Such equipment shall be stored under the control of the inspection team. Throughout the in-country period the inspectors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment.

16. Monitors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 9, and 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to bring, and shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 10 of Section V of this Protocol and of Annex 7 to this Protocol, to deliver to each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility documents intended for continuous monitoring activities, as well as equipment provided for in Annexes 8 and 9 to this Protocol and supplies. Throughout the in-country period the monitors shall permit the in-country escort to observe such equipment and supplies, except when those supplies are located in the living quarters for the monitors, and except when such equipment and supplies are located in their office premises that enjoy inviolability or protection in accordance with subparagraph 7(b) of Section II of this Protocol.

17. The inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list of items of equipment, provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, if not previously provided. Technical specifications of such items of equipment shall be agreed by the Parties without undue delay and prior to the first time such items of equipment are brought or delivered to the territory of the inspected Party. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace, upon agreement with the inspected Party, equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol with other equipment, subject to the following provisions:

(a) If the purpose and characteristics of the replacement equipment are similar to the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol, such equipment shall, at the choice of the inspected Party, be agreed upon either before such equipment is delivered to the territory of the inspected Party or upon completion of the examination of the equipment conducted in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section V of this Protocol or in accordance with paragraph 4 or 8 of Annex 7 to this Protocol when applicable. For that purpose, the inspecting Party shall provide to the inspected Party through diplomatic channels a list and description of such equipment, indicating the manufacturer's name and the model, if available, and the type of inspection or the place in the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system where the equipment will be used or installed. This list and this description shall be provided in the time agreed for the provision of the inventory in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol.

(b) If the Parties have not reached agreement regarding the replacement equipment in accordance with subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, or if the purpose or characteristics of the replacement equipment differ from the purpose and characteristics of the equipment provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol, the question of the use of such equipment shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

18. During an inspection or continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to use any of the equipment specified in Annex 8 or 9 to this Protocol for a specific type of inspection or for continuous monitoring activities, except for cameras, which shall be used only by the inspected Party, at the request of the inspecting Party. At the request of the inspectors or monitors, a member of the in-country escort shall take photographs in order to obtain two photographs of each object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area, designated by the inspectors or monitors, relating to which questions or ambiguities have arisen. One camera on a tripod shall be allowed for taking two photographs in sequence. Each Party shall retain one photograph of each item. The photographic equipment furnished by the inspecting Party shall be capable of producing instant development photographs.

19. Measurements recorded during inspections or continuous monitoring activities shall be certified by the signatures of an inspector or a monitor and a member of the in-country escort immediately after they are taken. Such certified data shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report. The result of each measurement of the weight or dimensions that deviates by no more than three percent from the relevant technical data provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty shall be considered acceptable.

20. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of inspection is understood to mean:

(a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: an ICBM or SLBM, a first stage of an ICBM or SLBM maintained, stored, and transported in stages, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or support equipment of the inspected Party;

(b) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and close-out inspections at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers: a heavy bomber or a former heavy bomber of the inspected Party;

(c) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at weapons storage areas that

are subject to inspection at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers: the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party;

(d) for suspect-site inspections: an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or a solid rocket motor for a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party; and

(e) for post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles: a mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site or, for such an inspection at a maintenance facility, a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the inspected Party attributed to the inspection site.

21. For the purposes of this Protocol, an item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or a first stage of such an ICBM, if such an ICBM is maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

22. For the purposes of this Protocol, for each structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or object, the expression "large enough to contain" or "large enough to be" an item of inspection or item of continuous monitoring is understood to mean that each of the measured linear dimensions, that is, length, width, height, and diameter, of such structure, container, launch canister, covered or environmentally protected object, vehicle, or other object is determined to be 97 percent or more of the corresponding linear dimensions specified for that item.

23. For each Party, the size criteria used in inspections shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of inspection of that Party, except that, for items of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM. The specific size criteria for inspections are provided in paragraphs 1 and 2 of Annex 12 to this Protocol. The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be:

(a) for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers:

(i) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage;

(ii) for ICBMs and SLBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM or SLBM of each type and 90 percent of the length of that stage, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and

(iii) for ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters: the diameter and length of an ICBM of each type in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM of that type without the front section, except for such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(b) for suspect-site inspections: the diameter of the first stage of an ICBM of each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the agreed percentage of the length of that stage.

24. For each Party, the size criteria used in continuous monitoring shall be determined on the basis of the diameters and lengths of all the reference cylinders for the items of continuous monitoring of that Party, except that, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics existing as of Treaty signature, such size criteria shall be determined on the basis of the diameter and length of the reference cylinder for the SS-25 ICBM. These criteria shall be used at the portals of all monitored facilities of the inspected Party. The specific size criteria for continuous monitoring are provided in paragraph 3 of Annex 12 to this Protocol. The lengths and diameters of the reference cylinders shall be determined as follows:

(a) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters: 90 percent of the diameter and 90 percent of the length of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in the shipment configuration that is the shortest configuration specified that holds an assembled ICBM of that type without the front section;

(b) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in stages: the diameter and length of the first stage of an ICBM of that type; and

(c) for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters: as agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

25. The size criteria for inspection of containers or vehicles at a monitored facility producing ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a type of ICBM to which more than one warhead is attributed, conducted pursuant to paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, shall be determined using a reference cylinder whose diameter is 97 percent of the diameter of the first stage and whose length is 97 percent of the distance from the lower edge of the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case of the first stage of an ICBM of that type.

26. If the inspection team or monitoring team is unable to carry out a procedure chosen by the inspected Party in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol to confirm that a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, vehicle, structure, or other object is or is not an item of inspection or an item of continuous monitoring either because such a team has not brought to the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area agreed equipment to carry out that procedure or if, through no fault of the

inspected Party, equipment brought by the inspecting Party for that procedure cannot function, the inspected Party shall have the right to decline to choose another procedure for such demonstration.

27. During an inspection or during continuous monitoring activities, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to request clarification. Such requests shall be made promptly through the in-country escort. The in-country escort shall provide clarifications that may be useful in resolving questions and ambiguities. In the event questions and ambiguities relating to an object or building located within the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area are not resolved, the inspected Party shall photograph such object or building at the request of the inspecting Party. If questions or ambiguities remain at the end of the inspection, or for continuous monitoring activities, at the end of the period covered by the report provided for in paragraph 2 of Section XVIII of this Protocol, relevant clarifications shall be included in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, and each photograph retained by the Party shall be considered to be an integral part of the report.

28. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 9, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty during the 165-day period after entry into force of the Treaty, shall include no more than 15 inspectors. After expiration of that period, such an inspection team shall include no more than 10 inspectors. An inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty shall include no more than 20 inspectors. A monitoring team shall include no more than 30 monitors, except that the inspecting Party shall have the right to exceed that number of monitors at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility by:

(a) no more than 15 monitors for the engineering site survey and establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for no more than an aggregate of 90 days, unless the Parties agree otherwise;

(b) no more than five monitors for the maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system for a period of no more than seven days for each visit by monitors for such purpose and for no more than an aggregate of 84 days each year for each monitored facility, after the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system is established, unless the Parties agree otherwise; and

(c) no more than 40 monitors for a period of no more than five days during the replacement of monitors in accordance with paragraph 30 of this Section.

At least two inspectors or monitors on each inspection team or monitoring team shall speak the language of the inspected Party. An inspection team or monitoring team shall operate under the direction of the team leader and depart with it. There shall be no more than one inspection team or monitoring team at each inspection site or at each perimeter continuous monitoring area, respectively, at any one time. Upon arrival at the inspection site, the inspection team leader shall have the right to indicate subgroups consisting of no fewer than two inspectors each.

29. Pre-inspection procedures, including safety briefings and the provision of information relating to the conduct of the inspection and the inspection site, shall begin upon arrival of the inspection team or monitors at the inspection site or perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall be completed within one hour. The inspection team shall begin the inspection immediately upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

30. Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader may designate not less than one subgroup from among the members of the inspection team to inspect vehicles leaving the inspection site in such a way that, in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, the operation of the facility is not hampered or delayed. If a subgroup of the inspection team is not designated, vehicles shall be free to depart the facility.

31. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 10, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall not exceed 24 hours. By agreement with the in-country escort, the period of inspection may be extended by no more than eight hours, except that in case of an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 4, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall be extended for the time necessary to complete the inspection. Such an extension, with respect to baseline data inspections and new facility inspections of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be determined, as agreed by the Parties in each specific case, taking into account the time required to complete the inspection of all restricted areas and the maintenance facility of the designated base after the return of all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to the restricted area. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty, the period of inspection shall terminate upon completion of the inspection procedures, and as provided for in paragraph 16 of Annex 2 to this Protocol upon the entry of the inspection team at the location designated by the inspected Party for conducting post-inspection procedures.

32. Post-inspection procedures, which include completing the inspection report in accordance with the provisions of Section XVIII of this Protocol, shall begin, when the period of inspection expires, at the location designated by the inspected Party and shall be completed no later than four hours after the arrival of the inspection team at that location, or no later than three hours after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at that location, whichever is later.

33. For the purposes of this Protocol, a sequential inspection is understood to mean an inspection conducted by an inspection team after the completion of an inspection and prior to the departure of the team from the territory of the inspected Party. Sequential inspections shall be conducted only at facilities associated with the same point of entry by an inspection team that has not left the territory of the inspected Party.

34. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, prior to an inspection of a structure within the inspection site, inspectors may be present at the exits of the structure whose entrances and exits are large enough to permit passage of an item of inspection. During an inspection of such a structure, no object, container, or vehicle shall leave the structure until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she has no intention to inspect it.

35. For an inspection conducted pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, or 7 of Article XI of the Treaty, inspectors shall have the right during the period of inspection to patrol the perimeter of the inspection site and to be present at the exits of the site. No vehicle shall leave the inspection site during the period of inspection until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

36. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the pre-inspection procedures, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol, and then, prior to completion of post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the return of the inspection team to the point of entry, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section III of this Protocol. No facility may be designated for inspection more than one time by each inspection team.

37. If the inspection team intends to conduct a sequential inspection pursuant to paragraph 8, 9, 11, 12, or 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspection team leader, prior to completion of the post-inspection procedures but no less than 24 hours before the planned commencement of the sequential inspection, shall provide a notification in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section III of this Protocol. Arrangements for rest and the timing of the departure of the inspection team and of its arrival at the next inspection site shall be as agreed by the Parties.

38. If the inspection team does not intend to conduct another inspection, upon completion of the post-inspection procedures the inspection team shall return to the point of entry and then shall leave, within 24 hours, the territory of the inspected Party.

39. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace monitors, subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section:

(a) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility no more than 34 times each year, provided that the replacement of monitors directly at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility may be conducted no more than once in each three-week period; and

(b) directly at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or at the airport associated with such facility when an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol arrives at such an airport.

One replacement of monitors counted against the limits provided for in this paragraph is understood to mean one arrival of monitors on the territory of the inspected Party in accordance with the notification provided for in paragraph 14 of Section III of this Protocol. The number of departures of such monitors from the territory of the inspected Party shall not exceed 34 in each year.

40. Monitors for the purpose of maintaining the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system at a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party subject to the limits provided for in paragraph 39 of this Section and subject to the provisions of paragraph 28 of this Section. Such monitors may arrive together with or separately from replacement monitors.

VII. Baseline Data Inspections, Data Update Inspections, and New Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections beginning 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and ending 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty.

2. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section, each Party shall have the right to conduct data update inspections 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of 15 such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility.

3. In infrequent special cases, and for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, the inspected Party may temporarily exempt appropriate air bases from data update inspections. Notification of such exemptions shall be provided through diplomatic channels along with an explanation of the reason for the exemption.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct new facility inspections 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter. Such inspections shall be conducted at facilities that were not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol and that were specified in notifications provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted at such a facility no later than 60 days after such notification has been provided. Such a facility shall not be subject to any other inspection before a new facility inspection has been conducted or, if no such inspection has been conducted, before the 60-day period for conducting such an inspection has expired.

5. Each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile

launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers, except for air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested; and air bases for former heavy bombers. In addition, only for the inspection of weapons storage areas, each Party shall have the right to conduct baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections at air bases at which are based only heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested.

6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes its pre-inspection procedures, except as provided for in subparagraph 12(d) of this Section:

(a) For facilities other than facilities specified in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, ICBMs or SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment of the inspected Party; containers, launch canisters, and closed vehicles large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party; and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection of the inspected Party, as determined by paragraph 22 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall not be removed from the inspection site.

(b) For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, storage facilities for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of types of airplanes based at the inspected facility, shall not leave the inspection site. For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, closed vehicles and containers large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be a long-range nuclear ALCM of the inspected Party, and ALCMs large enough to be long-range nuclear ALCMs of the inspected Party shall not be removed from the weapons storage area.

(c) For facilities that contain non-contiguous parts of an inspection site, once pre-inspection restrictions are in effect at the facility, a container, launch canister, or vehicle that has departed one non-contiguous part of a facility and is en route to another non-contiguous part of the same facility shall not be subject to pre-inspection restrictions until the container, launch canister, or vehicle enters an inspection site.

7. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than a total of ten baseline data inspections and new facility inspections at any one time, and no more than one such inspection at each facility. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one data update inspection at any one time.

8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of ICBMs, SLBMs, first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, ballistic missile submarines, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, empty launch canisters, support equipment, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers at that inspection site. At the same time, the member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the location at the inspection site of such items and the structures or vehicles in which they are located. The following shall also apply:

(a) In the case of air bases at which, pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection, such information shall not be provided.

(b) For an inspection conducted at an ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs, if a member of the in-country escort informs the inspection team leader that there are more ICBMs at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base than provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, a member of the in-country escort shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs that do not contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty.

(c) For an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and for an inspection conducted at an air base for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, except for air bases at which only the weapons storage area is subject to inspection pursuant to paragraph 5 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the numbers, by category, type, and, if applicable, variant, of any heavy bombers that are on alert and the area where those heavy bombers are located. During pre-inspection procedures at air bases for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which each type and variant of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs is actually equipped, indicating the numbers, by type and, if applicable, variant, of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs based and located at the air base that are specified, for the United States of America, to be in excess of 150 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(e) of Article III of the Treaty, or, for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, to be in excess of 180 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, as provided for in subparagraph 4(f) of Article III of the Treaty.

(d) If any of the items specified for an inspection site are absent from the inspection site at the time of the arrival of

the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type and, if applicable, variant, and the reason for the absence of each item. For a facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, a member of the in-country escort shall also provide, in addition to the information provided at the point of entry pursuant to subparagraph 17(b) of Section V of this Protocol, the category of each such heavy bomber and, for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are located outside national territory of the inspected Party, the general location of each such airplane.

(c) At a facility that contains non-contiguous parts of an inspection site connected by roads depicted on a site diagram, if any of those items declared absent are located on the roads connecting one non-contiguous part of the facility to another non-contiguous part of the facility, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the type, and if applicable, variant of a type, and reason for the absence of each item, its approximate location, and, its estimated time of arrival at an inspection site. Such items shall return to the inspection site not later than 18 hours after the commencement of the inspection.

9. For data update inspections and new facility inspections, the inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs except for such ICBMs deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs and except for such ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* and for which a member of the in-country escort has specified geographic coordinates in accordance with subparagraph 12(b) of this Section.

10. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to confirm that ICBMs or SLBMs declared to be training models of missiles, or launch canisters declared to contain training models of missiles, are training models of missiles or contain such training models of missiles.

11. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. If the number of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base exceeds the number provided for in subparagraph 1(c) of Article IV of the Treaty, the inspectors shall have the right to inspect the silo launchers of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain ICBMs but that are considered to contain ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspection of such a silo launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM. If the inspection team intends to inspect such silo launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader, upon completion of pre-inspection procedures, shall designate the silo launchers of ICBMs to be inspected and shall indicate a subgroup or subgroups, each consisting of no more than four inspectors, to conduct such inspections. No later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures, the inspected Party shall transport a subgroup of the inspection team to the silo launcher of ICBMs designated to be inspected.

12. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) The inspected Party shall return all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside restricted areas to the restricted areas of the ICBM base to be inspected except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located at a maintenance facility, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are engaged in a relocation, and road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that cannot return to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*. The return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be completed within the following period of time:

(i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection; or

(ii) for data update inspections, no later than 24 hours after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol.

(b) For each restricted area, a member of the in-country escort shall, in addition to the information provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to the restricted area. Such information shall be provided within the following periods of time:

(i) for baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a)(i) of this paragraph has elapsed; or

(ii) for data update inspections, during pre-inspection procedures, when the period of time for the return of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with subparagraph (a)(ii) of this paragraph has elapsed.

For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, the inspected Party may, at its own choosing, either designate the geographic coordinates of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, or transport the inspectors to such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(c) Prior to the completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the inspection team leader shall designate which restricted area or restricted areas are to be inspected. For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected. For these purposes, the inspection team may be divided into at least two subgroups, each of which may independently inspect the designated locations. For data update inspections, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect one restricted area and the maintenance facility that are part of the

ICBM base to be inspected. If an inspection of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to their restricted areas due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* is permitted pursuant to subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the inspection team leader shall also indicate whether the inspection team intends to inspect those road-mobile launchers of ICBMs whose geographic coordinates were not designated in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, and shall indicate the subgroup assigned for this purpose.

(d) Pre-inspection restrictions with respect to each of the restricted areas designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until the arrival there of the inspectors. For data update inspections, pre-inspection restrictions with respect to restricted areas not designated for inspection in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph shall remain in effect until six hours after the completion of the pre-inspection procedures.

(e) The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the restricted area designated for inspection without undue delay and within the following period of time:

(i) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or

(ii) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

During the period of inspection, road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within these restricted areas at the time the inspection begins may depart such areas only with the consent of the inspectors.

(f) The maintenance facility and restricted areas shall be inspected subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

13. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the maintenance facility and the rail garrison, including all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, parking sites, and associated structures except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored, that are part of the ICBM base to be inspected, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

(b) For baseline data inspections and new facility inspections, the inspected Party shall concentrate at the inspected ICBM base all rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs attributed to that ICBM base no later than 18 hours after the commencement of the period of inspection.

(c) During the period of inspection, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within the inspected ICBM base at the time the inspection begins may leave it only with the consent of the inspectors.

(d) The inspected Party shall provide the inspectors with the necessary transportation to permit them to inspect all rail lines within the inspected ICBM base during the daylight hours of the period of inspection.

14. For air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers:

(a) The inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, of a type specified as based at that air base, that were located at the inspected facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect or that have returned to the facility in accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph. Alert heavy bombers, however, shall be subject to inspection only in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph. Heavy bombers of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested and test heavy bombers shall not be subject to inspection. Such inspections shall be conducted to confirm the data on the numbers, by type and, if applicable, category and variant, of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers; and to confirm that:

(i) heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for more long-range nuclear ALCMs than the number provided for in paragraph 20 or 21 of Article V of the Treaty, as applicable;

(ii) heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs; and

(iii) heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers satisfy the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(b) For baseline data and new facility inspections at such facilities, the inspected Party, no later than 20 hours after commencement of the period of inspection, shall concentrate at the inspected facility all heavy bombers and former heavy bombers specified for it except for such heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, mechanical incapability, or temporary stationing outside the national territory of the inspected Party for purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty, cannot return to the inspected facility.

(c) Inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.

(d) Inspectors shall have the right to inspect one alert heavy bomber of each type, category, and, if applicable, variant each year during baseline data inspections and data update inspections. Only heavy bombers loaded with nuclear armaments shall be considered to be alert heavy bombers.

(e) For inspections at such facilities, except for inspections at air bases for heavy bombers only of a type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, the item of inspection shall be a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber. For structures within the

boundaries of the inspection site large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain whether or not that structure contains a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber.

(f) For air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect all weapons storage areas, and to inspect all covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM of a type for which notifications of data according to categories of data contained in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding have been provided, to confirm the absence of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Such inspections shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.

15. For test ranges, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, except that for silo launchers of ICBMs located at the test range being inspected, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect, at its choice, no more than one silo launcher of ICBMs that the inspected Party declares not to contain ICBMs. Inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs shall be conducted subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol for the purpose of confirming that it does not contain an ICBM.

16. For facilities other than those facilities specified in paragraphs 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15 of this Section, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

17. For test ranges, conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM bases, the inspection team shall have the right to inspect all launch canisters declared to be empty at each test range, conversion or elimination facility for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs, and ICBM base.

VIII. Suspect-Site Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct suspect-site inspections. Following each suspect-site inspection conducted by the inspecting Party, the number of data update inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Section VII of this Protocol, shall be reduced by one for that year.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct suspect-site inspections at each facility specified as subject to suspect-site inspections in paragraph 12 of Annex 1 to the Memorandum of Understanding or in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, if it is provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section.

3. A Party shall specify a facility as subject to suspect-site inspection and provide a notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for:

(a) each facility that after entry into force of the Treaty begins to produce ICBMs or SLBMs as large or larger than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the inspected Party and is not subject to continuous monitoring, unless otherwise agreed; and

(b) each facility at which continuous monitoring has ceased.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one suspect-site inspection at any one time. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two such inspections each year at the same facility.

5. The Parties may agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to remove a facility from the list of facilities subject to suspect-site inspection.

6. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, vehicles, containers, and launch canisters large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site.

7. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

IX. Reentry Vehicle Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct reentry vehicle inspections. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of ten reentry vehicle inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct reentry vehicle inspections at ICBM bases and at submarine bases.

3. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than one reentry vehicle inspection at any one time. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection simultaneously with any other type of inspection at the same facility. No more than one ICBM or SLBM may be inspected during each reentry vehicle inspection, except as provided for in paragraph 18 of this Section.

4. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-

inspection restrictions at the ICBM base or submarine base, including the waters within five kilometers of the boundary of the submarine base.

(a) The inspected Party shall not open silo doors of silo launchers of ICBMs or hatches of launchers of SLBMs that were closed at the time the restrictions were implemented.

(b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs or SLBMs from silo launchers of ICBMs or launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented.

(c) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(d) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs or SLBMs in silo launchers of ICBMs or in launchers of SLBMs that were open at the time the restrictions were implemented.

(e) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal or installation of front sections of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(f) The inspected Party shall not remove mobile launchers of ICBMs from restricted areas or from rail garrisons.

(g) The inspected Party shall not move rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs into the maintenance facility.

(h) The inspected Party shall not move any ballistic missile submarine any farther than five kilometers from the boundary of the submarine base, and shall not commence dry docking of such submarines.

5. In addition to the provisions provided for in paragraph 4 of this Section, upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, the inspected Party shall not move mobile launchers of ICBMs that are located in restricted areas or the rail garrison, or ballistic missile submarines to which pre-inspection restrictions apply.

6. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall not apply to work conducted to deal with an emergency involving a launcher, missile, or submarine.

7. Pre-inspection restrictions provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of this Section shall remain in effect until the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section have been completed, and for a launcher of ICBMs, fixed structure, restricted area, or ballistic missile submarine designated by the inspection team leader until inspectors have arrived at that location.

8. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall:

(a) For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs, inform the inspection team leader of the number of silo launchers of ICBMs for each type of ICBM based there, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the designator and location of each of those launchers at that base. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that base, the site diagram shall show the silo launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM.

(b) For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base annotated to show the type of ICBM for each restricted area.

(c) For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the ICBM base, if there is such a diagram, and a copy of the site diagram of the rail garrison annotated to show the location of each of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside fixed structures at the rail garrison. If more than one type of ICBM is specified for that ICBM base, the site diagram shall show the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs by type of ICBM. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility shall not be shown on the site diagram.

(d) For submarine bases, inform the inspection team leader of the location and type of each ballistic missile submarine to which pre-inspection restrictions apply, and of the type of SLBM for each such submarine, and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of a site diagram or map of the submarine base annotated to show the waters within five kilometers of the boundary of the submarine base, the coastline, the location of each ballistic missile submarine, and the number of launchers on each submarine.

9. Upon the completion of pre-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall designate in writing to a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected. The inspection team leader shall also have the right to designate for inspection, in the cases provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, one of the launchers of ICBMs or SLBMs, one of the fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or one of the restricted areas declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or deployed SLBM, and shall designate a subgroup consisting of no more than four inspectors to conduct such an inspection. The inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 2 to this Protocol. The inspection of such a fixed structure shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 1 to this Protocol. After a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs has been designated in accordance with paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall brief the inspectors on the route they will travel to reach the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

10. For ICBM bases for silo launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.

(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no silo launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a

deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its designator or geographic coordinates, the silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected.

(c) If the designated silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected.

(d) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the silo launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a silo launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM.

11. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.

(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected ICBM base contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using its name or geographic coordinates, the restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

(c) If no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another restricted area in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

(d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no road-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the designated restricted area contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the site diagram of that restricted area annotated to show the location of each of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located outside of fixed structures in this restricted area, and the inspection team leader shall designate, using that site diagram, the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, or fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, in which the ICBM to be inspected is located.

(e) If a designated fixed structure contains more than one road-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram. The inspection team leader shall designate on the annotated site diagram the road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains the ICBM to be inspected.

(f) If a designated fixed structure for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated road-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected from among those fixed structures or launchers located in the same restricted area.

(g) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that a member of the in-country escort has identified, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (f) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such fixed structures or such road-mobile launchers of ICBMs do not contain deployed ICBMs. The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate:

(i) All fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and all road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located in one of the restricted areas of the inspected ICBM base, if a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that the ICBM base does not contain deployed ICBMs for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

(ii) In all other cases, one of the fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, that, in accordance with subparagraph (f) of this paragraph, a member of the in-country escort has identified for the inspection team leader as not containing a deployed ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs.

12. For ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(a) If no rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.

(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs at the inspected rail garrison contains a deployed ICBM, the inspection team leader, using the annotated site diagram provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, shall designate the launcher or fixed structure containing the ICBM to be inspected. Rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at the maintenance facility may not be designated for reentry vehicle inspection.

(c) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs contains more than one rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of their locations using the annotated site diagram. The inspection team leader shall designate on the site diagram the launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.

(d) If a designated fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or a designated rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who

shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another fixed structure or another launcher containing the ICBM to be inspected.

(e) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs or one of the rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed ICBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such a fixed structure or such a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs does not contain a deployed ICBM.

13. For submarine bases:

(a) If no launcher of SLBMs at the submarine base contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader.

(b) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher at the base contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate, using the annotated site diagram or map provided for in paragraph 8 of this Section, the ballistic missile submarine containing the SLBM to be inspected.

(c) If no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate for inspection, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, another ballistic missile submarine.

(d) Unless a member of the in-country escort has informed the inspection team leader that no SLBM launcher on the designated submarine contains a deployed SLBM, the inspection team leader shall designate the SLBM launcher containing the SLBM to be inspected.

(e) If the designated SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM, a member of the in-country escort shall so inform the inspection team leader, who shall designate, in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph, another SLBM launcher from among those SLBM launchers located on the same ballistic missile submarine.

(f) The inspection team leader shall have the right to designate for inspection one of the SLBM launchers identified by a member of the in-country escort, in accordance with subparagraph (c) or (e) of this paragraph, as not containing deployed SLBMs. The purpose of such an inspection shall be to confirm that such an SLBM launcher does not contain a deployed SLBM.

(g) SLBM launchers on submarines in dry dock may not be designated for a reentry vehicle inspection.

14. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs that contain the deployed ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, without undue delay and within the following period of time:

(a) to a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs: no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;

(b) to an SLBM launcher: no later than three hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;

(c) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;

(d) to a restricted area located at a straight line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures; or

(e) to a silo launcher of ICBMs: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

The times for transportation of an inspection team, provided for in this paragraph, shall also apply to the transportation of subgroups of an inspection team to the designated launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, to the designated restricted area, or to the designated fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that they do not contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM.

15. For the purposes of this Section, a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs containing an ICBM or SLBM without a front section shall be considered not to contain an ICBM or SLBM; in this connection, the inspection of such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in subparagraph 7(c) of Annex 3 to this Protocol.

16. Reentry vehicle inspections shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 3 to this Protocol.

17. If a front section of an ICBM or SLBM to be inspected is viewed at a location outside the boundaries of the inspection site, the provisions of Section VI of this Protocol pertaining to the inspection site shall apply to that location, except for paragraph 3 of Section VI of this Protocol.

18. If an inspection team subgroup conducting an inspection, in accordance with paragraph 9 of this Section, of a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs or a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs declared not to contain a deployed ICBM or SLBM discovers that such a launcher or fixed structure contains an ICBM or SLBM, the inspection team may inspect that ICBM or SLBM in addition to the ICBM or SLBM previously designated for inspection. The inspection of such an ICBM or SLBM shall not be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.

19. If a member of the in-country escort has reported that the ICBM base or submarine base to be inspected does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs, the inspection team leader shall have the right to:

(a) designate an inspection site associated with the same point of entry in accordance with the provisions provided for in paragraph 16 of Section V, or in paragraph 36 or 37 of Section VI of this Protocol;

(b) designate for inspection a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, restricted area, or fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in subparagraph 10(d), 11(g), 12(e), or 13(f) of this Section, to confirm that such a launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, fixed structure, or restricted area does not contain deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs. In this case the inspection shall be counted against the quota provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section; or

(c) to decline to conduct an inspection and to leave the territory of the inspected Party. In this case the number of reentry vehicle inspections for deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

X. Post-Dispersal Inspections of Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and their Associated Missiles Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 7 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles after a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol. Such inspections shall be conducted at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification, subject to the following:

(a) for an exercise dispersal that involved only road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater;

(b) for an exercise dispersal that involved only rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater;

(c) for an exercise dispersal that involved both road-mobile and rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, the inspecting Party shall have the right to inspect no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater, and no more than 40 percent of the total number of ICBM bases for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs that were involved in the dispersal, or one such ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, whichever is greater.

2. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with any other type of inspection at the same inspection site. Neither Party shall have the right to conduct, at the same inspection site, a post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles concurrently with the implementation of cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification.

3. From the time of completion of an exercise dispersal specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section II of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement the following pre-inspection restrictions at all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in such a notification:

(a) Mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles shall not be removed from restricted areas, rail garrisons, or maintenance facilities.

(b) The inspected Party shall not begin any work associated with the removal of ICBMs from mobile launchers of ICBMs, except that such work shall be permitted at the maintenance facility.

Pre-inspection restrictions shall not apply to work carried out to deal with an emergency involving a launcher or a missile.

4. All ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall be designated by the inspection team leaders in accordance with paragraph 15 of Section V of this Protocol and within the time provided for in subparagraph 4(c) of Section III of this Protocol. If an inspection team leader has designated an inspection site less than four hours after arrival at the point of entry and before the inspected Party has completed the examination of equipment brought in by the inspectors, the inspected Party shall have the right to complete that examination after the designation of the inspection site by the inspection team leader. The period for the transportation of the inspection team to the inspection site, provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall begin upon completion of the examination of equipment but no later than four hours after the designation of the inspection site.

5. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect until an inspection team or inspection teams specify all ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. Pre-inspection restrictions at ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected shall remain in effect until inspectors arrive there and pre-inspection procedures have been completed.

6. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the inspection site, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and provide the inspection team leader with a copy of the simplified site diagram of the inspection site and all site diagrams of the inspection site, annotated to indicate the current location at the inspection site of such items and those structures in which they are located. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall also inform the inspection team leader, for each restricted area, of each road-mobile launcher of ICBMs within the deployment area that has not returned to the restricted area of the inspected ICBM base, except road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that are on relocation outside the deployment area or are being transported by air, rail, or by waterborne vehicles within the deployment area.

7. For each road-mobile launcher of ICBMs that has not returned to the restricted area and of which the inspection team leader was informed in accordance with paragraph 6 of this Section, a member of the in-country escort shall, at the choice of that member, either designate the geographic coordinates of such a mobile launcher of ICBMs or ensure transportation of the inspectors to such a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

8. For an ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspection team leader shall designate, upon completion of the pre-inspection procedures, the restricted area or restricted areas of the ICBM base that are to be inspected. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team or subgroups of the inspection team to the designated restricted areas within the following time period:

(a) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of less than 100 kilometers from the maintenance facility: no later than five hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures;

(b) to a restricted area located at a straight-line distance of 100 kilometers or more from the maintenance facility: no later than eight hours after completion of pre-inspection procedures.

9. The inspection team shall have the right to inspect all restricted areas and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected, or the rail garrison and the maintenance facility that are part of the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to be inspected. For ICBM bases for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, if the inspection team intends to inspect road-mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have not been designated in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section, the inspection team leader shall also indicate the subgroup to conduct such an inspection.

10. Pre-inspection restrictions shall remain in effect in each restricted area, rail garrison, and maintenance facility to be inspected until inspectors arrive there.

11. Inspectors shall have the right, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol, to read the data from the unique identifiers on all ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for ICBMs deployed on mobile launchers of ICBMs that have not returned to restricted areas and whose geographic coordinates have been designated by a member of the in-country escort in accordance with paragraph 7 of this Section.

12. During the period of inspection, mobile launchers of ICBMs located within restricted areas designated to be inspected or within a rail garrison designated to be inspected may leave those restricted areas or that rail garrison only with the consent of the inspectors.

13. During each post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, inspectors shall have the right to ascertain that the aggregate number of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles located at the inspection site and the number of such items that have not returned there following the completion of the dispersal does not exceed the number specified for the inspected ICBM base. For that purpose, inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annexes 1 and 2 to this Protocol.

XI. Conversion or Elimination Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 8 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall conduct, and shall have the right to conduct, 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, conversion or elimination inspections in accordance with the provisions provided for in this Section and the procedures provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Upon arrival of the inspection team at the location specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide the inspection team with a schedule of conversion or elimination activities.

3. Within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections, each Party shall have the right to implement conversion or elimination procedures at no more than two sites at any one time if such procedures provide for conversion or elimination inspections.

4. The inspecting Party shall have the right to replace its inspectors conducting conversion or elimination inspections, subject to the following provisions:

(a) For each inspection site, replacement of inspectors shall be carried out not more than once every three weeks, and the number of inspectors subject to replacement in each case shall not be less than 50 percent of the inspectors located there.

(b) Replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the inspection site, subject to the limitation on the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI to this Protocol. If at any time the total of the number of inspectors at the inspection site and the number of those arriving on the territory of the inspected Party for replacement exceeds the maximum number of inspectors provided for in paragraph 28 of Section VI of this Protocol, the replacement of inspectors shall be carried out at the airport closest to the inspection site.

(c) Before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall confirm in the inspection report that the inspection team as then constituted has completed its inspection with respect to the items presented to that team and shall indicate the number of items of each type for which elimination procedures have been completed. The specific procedures for eliminating the last item undergoing elimination at that site that were observed by the inspection team headed by the outgoing leader shall be completed before the departure of the outgoing inspection team leader from the inspection site.

(d) The inspected Party shall not resume the elimination procedures until the pre-inspection procedures have been completed for the newly arrived inspectors.

Any delay in the resumption of the elimination procedures caused by the arrival of a new inspection team leader shall not exceed three hours.

5. In the case of a delay in the initiation of activities beyond the scheduled date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol:

(a) if the delay is five days or less and the inspection team is either en route to the point of entry or has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspected Party shall decide whether the inspection team should be located at the point of entry or at the inspection site for the period of the delay, or

(b) if the delay is more than five days and the inspection team has arrived on the territory of the inspected Party, the inspection team shall leave the territory of the inspected Party, unless the Parties agree otherwise.

6. For the elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters, inspectors shall make the observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 3 and 6 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

7. At conversion or elimination facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs and their launch canisters are eliminated by burning, explosive demolition, or explosion, as provided for in paragraphs 4 and 5 of Section I of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, the inspected Party shall provide inspectors with binoculars that permit observation of the elimination process from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort.

8. For the elimination of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, road-mobile training launchers, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, and rail-mobile training launchers, inspectors shall make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2, 3, and 4 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

9. For the eliminated fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, inspectors shall have the right to make observations subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section III of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection of such a fixed structure within the 90-day period beginning on the date of the completion of the elimination process. Such an inspection shall be conducted during a baseline data inspection, data update inspection, reentry vehicle inspection, post-dispersal inspection of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, or close-out inspection at the facility at which the fixed structure was located.

10. For the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraphs 2 and 8 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. Except for those cases when the initiation of the process of elimination of a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs was verified by inspection, the inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 90-day period beginning on the date of completion of the elimination process to confirm that the elimination of each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has been completed.

11. For converted heavy bombers, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct an inspection within the 20-day period that begins on the date the converted heavy bomber arrives at the viewing site at the conversion or elimination facility as provided for in paragraph 13 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, to confirm that it has been converted.

12. For changing the accountability of ICBMs, SLBMs, launch canisters, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers by placing them on static display, inspectors shall have the right to make observations and measurements subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of Section VIII of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to conduct such an inspection within the 30-day period that begins on the date of the receipt of the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of the Notification Protocol.

XII. Close-Out Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 9 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at the facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. Each such inspection shall be conducted within 60 days after such notification has been provided, or, for facilities that were specified in the Memorandum of Understanding but not specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, within the period of time provided for in paragraph 1 of Section VII of this Protocol for baseline data inspections. No more than one close-out inspection shall be conducted at each facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct close-out inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, mobile launchers of ICBMs, heavy bombers, or former heavy bombers; training facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or heavy bombers; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; test ranges; air bases for heavy bombers; and air bases for former heavy bombers.

3. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol no later than 48 hours after its arrival at the point of entry.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two close-out inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same

point of entry shall be conducted at any one time.

5. A facility, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall not be subject to any inspection other than a close-out inspection until such an inspection is conducted or until the expiration of the 60-day period provided for such an inspection in paragraph 1 of this Section, whichever occurs earlier. If a facility that is specified in paragraph 2 of this Section is subject to a close-out inspection, that facility shall not be subject to a baseline data inspection.

6. During the course of each close-out inspection, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the elimination procedures provided for in paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol have been completed. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex I to this Protocol.

XIII. Formerly Declared Facility Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 10 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct formerly declared facility inspections. Each Party shall have the right to conduct a total of three such inspections each year, with no more than two such inspections each year at any one facility. Such inspections may be conducted at facilities specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, the elimination of which has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. For each such facility, formerly declared facility inspections may be conducted after close-out inspections have been conducted or, if such an inspection was not conducted, beginning 60 days after notification has been provided, in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, of the elimination of the facility.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct formerly declared facility inspections at any of the following facilities: ICBM bases; submarine bases; ICBM loading facilities; SLBM loading facilities; repair facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; storage facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; training facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs; conversion or elimination facilities for ICBMs, SLBMs, or mobile launchers of ICBMs; and test ranges.

3. No later than one hour after the time for the designation of the inspection site, specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 3 or 8 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall implement pre-inspection restrictions at the inspection site, which shall remain in effect until the inspection team completes the pre-inspection procedures. During the period of time that pre-inspection restrictions are in effect, containers, launch canisters, and enclosed vehicles, large enough to contain an item of inspection of the inspected Party and covered or environmentally protected objects large enough to contain or to be such items shall not be removed from the inspection site.

4. Each Party shall have the right to conduct no more than two formerly declared facility inspections at any one time. No more than one such inspection utilizing the same point of entry shall be conducted at any one time.

5. Inspectors shall have the right to inspect the entire inspection site, subject to the procedures provided for in Annex I to this Protocol.

XIV. Technical Characteristics Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Except as provided for in paragraph 3 of this Section and subparagraphs 5(c) and 5(d) of Annex 11 to this Protocol, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, technical characteristics exhibitions required by paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty, of an ICBM and an SLBM of each type and variant thereof, and each version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs for each type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, of the ICBM or the SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

2. Subsequent technical characteristics exhibitions of ICBMs and SLBMs of each new type, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and of new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted at the times specified in such notifications. Technical characteristics exhibitions of mobile launchers of ICBMs of each new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be conducted at the same time as the technical characteristics exhibition of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type. An exhibition of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall include an exhibition, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 11 to this Protocol, in close proximity, of the ICBM or SLBM; the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM; the launch canister, if applicable; and the self-contained dispensing mechanism, if applicable. Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

3. If, during exhibitions conducted in accordance with the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of technical

characteristics exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the technical characteristics exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required. Technical characteristics exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated.

4. The technical characteristics exhibition sites shall be chosen by the inspected Party.

5. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner.

6. During pre-inspection procedures for technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the in-country escort shall:

(a) inform inspectors of the numbers of each type, variant and version, whichever is applicable, of the exhibited items; and

(b) point out to the inspectors, when applicable, in photographs, slides or drawings, the distinguishing features or external differences of such items.

7. During a technical characteristics exhibition, a member of the in-country escort shall point out the specific places on each exhibited item where measurements were taken to obtain the specified technical data and to obtain the dimensions specified in paragraphs 13, 14, 16, and, if applicable, 15, of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. For measurements of the first stage of a solid propellant ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall exhibit the first stage of such an ICBM in a configuration that permits inspectors to confirm the reference cylinder as provided for in subparagraph (a) (i) of paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol. A member of the in-country escort shall point out the places on such a first stage that permit measurement of the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case, and the maximum diameter of such a stage excluding protruding elements. If necessary, the in-country escort shall have the right to use diagrams or sketches to indicate such places. Inspectors shall have the right to make such measurements. Such measurements shall be recorded pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol.

8. During technical characteristics exhibitions, inspectors shall have the right to confirm the length and diameter of the first stage of an ICBM and SLBM of each type and variant, as well as the diameter of the second or third stage if that diameter differs from the diameter of the first stage, and the length and diameter of the assembled ICBM or SLBM, as provided for in Annex H to this Protocol.

9. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if this new type is declared on the basis of a change in the first stage length used for confirming a new type, with or without a change in the throw-weight, compared to the first stage length of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the notifying Party shall:

(a) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of the new type for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM; and

(b) exhibit the first stage of the ICBM or SLBM of appropriate existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs, respectively, for the purpose of confirming the first stage length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, if the length used for confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM has not been previously confirmed on an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of such existing types or previously declared new types of ICBMs or SLBMs.

When necessary, specific procedures for measuring the first stage length used for confirming a new type of an ICBM or SLBM shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

10. If a Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, and if that new type is declared on the basis of a change in the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of that new type from the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of appropriate existing types and previously declared new types, the inspecting Party shall have the right to weigh, or to determine by other agreed means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM of the new type and ICBMs or SLBMs of an appropriate existing type or previously declared new type in order to verify their launch weights. Procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of such ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission before the beginning of deployment of an ICBM or SLBM of such a new type.

11. If one Party declares a new type of ICBM or SLBM that the other Party believes has demonstrated a launch weight greater than 106,000 kilograms, the other Party shall have the right to raise its concern in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Resolution of the issue may include, among other things, an agreement to weigh, or to determine by other means the weight of, the ICBM or SLBM in question in order to assist in the verification of its launch weight.

12. Procedures for weighing and for other means of determining the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission no later than two years after entry into force of the Treaty.

13. For an ICBM for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type or for an ICBM for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, whichever is applicable, during the technical characteristics exhibition, the inspected Party shall demonstrate distinguishing

features pursuant to paragraph 9 of Article III of the Treaty.

(a) If an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type is larger either in length or diameter than the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type, technical characteristics exhibitions pursuant only to paragraph 2 of this Section shall be required.

(b) For an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type, exhibited in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, if the length and the diameter of the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of a new type are less than or equal to the length and less than or equal to the diameter, respectively, of the launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of an existing type or previously declared new type, and if either Party believes that the additional procedures during the exhibition are necessary, based on the information contained in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VII of the Protocol on Notification, with respect to the adequacy of the features that distinguish: the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type of ICBM from the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type of ICBM or previously declared new type of ICBM; the mobile launcher of ICBMs for ICBMs of the new type from the mobile launchers of ICBMs for ICBMs of each existing type or previously declared new type; the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of the new type installed from the mobile launcher of ICBMs with the associated missile of each existing type or previously declared new type installed, then the Party that has provided the notification shall conduct such an exhibition subject to the following additional procedures, unless otherwise agreed:

(i) The ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type shall be exhibited in close proximity to the launch canister for such an ICBM, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM; a launch canister for an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type, containing an assembled ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM; and a mobile launcher of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBM.

(ii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate the functionally related and external differences that distinguish the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type from the launch canister of each existing type and previously declared new type of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs; and

(iii) The inspected Party shall demonstrate that the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type, and that a launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the new type cannot be carried out from the launch canister for the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs of each existing type and previously declared new type. If the incapability to carry out such launches has not been demonstrated to the satisfaction of the inspecting Party, the inspecting Party may raise the issue within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

14. Technical characteristics exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annexes 8 and 11 to this Protocol.

15. During inspections conducted during technical characteristics exhibitions, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team.

XV. Distinguishability Exhibitions and Inspections and Baseline Exhibitions and Inspections Conducted Pursuant to Paragraphs 12 and 13, Respectively, of Article XI of the Treaty, and Exhibitions of Long-Range Non-Nuclear ALCMs Conducted Pursuant to Notifications Provided in Accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol.

1. Except as provided for in paragraph 6 of this Section, each Party shall conduct, no earlier than three days after notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, but no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty, distinguishability exhibitions, required by paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs of types, categories, and variants existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

2. Each Party shall conduct, no earlier than the completion of distinguishability exhibitions by that Party, but no later than 165 days after entry into force of the Treaty, baseline exhibitions, required by paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, former heavy bombers, and training heavy bombers existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such exhibitions shall be pre-scheduled by agreement between the Parties.

3. Subsequent distinguishability exhibitions conducted in connection with events, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. During such a

subsequent distinguishability exhibition, the inspected Party shall not be required to exhibit all categories or, if applicable, all variants of an item of a particular type, provided that the purpose of the exhibition is met by a combination of the current exhibition and previous distinguishability exhibitions concerning that type. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

4. Subsequent baseline exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 135 days after notification that a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested from a heavy bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM had previously been flight-tested, has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol. One such exhibition shall be conducted at each air base at which heavy bombers of that type equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are specified to be based. Pre-inspection procedures for such an exhibition shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 8 of Section VII of this Protocol, to the extent that such provisions relate to the heavy bombers to be exhibited. During such pre-inspection procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to designate for inspection no more than 30 percent of such heavy bombers specified to be based at each air base. The inspectors shall not have the right to designate alert heavy bombers for inspection during such baseline exhibitions.

5. Exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs pursuant to notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol shall be conducted no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such a notification has been provided. Such exhibitions shall be conducted separately from, and in addition to, baseline data inspections and data update inspections.

6. If, during exhibitions conducted pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Early Exhibitions of Strategic Offensive Arms Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms of July 31, 1991, the purpose of distinguishability exhibitions has been met concerning data specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol for items existing as of entry into force of the Treaty, the distinguishability exhibitions otherwise required to be conducted during the period provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section shall not be required. Distinguishability exhibitions during this time period shall be required only concerning data on characteristics that have not been so demonstrated.

7. The sites of such exhibitions shall be chosen by the inspected Party.

8. The inspection team shall arrive on the territory of the inspected Party no later than one day and no earlier than three days before the exhibition date. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the exhibition site so that the inspection team arrives at the site in a timely manner.

9. Such exhibitions shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 4 to this Protocol.

10. During inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and during inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall photograph each exhibited item in order to obtain three photographs of that item that satisfy the requirements provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex 3 to the Memorandum of Understanding. Such photographs shall be produced using a camera system of the inspected Party. If an ambiguous situation arises, a member of the in-country escort, at the request of the inspectors, shall take photographs, subject to the provisions of paragraph 18 and 27 of Section VI of this Protocol, using the camera system of the inspection team.

XVI. Continuous Monitoring Activities Conducted Pursuant to Paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty

1. Each Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct continuous monitoring activities.

2. Each Party shall have the right to conduct continuous monitoring activities at production facilities for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in paragraphs 3 and 4 of Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding.

3. Continuous monitoring activities shall cease at a monitored facility at which production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs has ceased, no later than one year after notification of the cessation of such production has been provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section I of the Notification Protocol, except that if such production ceases prior to May 31, 1994, continuous monitoring activities shall be permitted until May 31, 1995. Beginning on the date on which continuous monitoring activities are no longer permitted at such a facility:

(a) That facility shall be subject to a new facility inspection and data update inspections, in accordance with the provisions of Section VII of this Protocol, if it has been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol.

(b) That facility shall be subject to suspect-site inspections if it has not been converted to a facility of a category listed in paragraph 5 of Section VII of this Protocol.

4. If the inspected Party intends to produce at a monitored facility ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs that are not subject to the numerical limits on non-deployed missiles provided for in paragraph 1 of Article IV of the Treaty and that are as large as or larger than the size criteria as provided for

in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than 180 days in advance of the planned exit of the first such ICBM, SLBM, or first stage. The Parties shall agree on additional verification procedures in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission in an expeditious manner so as not to delay the exit of the first ICBM, SLBM, or first stage of an ICBM or SLBM.

5. The inspected Party shall determine the perimeter of each facility subject to continuous monitoring that has been specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol and shall not change it without prior notification to the inspecting Party. The inspected Party shall construct and maintain a fence around the perimeter of each such facility.

6. The inspected Party shall designate along the periphery of each facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, a perimeter continuous monitoring area the boundaries of which shall be agreed upon by the Parties for each such facility so that they shall be sufficient to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

7. If the inspected Party intends to change the perimeter of a facility at which work on establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system has begun or at which such a system has already been established, it shall inform the inspecting Party, in advance, of its intention to carry out such work, shall indicate the date planned for such work to begin, and provide through diplomatic channels a site diagram of that facility annotated to indicate the proposed changes to the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Before work to change the perimeter is begun, the Parties shall agree upon the new boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area and upon the procedure for relocating the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The procedure for relocating such equipment shall be agreed upon in such a way as to enable monitors to continue their continuous monitoring activities while work on changing the perimeter is in progress. The inspected Party shall bear the costs relating to relocation of the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system resulting from changing the perimeter.

8. The inspected Party shall define, separately for each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, a zone within which monitors shall have the right to travel with the permission of the in-country escort, and, as considered necessary by the inspected Party, accompanied by escorts. Areas from which monitors shall be excluded within these zones may be defined by the inspected Party. For each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party shall define, if possible, a free movement zone within which the monitors shall have the right to move between their place of duty and their living quarters without the permission of the in-country escort.

9. The inspecting Party shall have the right, 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty and thereafter, to conduct an engineering site survey at a facility subject to continuous monitoring. The purpose of the engineering site survey is on-site familiarization with geological and topographic conditions and available logistical resources for establishing a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

10. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to establish, operate, and maintain a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. The equipment for such a system is specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol.

11. Monitors shall have the right of unlimited access, at times of their own choosing, to the perimeter continuous monitoring area. In each case, monitors shall inform a member of the in-country escort of their intent to examine the perimeter continuous monitoring area. The inspected Party shall maintain continuously, on a 24-hour basis, a member of the in-country escort at the monitored facility, to accompany monitors to any portion of the perimeter continuous monitoring area. For this purpose, a member of the in-country escort shall promptly provide monitors with a vehicle upon request. In the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the monitors shall be enabled to move around the entire monitored facility.

12. The monitors shall have the right to use in the perimeter continuous monitoring area their own systems for two-way radio communication with the operations center at the monitored facility that is provided for in subparagraph 22(a) of this Section. The operating frequency and power levels for these radio systems shall be agreed by the Parties prior to the use of such systems in the perimeter continuous monitoring area. These radio systems must operate only on a single agreed operating frequency and may not contain components permitting them to operate on other frequencies. A member of the in-country escort shall have the right to ascertain at any time that these radio systems are capable of operating only on the single, agreed operating frequency.

13. For a facility specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall designate a portal with not more than one rail line. All objects, containers, launch canisters, and vehicles that are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring of the inspected Party shall exit only through the portal commencing on the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section III of this Protocol.

14. Except for the portal, the monitored facility shall have no other rail exits and shall have no more than two other road exits. Such exits shall be monitored as provided for in Annex 9 to this Protocol. The inspecting Party shall have the right to construct an environmental shelter with total floor space of up to 16 square meters at each exit.

15. There shall be no more than four additional exits from the monitored facility for personnel of the inspected Party. These exits shall be no wider than one meter.

16. No later than three months after the

notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of the inspecting Party, provide:

(a) two dedicated telephone lines providing direct communications between the monitoring team and the embassy of the inspecting Party with a single termination point, specified by the inspecting Party, at each end of a telephone line;

(b) one non-dedicated commercial telephone line for local and long distance communications throughout the existing telephone network within the territory of the inspected Party; and

(c) satellite communications equipment providing access to a telephone communications systems channel of the International Maritime Satellite Organization (INMARSAT) or to an equivalent satellite communication system for telephonic communications between the monitoring team and the territory of the inspecting Party, if such equipment is not provided by the inspecting Party at the request of the inspected Party.

17. All expenses associated with the installation and operation of the dedicated direct telephone lines shall be borne by the inspected Party. All expenses associated with the installation and use of the non-dedicated commercial telephone line shall be borne by the inspecting Party. All expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspected Party. If requested by the inspected Party, the inspecting Party may provide the satellite communications equipment. In such a case all expenses associated with the provision, installation, and maintenance of satellite communications equipment shall be borne by the inspecting Party. In any case all expenses associated with the use of the satellite communications system shall be borne by the inspecting Party.

18. Satellite communications equipment shall be under the control of the inspected Party, except that it shall be under the control of both Parties if provided by the inspecting Party. Monitors shall have the right to use the satellite communications system any time a monitor and a member of the in-country escort conclude that facsimile communications with the territory of the inspecting Party via the dedicated direct telephone lines to its embassy cannot be established within 20 minutes.

19. No later than six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 12 of Section III of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, provide the following logistic support:

(a) all utilities for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, including electrical power, water, fuel, heating, and sewage;

(b) basic construction materials, including concrete and lumber;

(c) the site preparation for the establishment of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, and for the operations center. Such preparation may include earth moving operations, laying of concrete foundations, trenching between equipment locations, and utility connections; and

(d) transportation to the perimeter continuous monitoring area of all tools, materials, and equipment necessary for the establishment, operation, and maintenance of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system.

20. Equipment and supplies brought into the territory of the inspected Party, subject to the provisions of paragraph 16 of Section VI of this Protocol, shall be delivered to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility without undue delay.

21. Prior to the completion of construction of the buildings or shelters provided for in paragraph 14 and subparagraph 22(b) of this Section, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall provide the monitors with temporary structures at the portal and road exits. Such temporary structures shall be provided at the expense of the inspecting Party.

22. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspecting Party shall have the right to:

(a) construct, operate, and maintain at the portal an operations center for receiving and storing data;

(b) construct at the portal no more than three buildings with a total floor space of up to 150 square meters to house the operations center and monitoring team headquarters; and

(c) install at the portal and the road exits provided for in paragraphs 13 and 14 of this Section, the equipment for a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol.

23. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall construct one building with floor space specified in such request, but of no more than 500 square meters, for use by the monitors for storage of equipment for continuous monitoring activities and of supplies.

24. Within the perimeter continuous monitoring area, the inspected Party shall have the right to construct at a location agreed upon with the inspecting Party, one building for conducting viewing procedures in accordance with this Protocol.

25. The monitoring team leader shall provide to the in-country escort:

(a) installation drawings, installation manuals, and other documentation, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors at that facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility to install or test the equipment for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to the commencement of the work described therein. During such discussions, the monitors shall provide clarification concerning such documentation; and

(b) manuals and any other documents, including any changes made to such documentation, to be used by the monitors to operate and maintain the equipment for

continuous monitoring activity within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. Such documentation shall be provided to and discussed with the inspected Party prior to the use of such documentation for the operation and maintenance of equipment within the perimeter continuous monitoring area. During such discussions, monitors shall provide clarification concerning the use of such documentation.

26. The following restrictions shall apply within and near the perimeter continuous monitoring area:

(a) Unobstructed tunnels shall not be permitted under the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed tunnels shall be subject to examination.

(b) Waterways, canals, or unobstructed culverts shall not be permitted to cross the perimeter continuous monitoring area; obstructed culverts shall be subject to examination.

(c) Aircraft shall not be permitted to arrive within the perimeter of the monitored facility unless the monitors have been informed in advance of their arrival, except for an emergency at such a facility. In case of an emergency, the in-country escort shall inform the monitors of the arrival of an aircraft within the perimeter of that facility immediately after such an arrival.

(d) Cranes shall not be permitted to be erected within 20 meters of either side of the boundaries of the perimeter continuous monitoring area unless the monitors have been informed in advance.

27. During the establishment, operation, or maintenance of a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, the inspecting Party shall not impede the inspected Party's access to any structures or security systems.

28. The inspecting Party shall provide an escort into any of its portal buildings constructed in accordance with paragraphs 22 and 23 of this Section, when the inspected Party desires access to such buildings.

29. Any two members of the monitoring team shall have the right to travel no more than one time per week to the embassy or consulate of the inspecting Party on the territory of the inspected Party. The monitoring team leader or the authorized representative of such a team shall inform a member of the in-country escort of the planned date of each such trip. The inspected Party shall make arrangements for each such trip in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VI of this Protocol.

30. No more than nine diplomatic personnel of the inspecting Party who are members of the Treaty implementation unit of that Party's embassy or consulate on the territory of the inspected Party, shall have the right to travel, no more than two times each year, to each facility subject to continuous monitoring, if monitors are present at such a facility, or monitored facility, with no more than two persons traveling each time and staying at such a facility for no more than two days. Arrangements for such travel shall be made in accordance with established procedures for travel by diplomats to open areas. Such personnel shall be permitted unrestricted movement in the free movement zone associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. In accordance with Article 32 of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of April 18, 1961, the Parties agree to waive the inviolability of any article, including personal baggage, their diplomatic personnel may be carrying at the last airport prior to arrival at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, except that this waiver of immunity shall not apply to papers. This waiver shall not apply to any other privileges and immunities accorded diplomatic personnel. Other requests for visits shall be considered on a case-by-case basis.

31. Once notification in accordance with paragraph 16 of Section III of this Protocol has been provided, monitors shall have the right to move from one facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility directly to another such facility and take with them equipment and supplies. The inspected Party may assign escorts to the monitors during such movements. The equipment and supplies brought with them may be examined by the inspected Party upon arrival at another facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility under the same terms as when they arrived on the territory of the inspected Party.

32. The inspecting Party shall not take any actions with respect to structures of the inspected Party without its consent. If the Parties agree that structures of the inspected Party are to be rebuilt or demolished, either partially or completely, the inspecting Party shall provide the necessary compensation.

33. The inspected Party shall not interfere with the installed equipment of the inspecting Party or restrict the access of the monitors to such equipment. The in-country escort shall have the right to observe such equipment during its installation, testing, operation, and maintenance at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

34. The inspected Party shall not interfere with continuous monitoring activities.

35. For the purpose of continuous monitoring after dark or during inclement weather the inspected Party, at the request of and at the expense of the inspecting Party, shall ensure sufficient lighting at the portal, road exits, and along the perimeter of the monitored facility to permit monitors to carry out their functions, including obtaining clear images of items being verified using a system of video cameras.

36. Continuous monitoring of containers, launch canisters, and vehicles exiting from the monitored facility shall be carried out subject to the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

XVII. Cancellation of Inspections

1. An inspection shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, it cannot be conducted. If an inspection is cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

2. In the case of a delay, including a delay due to circumstances brought about by

force majeure, that prevents an inspection team conducting an inspection pursuant to paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, or 10 of Article XI of the Treaty from arriving at the inspection site during the time specified in paragraph 14 of Section VI of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled due to delay, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

3. If the time to transport an inspection team or subgroup exceeds the times specified in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VII, paragraph 14 of Section IX, or paragraph 8 of Section X of this Protocol, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If such an inspection is cancelled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

4. For inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty, pre-inspection restrictions shall be cancelled if, due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, items subject to pre-inspection restrictions must be removed from the inspection site. In the case of pre-inspection restrictions being cancelled due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure*, the inspection team leader may either cancel or conduct the inspection. If an inspection is cancelled, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

5. If the inspected Party interrupts the procedures for a reentry vehicle inspection for reasons of personnel or equipment safety, the inspection team leader may cancel the inspection. In that case, the number of inspections to which the inspecting Party is entitled shall not be reduced.

XVIII. Inspection Reports and Continuous Monitoring Reports

1. During post-inspection procedures the inspection team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written inspection report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. Such a report shall be provided no later than two hours after the beginning of the post-inspection procedures or no later than one hour after the arrival of all subgroups of the inspection team at the location where such procedures are carried out, whichever is later. The report shall be factual. It shall include the type of inspection conducted; the inspection site; the type and number of missiles, stages, launchers, heavy bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and support equipment subject to the Treaty observed during the period of inspection and all measurements recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during the inspection as well as the site diagram or map of the inspection site provided for in paragraph 8 of Section VII, paragraph 8 or subparagraph 11(d) of Section IX, or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, shall be considered to be part of the report. The report shall be signed by the inspection team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

2. Within three days after the end of each month, the monitoring team leader shall provide the in-country escort with an official written continuous monitoring report in the language of the inspecting Party and an unofficial translation of the report in the language of the inspected Party. The report shall be factual. It shall include the number of vehicles declared to contain items of the inspected Party subject to the Treaty that left the monitored facility through the portal specified in paragraph 13 of Section XVI of this Protocol during that month. The report shall also include all measurements of containers contained in these vehicles recorded in accordance with paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Photographs taken during continuous monitoring shall be considered to be a part of the report. The report shall be signed by the monitoring team leader and by a member of the in-country escort. Each Party shall retain one copy of the report.

3. The inspected Party shall have the right to include written comments in the report.

4. The Parties shall, when possible, clarify ambiguities regarding factual information contained in the inspection report or the continuous monitoring report. Relevant clarifications shall be recorded in the report.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ANNEX 1

PROCEDURES FOR THE INSPECTION OF COVERED OBJECTS, CONTAINERS, LAUNCH CANISTERS, VEHICLES, AND STRUCTURES

1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions of items of inspection that are specified for the facility to be inspected and declared for the inspection site in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII or paragraph 6 of Section X of this Protocol, and to confirm the absence of any other item of inspection at the inspection site. For this purpose in carrying out the procedures for inspections provided for in this Annex the size criteria provided in paragraph 23 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used.

2. For an item of inspection that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of inspection designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of such viewing and measurements, the item of inspection shall not be subject to further inspection.

3. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by measurement of its external dimensions at locations on the object designated by a member of the in-country escort that it is not an item of inspection.

4. For a covered or environmentally protected object, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that such an object is an item of inspection of the declared type, and if applicable, variant or version, or that it is not an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex.

(iii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the object is an item of inspection, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 5, 6, or 7 of this Annex.

(b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

5. For a container, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the container contains an item of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container:

(i) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or confirm that the container does not contain an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the item of inspection is an item of inspection of the declared type or unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of inspection, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents of the container are an item of inspection or an unidentified object, inspectors shall have the right to carry out

procedures provided for in paragraph 2 or 3 of this Annex.

6. For a launch canister that is declared to contain an item of inspection, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Inspectors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of its dimensions to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and the measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

7. For a launch canister declared not to contain an item of inspection, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister, by removing at least one of the end caps from the launch canister, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents.

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) of this paragraph.

(b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister.

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 3 of this Annex.

8. For a launch canister that is declared to contain a training model of a missile, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors the features that confirm that such a launch canister contains a training model of a missile.

9. For a vehicle, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the vehicle contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of its enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such enclosed space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space.

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle.

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, or a launch canister, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of the vehicle contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container or a launch canister, inspectors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex.

After inspectors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, and, if applicable, types, variants or versions, of items of inspection or to confirm the absence of an item of inspection, the vehicle and the items of inspection, containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the inspection site.

10. For a structure other than a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the structure contains one or more items of inspection of the declared type and, if applicable, variant or version, or that it does not contain an item of inspection. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, inspectors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into the structure:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into the structure, the structure is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of the partitioned enclosed space within the structure or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain, or is not accessible to, an item of inspection, the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, inspectors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the structure, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain, and is accessible to, an item of inspection, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) of this paragraph.

(c) View the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister,or a vehicle, the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the structure or the partitioned enclosed space within the structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex.

11. For a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that the fixed structure contains one or more mobile launchers of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and, if applicable, version of a mobile launcher of ICBMs of the declared type of ICBM and no other item of inspection or that it does not contain an item of inspection. Inspectors shall have the right:

(a) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm that such fixed structures in a restricted area cannot contain more than the number of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs specified for that restricted area;

(b) To make measurements of the dimensions of all fixed structures for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs to confirm the specified dimensions of such fixed structures;

(c) To view the interior of each fixed structure from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the inspectors to view the entire interior of the fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs:

(i) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure does not contain an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, the fixed structure shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, inspectors confirm that the interior of the fixed structure contains an item of inspection, an unidentified object, a covered or environmentally protected object, a container, a launch canister, or a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, or 9 of this Annex.

(d) To read the data from the unique identifiers applied to ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs as provided for in paragraph 5 of Annex 6 to this Protocol.

When carrying out procedures provided for in this paragraph, no more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed inside a fixed structure for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such a fixed structure contains a mobile launcher of ICBMs.

ANNEX 2
PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTION OF SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS, AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

1. For an inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right to ascertain that it is the designated silo launcher of ICBMs by comparing its geographic coordinates, determined using a satellite system receiver and the procedures provided for in Annex 8 to this Protocol, with the geographic coordinates specified for that silo launcher. After confirmation of coordinates, the inspected Party shall open the silo door. The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of this ICBM launcher from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM or a first stage of an ICBM.

2. For an inspection of a road-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, if inspectors are unable to confirm by means of external viewing of the launcher that it does not contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of that road-mobile launcher of ICBMs through a maintenance hatch.

3. For an inspection of a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs declared not to contain an ICBM, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the railcar of such a launcher through a maintenance hatch or from the entry compartment of that railcar to confirm that it does not contain an ICBM.

4. For an inspection of an SLBM launcher declared not to contain an SLBM, upon arrival of the inspection team subgroup at such an SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall open the SLBM launcher hatch. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the SLBM launcher, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that it does not contain an SLBM or the first stage of an SLBM.

5. For baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections, after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall return to the maintenance facility of the inspected ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs or, for a reentry vehicle inspection after the viewing in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, 3, or 4 of this Annex has been completed, the inspection team subgroup shall have the right, at its choice, to rejoin the inspection team or to go to the designated location where post-inspection procedures will be carried out.

ANNEX 3

PROCEDURES FOR REENTRY VEHICLE INSPECTIONS CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE XI OF THE TREATY

1. The inspected Party shall have the right to prepare the front section for viewing in the launcher of ICBMs or SLBMs, in close proximity to it, in a vehicle, or at a specially allocated site determined by the inspected Party.

2. For silo launchers of ICBMs and SLBM launchers:

(a) Upon arrival of the inspection team at a designated silo launcher of ICBMs containing the ICBM to be inspected, inspectors shall have the right to confirm, in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 1 of Annex 2 to this Protocol, that it is the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader.

(b) Upon arrival of inspectors at the silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher containing the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected, a member of the in-country escort shall designate one or more places where the inspectors may be present. This place or these places shall be determined in a manner permitting inspectors to observe the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher and permitting inspectors to see any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher. The boundaries of that vicinity shall be determined by a member of the in-country escort. The place or places from which inspectors may observe the upper silo or tube edge of the ICBM or SLBM launcher shall be located no more than 50 meters from that launcher. In cases where a clear and unobstructed view cannot be achieved within a 50-meter distance, the inspection team leader and a member of the in-country escort may agree to a position or positions that permit a clear and unobstructed view of the upper edge of the launcher from a distance greater than 50 meters.

(c) Upon the arrival of inspectors at the designated silo launcher of ICBMs or SLBM launcher, if requested by the inspection team leader, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the vicinity of this launcher in such a manner that inspectors may orient themselves and have an understanding of the relative positions of the launcher and such structures or vehicles as may be located in its vicinity.

(d) Inspectors shall have the right to maintain continuous visual observation of the upper silo or tube edge of such an ICBM or SLBM launcher or of vehicles, devices, or temporary structures used for the removal of the missile or the front section from the launcher or for the preparation of the front section for viewing. The purpose of such observation shall be to ascertain that no reentry vehicle is removed from the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier.

(e) Prior to the time of the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the opening. Inspectors shall have the right to observe the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch; the time of the opening shall be at the discretion of the inspected Party.

(f) A member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of inspectors that any vehicles, containers, or objects that enter or leave the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher during the time period beginning with the opening of the ICBM silo launcher door or SLBM launcher hatch and ending with the completion of the preparation of the front section for viewing or the removal of the missile or front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher, whichever is earlier, do not contain reentry vehicles.

3. As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a mobile launcher of ICBMs that contains an ICBM to be inspected may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an ICBM will be carried out, or where the front section will be separated from the ICBM. In that case, the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the mobile launcher of ICBMs.

4. As required, at the choice of the inspected Party, a submarine whose launcher contains an SLBM to be inspected, may proceed to a specially allocated site where the viewing of the front section of such an SLBM will be carried out, or where the SLBM will be removed from its launcher, or the front section will be separated from the SLBM. In that case, the submarine shall proceed on the surface to that site, and the inspection team shall have the right to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with that ballistic missile submarine.

5. The inspected Party shall not remove any reentry vehicles from the front section of the ICBM or SLBM to be inspected throughout the entire period of time between the time it is designated for inspection and the completion of the viewing of the front section.

6. If the front section is viewed directly in the ICBM or SLBM launcher, the inspected Party shall prepare the front section for viewing subject to the provisions of paragraph 8 or 11 of this Section and shall give the inspection team an opportunity to view it. Preparation of the front section for viewing may include its partial separation from the missile. Inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to prepare the front section for viewing, prior to their use and after the completion of viewing of the front section. This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that such vehicles or devices do not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles. For SLBMs, if the inspected Party places over an SLBM launcher a temporary structure specially intended for preparing the front

section for viewing and for viewing it, inspectors shall have the right to inspect that temporary structure before it is put in place and after the viewing of the front section is completed. This viewing shall be carried out to confirm that the temporary structure does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles.

7. For viewing of the front section carried out outside an ICBM or SLBM launcher:

(a) The inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicles and devices used to remove a missile or front section from an ICBM or SLBM launcher, prior to their use. This viewing shall be carried out to ascertain that such vehicles or devices do not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicle. After the removal of the missile or front section from a vehicle or device, inspectors shall have the right to view it again to ascertain that it contains no reentry vehicles.

(b) The inspected Party shall separate the front section and remove it from the ICBM or SLBM launcher or remove the missile with its front section from the ICBM or SLBM launcher.

(c) If the inspected Party separates the front section in the ICBM or SLBM launcher and then removes it, no more than two inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the launcher for no more than one minute from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort, to confirm that the front section is completely separated. A member of the in-country escort shall designate this place in such a way as to provide an unobstructed view of the interior of the ICBM or SLBM launcher.

(d) If, in the process of preparing for the demonstration, the front section or missile with its front section is placed into a vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the interior of the vehicle before the missile or front section is placed in it, in order to ascertain that it does not contain another missile, front section, or other reentry vehicles.

(e) If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, inspectors shall have the right to follow that vehicle during the transportation of the missile with its front section or of the front section in the vehicle to that site in such a way as to maintain uninterrupted visual contact with the vehicle; after the missile with its front section or the front section has been unloaded from that vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to view the vehicle again to ascertain the absence therein of reentry vehicles.

8. Preparation of the front section for viewing shall include full or partial removal of the shroud except for missiles that do not utilize a shroud. The process of preparation of the front section for viewing may be carried out outside the field of view of inspectors in such a way as to permit inspectors to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from the front section.

9. If the front section is viewed in the vehicle, inspectors shall have the right to observe the vehicle throughout the entire period of time between the placement of the front section in the vehicle and the viewing of the front section.

10. If the front section is viewed at a specially allocated site, the following procedures shall apply:

(a) Before the shroud is removed, inspectors shall have the right to view the specially allocated site inside a room or within a portion of the site for viewing the front section, to ascertain that the site does not contain another front section or other reentry vehicles.

(b) During the entire process of preparation of the front section for viewing, inspectors shall have the right, at their own choice, either to observe all exits of the site to ascertain that no reentry vehicles are removed from that site, or to seal all the exits with seals. During the process of preparation of the front section for viewing, no vehicle, container, launch canister, or object shall leave the site until inspected or until an inspector declares that he or she does not intend to inspect it.

11. Before the front section is viewed, the inspected Party may cover reentry vehicles and other equipment, including the mounting platform, with covers, in such a manner that the covers shall not hamper inspectors in ascertaining that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type. Inspectors shall have the right to view the covers and to measure hard covers prior to their placement on the reentry vehicles.

12. After the process of preparation of the front section for viewing has been completed, inspectors may view the front section continuously for no more than 15 minutes from a place or places designated by a member of the in-country escort no more than five meters from the front section and providing a clear, unobstructed view of the front section, to ascertain that the front section contains no more reentry vehicles than the number of warheads attributed to missiles of that type.

13. If a member of the in-country escort declares that an object contained in the front section is not a reentry vehicle, the inspected Party shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of the inspectors that this object is not a reentry vehicle.

14. If the preparation of the front section for viewing has been carried out outside the field of view of inspectors, the inspectors, upon completion of viewing of the front section and prior to the reinstallation of the shroud, may view the vehicle or specially allocated site where the front section was viewed, including the space under the shroud, to ascertain the absence of reentry vehicles outside the front section.

15. The in-country escort shall provide in the vicinity of the ICBM or SLBM launcher and at the site where the viewing of the front section will be carried out, lighting sufficient for the conduct of the procedures provided for in this Annex.

16. The inspected Party shall transport the inspection team to the location designated by the inspected Party for carrying out post-inspection procedures.

ANNEX 4
PROCEDURES FOR INSPECTIONS OF HEAVY BOMBERS, FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS, LONG-RANGE ALCMS, AND THEIR FACILITIES

I. For inspections of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs conducted during distinguishability exhibitions, and for inspections of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted during exhibitions conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol:

1. Inspectors shall have the right to view a heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol, to confirm that the technical data and distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding, for the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of such heavy bomber, as well as to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding, to the extent that such data is required to confirm the distinguishing features of such heavy bomber. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber that are not related to specified technical data or distinguishing features.

2. Inspectors shall have the right to view a former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type of such former heavy bomber, that make it distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements to confirm that the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type of such former heavy bomber, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features.

3. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range nuclear ALCM and to make linear measurements to confirm that the technical data correspond to the values specified in Annex H to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, variant of such long-range nuclear ALCM, pursuant to paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol.

4. Inspectors shall have the right to view a long-range non-nuclear ALCM, to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the ALCM is non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, which have been specified in the notification provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs, pursuant to subparagraph 9(f) of Article III of the Treaty. For long-range non-nuclear ALCMs stored in containers, prior to the commencement of such procedures, the inspectors shall have the right to make linear measurements of the dimensions of the container, and the in-country escort shall open the container and remove the missile. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the missile from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the missile and container are the same ones originally exhibited. The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation.

5. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection. Photographs may be taken to document features of the exhibited items subject to procedures provided for in paragraph 10 of Section XV of this Protocol.

6. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol.

II. For inspections of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, and baseline exhibitions:

1. Inspectors shall have the right to confirm, as provided for in paragraph 14 of Section VII of this Protocol, heavy bomber equipage and that a heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a training heavy bomber, or a former heavy bomber satisfies the requirements for conversion in accordance with Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

2. Inspectors shall also have the right to view a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber to confirm the presence of features, specified for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, that make the heavy bomber distinguishable from other heavy bombers of the same type, or that make the former heavy bomber distinguishable from heavy bombers of the same type, pursuant to subparagraph 9(e) of Article III of the Treaty. Inspectors shall have the right to make those linear measurements that can be made without changing the configuration of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber by adding or removing equipment, to confirm that the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which the heavy bomber is equipped or the distinguishing features correspond to the values specified in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding for the type and, if applicable, the category and variant of such airplane, pursuant to

paragraph 19 of Section VI of this Protocol. During each inspection of a facility, however, at the request of the inspection team leader, the in-country escort shall remove one pylon from one non-alert heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, of a type specified not to carry long-range nuclear ALCMs on external attachment joints, or one pylon from one heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments. The particular heavy bomber and the particular pylon shall be designated by the inspection team leader. Inspectors shall not have the right to inspect areas of the interior of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that are not related to specified distinguishing features.

3. The inspection team leader shall designate prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures which of the heavy bombers subject to inspection and former heavy bombers located at the facility at the time pre-inspection restrictions went into effect are to be inspected. For a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber that arrives at the facility during the period of inspection and that is subject to inspection, the inspection team leader shall, immediately upon the arrival of the heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, inform the in-country escort whether it is designated to be inspected. During the period of inspection, no heavy bomber or former heavy bomber designated for inspection shall depart the facility until inspected.

4. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected item where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the item to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable, of the inspected item. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection.

III. For inspections of alert heavy bombers conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(d) of Section VII of this Protocol:

1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to heavy bombers designated as alert heavy bombers during inspections of air bases for heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs and air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

2. At air bases referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspection team leader of the location of alert heavy bombers. The in-country escort shall have the right to prepare each heavy bomber for inspection at a location chosen by the inspected Party that shall permit inspectors to view the preparation. Preparation may involve the use of covering, provided that such covering allows the inspectors to confirm the data provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(ii) or 14(a)(iii) of Section VII of this Protocol. The areas where alert heavy bombers are located shall not be subject to inspection except as provided for in this Section.

3. No more than a total of four inspectors shall inspect an alert heavy bomber for a total period of no more than 30 minutes. Measurements shall not be taken during such an inspection, except that closed weapons bay doors may be measured. For heavy bombers of a category, type, and, if applicable, variant, the internal weapons bays of which are specified to be large enough to contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, the weapons bay doors shall be opened, and inspectors may view the contents of the bay from a position external to the bay, designated by a member of the in-country escort, from which inspectors can accomplish the purpose provided for in subparagraph 14(a)(ii) or 14(a)(iii) of Section VII of this Protocol.

IV. For inspections of weapons storage areas conducted pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of this Protocol:

1. The procedures provided for in this Section shall apply to air bases for heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, air bases for heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, air bases for former heavy bombers, and training facilities for heavy bombers.

2. A member of the in-country escort shall, prior to the completion of pre-inspection procedures at a facility referred to in paragraph 1 of this Section, inform the inspection team leader of the location of weapons storage areas, and shall provide a site diagram of such areas depicting the structures that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM.

3. Inspections of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures that are located within the boundaries of weapons storage areas shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex I to this Protocol, except that inspections of containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, of a type for which data according to categories of data contained in Annex II to the Memorandum of Understanding have been specified, shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraphs 4, 5, 6, and 7 of this Section. Additionally, except as provided for in paragraph 4 or 5 of this Section, the inspectors may, in carrying out the procedures provided for in Annex I to this Protocol, make linear measurements only of covered or environmentally protected objects, containers, vehicles, and structures. No more than a total of four inspectors shall be allowed in a structure.

4. During the inspection of weapons storage areas at each facility, the inspectors may designate for further inspection no more than three containers that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, or no more than three ALCMs stored outside containers, or any combination of no more than three such items.

(a) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that such a designated container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right to make additional linear measurements of the dimensions of such a container, and to use radiation detection equipment on the exterior of the container.

(ii) For containers inside which is a source of radiation that is detected by using radiation detection equipment, the in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.

(iii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection.

(iv) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe the removal of the contents of the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and the container are the items chosen by the inspectors. The inspectors shall have the right to view the contents of the container and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features that make the contents of the container distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(v) If, by such viewing and making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol.

(b) Inspectors shall have the right to confirm that a designated ALCM stored outside a container is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, subject to the following procedures:

(i) Inspectors shall have the right to view such an ALCM to confirm the presence of the features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(ii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the ALCM shall not be subject to further inspection.

(iii) If, by viewing such an ALCM, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, a member of the in-country escort may allow the inspectors to carry out additional actions, which may include making linear measurements and using radiation detection equipment, to confirm the presence of features that make the ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(iv) If a member of the in-country escort does not allow such additional actions, or if, by carrying out such additional actions, inspectors are unable to confirm that the ALCM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the ALCM subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol.

5. For containers that are declared by a member of the in-country escort to be of types of containers exhibited pursuant to Section VII of the Notification Protocol as containers of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, and that are large enough to contain the smallest long-range nuclear ALCM, the inspectors shall also have the right to designate for inspection a total of no more than three such containers during each three-year period in order to confirm that a long-range nuclear ALCM is not contained therein, subject to the following procedures:

(a) The in-country escort shall open the container so that inspectors can confirm by means of viewing its interior that the container does not contain a long-range nuclear ALCM.

(b) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, then the container and its contents shall not be subject to further inspection.

(c) If, by viewing the contents of the container, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, the in-country escort shall remove the contents from the container. Inspectors shall have the right to use radiation detection equipment to confirm that the contents are non-nuclear, and to make linear measurements to confirm the presence of features, notification of which has been provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, that make the contents of the container distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. Inspectors shall not have the right to observe removal of the contents from the container, but removal shall be accomplished so as to provide confidence that the contents and container are the same ones originally designated by the inspectors. The radiation detection equipment and a radiation source may also be used to confirm that the container does not conceal the presence of radiation.

(d) If, by making such measurements, inspectors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not a long-range nuclear ALCM, they shall record their findings in the inspection report. A member of the in-country escort shall, at the request of the inspectors, photograph the contents of the container subject to the procedures provided for in paragraph 27 of Section VI of this Protocol.

6. A member of the in-country escort shall designate locations on an inspected object where linear measurements may be made. The inspected Party may cover the object to be inspected provided that such covering does not preclude confirmation by viewing or linear measurement of specified distinguishing features and technical data, as applicable. The inspected Party shall ensure sufficient lighting to facilitate inspection.

7. Inspectors shall use radiation detection equipment in accordance with the procedures provided for in Section VI of Annex 8 to this Protocol.

V. Procedures for exhibitions of heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range ALCMs:

1. During distinguishability exhibitions for heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and long-range nuclear ALCMs:

(a) For an exhibition conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 1 of Section XV of this Protocol, the inspected Party shall exhibit, for a type of heavy bomber from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, one heavy bomber of each category and, if applicable, variant of that type in close proximity to one another. In addition, the inspected Party shall exhibit, in close proximity to such heavy bombers, one long-range nuclear ALCM of each type and, if applicable, variant. Different types of heavy bombers from any one of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested may be exhibited at separate sites.

(b) For subsequent exhibitions conducted subject to the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section XV of this Protocol:

(i) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 8 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one heavy bomber of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type.

(ii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit, in close proximity to one another, one heavy bomber of the type specified in such notification equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and one heavy bomber of each variant of the same type of heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(iii) If notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 11 of Section VII of the Notification Protocol, the inspected Party shall, at a minimum, exhibit one long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type specified in such notification.

2. During pre-inspection procedures for distinguishability exhibitions:

(a) A member of the in-country escort shall identify for inspectors each type, category, and, if applicable, variant of heavy bomber that is to be exhibited, and each type and, if applicable, variant of long-range nuclear ALCM that is to be exhibited.

(b) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of heavy bomber and former heavy bomber to be exhibited, the differences that make heavy bombers of each category and, if applicable, variant distinguishable from heavy bombers of other categories and variants of that type and from a former heavy bomber of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features.

(c) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, for each type of long-range nuclear ALCM to be exhibited for which there are variants, the differences that make each variant of long-range nuclear ALCM of that type distinguishable from other variants of that type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features. A member of the in-country escort shall also point out all the positions for long-range nuclear ALCMs on heavy bombers, of each type and variant, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, and inform inspectors of the maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of each type and, if applicable, each variant is equipped.

3. For exhibitions of long-range non-nuclear ALCMs conducted pursuant to notifications provided in accordance with Section VII of the Notification Protocol, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the differences that make long-range non-nuclear ALCMs of the type exhibited distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs of each type. A member of the in-country escort shall provide to the inspection team leader photographs demonstrating such distinguishing features.

4. During baseline exhibitions for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers conducted pursuant to paragraph 13 of Article XI of the Treaty, the inspected Party shall exhibit, at one or more exhibition sites, all heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, all former heavy bombers, and all training heavy bombers specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

5. During pre-inspection procedures for baseline exhibitions:

(a) A member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of the numbers of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs; of heavy bombers, of each type, equipped for non-nuclear armaments; of former heavy bombers of each type; and of training heavy bombers of each type that are to be exhibited.

(b) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such heavy bombers during modification pursuant to paragraph 11 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol.

(c) For exhibitions of former heavy bombers and training heavy bombers, a member of the in-country escort shall inform the inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the distinguishing features that have been given to such airplanes during modification pursuant to paragraphs 11 and 12 of Section VI of the Conversion or Elimination Protocol, or the recognition features of specified former heavy bombers.

(d) For exhibitions of heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, a member of the in-country escort shall inform inspectors of, and point out in photographs or slides and in drawings, the features that make such heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers, of the same type, equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

ANNEX 5
PROCEDURES FOR CONTINUOUS MONITORING

1. Monitors shall have the right to confirm the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring that are declared to exit from the monitored facility, and to confirm that no other items of continuous monitoring exit from the monitored facility. For this purpose, in carrying out the procedures for continuous monitoring provided for in this Annex, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 24 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used.

2. If any covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle exiting from the monitored facility through the portal is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall so declare to monitors no less than 30 minutes prior to the arrival of the covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or other object or vehicle at the portal. The declaration shall state whether or not such an object is an item of continuous monitoring, or whether or not such an object, container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring and the estimated time of its arrival at the portal. If such an object is an item of continuous monitoring or if a container, launch canister, or vehicle contains an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall specify in writing the numbers, types, and, if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring. More than one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in a vehicle, but only one item of continuous monitoring may be transported in each container or in each launch canister.

3. Monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifier on each launch canister declared to contain an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, or on each first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs if such ICBMs are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles without launch canisters or in stages.

4. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle contains one or more items of continuous monitoring, of the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type declared. For this purpose, monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle. If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or the open bed of the vehicle contains a covered or environmentally protected object, container, launch canister, or an item of continuous monitoring that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 5, 6, 7, or 8 of this Annex. If inside such a vehicle there is a partitioned enclosed space that is declared by a member of the in-country escort not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph 9(b) of this Annex. After completion of those procedures, the vehicle may leave the monitored facility.

5. For a covered or environmentally protected object exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such an object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type. A member of the in-country escort shall partially or, if necessary, completely remove the cover or environmental protection. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is an item of continuous monitoring of the declared type, and if applicable, variant of the type, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex. If after partial or complete removal of such a cover or environmental protection, monitors confirm by viewing that the object is a container or launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 6 or 7 of this Annex.

6. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that such a container contains the item of continuous monitoring of the declared type and, if applicable, variant of the type. Monitors shall have the right to view the interior of such a container. If by viewing the interior of the container, monitors are unable to confirm the number, type, and, if applicable, variant of the type of the item of continuous monitoring that is contained therein, a member of the in-country escort shall remove such an item from the container. In that event, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 8 of this Annex.

7. For a launch canister exiting from the monitored facility that is declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister is a launch canister for an item of the declared type. Monitors shall have the right to view such a launch canister and, at locations on the launch canister designated by a member of the in-country escort, make measurements of the dimensions of the launch canister to confirm that those dimensions correspond to the dimensions specified for an item of the declared type. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

8. For an item of continuous monitoring that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm the type and, if applicable, variant of the type of the declared item of continuous monitoring by external viewing and by measurement of its dimensions at locations on the item of

continuous monitoring designated by a member of the in-country escort. Upon completion of the viewing and measurements, the item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection.

9. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through the portal and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the enclosed space of the vehicle or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space or the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by the dimensions of the enclosed space and the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(b) Make measurements of the dimensions of a partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle or of the dimensions of the accesses into such a space:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions or by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is not large enough to contain or is not accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, by its dimensions and by the dimensions of the accesses into such a space, is large enough to contain and is accessible to an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(c) Weigh a vehicle with its contents:

(i) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is not heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by weighing, monitors confirm that the vehicle, by its gross weight, is heavy enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (d) of this paragraph.

(d) View the interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle, from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort. This place shall be designated in such a way as to allow the monitors to view the entire interior of the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle:

(i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, the vehicle or the partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the interior of the vehicle or partitioned enclosed space within the vehicle, or the open bed of a vehicle contains a container, a launch canister, a covered or environmentally protected object, or an unidentified object, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10, 11, 12, or 13 of this Annex.

After monitors have completed the procedures to confirm the numbers, types, and if applicable, variants of types of items of continuous monitoring or to confirm the absence of an item of continuous monitoring, the vehicle and the containers, launch canisters, or other objects contained therein may leave the monitored facility.

10. For a container that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) Make measurements of the dimensions of the container:

(i) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements monitors confirm that, by its dimensions, the container is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b), (c), or (d) of this paragraph.

(b) View the interior of the container after a member of the in-country escort has opened the container, and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the container does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the container and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container

are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (c) or (d) of this paragraph.

(c) View the contents of the container, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the container:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, the container shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the container, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the container are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

(d) Image the contents of the container using non-damaging imaging equipment. If non-damaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a container be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a container, of the planned exit thereof.

11. For a launch canister that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is declared not to contain an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the interior of the launch canister after a member of the in-country escort has opened the launch canister by removing at least one of the end caps of the launch canister and, as necessary, measure the dimensions of its contents:

(i) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors confirm that the launch canister does not contain an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the interior of the launch canister and measuring the dimensions of its contents, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in subparagraph (b) or (c) of this paragraph.

(b) View the contents of the launch canister, after a member of the in-country escort has removed the contents from the launch canister:

(i) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, the launch canister shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing the contents of the launch canister, monitors are unable to confirm that the contents of the launch canister are not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

(c) Image the contents of the launch canister using non-damaging imaging equipment. If non-damaging imaging equipment has not been installed, and the inspected Party prefers that the contents of a launch canister be imaged, the inspected Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than six months in advance of the planned exit of such a launch canister, of the planned exit thereof.

12. For a covered or environmentally protected object that is exiting from the monitored facility and that is not declared to be an item of continuous monitoring, a member of the in-country escort shall demonstrate to the satisfaction of monitors that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring. At the choice of a member of the in-country escort, monitors shall have the right to carry out one or more of the following procedures:

(a) View the covered or environmentally protected object from a place designated by a member of the in-country escort after a member of the in-country escort has partially or, if necessary, completely removed the cover or environmental protection:

(i) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, a container, or a launch canister, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by viewing, monitors are unable to confirm that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out procedures provided for in paragraph 13 of this Annex.

(iii) If, by viewing, monitors confirm that the object is a container or a launch canister, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in paragraph 10 or 11 of this Annex.

(b) Measure the dimensions of the covered or environmentally protected object:

(i) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, that object shall not be subject to further inspection.

(ii) If, by making such measurements, monitors confirm that the object is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to carry out the procedures provided for in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph.

13. For an object that is outside a container or launch canister and that is not covered or environmentally protected, monitors shall have the right to confirm by external viewing and by making measurements of its dimensions, at locations on the object designated by a member of the in-country escort, that the object is not an item of continuous monitoring.

14. For a vehicle that is exiting from the monitored facility through a road exit, monitors shall have the right to make measurements of any such vehicle to determine whether it is large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring. Those measurements shall be made in such a way as to minimize the delay of vehicles

exiting from the facility. Vehicles large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall proceed to the portal. Vehicles that are not large enough to contain an item of continuous monitoring shall not be subject to further inspection and may leave the monitored facility.

15. At monitored facilities where ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs with multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles are produced, monitors shall have the right, no more than five times each year, to inspect containers or vehicles to confirm that no solid rocket motors for the first stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with missiles attached, exit the monitored facility. In such cases, the size criteria as defined in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol shall be used in carrying out the inspection procedures for containers and vehicles. For the purposes of these inspections, monitors shall have the right to request a member of the in-country escort to direct a vehicle that is large enough to contain a solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, with a missile attached, to proceed to the portal. Monitors shall have the right to carry out the inspection procedures provided for in paragraph 9 or 10 of this Annex.

ANNEX 6
PROCEDURES RELATING TO UNIQUE IDENTIFIERS

1. A unique identifier is a non-repeating alphanumeric production number, or a copy thereof, that has been applied by the inspected Party, using its own technology, to an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex.

2. Each Party shall provide the other Party with unique identifier data for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs in accordance with paragraph 3 or 13 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

3. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported in launch canisters, unique identifiers shall be applied:

(a) for ICBMs existing as of Treaty signature, on each launch canister of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(b) for ICBMs leaving the production facility after Treaty signature, on each launch canister and on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. The data from such unique identifiers shall be provided in a form that establishes the "one-to-one" relationship between the data from the unique identifier applied on the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs and the data from the unique identifier applied on the launch canister associated with such an ICBM. Such unique identifiers may not be changed.

4. For ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are maintained, stored, and transported as a unit without launch canisters or in stages, the unique identifiers shall be applied on each first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

5. During baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, post-dispersal inspections of mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, and conversion or elimination inspections, as well as during the conduct of continuous monitoring, inspectors or monitors shall have the right to read the data from the unique identifiers on deployed and non-deployed ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, except for such ICBMs that are deployed in silo launchers of ICBMs.

The data from a unique identifier shall be read:

(a) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(a) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(b) for ICBMs specified in subparagraph 3(b) of this Annex, from the launch canister associated with ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and if the unique identifier applied on the first stage of such a missile is accessible for external viewing and reading without opening the launch canister, or if during the process of elimination of such an ICBM the missile is removed from its launch canister, from the first stage of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(c) for ICBMs specified in paragraph 4 of this Annex, from the first stage of such ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

6. The place from which inspectors or monitors are allowed to read data from the unique identifier applied on each launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or each first stage of such an ICBM shall be specified by a member of the in-country escort in such a manner as to ensure an accurate reading of such data. If a unique identifier applied on a launch canister or a first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is not accessible for reading as provided for in paragraph 5 of this Annex, such a unique identifier shall be duplicated on the portion of the surface of the launch canister or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile

launchers of ICBMs that is accessible for reading its data by inspectors or monitors during viewing.

7. For a newly-produced ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall inform the monitors of the data from the unique identifier applied to such an ICBM, as provided for in paragraph 3 or 4 of this Annex, before such an item exits through the portal of the monitored facility and shall provide to the inspecting Party such data in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

ANNEX 7
PROCEDURES FOR DELIVERING AND EXAMINING EQUIPMENT AND SUPPLIES TRANSPORTED BY INSPECTION AIRPLANES USED IN ACCORDANCE WITH PARAGRAPH 4 OF SECTION IV OF THIS PROTOCOL

1. Prior to the arrival of an inspection airplane used in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section IV of this Protocol, the inspecting Party, through its embassy, shall provide the inspected Party with an inventory of cargo being delivered that consists of equipment and supplies intended for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the period of time prior to the arrival of such an airplane for providing the inventory. Such an inventory shall include:

(a) to which facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility a particular palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, shall be delivered;

(b) the weight and dimensions of each separate palletized or oversize item of cargo, including modular structures, and, if necessary for facilitating transportation of separate items from the point of entry to a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, black-and-white photographs, or clear facsimile copies of photographs, of each such item;

(c) whether there are modular structures in the cargo that is being delivered;

(d) the contents of each shipping container on a pallet and of each modular structure described in such a way that the inspected Party is able to correlate each item of equipment that is being delivered with the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol; and

(e) for each major item of equipment specified in that inventory, the part of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, as specified in Annex 9 to this Protocol, in which that item of equipment is included.

2. Each shipping container on a pallet, listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, shall be marked with a freight marking, and shall have a complete packing list. One copy of that packing list shall also be included in the inventory.

3. At the choice of the inspected Party, cargoes consisting of equipment and supplies listed in the inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Annex, may be examined at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility. If the examination of such cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, such an examination, at the discretion of the inspecting Party, may be conducted in the presence of the aircrew members. Equipment and supplies carried separately from the cargo shall be examined at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, subject to the provisions of paragraphs 8, 11, 12 and 13 of Section V of this Protocol.

4. During the examination of the cargo, the contents of each shipping container, and of each modular structure, shall be checked against the list of equipment provided for in Section V of Annex 8 and in Annex 9 to this Protocol and against the inventory of equipment and supplies provided pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Annex. Based on the results of the examination of the cargo, a member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader or an authorized representative of such a team shall draw up and sign a joint inventory of the equipment and supplies to reflect items actually delivered. After the joint inventory has been signed, the

monitors shall have the right to begin using the cleared equipment, subject to the provisions of paragraph 25 of Section XVI of this Protocol, and the cleared supplies, at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility.

5. Until the joint inventory referred to in paragraph 4 of this Annex is signed, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing security and protection from inclement weather for the cargo. For that purpose the inspected Party shall provide storage areas for the equipment and supplies. If the examination of cargo is conducted at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party may conduct that examination in the building for the storage of equipment and supplies provided for in paragraph 23 of Section XVI of this Protocol. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the equipment or supplies.

6. If the examination of the cargo is carried out at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, upon completion of the examination procedures, such cargo shall be repacked subject to provisions that shall be agreed within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. If the examination of the cargo is conducted at the point of entry or at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the inspected Party at the request of the inspecting Party shall assist the inspecting Party in providing for the security of the equipment and supplies during loading and unloading operations, in fastening the cargo for shipment, and in protecting the cargo from inclement weather. After the cargo has been packed, it shall be sealed with seals of each of the Parties. Upon arrival of the cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, the monitoring team leader and a member of the in-country escort shall jointly examine the seals. The monitors shall open each shipping container and modular structure in the presence of the in-country escort.

7. The monitors shall have the right to observe palletized or oversize items of cargo, including modular structures, at the point of entry and at each point where they are transferred from one vehicle to another, including: observing the loading of such items of cargo onto the vehicles that will transport them to the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility or to an intermediate transfer point; observing the transfer of such items of cargo at an intermediate transfer point; and observing such items of cargo at the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility after the vehicles carrying such cargo arrive there. In the event of unforeseen delays, the monitors shall have the right to observe such items of cargo that are inside vehicles while such items of cargo are in transit.

8. If during the examination of cargo, or at any time during installation, operation, or maintenance of equipment, the in-country escort concludes that an item of equipment or supplies can perform, or does perform, functions unconnected with the requirements of continuous monitoring activities, such an item of equipment or supplies shall be impounded at the location of the examination. A member of the in-country escort shall explain to the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, the reasons for such a conclusion. If the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, disagrees with the conclusion of the member of the in-country escort, the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, may explain the appropriateness of the item of equipment or supplies to the requirements of continuous monitoring activities. If the member of the in-country escort remains convinced of the original conclusion, that member of the in-country escort and the monitoring team leader, or authorized representative of such a team, shall record their views in a joint document, and each of them shall retain a copy of the document. The Parties may resolve disagreements on the use of impounded equipment or supplies through diplomatic channels, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, or by other methods agreed by the Parties. Equipment and supplies impounded at the point of entry or at the airport associated with a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility shall not be brought to such a facility. Equipment impounded at such a facility shall either not be installed or its use shall be discontinued, and supplies impounded at such a facility shall not be used. Unless the inspected Party informs the inspecting Party of a different decision, such equipment or supplies shall be removed from the territory of the inspected Party. If necessary, the inspected Party shall assist the inspecting Party in delivering such equipment or supplies to the point of entry or airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. At the choice of the inspected Party, prior to removal from the territory of the inspected Party, such equipment or supplies shall be stored at the point of entry, at the airport associated with the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, or directly at such a facility. A storage method shall be used that requires the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the impounded equipment or supplies.

ANNEX 8
EQUIPMENT FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES

I. Characteristics of equipment for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, suspect-site inspections, post-dispersal inspections of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, conversion or elimination inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections conducted pursuant to paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 8, 9, and 10 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes, Lufkin, Model HY 30cm;

(b) 10 3-meter measuring tapes, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(d) 10 24-ounce (680-gram) plumb bobs, Thorpe-Smith;

(e) 2 50-yard (46-meter) plumb bob cords, Duraplex;

(f) 10 Plumb bob targets, Leitz, Model 126-25;

(g) 1 Roll duct tape; and

(h) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Model 600SE;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack;

(c) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(d) 1 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(e) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;

(f) 1 Spare 600SE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;

(g) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(h) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release, Velbo, Model Vel-27-1035;

(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;

(l) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton;

(m) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(p) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety approved);

(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic;

(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model ZI; and

(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter, Victoreen, Model 541-L.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units, Victoreen, Model 2000A;

(b) 2 Satellite system receivers (provided by the inspected Party); and

(c) Radiation detection equipment consisting of the following items:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors with signal/power cables;

(ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual, Eberline, Model ESP-2 modified;

(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;

(iv) 1 Calibration source;

(v) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;

(vi) 30 Miscellaneous spare batteries, sizes C and D;

(vii) 1 Tripod, Anlift, Model BG modified;

(viii) 1 Measuring tape;

(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights, Maglight, Model ML-2;

(x) 3 Programmable calculators with instruction manual, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s; and

(xi) 2 Thermometers.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;

(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;

(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(d) 2 Rod levels;

(e) 2 Spark-proof plumb bobs (600-700 gram);

(f) 2 20-meter plumb bob cords;

(g) 2 4-meter plumb bob cords;

(h) 4 Plumb bob targets;

(i) 2 Target fixing tapes (5cm wide roll);

(j) 3 Measuring tape clamps;

(k) 2 5-10kg tape tensioning scales; and

(l) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack-1;

(c) 1 Tripod;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix-3;

(e) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(f) 1 Flash, Vivitar;

(g) 1 Spare film back, Polaroid for Polaroid camera;

(h) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release;

(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz;

(l) 1 Camera case;

(m) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz; and

(p) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (explosion proof);

(b) 1 Spare flashlight bulb;

(c) 1 Set of batteries for flashlight;

(d) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(e) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(f) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(g) 1 Ruler; and

(h) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, DPG-03.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receivers (provided by the inspected Party); and

(b) 2 Radiation detection equipment.

II. Characteristics of equipment for reentry vehicle inspections conducted pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 3-meter measuring tape, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(b) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety approved);

(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(d) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic;

(e) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(f) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model ZI; and

(g) 1 Ionization dosimeter, Victoreen, Model 541-L.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units, Victoreen, Model 2000A;

(b) 2 Satellite system receivers (provided by the inspected Party); and

(c) Radiation detection equipment consisting of the following items:

(i) 2 Neutron detectors with signal/ power cables;

(ii) 2 Electronic counters with instruction manual, Eberline, Model ESP-2 modified;

(iii) 10 Plastic bags for weather protection;

(iv) 1 Calibration source;

(v) 1 Tool kit, Jensen Tools, Model JTK-6;

(vi) 30 Miscellaneous spare batteries, sizes C and D;

(vii) 1 Tripod, Airlift, Model BG modified;

(viii) 1 Measuring tape;

(ix) 2 Battery-powered lights, Maglight, Model ML-2;

(x) 3 Programmable calculators with instruction manual, Hewlett-Packard, Model HP-27s; and

(xi) 2 Thermometers.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (explosion proof);

(b) 1 Spare flashlight bulb;

(c) 1 Set of batteries for flashlight;

(d) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(e) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(f) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(g) 1 Ruler up to 300 mm;

(h) 1 Curvometer;

(i) 1 Pair of dividers; and

(j) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, DPG-03.

2. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Satellite system receivers (provided by the inspected Party);

(b) 2 Radiation detection equipment; and

(c) 5 5-meter measuring tapes.

III. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps, CST, Model 040710;

(b) 2 0-30 pound (0-14 kilogram) tape tensioning scales, Lufkin, Model 586;

(c) 2 Magnifying glasses, Charvoz;

(d) 2 Hand levels, Topcon, Model 56210;

(e) 2 String line levels, Stanley;

(f) 2 200-millimeter calipers with micrometer screw, MSC, Model 624777;

(g) 2 18-inch (46-centimeter) combination squares, MSC, Model 8640068;

(h) 5 30-meter calibrated measuring tapes;

(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(k) 3 24-ounce (680-gram) plumb bobs, Thorpe-Smith;

(l) 1 50-yard (46-meter) plumb bob cord, Duraplex;

(m) 10 Plumb bob targets, Leitz, Model 126-25;

(n) 3 Rolls duct tape;

(o) 3 Log books;

(p) 2 Rod levels;

(q) 2 2.5-meter range rods, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(r) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash, Polaroid, Model 600SE;

(b) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(c) 2 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;

(e) 1 Spare 600SE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;

(f) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(g) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release, Velbo, Model Vel-27-1035;

(h) Photographic film, Polaroid, Type 665;

(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(j) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;

(k) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton;

(l) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(m) 1 Lens brush;

(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kidde Bright Star (safety approved);

(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic;

(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model ZI; and

(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter, Victoreen, Model 541-L.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units, Victoreen, Model 2000A.

5. Weighing Devices (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type).

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;

(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;

(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(d) 2 Rod levels;

(e) 2 Spark-proof plumb bobs (600-700 gram);

(f) 2 20-meter plumb bob cords;

(g) 2 4-meter plumb bob cords;

(h) 4 Plumb bob targets;

(i) 2 Target fixing tapes (5cm wide roll);

(j) 3 Measuring tape clamps;

(k) 2 5-10kg tape tensioning scales; and

(l) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack-1;

(c) 1 Tripod;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix- 3;

(e) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(f) 1 Flash, Vivitar;

(g) 1 Spare film back, Polaroid, for Polaroid camera;

(h) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release;

(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz;

(l) 1 Camera case;

(m) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz; and

(p) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (explosion proof);

(b) 1 Spare flashlight bulb;

(c) 1 Set of batteries for flashlight;

(d) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(e) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(f) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(g) 1 Ruler; and

(h) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, DPG-03.

4. Weighing devices (as agreed by the Parties within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type).

IV. Characteristics of equipment for inspections during heavy bomber distinguishability exhibitions and heavy bomber baseline exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraphs 12 and 13 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America.

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 3 Measuring tape clamps, CST, Model 040710;

(b) 2 0-30 pound (0-14 kilogram) tape tensioning scale, Lufkin, Model 586;

(c) 2 Magnifying glasses, Charvoz;

(d) 2 Hand levels, Topcon, Model 56210;

(e) 2 String line levels, Stanley;

(f) 2 200-millimeter calipers with micrometer screw, MSC, Model 624777;

(g) 2 18-inch (46-centimeter) combination squares, MSC, Model 8640068;

(h) 5 30-meter calibrated measuring tapes;

(i) 10 3-meter measuring tapes, Lufkin, Model RY23cm;

(j) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(k) 3 24-ounce (680-gram) plumb bobs, Thorpe-South;

(l) 1 50-yard (46-meter) plumb bob cord, Duraplex;

(m) 10 Plumb bob targets, Leitz, Model 126-25;

(n) 3 Roll duct tape;

(o) 3 Log books;

(p) 2 Rod levels;

(q) 2 2.5- meter range rods, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(r) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Cameras with flash, Polaroid, Model 600SE;

(b) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(c) 2 Flash, Vivitar, 285-HV;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Pentax, Digital Spotmeter;

(e) 1 Spare 600SE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;

(f) 1 Tripod, Stitz Quick Release;

(g) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release, Velbo Model

(h) Photographic film, Polaroid, Type 665;

(i) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(j) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;

(k) 1 Aluminum case, Zero-Halliburton;

(l) 1 Package of lens paper, Kodak;

(m) 1 Lens brush;

(n) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(o) 2 Lens filters—one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight, Kwide Bright Star (safety approved);

(b) 1 Magnetic compass, U.S. Lensatic;

(c) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(d) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(e) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, Landauer, Model Z1; and

(f) 1 Ionization dosimeter, Victoreen, Model 541-L.

4. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 2 Ionization dosimeter charger units, Victoreen, Model 2000A.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;

(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;

(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(d) 2 Rod Levels;

(e) 2 Spark-proof plumb bobs (600-700 gram);

(f) 2 20-meter plumb bob cords;

(g) 2 4-meter plumb bob cords;

(h) 4 Plumb bob targets;

(i) 2 Target fixing tapes (5cm wide roll);

(j) 3 Measuring tape clamps;

(k) 2 5-10kg tape tensioning scales; and

(l) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each inspection team):

(a) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack-1;

(c) 1 Tripod;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix- 3;

(e) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(f) 1 Flash Vivitar;

(g) 1 Spare film back, Polaroid, for Polaroid camera;

(h) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release;

(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz;

(l) 1 Camera case;

(m) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz; and

(p) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each inspector):

(a) 1 Flashlight (explosion proof);

(b) 1 Spare flashlight bulb;

(c) 1 Set of batteries for flashlight;

(d) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(e) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(f) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(g) 1 Ruler; and

(h) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, DPG-03.

V. Characteristics of equipment for continuous monitoring activities conducted pursuant to paragraph 14 of Article XI of the Treaty.

A. For the United States of America:

1. Tape measures, measuring sticks, and other devices as agreed between the Parties for measuring dimensions.

2. Camera equipment capable of producing instant development photographic prints, with tripod and measuring sticks as agreed by the Parties.

3. Flashlights.

4. Other equipment as agreed by the Parties.

5. Engineering site survey equipment:

(a) 2 Theodolites, levels, survey chains, survey rods, and stakes;

(b) 2 Light meters;

(c) Engineering tape and stakes, as necessary;

(d) 1 Measuring Wheel;

(e) 6 Measuring tapes, two of each length (3, 30, and 100 meter);

(f) Topographic maps, as necessary;

(g) 2 Water sampling kits;

(h) 2 Portable computers, printers, and accessories;

(i) 1 Portable copier;

(j) 1 Portable facsimile machine;

(k) 2 Video cameras with portable recorders;

(l) 1 Video cassette recorder, with video cassettes, and television monitor;

(m) 2 Cameras with flash; and

(n) Hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials, as required.

B. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Linear Measurement Devices (quantity for each monitoring team):

(a) 5 30-meter measuring tapes;

(b) 5 5-meter measuring tapes;

(c) 2 3-meter measuring sticks;

(d) 2 Rod levels;

(e) 2 Spark-proof plumb bobs (600-700 grain);

(f) 2 20-meter plumb bob cords;

(g) 2 4-meter plumb bob cords;

(h) 4 Plumb bob targets;

(i) 2 Target fixing tapes (5cm wide rolls);

(j) 4 Measuring tape clamps;

(k) 2 5-10kg tape tensioning scales; and

(l) 1 Inspection suitcase.

2. Camera Equipment (quantity for each monitoring team):

(a) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, 600SE;

(b) 1 Camera with flash, Polaroid, Propack-1;

(c) 1 Tripod, Sousts-520;

(d) 1 Exposure meter, Gossen, Lunasix-3;

(e) 1 Lens, Mamiya 75mm/f5.6 with viewfinder;

(f) 1 Flash, Vivitar, 285-EV;

(g) 1 Spare 600SE film back, Polaroid, 601-008;

(h) 1 20-inch (51-centimeter) cable release, Velbo, Model Vel-27-1035;

(i) 8 Eight-packs of photographic film, Polaroid, Types 665, 667, 669;

(j) 10 Spare batteries for cameras, flash, and exposure meter;

(k) 1 Range rod point, Leitz, Model 8078-42;

(l) 1 Camera case;

(m) 1 Package of lens tissue, Kodak;

(n) 1 Lens brush;

(o) 1 2.5-meter range rod, Leitz, Model 8078-42; and

(p) 2 Lens filters--one ultraviolet haze, one amber.

3. Other Portable Equipment (quantity for each monitor):

(a) 1 Flashlight (explosion proof);

(b) 1 Spare flashlight bulb;

(c) 1 Set of batteries for flashlight;

(d) 1 Compass, Azimuth;

(e) 1 Pocket calculator with spare batteries;

(f) 1 Roll of tamper-indicating tape seals;

(g) 1 Ruler; and

(h) 1 Thermoluminescent dosimeter, DPG-03.

4. Engineering Site Survey Equipment:

(a) 2 Theodolites, levels, measuring sticks, and level markers;

(b) 2 Photo-range finders and reflectors;

(c) 10 Measuring tapes or tape measures, two of each length (2, 3, 10, 30, and 100 meter);

(d) 1 Field laboratory (portable) for water sampling;

(e) 1 Digital multimeter;

(f) 2 Avometers;

(g) 1 Photometer;

(h) Topographic maps, as required;

(i) 1 Fence vibration meter;

(j) 1 Four-channel TEAC magnetograph;

(k) 1 Oscillograph;

(l) 1 Portable computer;

(m) 1 Portable copier;

(n) 2 Cameras with flash; and

(o) Hand tools (hammers, pliers, screwdrivers, etc.) and expendable materials, as required.

VI. Methods of use of equipment.

A. The Parties agree to use linear measurement devices in the following manner:

1. Linear measurement devices shall be used to determine length, width, and height of objects by measuring the straight-line distance between the extreme points of these objects or, if required, between tangents drawn perpendicular to the direction of measurement from the outside points of curved surfaces.

2. The diameter of any cylindrical object shall be determined by measuring the circumference, by directly measuring the diameter, or by measuring the distance between parallel lines that are vertical tangents to the cylindrical surface of the object and that lie in a plane perpendicular to the axis of the object. Such measurements shall be taken at several points along the length of that object.

3. In determining the dimensions of an object, each dimension shall be measured at least two times. If the results of the first two measurements are within one percent of each other, then the results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object. If the results of the first two measurements are not within one percent of each other, additional measurements shall be taken until results from two measurements are obtained that are within one percent of each other. The results of these two measurements shall be averaged to determine the dimension of the object.

B. The Parties agree to use cameras in the following manner:

1. Before a member of the in-country escort takes photographs, inspectors shall have the right to determine by observing through the viewfinder, that the object is in

the camera's field of view and is in focus. The inspected Party may take test photographs, which shall be the property of the inspected Party.

2. While taking photographs, the inspected Party shall, at the direction of inspectors or monitors place a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device perpendicular to the ground and directly against the object being photographed; the scale or length of such a measuring stick or equivalent measuring device may be verified and recorded in the inspection report or continuous monitoring report, if the inspection team or monitoring team so desires.

3. The Parties understand that the procedures agreed upon with respect to the taking of photographs shall apply at all inspection sites, and at facilities subject to continuous monitoring and monitored facilities.

C. The Parties agree to use engineering site survey equipment in the following manner:

1. The portable facsimile machine shall be stored within a secure structure or room at the facility subject to continuous monitoring and the inspecting Party may provide a container that is locked by locks and sealed by seals belonging to the inspecting Party. The method of storage shall require the presence of representatives of both Parties for access to the portable facsimile machine. The portable facsimile machine shall be operated by a member of the monitoring team in the presence of a member of the in-country escort. The inspected Party shall have the right to examine the information to be transmitted, prior to the use of the portable facsimile machine, in order to ascertain that it does not contain images that are not connected with the purposes of the engineering site survey.

2. At the request of the inspecting Party, the video camera and the portable recorder, and photographic cameras shall be used by a member of the in-country escort.

D. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on methods of use for weighing devices for the purpose of confirming the launch weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type.

E. The Parties agree to use satellite system receivers provided by the inspected Party to confirm the geographic coordinates of silo launchers of ICBMs during reentry vehicle inspections and during the inspection of a silo launcher of ICBMs from which an ICBM has been removed but which continues to be considered to contain an ICBM in accordance with subparagraph 2(b) or 6(d) of Article III of the Treaty during baseline data inspections, data update inspections, and new facility inspections. When providing receivers for receiving signals from the satellite system that are used for determining the coordinates of such a silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspected Party shall ensure that such receivers are capable of providing such coordinate information at any time during the inspection for any silo launcher of ICBMs located on the territory of the inspected Party. The Parties agree to use such receivers in the following manner:

1. At the point of entry the inspection team leader, in accordance with agreed procedures, shall have the right to confirm that two receivers provided by the inspected Party are functional.

2. After confirming that the two receivers are functioning, a member of the in-country escort, in the presence of the inspection team leader, shall place the receivers in a case or container that shall be sealed by the inspection team leader and provided to a member of the in-country escort.

3. The sealed case or container shall remain in the custody of a member of the in-country escort until the arrival of the inspection team at the silo launcher of ICBMs designated by the inspection team leader.

4. Upon arrival of the inspection team or subgroup of the inspection team at a silo launcher of ICBMs designated for inspection, inspectors shall select and operate in accordance with agreed procedures one of the two satellite system receivers that have been provided by the inspected Party, to determine the coordinates of such silo launcher of ICBMs.

5. If the coordinates of the location of the designated silo launcher of ICBMs displayed by the selected receiver correspond to the geographic coordinates specified for this silo launcher of ICBMs, these readings shall be recorded in the inspection report.

6. If the coordinates of the location of the designated silo launcher of ICBMs displayed by the selected receiver do not correspond to the geographic coordinates specified for this silo launcher of ICBMs, inspectors shall have the right to use the second such receiver.

7. If neither receiver displays geographic coordinates that correspond to the geographic coordinates specified for this silo launcher of ICBMs, the inspectors shall record that fact in the inspection report and the inspection shall continue.

8. Procedures for using the satellite system receivers shall be subject to agreement within the framework of Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission no later than 45 days after entry into force of the Treaty.

F. The Parties agree to use radiation detection equipment in the following manner:

1. Radiation detection equipment shall be used to measure nuclear radiation levels in order to demonstrate that objects declared to be non-nuclear are non-nuclear.

2. The radiation detection equipment shall be provided by the inspecting Party, unless otherwise agreed by the Parties.

3. Before carrying out procedures of measuring with the use of radiation detection equipment, inspectors and the in-country escort shall have the right to perform a check of the operability of such equipment, using standard nuclear radiation sources and agreed procedures.

4. Measurements of the radiation level shall be made by the in-country escort in the presence of inspectors, using the agreed procedures.

ANNEX 9
CHARACTERISTICS AND METHODS OF USE OF EQUIPMENT FOR THE PERIMETER AND PORTAL CONTINUOUS MONITORING SYSTEM

I. Equipment

The inspecting Party shall have the right to install the equipment listed in this Section at each facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. The inspecting Party shall have the right to store such equipment that has not yet been installed and spare parts for such equipment in quantities sufficient for the continuous monitoring activities at the facility where that equipment is to be installed.

A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Monitoring Equipment for the Portal:

(a) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meter-high assembled sectional masts;

(b) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors;

(c) Traffic signal and control equipment:

(i) Electromechanical gate position sensors;

(ii) Traffic lights; and

(iii) Semaphore gates;

(d) Equipment for additional lighting of the portal area:

(i) General purpose lights;

(ii) Emergency lights;

(iii) Floodlights for contrast illumination of vehicles;

(iv) Six-meter high metal poles; and

(v) Three- or six-meter-high sectional masts;

(e) Other equipment:

(i) Fixed measuring rods;

(ii) Portable measuring poles;

(iii) Tape measures and other measuring devices;

(iv) Cabling; and

(v) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party);

(f) Other equipment, as agreed by the Parties.

2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits:

(a) Environmental shelter;

(b) Equipment for monitoring each exit, to be installed in an environmental shelter:

(i) Local control console for independent control of traffic control devices;

(ii) Television monitors for the television surveillance system;

(iii) Connector units for linking equipment at the exit with the operations center;

(iv) Heating control units for infrared sensor protective glass;

(v) Equipment for communications with the operations center; and

(vi) Personal (micro)computers;

(c) Television camera surveillance and measurement system mounted on three- and six-meter-high sectional masts;

(d) System of infrared and magnetometric sensors;

(e) Vehicle dimension screening system:

(i) Vertical receiving and transmitting arrays of infrared sensors; and

(ii) Doppler road sensor;

(f) Traffic signal and control equipment:

(i) Electromechanical gate position sensors;

(ii) Dual-signal traffic lights; and

(iii) Semaphore gates;

(g) Additional lighting equipment for road exit:

(i) General purpose lights;

(ii) Emergency lights;

(iii) Six-meter-high metal poles; and

(iv) Three- and six-meter-high masts;

(h) Other equipment:

(i) Fixed measuring rods;

(ii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices; and

(iii) Cabling;

(i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Perimeter fence integrity monitoring system:

(i) Sensor elements;

(ii) Section boxes;

(iii) Signal cables;

(iv) Equipment for telephone communication with the operations center; and

(v) Cable conduits;

(b) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) Operations center building;

(b) Main control console;

(c) Video data receiving, switching, and digital processing equipment;

(d) Personal (micro)computers;

(e) Television monitors;

(f) Equipment for recording video data and information from sensors, and for recording the results of computer processing of data;

(g) Equipment for receiving, processing, and storing data from the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system;

(h) Telephone and radio communications equipment and fire alarm equipment;

(i) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party);

(j) Photocopying equipment;

(k) Facsimile equipment;

(l) Equipment for the power supply system;

(m) Diesel generator with fuel tanks; and

(n) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Equipment for use at the Portal:

(a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment:

(i) Infrared breakbeam system; and

(ii) Metal base (for mounting of infrared sensors);

(b) Weight sensors (provided by the inspected Party);

(c) Surveillance system (some items of which will be located inside the Operations Center and Exit Shelters, as appropriate):

(i) Character generators and mounting racks;

(ii) Monochrome television cameras;

(iii) Interconnect cables for the television cameras;

(iv) Adjustable mounting head for television cameras;

(v) Camera towers (in sections);

(vi) Camera junction boxes;

(vii) Video distribution amplifiers and mounting racks;

(viii) Nine-inch (23-centimeters) television monitors and mounting racks;

(ix) Videocassette recorder and mounting shelf;

(x) Fiber-optic transmitter cards;

(xi) Fiber-optic cables;

(xii) Fiber-optic receiver cards;

(xiii) Exterior lighting mounting poles;

(xiv) High-pressure sodium lighting and supports;

(xv) Instrument console and panels;

(xvi) Video loss detectors and closure panel;

(xvii) Video switching devices;

(xviii) Data authentication devices; and

(xix) Video foredrop (fixed measuring rod for video imaging);

(d) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment:

(i) Infrared breakbeam system;

(ii) Induction loop-sensors;

(iii) Gate opening sensors;

(iv) Traffic signal lights;

(v) Semaphore gates;

(vi) Traffic control junction box; and

(vii) Metal base (for mounting of sensors, signal lights, and semaphore gates);

(e) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

2. Equipment for use at the Road Exits, consisting of:

(a) Vehicle dimensional screening equipment (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(a) of this Annex);

(b) Surveillance system (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex);

(c) Vehicle Sensors and Control Equipment (equipment as specified in subparagraph I.B.1.(d) of this Annex);

(d) Communications equipment, to include telephones, intercom and hand-held radios specified in subparagraph I.B.4.(v) of this Annex;

(e) Environmental shelter (modular, with equipment specified in paragraph I.B.4 of this Annex, as necessary, for independent monitoring of a road exit);

(f) Cabling, as required;

(g) Gate Seals;

(h) Data authentication devices; and

(i) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

3. Equipment for use along the Perimeter, consisting of:

(a) Surveillance System (equipment as listed in subparagraph I.B.1.(c) of this Annex);

(b) Video motion-detection equipment;

(c) Video switching equipment;

(d) Data authentication devices;

(e) Cabling, as required; and

(f) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) Programmable logic controller;

(b) Executive module for logic controller;

(c) Memory module for logic controller;

(d) Interface rack for logic controller;

(e) Output module for logic controller;

(f) Input module for logic controller;

(g) Equipment control panel;

(h) Printers for personal (micro)-computers;

(i) Personal (micro)computers;

(j) Hard and floppy disk, and tape drives for personal (micro)computers;

(k) Keyboards for personal (micro)computers;

(l) Display monitors for personal (micro)computers;

(m) Desktop scanner and interface for personal (micro)computers;

(n) Software for personal (micro)-computers;

(o) Hardware and software for the personal (micro)computers for recording a digitized video image to computer memory;

(p) Videocassette recorders;

(q) Consoles for video, traffic control, and other subsystems;

(r) Photocopying equipment;

(s) Environmental control equipment;

(t) Video equipment as specified for the surveillance system;

(u) Data authentication equipment;

(v) Communications equipment:

(i) Laser facsimile equipment;

(ii) Telephone system, to include wiring connectors, and switching equipment;

(iii) Intercom system;

(iv) Base station radio transceiver;

(v) Hand-held radios;

(vi) Antenna for base radio station;

(vii) Fiber-optic cabling for connecting exit shelters and equipment at the exits to the operations center; and

(viii) Satellite communications equipment (if provided by the inspecting Party);

(w) Operations center building (modular);

(x) Power Supply Equipment:

(i) Back-up power generator;

(ii) Automatic switching equipment for generator;

(iii) Generator fuel storage tank;

(iv) Transformer for generator; and

(v) Distribution panel for generator;

(y) Other equipment, as agreed between the Parties.

II. Methods of Use of Equipment

The Parties agree to use the equipment specified in Section I of this Annex as follows:

A. For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

1. Equipment at the Portal:

(a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen road and rail vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles and cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the portal, produce a continuous videotape and video snapshots of vehicles proceeding through the portal, and perform remote dimensional screening of vehicles exiting the monitored facility. Television cameras shall be mounted on three- and six-meter-high assembled sectional masts. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties. Television cameras for remote dimensional screening of exiting vehicles shall be located no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicular route through the portal and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic.

(ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors shall be installed in the screening area on both sides of the route of traffic and used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles, to identify vehicle locations, and to relay video snapshots of side views and front images of vehicles for the remote dimensional screening of vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Infrared sensors shall be mounted on special supports on both sides of the screening area and shall register beam interruption by exiting vehicles. Magnetometric sensors shall be installed on one side of the screening area and shall be a back-up system that allows vehicles to be distinguished from other objects breaking the sensor beams.

(iii) Traffic signal and control equipment consisting of electro-mechanical entrance and exit gate position sensors, traffic lights controlling the exit of a vehicle from the monitored facility, as well as a semaphore gate shall be used to control a vehicle in the portal area.

(iv) The equipment for additional lighting of the portal areas shall include general purpose and emergency lights and flood lights for contrast lighting of vehicles while the side and front measurement television cameras are turned on. General purpose and emergency lights shall be mounted on six-meter-high assembled metal poles so as to ensure the lighting of the portal area. Floodlights for contrast lighting of vehicles shall be mounted on three- or six-meter-high sectional masts near the screening area along the vehicular route through the portal.

(v) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

(vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be

used for visual evaluation of vehicle dimensions.

(vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles, covered and environmentally protected objects, containers, launch canisters, and cargoes.

(viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the portal and the operations center.

2. Monitoring Equipment for Road Exits:

(a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles or cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargo are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall bring that to the attention of the in-country escort, and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicle or cargo to the portal of the monitored facility.

(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The television camera surveillance and measurement system shall permit a monitor in the operations center to observe the situation at the road exits and remotely screen the dimensions of exiting vehicles by means of video information from the measurement television cameras. Television cameras shall be installed on three- and six-meter-high sectional masts. Surveillance television cameras shall monitor the entrance and exit gates as well as the area of the road exit. Measurement television cameras shall be installed no more than 50 meters from, and perpendicular to the vehicle route through the road exit and no more than 30 meters from the middle of the screening area facing in the direction of traffic. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.

(ii) The system of infrared and magnetometric sensors installed on both sides of the screening area of the road exit shall be used to monitor the direction of movement of vehicles and exposed cargoes, relay video snapshots of side and frontal images of vehicles.

(iii) The system for monitoring the dimensions of vehicles, consists of vertical arrays of infrared transmitters and receivers located on both sides of the screening area of the road exit and of a doppler road sensor installed on the shoulder and beamed at the approaching exiting vehicle. The information from the doppler and infrared sensors is received in the operations center in order to produce a profile of the exiting vehicle or exposed cargo to determine whether the vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring.

(iv) The traffic signal and control equipment, consisting of electromechanical exit and entrance gate position sensors, dual-signal traffic lights and semaphore gates shall be used to control vehicles exiting the monitored facility.

(v) The equipment for additional lighting of the road exit control area, which includes general purpose and emergency lights and floodlights, shall ensure the operation of the television measurement cameras. Such equipment shall be mounted on six-meter-high poles and three-meter-high masts.

(vi) Fixed measuring rods shall be used for visual evaluation of the dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes.

(vii) Portable measuring poles, tape measures, and other measuring devices shall be used for direct dimensional measurement of vehicles and exposed cargoes.

(viii) Cabling shall link equipment at the exit with the operations center.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.

(b) The following equipment, which the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) The perimeter fence integrity monitoring system shall consist of sensor elements and section boxes mounted on the perimeter mesh fence. A sensor element shall consist of segments of special cable up to 500 meters long, laid in two parallel "threads" along the fence and connected to a section box that is mounted on fence supports.

(ii) The section boxes shall be connected to one another and to the operations center by a cable for signaling a possible perimeter violation and the location of the violation.

(iii) The section boxes shall have telephone connections to the operations center as well. Conduits for cables connecting portal equipment to equipment at the road exits, shall be fastened onto the perimeter mesh fence supports.

4. Operations Center Equipment:

(a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team. The operations center building shall be located at the portal within the perimeter continuous monitoring area and shall consist of five sections, three of which shall be used to house technical equipment and two shall be used as an off-duty area. The location of the building shall provide for an unobstructed view of the portal.

(b) The equipment located in the operations center may be used by monitors to:

(i) Observe on television monitor screens the situation in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, at the portal, and at the road exits;

(ii) Operate the traffic lights and semaphore gates;

(iii) Check color graphic displays of measurements of dimensions of exiting vehicles and exposed cargoes obtained using infrared and television systems;

(iv) Remotely control the lighting of the portal areas;

(v) Control the perimeter fence integrity monitoring system;

(vi) Receive, switch, and digitally process video information from surveillance and measurement television cameras;

(vii) Control outside devices, monitor sensors, and determine whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring;

(viii) Record video data, information from sensors, and computer processed information;

(ix) Provide telephone communications, radio communications and fire alarms; and

(x) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment, unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line.

(c) Electrical power supply equipment shall be used to transform the voltages and the frequencies of the feeder network to supply uninterrupted power for technical systems in the event of a brief interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.

(d) A diesel generator with fuel tanks shall be located under an awning near the operations center and shall be used as an independent electrical power supply source for technical systems in the event of a protracted interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.

B. For the United States of America:

1. Equipment at the Portal:

(a) Equipment installed at the portal shall be used to screen rail vehicles, road vehicles, and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring, as determined by screening, such vehicles and cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without further inspection and without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, monitors shall have the right to stop and inspect such vehicles and cargoes in accordance with the procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

(b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at the portal of a facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching vehicle to the monitors in the operations center. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors.

(ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control each vehicle's passage through the portal so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices.

(iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for video imaging), or other sensors.

(iv) Weight sensors shall be used to weigh road vehicles in accordance with procedures provided for in Annex 5 to this Protocol.

(v) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities in the area of the portal from the operations center, to record video images, and to take, as necessary, video snapshots of vehicles moving through the portal. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.

(vi) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the portal area and for the video cameras.

(vii) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of signals relayed from cameras and sensors to the operations center.

2. Equipment at the Road Exits:

(a) Equipment installed at each road exit shall be used to screen road vehicles and exposed cargoes to determine whether they are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. If such vehicles and cargoes are not large enough to contain or to be such an item of continuous monitoring as determined by screening, such vehicles or cargoes shall be allowed to proceed without undue delay. If such vehicles or cargoes are large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring, the monitors shall call this to the attention of the in-country escort and the inspected Party shall direct such vehicles or cargoes to the portal of the monitored facility.

(b) The following equipment or part of such equipment, which the inspecting Party may install at each road exit of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Vehicle sensors shall provide indication of an approaching road vehicle to the monitors in the operations center and exit shelter. Such sensors may include in-road induction loop sensors, above-ground induction loop sensors, infrared breakbeams, gate opening sensors placed on gates of the facility, or other sensors.

(ii) Traffic control devices shall be employed to control the passage of each vehicle or exposed cargo through the road

exit so that it may be screened by the monitors and the equipment. Traffic control devices may include traffic lights and semaphore gates, or other devices.

(iii) Length screening sensors shall assist monitors in the operations center and exit shelters in determining whether a vehicle or exposed cargo is large enough to contain or to be an item of continuous monitoring. Such sensors may include infrared breakbeams, video cameras with video foredrops (fixed measuring rods for visual imaging) or other sensors.

(iv) The surveillance system, which may include video cameras mounted on poles, shall allow the monitors to observe activities from the operations center and exit shelter, to record video images, and to take, as necessary, video snapshots of road vehicles and cargoes moving through the exit. The fixed field of view of such cameras shall be agreed by the Parties.

(v) Lights on poles shall provide illumination for observation of the exit area and for the video cameras.

(vi) Environmental shelters for monitors shall contain equipment as specified in paragraph I.B.4 of this Annex, and telephone equipment for communications with the operations center. Such shelters shall be used to receive all data from equipment at the road exits when monitors are present at those exits.

(vii) Gate seals may be used on the gates of a road exit when the exit is not in use. The seals shall be checked by monitors to verify that the gate was not used prior to the opening of the exit by the inspected Party.

(viii) Data authentication devices shall be used to confirm the validity of signals from the sensors and video cameras to the operations center and exit shelter.

3. Perimeter Monitoring Equipment:

(a) Equipment may be placed by the inspecting Party along the entire perimeter of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility. Such equipment shall be used by monitors to observe the activity along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area.

(b) The following equipment, or part of such equipment that the inspecting Party may install along the perimeter and within the perimeter continuous monitoring area of the facility subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facility, shall function as follows:

(i) Video cameras shall be located along the perimeter in such a way as to provide for viewing of the perimeter by monitors in the operations center. The distance between such cameras and the height of the cameras above the ground shall allow the cameras to provide for full viewing of corresponding sectors of the perimeter. Such cameras may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground. The fixed field of view shall be agreed to by the Parties;

(ii) Video switching devices located in the operations center shall be used to select sectors of the perimeter for observation by the monitors;

(iii) The surveillance system may include video motion detectors to signal the presence of a moving object within the field of view of a camera;

(iv) Lights on poles shall provide illumination along the entire perimeter and allow for viewing by video cameras during periods of darkness. Lights may be placed 50 meters or less apart and no more than eight meters above the ground;

(v) Data authentication devices may be used to confirm the validity of the signals transmitted by the video cameras to the operations center or shelters.

4. Operations Center:

(a) The operations center for the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system shall serve as the headquarters for the monitoring team. The building for the operations center shall be located at the portal. The location of the building shall provide for an unobstructed view of the portal.

(b) The equipment located in the operations center shall be used by monitors to:

(i) Receive, review, and authenticate data from all portal, road exit, and perimeter monitoring equipment;

(ii) Process data, display video images, and collect monitoring data;

(iii) Operate all traffic control devices and vehicle sensors when such devices and sensors are not under the control of monitors at the road exits;

(iv) Transmit, using the two dedicated telephone lines and satellite communications equipment unencrypted monitoring-related data including video snapshots and photographs. Such information shall not be transmitted via the non-dedicated commercial telephone line;

(v) Record and store video and sensor data;

(vi) Provide telephone communications with monitors at exit shelters, at any other buildings or structures used for inspection of vehicles or their cargoes, at the storage building, and at the monitors' living quarters; and

(vii) Provide two-way radio communications with monitors in the perimeter continuous monitoring area, including with monitors at the road exits.

(c) A backup power generator shall be located near the operations center and shall be used to provide power to the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system in the event of an interruption in the electrical power provided by the inspected Party.

ANNEX 10
TYPES OF INSPECTION AIRPLANES

1. Inspection airplanes may include military transport airplanes with standard markings and paint schemes, to include camouflage.

2. The types of inspection airplanes that may be used to transport inspectors and monitors are:

(a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, types known as the C-130, C-141, C-9, and T-43; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the Il-62 and Il-96.

3. The types of inspection airplanes that may be used for delivery and removal of cargoes consisting of equipment or supplies specified in an inventory provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Annex 7 to this Protocol are:

(a) for the United States of America, for flights to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, types known as the C-5, C-130, and C-141; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, for flights to the United States of America, types known as the Il-76 and An-124.

4. Each Party shall have the right to replace the types of airplanes specified in this Annex with other types of airplanes, as well as to add other types of airplanes after it has informed the other Party of such a replacement or addition. Unless otherwise agreed by the Parties, each such change shall enter into force three months after a Party has so informed the other.

ANNEX 11
PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMING THE DIMENSIONS OF ICBMS AND SLBMS

1. During confirmation of dimensions of the exhibited items the inspectors shall have the right to make measurements at the locations on the items, designated by a member of the in-country escort.

2. For liquid fuel ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types and new types, assembled missiles and separate first stages for such ICBMs or SLBMs may be exhibited either with fuel or without fuel. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types, except for the SS-25 ICBM and the Trident II SLBM, assembled missiles shall be exhibited with propellant. Separate first stages for solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, the assembled missiles, at the choice of the inspected Party, may be exhibited with propellant, without propellant, or as an inert missile. If a solid propellant ICBM or SLBM of a new type is declared on the basis of a change in missile length, such an ICBM or SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant. For solid propellant ICBMs or SLBMs of new types, separate first stages shall be exhibited with propellant.

3. The self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited, either separately or with the third stage as a unit, for the purpose of confirming the length of an ICBM or SLBM, which is maintained, stored, and transported in stages. If the self-contained dispensing mechanism is exhibited separately, the inspectors shall have the right to measure its length.

4. For ICBMs that are maintained, stored and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters, either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM, shall be exhibited.

5. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions, during technical characteristics exhibitions, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) For the SS-25, SS-24, and SS-18 ICBMs, and each variant thereof, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. The assembled SS-25 ICBM outside its launch canister may be exhibited without propellant. The separate first stage of the SS-25 ICBM shall be exhibited with propellant.

(b) For the SS-13 ICBM, the first stage shall be exhibited and measured separately, and the second and third stages shall be exhibited and measured as a unit. The SS-13 ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile.

(c) For the SS-11, SS-17, and SS-19 ICBMs, the separate first stage, the assembled missile outside its launch canister, and either a launch canister containing an ICBM without front section or, at the choice of the inspected Party, an empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM shall be exhibited. Technical characteristics exhibitions for these ICBMs shall take place no later than one year after Treaty signature during an elimination of an ICBM of such a type.

(d) For SLBMs of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, assembled missiles shall be exhibited. Confirmation of the length and diameter of the first stages of such SLBMs shall take place on the assembled missile. The SS-N-17 SLBM has been retired prior to Treaty signature, and it will not be subject to a technical characteristics exhibition. If, after the technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America requests, through diplomatic channels, additional confirmation of dimensions of the first stage of any SLBM, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall exhibit such SLBM during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type. In its request for such an exhibition, the United States of America shall designate what it seeks to confirm regarding the dimensions of such a first stage. Procedures for such additional confirmation of the dimensions of the first stages of SLBMs shall be agreed upon within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission prior to entry into force of the Treaty. The diameter of the third stage of the SS-N-20 SLBM shall be confirmed during the first elimination of an SLBM of that type.

6. For the purpose of confirming ICBM or SLBM dimensions during technical characteristics exhibitions, the United States of America shall exhibit an ICBM and SLBM of each existing type in accordance with the following procedures:

(a) For an ICBM or an SLBM of each type, except for the Peacekeeper ICBM, the separate first stage and the assembled missile shall be exhibited. For the Minuteman II ICBM, the guidance ring and the forward spacer ring shall be exhibited separately. For the Minuteman III ICBM, the self-contained dispensing mechanism shall be exhibited separately.

(b) For the Peacekeeper ICBM, all stages shall be exhibited and measured separately. The Peacekeeper ICBM shall not be exhibited as an assembled missile.

(c) The assembled Trident II SLBM may be exhibited without propellant or as an inert missile. The separate first stage of the Trident II SLBM shall be exhibited with propellant.

7. For a technical characteristics exhibition for an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or variant, the separate first stage, assembled missile outside its launch canister, and if applicable, either launch canister containing the assembled missile without front section, or, at the choice of the inspected Party, the empty launch canister associated with such an ICBM or SLBM, shall be exhibited. If an ICBM or

SLBM of a new type cannot be exhibited as an assembled missile, separate stages shall be exhibited. The first stage of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage, with or without a difference in throw-weight, shall be exhibited in a configuration that allows confirmation of the length of such first stage as defined in paragraph 15 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding.

ANNEX 12
SIZE CRITERIA TO BE USED DURING INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING

1. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex I to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(a) of Section VI of this Protocol, for baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility inspections, close-out inspections, and formerly declared facility inspections at facilities other than air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, training facilities for heavy bombers, and storage facilities for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	4.1
Diameter (meters)	1.88
Missile Type	Trident I/Poseidon
Length (meters)	6.3
Diameter (meters)	1.68
Missile Type	Minuteman II/III

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	7.4
Diameter (meters)	1.80
Missile Type	SS-25

2. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by inspectors carrying out the procedures of Annex I to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 20 and subparagraph 23(b) of Section VI of this Protocol, for suspect-site inspections, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	7.4
Diameter (meters)	2.3
Missile Type	Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	7.4
Diameter (meters)	1.80
Missile Type	SS-25

3. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraphs 1 through 14 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraphs 21 and 24 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	8.4
Diameter (meters)	2.3
Missile Type	Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	18.0
Diameter (meters)	1.80
Missile Type	SS-25

4. For each Party, the size criteria to be used by monitors carrying out the procedures of paragraph 15 of Annex 5 to this Protocol, as provided for in paragraph 25 of Section VI of this Protocol, and the associated missile types, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	8.2
Diameter (meters)	2.2
Missile Type	Peacekeeper

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
Size Criteria

Length (meters)	8.2
Diameter (meters)	2.3
Missile Type	SS-24

5. The size criteria indicated above are derived using data for ICBMs and SLBMs existing as of Treaty signature. In the event that a new type of ICBM or SLBM is deployed or in the event that a type of ICBM or SLBM is retired, these size criteria shall be changed, if necessary. In addition, these size criteria shall be confirmed based on the results of measurements taken during technical characteristics exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree on any changes to the size criteria within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

PROTOCOL ON NOTIFICATIONS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions that establish the procedures for, and the content of, the notifications provided for in Article VIII of the Treaty.

I. Notifications Concerning Data With Respect to Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty, According to Categories of Data Contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and Other Agreed Categories of Data

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(a) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding and other agreed categories of data:

(1) notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding;

(2) notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following the entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include, for each Party, all its data for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding;

(3) notification, no later than five days after it occurs, of each change in data with respect to items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty, according to categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding or other agreed categories of data, unless notification of such change has been provided in accordance with another paragraph of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the change in data, by number and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the items; the location of the items; the date on which such a change occurred; and, for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier. Such notification shall also include the geographic coordinates of the location of the following that relate to the change: except for silo launcher groups, each facility, including any eliminated facility; any facility subject to continuous monitoring, and any monitored facility; each silo launcher of ICBMs; each silo used as a launch control center, each other launch control center; each deployment area; each rail garrison entrance/exit; each fixed test launcher; and each heavy bomber or former heavy bomber converted for use as a ground trainer. Such notification shall further include:

(a) for the loss as the result of an accident of an item accountable under the terms of the Treaty: the approximate or assumed location of the accidental loss; the circumstances related to the loss, if such circumstances are known; and the assumed date of the loss;

(b) for disablement beyond repair of an item accountable under the provisions of the Treaty: the circumstances of the disablement;

(c) for elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or soft-site launcher, at which grading is not to be performed, a statement that the date specified is the date of completion of the elimination process for such a launcher;

(d) for new facilities, for new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions of items: a statement that site diagrams for new facilities, and photographs of new kinds of support equipment, and, as applicable, for new types, categories, variants, and versions of items that meet the requirements for site diagrams and photographs set forth in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph;

(e) for new variants of ICBMs and SLBMs and new versions of mobile launchers of ICBMs, the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided;

(4) notification, no less than 30 days in advance, of a reduction in the number of warheads attributed to ICBMs at an ICBM base or to SLBMs on ballistic missile submarines at submarine bases. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM or the type of SLBM to which a reduced number of warheads will be attributed; the reduced number of warheads that will be attributed to deployed ICBMs or deployed SLBMs of that type; the planned date on which the reduced number of warheads is to be attributed to such ICBMs or SLBMs; and the ICBM base for the ICBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed, or the submarine bases for the ballistic missile submarines for the SLBMs to which the reduced number of warheads will be attributed;

(5) notification, no later than February 1 of each year, of planned changes, as of the end of that calendar year, in the number of deployed strategic offensive arms. Such notification shall include: the planned aggregate number as of the end of that calendar year of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers by type, deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers by type, and deployed heavy bombers by type and category; the planned number of ICBMs and SLBMs to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of ICBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; the planned number of SLBM launchers to be converted or eliminated by type; and the planned number of heavy bombers, by type and category, to be converted into heavy bombers of another category or into former heavy bombers, and the planned number of heavy bombers to be eliminated. If the expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms of any type will be greater as of the end of that year than the planned number that was specified in accordance with this paragraph, notification of such expected number of deployed strategic offensive arms as of the end of that year shall be provided no less than 30 days in advance of such a change;

(6) notification containing a request regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, the coordinates of which are provided to the nearest minute, that are considered by the Party receiving data on such locations to have the same appearance. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the locations; their geographic coordinates; and reasons that the Party considers such locations to have the same appearance;

(7) notification, no later than 15 days after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 6 of this Section, regarding locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other. Such notification shall include: the name or designator of the requested locations; information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the specified locations, or the geographic coordinates of the locations to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations;

(8) notification, no later than 48 hours after it has been completed, of the transfer of items to or from a third State in accordance with a pattern of cooperation existing at the time of signature of the Treaty referred to in Article XVI of the Treaty and the First Agreed Statement in the Annex to the Treaty on Agreed Statements. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items transferred; the date of transfer; and the location of transfer;

(9) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the exit from a newly constructed facility or a facility for which such items have not been specified in the Memorandum of Understanding, or no less than 30 days in advance of the appearance of an ICBM, SLBM, first stage of an ICBM or SLBM, solid rocket motor for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, mobile launcher of ICBMs, or heavy bomber at such a facility, of the existence of a new facility or of a change of category of a facility. Such notification shall include: the name of the facility; its function according to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and its geographic coordinates. Such notification shall not be required if notification was provided in accordance with paragraph 10 of this Section;

(10) notification of the location of a production facility, not previously declared, at which production of ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs is planned, no less than 90 days in advance of the exit from such a facility of the first of the items specified in the notification. Such notification shall include: the name of the production facility; the type of items that will be produced at the facility; the planned date of the exit from the facility of the first of the items that will be produced at the facility; the geographic coordinates of the facility; and, if the production facility is a production facility for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs or if the ICBMs or SLBMs or first stages of the ICBMs or SLBMs that will be produced at the facility are as large as or larger than the smallest ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, a statement that the site diagram of the facility, which meets the requirements for site diagrams specified in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding, will be provided through diplomatic channels no later than 48 hours after the notification provided for in this paragraph;

(11) notification, no later than five days after excavation begins, of the beginning of construction of a new silo launcher of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM which the silo launcher under construction will contain; the name of the ICBM base; the geographic coordinates of the silo launcher of ICBMs under construction; and the date on which excavation began;

(12) notification, no later than five days after production has ceased, of the cessation of production of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs or first stages of such ICBMs at a monitored facility. Such notification shall include: the monitored facility and the date on which such production ceased;

(13) notification, no later than 30 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing the data from the unique identifier for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs existing as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the data from the unique identifier; the restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility at which the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is located, or, if the ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs is in transit or relocation, its destination;

(14) notification declaring that ICBMs or SLBMs of a type shall be considered to be ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM or SLBM;

(15) notification, beginning three months after the notification that ICBMs of a type for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be considered to be ICBMs of a retired type in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section, and at each three-month period thereafter, of the number and location, by facility, of the retired ICBMs of that type. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has such retired types. In

the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs no later than the last day of each three-month period that follows the notification of the first retired type of such ICBM.

(16) notification, beginning six months after the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 14 of this Section and at each six-month period thereafter, of the type, number, and location of ICBMs and SLBMs of retired types, other than ICBMs of retired types of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notifications shall continue for as long as the Party has ICBMs or SLBMs of such retired types. In the event that a Party has more than one type of such ICBMs or SLBMs of a retired type, it shall provide notification for all such retired ICBMs and SLBMs no later than the last day of each six-month period that follows the notification of the first retired type of ICBM or SLBM;

(17) notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, providing data current as of the date of entry into force of the Treaty for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM;

(18) notification, no later than 30 days after the expiration of each six-month period following entry into force of the Treaty, providing updated data for ICBMs and SLBMs of former types. The first of these six-month periods shall begin the first day of the calendar month following the month in which the Treaty enters into force. Such notification shall include: the type, number, and location for each such ICBM and SLBM.

II. Notifications Concerning Movement of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(b) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning movement of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty:

(1) notification, no later than 48 hours after its completion, of the transit of non-deployed ICBMs and non-deployed SLBMs, launch canisters that remain after flight tests of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, non-deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs, and mobile training launchers. Such notification shall include: the number and type of items involved; the facility from which the items departed; the date of departure; the facility at which the items have arrived; the date of arrival; the mode of transport; and, for each ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier;

(2) notification, no later than eight hours after a visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber has exceeded 24 hours in duration, of the visit of such an airplane to a specified facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers or to an eliminated facility. Such notification shall include: for each air base, production facility, repair facility, conversion or elimination facility, or storage facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test center, training facility for heavy bombers, or eliminated facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that are visiting; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; the facility such airplanes are visiting; and the date and time of arrival;

(3) notification, no later than 24 hours after departure, of the conclusion of the visit of a heavy bomber or former heavy bomber, notification of which has been provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section. Such notification shall include, for each visited facility: the number, by type, category, and, if applicable, variant, of the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers that have concluded the visit; the facility visited by such airplanes; the air base, heavy bomber flight test center, production facility for heavy bombers or former heavy bombers, or training facility for heavy bombers, at which such airplanes are based; and the date and time of departure;

(4) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a rail garrison for routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles departing from the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of departure;

(5) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each rail-mobile test launcher from a test range. Such notification shall include: the number of rail-mobile test launchers and the number of launch-associated railcars departing the test range; the test range; and the date of departure;

(6) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile to the rail garrison from which it departed, of its return from routine movement. Such notification shall include, for each rail garrison: the number of deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have returned to the rail garrison; the rail garrison; and the date of return;

(7) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return, of the return of each rail-mobile test launcher to the test range from which it departed. Such notification shall include: the date of return; and the test range;

(8) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return of a train with rail-mobile test launchers to the test range from which it departed, of any variation from the configuration of the train that was specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 5 of this Section during the time the train was outside the test range. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation; and the extraordinary circumstances, which must exist for such a variation from the configuration of the train to take place, that required a variation from the configuration of the train;

(9) notification, no less than 24 hours in advance, of the departure of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile from a restricted area, rail garrison, or other facility, for a relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or for each other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles; the point of departure, or the facility of origin; the destination; and the date of departure;

(10) notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival of each deployed mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile at its destination, of the completion of the relocation. Such notification shall include, for each ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs or other facility: the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have relocated; the facility of origin and, if applicable, the point of departure; the date of departure; the facility at which each such launcher and its associated missile has arrived; the date of arrival; the data from the unique identifier for each of the ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs involved in the relocation; and for those portions of the route taken by deployed road-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles outside the deployment area, the location, date and time at that location at least once every four days during the relocation;

(11) notification, no later than 18 hours after the beginning of an exercise dispersal, of the beginning of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include: the ICBM bases for mobile launchers of ICBMs that are involved in such a dispersal; and the date and time of the beginning of the dispersal;

(12) notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of an exercise dispersal, of the completion of an exercise dispersal of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles. Such notification shall include, for each applicable ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs: the ICBM base; the date and time of the completion of the dispersal; and, for each specific restricted area or for each specific rail garrison of the ICBM base, the number of deployed mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles that have not returned to the restricted area or rail garrison. Such notification shall also include:

(a) for each deployed road-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the restricted area and to which transportation for inspectors is not provided, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located; and the reason for its location there;

(b) for each deployed rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile that has not returned to the rail garrison, the specific facility or the geographic coordinates of the location at which each such mobile launcher of ICBMs and its associated missile is located, and the reason for its location there;

(13) notification, no less than three hours in advance of the date of a variation from standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, of such a variation, if such variation will be the result of the departure of the train or of a portion of such a train for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison and if the return of that train to standard configuration cannot take place within the 12-hour period provided for the preparation for the implementation of a cooperative measure in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article XII of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date when such variation will take place; the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the portion of the train that will depart for the maintenance facility associated with the rail garrison; and the parking site of the train with a variation in the standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site;

(14) notification, no later than 24 hours after the completion of the routine movement or no later than 48 hours after the completion of the relocation, of any variation from the standard configuration of trains with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles during routine movements and relocations. Such notification shall include: the dates on which each variation took place; the portions of the route on which each variation took place; and the number of launchers and launch-associated railcars contained in the train during each such variation;

(15) notification, no later than 24 hours after the return to standard configuration, of the return to standard configuration of a train with deployed rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs and their associated missiles, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 13 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs; the date on which the return to standard configuration took place; and the parking site of the train that has returned to standard configuration, if there is a fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs at such a parking site;

(16) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the beginning of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIII of the Treaty, of the beginning of such an exercise. Such notification shall include: the air bases for heavy bombers and air bases for former heavy bombers that are involved in the exercise; and the date and time of the beginning of the exercise;

(17) notification, no later than eight hours after the completion of a major strategic exercise involving heavy bombers, about which a notification has been provided in accordance with paragraph 16 of this Section, of the completion of that exercise. Such notification shall include the date and time of the completion of the exercise.

III. Notifications Concerning Data on ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight in Connection with the Throw-weight Protocol

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(c) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning data on ICBM and SLBM throw-weight in connection with the Throw-weight Protocol:

(1) notification, no less than seven days in advance of the eighth flight test of an ICBM or SLBM of each new type, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in the course of the first seven flight tests; data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 8000; 9000; 10,000; 11,000; and 12,000 kilometers, or that an SLBM of a new type could deliver to distances of 6500; 7500; 8500; 9500; and 10,500 kilometers; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight;

(2) notification, no less than 45 days in advance of each flight test conducted to satisfy the requirements of paragraph 2 of Section II of the Throw-weight Protocol, of data about such a flight test. Such notification shall include: the designation of the type of ICBM or SLBM, the planned date of the flight test, and the launch area and the planned reentry vehicle impact area, specified in accordance with the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988;

(3) notification, no later than five days after an ICBM or SLBM of a new type first becomes subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the accountable throw-weight; the date on which the flight test with the accountable throw-weight was conducted; the data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight;

(4) notification, no later than five days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which a throw-weight greater than its accountable throw-weight was demonstrated, of data about that ICBM or SLBM. Such notification shall include: the new value of the accountable throw-weight; and the date on which the flight test with the new value of the accountable throw-weight was conducted. For an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the notification shall also include data on the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of the new type could deliver to the distances specified in paragraph 1 of this Section; and data on the residual propellant for each stage and on the descending ballistic flight path angle at an altitude of 100 kilometers that were used in determining each such value of the maximum calculated throw-weight; however, if such data has not changed with respect to the data previously declared for that type of missile, this data need not be included, but the number of the earlier notification containing such data shall be specified.

IV. Notifications Concerning Conversion or Elimination of Items Subject to the Limitations Provided for in the Treaty and Elimination of Facilities Subject to the Treaty

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(d) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning conversion or elimination of items subject to the limitations provided for in the Treaty and elimination of facilities subject to the Treaty:

(1) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the respective processes of conversion or elimination of items, including placement of items on static display, of the intention to carry out the procedures for those processes provided for in the Conversion or Elimination Protocol and in paragraph 7 of Article III of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number, and, as applicable, type, category, variant, and version of the item to be converted or eliminated, or placed on static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location of such item; the location at which such processes will take place; the procedures to be carried out; and in each case, the scheduled date of the initiation of such processes;

(2) notification, no later than five days after the initiation of a conversion or elimination process, of the date on which that process began. Such notification shall include: the number of items, and, as applicable, the type, category, variant, and version of each item to be converted or eliminated; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the location for such a process; for each item, the date of the initiation of the process; and the procedures being carried out during the process. Such notification shall not be required if such a process was subjected to inspection;

(3) notification, no less than five days in advance, of the intention to install an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type in a silo launcher of ICBMs if, during the conversion of such silo launcher of ICBMs, the silo door was not removed. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM or type of the training model of a missile to be installed in that silo launcher of ICBMs; the location of that silo launcher of ICBMs; and the date on which an ICBM of a different type or a training model of a missile of such different type is to be installed in that silo launcher of ICBMs;

(4) notification, no later than five days after completion, of the completion of

(a) the elimination of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, silo test launcher, or soft-site launcher, if grading was performed during the process of its elimination. Such notification shall include: location of the eliminated launcher; date of completion of elimination; and, in the case of a silo launcher of ICBMs, silo training launcher, or silo test launcher, the type of ICBM it was associated with;

(b) the elimination of SLBM launchers. Such notification shall include: the number of SLBM launchers eliminated; the type of SLBM; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; the date of completion of elimination; and the

elimination procedures that were carried out;

(c) the elimination of heavy bombers or former heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: by type, category, and variant, the number of heavy bombers, or, by type, the number of former heavy bombers; the conversion or elimination facility at which such elimination was carried out; and the date of completion of elimination;

(d) the conversion of a heavy bomber and of its arrival at a viewing site. Such notification shall include: type, category, and variant of the heavy bomber; the conversion or elimination facility at which such conversion was carried out; the conversion procedures that were carried out; and the date of arrival of the heavy bomber at a viewing site;

(e) the elimination of an ICBM or SLBM, other than an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the number and type of ICBMs or SLBMs eliminated; the location at which such elimination was carried out; the method of elimination; and the date of completion of the elimination;

(f) procedures associated with making an item a static display. Such notification shall include: the type, and, if applicable, the category and variant of the item for static display; for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, the data from the unique identifier; the date of arrival and the location at which inspection of such an item may take place; and the name and coordinates of the location at which such an item is to be on static display;

(5) notification, no later than five days after completion, of the static testing of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, or if such testing involved the removal of propellant segments by dissection, each time a propellant segment is removed from an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs or from the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the ICBM type; the data from the unique identifier; the length of the remaining portion of the stage after segment removal, if static testing was accomplished through dissection; and the location and date of the static testing;

(6) notification, no later than 90 days after entry into force of the Treaty, and no less than 90 days prior to the beginning of each of the six subsequent one-year periods after entry into force of the Treaty, of the annual schedule for conversion or elimination of ICBMs, SLBMs, ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, and fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the provisions of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the number and types of such items planned for conversion or elimination during that one-year period; and the planned date of the initiation of the conversion or elimination process of each such item;

(7) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the initiation of the elimination process for the first ICBM of a particular type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, of data to be used to identify the type of such an ICBM within its launch canister. Such notification shall include: the data to be used for the identification of the type of ICBM, including necessary dimensions; and the proposed methods to be used by the inspectors to identify the type of ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

V. Notifications Concerning Cooperative Measures to Enhance the Effectiveness of National Technical Means of Verification

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(e) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning cooperative measures to enhance the effectiveness of national technical means of verification:

(1) notification containing a request for a display in the open of road-mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas, rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs located at specified parking sites, or all heavy bombers located within a specified air base. Such notification shall include:

(a) for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the ICBM base and the restricted areas at that ICBM base at which the display is requested;

(b) for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, the rail garrisons and the parking sites at those rail garrisons at which the display is requested;

(c) for heavy bombers, the air base at which the display is requested.

(2) notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to subparagraph 1(c) of this Section, concerning heavy bombers that cannot be displayed on request because they are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations. Such notification shall include: the air base; and the number, type, and category of heavy bombers that are not readily movable due to maintenance or operations;

(3) notification, no later than 12 hours after receipt of a request pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Section, of the cancellation due to circumstances brought about by *force majeure* of the display in the open of mobile launchers of ICBMs located within specified restricted areas or within specified parking sites or of heavy bombers located at a specified air base. Such notification shall include: the reasons for the cancellation of the display; the facility; and, if possible, the approximate date when conditions will permit a new display;

(4) notification, no later than 24 hours after the exit, of the exit of a ballistic missile submarine from a covered facility in which conversion of its SLBM launchers was carried out. Such notification shall include: the date of exit; the facility where such conversion was carried out; the type of the submarine; and the type of SLBM before and after conversion;

(5) notification containing a request for a display in the open of a special purpose submarine located at a specified port. Such notification shall include the name of the port at which the display is to be conducted.

VI. Notifications Concerning Flight Tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and Notifications Concerning Telemetric Information

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(f) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs and notifications concerning telemetric information:

(1) notification of any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, including any flight test of a prototype ICBM or SLBM and any flight test of an ICBM or SLBM used for delivering objects into the upper atmosphere or space. Such notification shall be provided in accordance with the provisions of the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Notifications of Launches of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles and Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles of May 31, 1988. Such notification shall also include: telemetry broadcast frequencies to be used expressed in megahertz to the nearest one megahertz; modulation types; and information as to whether the flight test is to employ encapsulation or encryption pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty;

(2) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the demonstration pursuant to subparagraph 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the proposed date and place of the demonstration of the tapes or appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information recorded on those tapes;

(3) notification, following the demonstration provided for in subparagraph 4(a) or 4(b) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, of the request for the opportunity to acquire playback equipment pursuant to subparagraph 4(c) of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol;

(4) notification pursuant to paragraph 3 of Section I of the Telemetry Protocol, no later than 45 days after receipt of tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, of the determination by the Party that has received the tapes of the incompleteness or insufficient quality of telemetric information recorded on the tapes that do not allow for processing of such information. Such notification shall include: type of ICBM or type of SLBM; date of flight test; tape number; time periods during which incomplete or low quality recordings of telemetric information were received; and a description of the difficulties that arose during the processing of such information;

(5) notification, no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test after entry into force of the Treaty of an ICBM or SLBM of one existing type on which encryption of telemetric information will be carried out pursuant to subparagraph 2(a) of Section III of the Telemetry Protocol, of the type of ICBM or type of SLBM.

VII. Notifications Concerning Strategic Offensive Arms of New Types and New Kinds

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(g) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning strategic offensive arms of new types and new kinds:

(1) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance, of the planned departure from a production facility of the first prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM. Such notification shall include: the type of prototype ICBM or the type of prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the length and diameter of the first stage of such a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the launch weight and maximum calculated throw-weight that the prototype ICBM could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers or that the prototype SLBM could deliver to a distance of 9500 kilometers; and the name and location of the production facility that will produce the prototype ICBM or the prototype SLBM;

(2) notification, no later than five days after the first flight test of a prototype ICBM of a particular type from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, or after the eighth flight test of a prototype ICBM of the same type from a fixed launcher of ICBMs, or after the exit of the twentieth prototype ICBM of the same type from a production facility, whichever is earlier, of whether ICBMs of that type shall be considered ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM; the name and location of the production facility; the basing mode of the new type of ICBM; and, if the prototype is declared to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, data on the technical characteristics of the prototype ICBM according to the categories of data specified in Annex F to the Memorandum of Understanding;

(3) notification of a decision to forego deployment of an ICBM of a new type as an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, for a new type of ICBM that had been considered to be an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs pursuant to a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section but that had not been flight-tested from a mobile launcher of ICBMs, and that such an ICBM is not subject to the provisions for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs of the Treaty. Such notification shall include: the type of the ICBM; and the name and location of the production facility;

(4) notification, no later than five days after the twentieth flight test of a prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM of a particular type or the declaration by the developing Party that the ICBM or SLBM of such particular type shall be accountable for the purposes of warhead and throw-weight attribution, or no less than 30 days in advance of the deployment of the first ICBM or SLBM of the same particular type, whichever is earlier, that the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM shall be considered an ICBM or SLBM of a new type. Such notification shall include: the type of ICBM of the new type or the type of SLBM of the new type; the name and location of the production facility; the data for the ICBM or SLBM of a new type by categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; if used as the basis for the new type, a statement whether the ICBM or SLBM of the new type differs from an ICBM or SLBM, respectively, of each existing type and previously declared new type in terms of the length of the first stage used for confirming the new type or in terms of the launch weight; the location for the exhibition or exhibitions conducted pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an

exhibition or such exhibitions, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after this notification has been provided;

(5) notification of the cessation of development of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type and of the intention not to deploy such ICBMs or SLBMs. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM or prototype SLBM; the name and location of the production facility that produced the prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs; the number of prototype ICBMs or prototype SLBMs in existence; and the elimination facility for the prototype ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs;

(6) notification, no less than 48 hours in advance of the departure, of the departure of a mobile launcher of prototype ICBMs from its production facility. Such notification shall include: the type of the prototype ICBM for which the mobile launcher is intended; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of departure;

(7) notification, no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first heavy bomber of a new type from the shop, plant, or building where its assembly was performed. Such notification shall include: the type and the category of the heavy bomber; the name and location of the production facility; and the date of exit;

(8) notification, no later than five days after the arrival, of the arrival of the first heavy bomber of a new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type at the first air base at which any such heavy bomber has begun to be based. Such notification shall include: the type, category, and, if applicable, variant of the heavy bomber; the air base at which the heavy bomber has begun to be based; the date of its initial basing at that air base; the technical data for heavy bombers of the new type, new category of a type, or new variant of a category and type provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(9) notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; and either the date of exit of that first long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers, whichever is applicable;

(10) notification, no later than five days after the flight test, of the flight test of a long-range nuclear ALCM from a bomber of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has previously been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of heavy bomber from which the long-range nuclear ALCM has been first flight-tested; the date of the flight test; the heavy bomber technical data provided for in Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(11) notification, no later than 48 hours after the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range nuclear ALCM of a new type at the first air base for heavy bombers. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range nuclear ALCM; the date of arrival; the technical data for a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding; the location for the exhibition of a long-range nuclear ALCM of the new type; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(12) notification, at the choice of the developing Party, either no later than five days after the exit, of the exit of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type from the production facility; or, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than six months in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; either the date of exit of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from the production facility, or the planned date of the arrival of that first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located, whichever is applicable; and the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(13) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 60 days in advance of the arrival, of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; the planned date of the arrival of the first long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type at the first air base for heavy bombers at which it is to be located; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided;

(14) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type from an airplane of a type, from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(15) notification, if a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of a new type has not been previously exhibited, no less than 30 days in advance of the flight test, of the first flight test of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type armed with two or more weapons. Such notification shall include: the type of long-range non-nuclear ALCM; if a heavy bomber will be used to conduct the flight test, the type of heavy bomber; the planned date of the flight test; the features that make such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs; the location for the exhibition of a long-range non-nuclear ALCM of the new type to demonstrate such features; and the date for such an exhibition, which shall be no earlier than 15 days and no later than 30 days after such notification has been provided. No later than 48 hours after such notification has been provided, one photograph of such a long-range non-nuclear ALCM shall be provided through diplomatic channels. The long-range non-nuclear ALCM shown in such photograph may be covered to the extent provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of Annex 4 to the Inspection Protocol;

(16) notification of the development of a new kind of strategic offensive arm, no later than 30 days after the first flight test of such an arm, unless issues concerning such an arm have been raised earlier within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. Such notification shall include: a description of the new kind of strategic offensive arm; and the date of its first flight test.

VIII. Notifications Concerning Changes in the Content of Information Provided Pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty, Including the Rescheduling of Activities

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(h) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning changes in the content of information provided pursuant to that Article, including the rescheduling of activities:

(1) notification, no less than 12 hours in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change to information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the changed information. If the change in the scheduled date specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol is more than four days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II of this Protocol;

(2) notification, no less than five days in advance of the scheduled date of the initiation of the activity, of a change in the information specified in a notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol. Such notification shall include: the number of the earlier notification; and the new information. If the change in the scheduled date is more than five days, an additional notification shall be provided specifying the new scheduled date, subject to the same conditions as the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section IV of this Protocol. If there is a delay in an activity specified in an advance notification provided in accordance with a paragraph of this Protocol other than paragraph 4, 5, or 9 of Section II, paragraph 1 of Section IV, or paragraph 1 of Section VI and if that delay exceeds twice the amount of time in advance that is required for such notification, an additional notification shall be provided, subject to the same conditions as the original notification.

IX. Notifications Concerning Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(i) of Article VIII of the Treaty, notifications concerning inspections and continuous monitoring activities provided for in Section III of the Inspection Protocol.

X. Notifications Concerning Operational Dispersals

Each Party shall provide to the other Party, pursuant to subparagraph 3(j) of Article VIII of the Treaty, the following notifications concerning operational dispersals:

(1) notification, no later than 18 hours after the dispersal begins, of the beginning of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the beginning of the operational dispersal; and the reasons for the operational dispersal;

(2) notification of the completion of the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the date and time of the completion of the operational dispersal;

(3) notification of the suspension, pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections during the operational dispersal. Such notification shall include: the notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that

are temporarily suspended; and the date on which such suspension began;

(4) notification, before the time specified in paragraph 2 of this Section, of the resumption of the obligation to provide notifications, to carry out cooperative measures, and to allow inspections that had been suspended in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Section. Such notification shall include: the specific notifications, inspections, and cooperative measures that will resume; and the date of such resumption;

(5) notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing either:

(a) that Party's data updated for each category of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding; and the notifications of incomplete movements that would have been provided pursuant to the provisions of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications; or

(b) all the notifications that should have been provided but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications;

(6) notification, by a Party that suspended notifications during the operational dispersal pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article XIV of the Treaty and elected to provide updated data in accordance with subparagraph 5(a) of this Section, no later than three days after the date specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 or 4 of this Section, providing all the notifications that would have been provided in accordance with Sections III, VI, and VII of this Protocol but for the temporary suspension of the obligation to provide such notifications;

(7) notification, no later than three days after the date and time specified in the notification provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, of the location of all heavy bombers that were not located at their air bases as of such date and time. Such notification shall also include, for each heavy bomber that was not located at its air base: the specific air base to which the heavy bomber had not returned; and the name of the airfield within national territory, or the general location outside national territory, where such a heavy bomber was located.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PROTOCOL ON ICBM AND SLBM THROW-WEIGHT RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon procedures governing the determination and accountability of ICBM and SLBM throw-weight.

I. Determination and Accountability of ICBM and SLBM Throw-weight

1. The throw-weight demonstrated in a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be:

(a) for an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the aggregate weight of that stage including its propellant and elements not separated from the stage, at the time at which the first release of a reentry vehicle or penetration aid occurs, and its payload;

(b) for an ICBM or SLBM that is not an ICBM or SLBM the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles, the weight of the payload of the final stage or final stages.

2. For each ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type.

3. For each ICBM or SLBM of a new type, the accountable throw-weight shall be the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of that type, which shall be determined subject to the following provisions:

(a) The greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type shall be no less than the maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of that type could deliver to a distance of 11,000 kilometers for ICBMs, or to a distance of 9500 kilometers for SLBMs.

(b) None of the first seven flight tests shall be taken into account in determining the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type unless the throw-weight demonstrated in such a flight test exceeds the greatest throw-weight demonstrated in subsequent flight tests by more than 20 percent or 250 kilograms, whichever is less, prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty.

4. The maximum calculated throw-weight that an ICBM or SLBM of a new type could deliver to a particular distance shall be calculated by the Party developing such a missile using its own methods of calculation, subject to the following conditions:

(a) the distance to which the throw-weight is delivered shall be measured along the projection of the missile's flight trajectory on the Earth's surface between the launch point and the point that a reentry vehicle that is released immediately after termination of the main engine thrust of the final stage is projected to impact the Earth;

(b) a spherical, non-rotating Earth;

(c) a vacuum ballistic trajectory for the reentry vehicle;

(d) a full propellant load for each stage; and

(e) the residual propellant in each stage shall not be greater than one percent for solid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs, or two percent for liquid-propellant ICBMs or SLBMs.

5. Each Party undertakes not to increase the accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing type, as determined in accordance with paragraph 2 of this Section, by more than 21 percent of its initial accountable throw-weight.

6. Notifications concerning data on throw-weight of ICBMs or SLBMs in connection with this Protocol shall be provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol. Throw-weight values, measured in kilograms, shall be specified to the nearest value evenly divisible by 50.

7. In the event of a dispute concerning the initial value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of a new type, or an increased value of accountable throw-weight of an ICBM or SLBM of an existing or new type, specified in a notification provided in accordance with Section III of the Notification Protocol, the accountable throw-weight shall be the value specified in such notification until such dispute is resolved in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

II. Verification

1. Verification of compliance with provisions of this Protocol shall be by national technical means of verification.

2. To facilitate verification, for an ICBM and SLBM of each new type, two preannounced flight tests shall be conducted either in the 12-month period prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty, or from among the last five flight tests prior to an ICBM or SLBM of that type becoming subject to the limitations provided for in Article II of the Treaty.

3. No more than one pre-announced flight test of an ICBM or SLBM shall be conducted pursuant to paragraph 2 of this Section in any 30-day period.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and

shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PROTOCOL ON TELEMETRIC INFORMATION RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions and procedures associated with the fulfillment of obligations concerning telemetric information pursuant to Article X of the Treaty.

I. Provision of Tapes that Contain a Recording of Telemetric Information

1. Pursuant to paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide through diplomatic channels, no later than 50 days after the flight test of an ICBM or SLBM:

(a) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information broadcast during the flight test;

(b) tapes that contain a recording of all telemetric information that is encapsulated, if such tapes are recovered; and

(c) a summary for each tape provided in accordance with subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph, including the following:

(i) type of ICBM or SLBM, date of flight test, tape number, recorder type, and recording speed (meters/second or inches/second);

(ii) information for each track, including track number, record period, record mode, and broadcast frequency (megahertz);

(iii) digital data encoding methods employed and digital data recording formats; and

(iv) identifications, and explanations where possible, keyed to a time standard, of the periods during the flight test for which no tape recordings were obtained or for which tape recordings are of inferior quality.

2. The Party conducting the flight test shall determine the method of recording the telemetric information on the tapes.

3. If the Party that receives the tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information determines that such tapes do not contain the complete set of telemetric information or that their quality is insufficient for processing such information, that Party shall provide notification thereof in accordance with paragraph 4 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. No later than 30 days after its receipt, the Party receiving such notification shall provide through diplomatic channels either a statement explaining the reasons for the incompleteness or insufficient quality of the recording of telemetric information or, if possible, new copies of the tapes.

4. In order to make it possible for the other Party to play back tapes that contain a recording of telemetric information, each Party shall:

(a) conduct, no later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, an initial demonstration of the tapes being used, and of the appropriate equipment for playing back the telemetric information recorded on such tapes;

(b) conduct a demonstration of tapes or appropriate playback equipment that are different from the tapes or equipment previously demonstrated. Such demonstration shall be conducted no less than 30 days in advance of the first flight test of an ICBM or SLBM during which such tapes or equipment that are different are to be used. Notification of the date and place of such demonstration shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. If the recording format is the only difference in the tape that contains a recording of telemetric information, and this difference does not require different playback equipment, a Party shall provide, through diplomatic channels, only information describing the format, no less than 60 days in advance of the flight test specified in this subparagraph; and

(c) if requested, provide the opportunity to acquire the appropriate equipment to play back the telemetric information that is contained on the tapes no less than 30 days in advance of the receipt of such tapes, unless otherwise agreed. Notification of such request shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol.

The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the procedures for the demonstrations provided for in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

II. Provision of Data Associated with the Analysis of Telemetric Information

1. Pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article X of the Treaty, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, no later than 50 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the following interpretive data:

(a) for all telemetric information that is broadcast, except for telemetric information that originates in and is broadcast from a reentry vehicle, a description of the format of the telemetry frame and methods of encoding, including but not limited to:

(i) bits per standard word;

(ii) standard words per frame;

(iii) frames per second;

(iv) location of synchronization words or bits;

(v) location of information in the frame describing its formatting;

(vi) designation and location of each data element within the frame throughout the flight and, if a given word location is time-shared by two or more data elements, the structure for such time-sharing;

(vii) method of representing each data element, including the location of each bit in each data element, the order of the bits from least significant to most significant, and the method for representing negative values; and

(viii) all information regarding encoding algorithms, including error detection and correction, data compression, and any conversion processes that are applied in the telemetry equipment to on-board measured parameter values prior to their broadcast; and

(b) names of parameters and their locations in the telemetry frame, as well as conversion factors or analytic expressions for converting telemetric information to physical values of parameters, only for telemetric information necessary to determine:

(i) acceleration of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM;

(ii) separation times of the stages and the self-contained dispensing mechanism of the ICBM or SLBM; and

(iii) times of reentry vehicle separation commands and times of reentry vehicle releases.

2. No later than 50 days after each flight test of an ICBM or SLBM, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide, through diplomatic channels, a missile acceleration profile, for all its stages and its self-contained dispensing mechanism, having a precision better than one-tenth of a meter per second squared, with a rate of no less than five times per second, with these data provided relative to an inertial frame of reference in a three-dimensional Cartesian coordinate system. The missile acceleration profile shall be calculated on the basis of all relevant on-board and external measurements made during the flight test. In those cases when it is not possible to ensure the precision provided for in this paragraph, the Party conducting the flight test shall provide such a profile calculated to the greatest possible precision.

3. No later than 120 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels or during demonstrations provided for in paragraph 4 of Section I of this Protocol, an example illustrative of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in paragraphs 1 and 2, respectively, of this Section for one of the following ICBMs or SLBMs:

(a) for the United States of America: Peacekeeper, Minuteman III, Trident I, or Trident II; and

(b) for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics: SS-18, SS-24, SS-25, or SS-N-23.

The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission on the content of the interpretive data and missile acceleration profile specified in this paragraph.

III. Provisions Concerning Encapsulation and Encryption of Telemetric Information

1. Encapsulation provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be conducted subject to the following:

(a) Encapsulation shall be applied only to reentry vehicle measurements made during the plasma phase of flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs. Notwithstanding this provision, reentry vehicle measurements may be encapsulated throughout each flight test of the missile designated by the United States of America as Minuteman II.

(b) When possible, the Party conducting the flight test shall broadcast, from the same reentry vehicle on which data are encapsulated, all measurements made before and after the plasma phase and, when possible, that Party shall broadcast, following the plasma phase, some measurements made and recorded during the plasma phase. The obligation to broadcast measurements made after the plasma phase shall not apply when impact of the reentry vehicle occurs during conditions of plasma formation.

2. Encryption provided for in paragraph 6 of Article X of the Treaty, shall be carried out subject to the following:

(a) Encryption shall be used only during flight tests of ICBMs or SLBMs of former and retired types, as well as during no more than two flight tests each year of an ICBM or SLBM of only one existing type of each Party. The Party that exercises the right to use encryption during flight tests of an ICBM or SLBM of such existing type shall provide the notification in accordance with paragraph 5 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol. Subsequent notifications shall be provided only when the ICBM or SLBM, the notification of which has previously been provided, is retired.

(b) Only telemetric information that pertains to the front section or its elements shall be encrypted, and only after that front section or its elements have separated from either:

(i) the self-contained dispensing mechanism, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM; or

(ii) the final stage, during a flight test of an ICBM or SLBM that is not equipped with a self-contained dispensing mechanism.

(c) Each Party undertakes not to encrypt telemetric information that pertains to the functioning of the stages or the self-contained dispensing mechanism of an ICBM or SLBM.

IV. Provisional Application

1. Beginning from the date of signature of the Treaty, the provisions of paragraph 3 of Section VI of the Notification Protocol, subparagraph 4(a) of Section I, and paragraph 3 of Section II of this Protocol shall apply provisionally.

2. The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other

Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of any such provisions; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of these provisions for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions specified in paragraph 1 of this Section shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

PROTOCOL
ON THE JOINT COMPLIANCE AND INSPECTION COMMISSION RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties hereby agree upon provisions governing the operation of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, hereinafter referred to as the Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty.

I. Composition of the Commission

1. Each Party shall communicate to the other Party the names of its designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission. The Parties shall communicate to each other the names of the initially designated Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner to the Commission as soon as practicable, but in any case no later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty.

2. Each Party shall have the right to be represented at a session of the Commission by its Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner as well as by their alternates, and by members, advisors, and experts. A session of the Commission may be convened without the participation of the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner. In such a case, any other individual provided for in this paragraph may be the head representative of a Party to a session of the Commission.

3. The head representatives of the Parties shall alternately preside over meetings during a session of the Commission.

4. The Commission shall have the right to constitute working groups consisting of any of the individuals provided for in paragraph 2 of this Section for the consideration of specific questions raised in the Commission.

II. Convening a Session of the Commission

1. A session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party. No later than 14 days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Requests and responses shall include the following:

(a) the questions that the Party intends to raise;

(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed or accepted date and location for the convening of the session.

Each Party may also submit additional questions to the other Party in the period from the submission of the initial response to the initial request until the convening of the session.

2. A session of the Commission shall be convened as soon as possible after receipt of the response provided for in paragraph 1 of this Section.

3. A session of the Commission shall be convened in Geneva, Switzerland, or, as appropriate, in another place agreed by the Parties.

4. The Commissioner or Deputy Commissioner of each of the Parties may, without the convening of a session of the Commission, communicate with the Commissioner of the other Party in order to clarify any unclear situations or to resolve questions.

III. Convening a Special Session of the Commission

1. A special session of the Commission shall be convened at the request of either Party to address what the requesting Party considers to be an urgent concern relating to compliance of the other Party with the obligations assumed under the Treaty. Such a request shall include, at a minimum, the following:

(a) the nature of the concern, including the kind and, if applicable, the type of strategic offensive arms related to the concern;

(b) the name of the head representative of the Party; and

(c) the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session.

The requesting Party may also propose in the request a specific method for resolving the concern. Such a method may include, but is not limited to, a visit with special right of access to the facility or location where, in the opinion of the requesting Party, the activity that caused the concern took place.

2. No later than seven days after receiving such a request, the requested Party shall submit a response. Such a response shall include either:

(a) acceptance of the proposed date and location for the convening of the special session; or

(b) a proposal for an alternate date and location for the convening of the special session. The alternate date shall be no later than ten days after the date proposed by the requesting Party.

3. The response of the requested Party may also include:

(a) acceptance of the proposed specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit; or

(b) a proposal for a specific method for resolving the concern, including, if a visit with special right of access is planned, the proposed date, location, and procedures for such a visit.

If the Parties agree to a visit with special right of access or another method for resolving the concern, the Parties may agree not to convene the special session.

Visits with special right of access may be conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Inspection Protocol, as applicable.

4. Either Party may request additional information related to the concern. A response to such a request shall be submitted no later than seven days after receipt of the request, but shall not affect the time for convening the special session of the Commission, if such a session is held.

5. A special session of the Commission shall remain in session for no more than 30 days.

IV. Agenda

1. The agenda for a session of the Commission shall consist of those questions that the Parties have included in the communications provided to each other in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of this Protocol.

2. Each Party shall have the right to raise in the Commission questions that arise immediately preceding or during a session of the Commission, provided, however, that consideration of such questions during the current session shall be subject to agreement of the Parties. In case of such agreement, the Parties shall allow sufficient time prior to consideration of such questions for preparation and any changes in the composition of their delegations that are required.

3. Sessions of the Commission shall be convened irrespective of the number of questions on the agenda.

V. Work of the Commission

The work of the Commission shall be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission. The Commission may record agreements or the results of its work in an appropriate document, which shall be done in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic. Such documents shall not be confidential, except as otherwise agreed by the Commission.

VI. Costs

Each Party shall bear the cost of its participation in the work of the Commission.

VII. Communications

Communications pursuant to this Protocol shall be provided through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers.

VIII. Additional Procedures and Provisional Application

1. The Parties shall have the right to agree upon additional procedures governing the operation of the Commission.

2. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally from the date of signature of the Treaty for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

3. The provisions of Article XV of the Treaty and the provisions of this Protocol shall apply provisionally in light of and in conformity with the other provisions of the Treaty.

This Protocol is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to make changes in this Protocol that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE DATA BASE RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

Pursuant to and in implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties have exchanged the following data current as of September 1, 1990, on ICBM launchers; SLBM launchers; heavy bombers; intercontinental ballistic missiles; submarine-launched ballistic missiles; long-range nuclear ALCMs; fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs; support equipment; and related facilities.

I. Numbers of Warheads and Throw-weight Values Attributed to Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs, and Numbers of Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers

1. The following are numbers of warheads and throw-weight values attributed to deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs of each type existing as of the date of signature of the Treaty or subsequently deployed. In this connection, in case of a change in the initial value of throw-weight or the number of warheads, respectively, data shall be included in the "Changed Value" column:

(a) United States of America

	Throw-weight(kg)		Number of Warheads	
	Initial Value	Changed Value	Initial Value	Changed Value
(I) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles				
Minuteman II (MM-II)	800		1	
Minuteman III (MM-III)	1150		3	
Peacekeeper (PK)	3950		10	
(II) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles				
Poseidon	2000		10	
Trident I	1500		8	
Trident II	2800		8	

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	Throw-weight(kg)		Number of Warheads	
	Initial Value	Changed Value	Initial Value	Changed Value
(I) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles				
SS-11	1200		1	
SS-13	600		1	
SS-17	2550		4	
SS-18	8800	—*	10	—
SS-19	4350		6	
SS-24	4050		10	
SS-25	1000		1	

* For the purposes of this Memorandum, "—" is used to denote that the entry is not applicable in such case.

	Throw-weight(kg)		Number of Warheads	
	Initial Value	Changed Value	Initial Value	Changed Value
(ii) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles				
SS-N-6	650		1	
SS-N-8	1100		1	
SS-N-17	450		1	
SS-N-18	1650		3	
SS-N-20	2550		10	
SS-N-23	2800		4	

2. The following are numbers of warheads attributed to deployed heavy bombers:

(a) United States of America	Number of Warheads
Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	
Up to a total of 150 such heavy bombers	
B-52G	10
B-52H	10
In excess of 150 such heavy bombers	
B-52G	12
Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	
B-52G	1
B-1	1

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics	Number of Warheads
Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	
Up to a total of 180 such heavy bombers	
Bear H	8
Blackjack	8
In excess of 180 such heavy bombers	
NONE (The specific type, and variant of a type, and number of warheads shall be specified after the number of such heavy bombers exceeds 180.)	

	Number of Warheads
Heavy Bomber Type and Variant of a Type Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	
Bear A	1
Bear B	1
Bear G	1

II. Aggregate Numbers

For each Party, the data on aggregate numbers of strategic offensive arms are as follows:

	USA	USSR
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers, Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	2246	2500
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs, Deployed SLBMs, and Deployed Heavy Bombers	10563	10271
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs	8210	9416
Throw-weight of Deployed ICBMs and Deployed SLBMs (MT)	2361.30	6626.30

(a) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(i) ICBMs and ICBM Launchers

	ICBM Type				
	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18	SS-19
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	326	40	47	308	300
Deployed Heavy ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	—	—	—	308	—
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs	326	40	188	3080	1800
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs on Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	—	—
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy ICBMs	—	—	—	3080	—
Throw-weight of Deployed ICBMs (MT)	391.20	24.00	119.85	2710.40	1305.00

START TREATY

	ICBM Type			Total
	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25	
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	56	33	288	1398
Deployed Heavy ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	—	—	—	308
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs	560	330	288	6612
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs on Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	330	288	618
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy ICBMs	—	—	—	3080
Throw-weight of Deployed ICBMs (MT)	226.80	133.65	288.00	5198.90

(ii) SLBMs and SLBM Launchers

	SLBM Type			
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17	SS-N-18
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	192	280	12	224
Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs	192	280	12	672
Throw-weight of Deployed SLBMs (MT)	124.80	308.00	5.40	369.60

	SLBM Type		Total
	SS-N-20	SS-N-23	
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	120	112	940
Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs	1200	448	2804
Throw-weight of Deployed SLBMs (MT)	306.00	313.60	1427.40

(iii) Heavy Bombers

	Bomber Type		Total
	Bear	Blackjack	
Deployed Heavy Bombers	147	15	162
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	84	15	99

	Bomber Type		Total
	Bear	Blackjack	
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	63	0	63
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers	735	120	855
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	672	120	792
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	63	0	63

(b) United States of America

(i) ICBMs and ICBM Launchers

	ICBM Type	
	MM-II	MM-III
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	450	500
Deployed Heavy ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	—	—
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs	450	1500
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs on Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy ICBMs	—	—
Throw-weight of Deployed ICBMs (MT)	360.00	575.00

	ICBM Type		Total
	PK For Silo Launcher	PK For Rail-Mobile Launcher	
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	50	0	1000
Deployed Heavy ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	—	—	—
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs	500	0	2450
Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs on Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	0	0
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy ICBMs	—	—	—
Throw-weight of Deployed ICBMs (MT)	197.50	0	1132.50

(ii) SLBMs and SLBM Launchers

	SLBM Type			Total
	Poseidon	Trident I	Trident II	
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	192	384	96	672
Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs	1920	3072	768	5760
Throw-weight of Deployed SLBMs (MT)	384.00	576.00	268.80	1228.80

(iii) Heavy Bombers

	Bomber Type			Total
	B-52	B-1	B-2	
Deployed Heavy Bombers	479	95	0	574
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	189	0	0	189
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	290	95	0	385
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers	2258	95	0	2353
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	1968	0	0	1968
Warheads Attributed to Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	290	95	0	385

III. Aggregate Numbers of Deployed ICBMs or SLBMs to Which a Reduced Number of Warheads Is Attributed

For each Party, the data on ICBM bases or submarine bases and on aggregate numbers of ICBMs or SLBMs of existing types deployed at those bases, on which the number of warheads attributed is reduced pursuant to paragraph 5 of Article III of the Treaty, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

	MM-III		First and Second Type of ICBM or SLBM	
	A	B	A	B
Deployed ICBMs or SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____*	____	____	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____	____	____	____

* For the purposes of this Memorandum, "____" is used to denote that this data does not currently exist, but will be provided when available.

	MM-III		First and Second Type of ICBM or SLBM	
	A	B	A	B
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced	____	____	____	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or SLBMs of That Type	____	____	____	____

Aggregate reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, excluding the MM-III ICBMs: ____

Aggregate reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, including the MM-III ICBMs: ____

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced

Name/Location _____

	ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced
Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of That Type	____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced

Name/Location _____

	SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced
Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM Was Reduced	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of That Type	____

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Deployed SLBMs of the Type SS-N-18	224
Multiplication Factor Specified in Subparagraph (a)(ii) of Paragraph 5 of Article III of the Treaty	4
Aggregate Number of Warheads Counted Toward the Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs and SLBMs	896

First and Second Type of ICBM or SLBM

	A	B
Deployed ICBMs or SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM or SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____	____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM or SLBM Was Reduced	____	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs or SLBMs of That Type	____	____

Aggregate reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, excluding the SS-N-18 SLBMs: ____

Aggregate reduction in the number of warheads attributed to deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, including the SS-N-18 SLBMs: 896

ICBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed ICBMs Is Reduced

Name/Location _____

	ICBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced
Deployed ICBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed ICBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each ICBM Was Reduced	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed ICBMs of That Type	____

SLBM Bases at Which the Number of Warheads on Deployed SLBMs Is Reduced

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced
Deployed SLBMs on Which the Number of Warheads Is Reduced	____
Warheads Attributed to Each Deployed SLBM After Reduction in the Number of Warheads on It	____
Number of Warheads by Which the Original Attribution of Warheads for Each SLBM Was Reduced	____
Aggregate Reduction in the Number of Warheads Attributed to Deployed SLBMs of That Type	____

IV. Additional Aggregate Numbers

For each Party, additional aggregate numbers related to the limitations provided for in the Treaty are as follows:

	USA	USSR
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	11*	60
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	11*	4
ICBMs and SLBMs at Test Ranges	4	15
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1	27
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1	10
Test Launchers	15	51
Mobile Test Launchers	1	14
Fixed Test Launchers	14	37
Training Launchers	11	22
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs at Training Facilities	0	9
Transporter-Loaders for ICBMs for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	____	____
Storage Facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs and Repair Facilities for ICBMs or SLBMs	4	8
Space Launch Facilities	0	1
Launchers, at Space Launch Facilities, that Have Contained or Launched ICBMs or SLBMs	0	2

* Non-Deployed Peacekeeper ICBMs are reflected in this data although Peacekeeper has not been deployed in a mobile mode.

	USA	USSR
ICBMs and SLBMs at Space Launch Facilities	0	1
Former Heavy Bombers	0	34
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0	11
Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Converted for Use as Ground Trainers	0	0
Test Heavy Bombers	9	14
Static Displays:		
ICBM Launchers	0	0
ICBMs and SLBMs	0	0
Launch Canisters	0	0
Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers	0	0

Signature of this Memorandum constitutes:

(a) agreement on the initial data for ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types specified in Section I of this Memorandum;

(b) inclusion of the data contained in Sections I, II, III, and IV and Annexes A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, and I to this Memorandum, and the data provided pursuant to Annex J to this Memorandum; and

(c) acceptance of the categories of data contained in this Memorandum.

The Parties, in signing this Memorandum, acknowledge that each of them is responsible for the accuracy of only its own data, provided, however, that the Parties' agreement with respect to the initial data for ICBMs and SLBMs of existing types specified in Section I of this Memorandum shall not be abrogated thereby.

This Memorandum is an integral part of the Treaty and shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force so long as the Treaty remains in force. The provisions of paragraphs 4-10 of Annex J to this Memorandum shall apply provisionally for a 12-month period beginning from the date of signature of the Treaty, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate the provisional application of such provisions; or
(b) the Treaty enters into force.

The Parties may agree to extend the provisional application of these provisions for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

As provided for in subparagraph (b) of Article XV of the Treaty, the Parties may agree upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the viability and effectiveness of the Treaty. The Parties agree that, if it becomes necessary to change the categories of data contained in this Memorandum or to make other changes in this Memorandum that do not affect substantive rights or obligations under the Treaty, they shall use the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to reach agreement on such changes, without resorting to the procedure for making amendments set forth in Article XVIII of the Treaty.

Done at Moscow on July 31, 1991, in two copies, each in the Russian and English languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

GEORGE BUSH
PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

M. GORBACHEV
PRESIDENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS

ANNEXES TO THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

Annex A	ICBMs and ICBM Launchers
Annex B	SLBMs and SLBM Launchers
Annex C	Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers
Annex D	Space Launch Facilities
Annex E	Eliminated Facilities
Annex F	ICBM and SLBM Technical Data
Annex G	Heavy Bomber Technical Data
Annex H	Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Technical Data
Annex I	Other Data Required by the Treaty
Annex J	Other Requirements

ANNEX A.
ICBMs AND ICBM LAUNCHERS

For each Party, the numbers of deployed ICBMs and their associated launchers, non-deployed ICBMs, non-deployed launchers of ICBMs, fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs, and support equipment, as well as data on related facilities, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

	ICBM Type		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK For Silo Launcher
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	450	500	50
Deployed ICBMs	450	500	50
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	450	500	50
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—
Non-Deployed ICBMs at Test Ranges	0	2	0
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—
Test Launchers	3	7	3
Training Launchers	4	5	2
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs at Training Facilities	—	—	—
Transporter-Loaders for ICBMs for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	0	0	0
ICBM Static Displays	0	0	0
Launch Canister Static Displays	0	0	0

START TREATY

	ICBM Type		Total
	PK For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SICBM For Road-Mobile Launcher	
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	0	____	1000
Deployed ICBMs	0	____	1000
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	0	____	1000
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	11*	____	11*
Non-Deployed ICBMs at Test Ranges	1*	1***	4
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1	____	1
Test Launchers	1	____	15**
Training Launchers	0	____	11
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs at Training Facilities	0	____	0
Transporter-Loaders for ICBMs for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	____	____
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	0	____	0
ICBM Static Displays	0	____	0
Launch Canister Static Displays	0	____	0
	Total Number		
Storage Facilities for ICBMs and Repair Facilities for ICBMs	2		

* Non-Deployed Peacekeeper ICBMs are reflected in this data although Peacekeeper has not been deployed in a mobile mode.
** Includes one soft-site launcher.
*** Non-Deployed SICBM prototype is reflected in this data although SICBM has not been deployed in a mobile mode.

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
F.E. WARREN MISSILE COMPLEX, WYOMING

	ICBM Type	
	MM-III	PK
Deployed ICBMs	150	50
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150	50

Launcher Group: **ALPHA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
A-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-2	MM-III
A-3	MM-III
A-4	MM-III
A-5	MM-III
A-6	MM-III
A-7	MM-III
A-8	MM-III
A-9	MM-III
A-10	MM-III
A-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **BRAVO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
B-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-2	MM-III
B-3	MM-III
B-4	MM-III
B-5	MM-III
B-6	MM-III
B-7	MM-III
B-8	MM-III
B-9	MM-III
B-10	MM-III
B-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-2	MM-III
C-3	MM-III
C-4	MM-III
C-5	MM-III
C-6	MM-III
C-7	MM-III
C-8	MM-III
C-9	MM-III
C-10	MM-III
C-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-2	MM-III
D-3	MM-III
D-4	MM-III
D-5	MM-III
D-6	MM-III
D-7	MM-III
D-8	MM-III
D-9	MM-III
D-10	MM-III
D-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-2	MM-III
E-3	MM-III
E-4	MM-III
E-5	MM-III
E-6	MM-III
E-7	MM-III
E-8	MM-III
E-9	MM-III
E-10	MM-III
E-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-2	MM-III
F-3	MM-III
F-4	MM-III
F-5	MM-III
F-6	MM-III
F-7	MM-III
F-8	MM-III
F-9	MM-III
F-10	MM-III
F-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-2	MM-III
G-3	MM-III
G-4	MM-III
G-5	MM-III
G-6	MM-III
G-7	MM-III
G-8	MM-III
G-9	MM-III
G-10	MM-III
G-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-2	MM-III
H-3	MM-III
H-4	MM-III
H-5	MM-III
H-6	MM-III
H-7	MM-III
H-8	MM-III
H-9	MM-III
H-10	MM-III
H-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-2	MM-III
I-3	MM-III
I-4	MM-III
I-5	MM-III
I-6	MM-III
I-7	MM-III
I-8	MM-III
I-9	MM-III
I-10	MM-III
I-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-2	MM-III
J-3	MM-III
J-4	MM-III
J-5	MM-III
J-6	MM-III
J-7	MM-III
J-8	MM-III
J-9	MM-III
J-10	MM-III
J-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-2	MM-III
K-3	MM-III
K-4	MM-III
K-5	MM-III
K-6	MM-III
K-7	MM-III
K-8	MM-III
K-9	MM-III
K-10	MM-III
K-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **LIMA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
L-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-2	MM-III
L-3	MM-III
L-4	MM-III
L-5	MM-III
L-6	MM-III
L-7	MM-III
L-8	MM-III
L-9	MM-III
L-10	MM-III
L-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **MIKE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
M-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-2	MM-III
M-3	MM-III
M-4	MM-III
M-5	MM-III
M-6	MM-III
M-7	MM-III
M-8	MM-III
M-9	MM-III
M-10	MM-III
M-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **NOVEMBER**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
N-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-2	MM-III
N-3	MM-III
N-4	MM-III
N-5	MM-III
N-6	MM-III
N-7	MM-III
N-8	MM-III
N-9	MM-III
N-10	MM-III
N-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **OSCAR**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
O-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-2	MM-III
O-3	MM-III
O-4	MM-III
O-5	MM-III
O-6	MM-III
O-7	MM-III
O-8	MM-III
O-9	MM-III
O-10	MM-III
O-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **PAPA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
P-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
P-2	PK
P-3	PK
P-4	PK
P-5	PK
P-6	PK
P-7	PK
P-8	PK
P-9	PK
P-10	PK
P-11	PK

Launcher Group: **QUEBEC**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
Q-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
Q-2	PK
Q-3	PK
Q-4	PK
Q-5	PK
Q-6	PK
Q-7	PK
Q-8	PK
Q-9	PK
Q-10	PK
Q-11	PK

Launcher Group: **ROMEO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
R-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
R-2	PK
R-3	PK
R-4	PK
R-5	PK
R-6	PK
R-7	PK
R-8	PK
R-9	PK
R-10	PK
R-11	PK

Launcher Group: **SIERRA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
S-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
S-2	PK
S-3	PK
S-4	PK
S-5	PK
S-6	PK
S-7	PK
S-8	PK
S-9	PK
S-10	PK
S-11	PK

Launcher Group: **TANGO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
T-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
T-2	PK
T-3	PK
T-4	PK
T-5	PK
T-6	PK
T-7	PK
T-8	PK
T-9	PK
T-10	PK
T-11	PK

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
F.E. WARREN AIR FORCE BASE, WYOMING

	ICBM Type	
	MM-III	PK
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1	0
Training Models of Missiles	1	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4	6
Silo Training Launchers	1	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMS:
WHITEMAN MISSILE COMPLEX, MISSOURI

	ICBM Type
	MM-II
Deployed ICBMs	150
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150

Launcher Group: **ALPHA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
A-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-2	MM-II
A-3	MM-II
A-4	MM-II
A-5	MM-II
A-6	MM-II
A-7	MM-II
A-8	MM-II
A-9	MM-II
A-10	MM-II
A-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **BRAVO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
B-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-2	MM-II
B-3	MM-II
B-4	MM-II
B-5	MM-II
B-6	MM-II
B-7	MM-II
B-8	MM-II
B-9	MM-II
B-10	MM-II
B-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-2	MM-II
C-3	MM-II
C-4	MM-II
C-5	MM-II
C-6	MM-II
C-7	MM-II
C-8	MM-II
C-9	MM-II
C-10	MM-II
C-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-2	MM-II
D-3	MM-II
D-4	MM-II
D-5	MM-II
D-6	MM-II
D-7	MM-II
D-8	MM-II
D-9	MM-II
D-10	MM-II
D-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-2	MM-II
E-3	MM-II
E-4	MM-II
E-5	MM-II
E-6	MM-II
E-7	MM-II
E-8	MM-II
E-9	MM-II
E-10	MM-II
E-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-2	MM-II
F-3	MM-II
F-4	MM-II
F-5	MM-II
F-6	MM-II
F-7	MM-II
F-8	MM-II
F-9	MM-II
F-10	MM-II
F-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-2	MM-II
G-3	MM-II
G-4	MM-II
G-5	MM-II
G-6	MM-II
G-7	MM-II
G-8	MM-II
G-9	MM-II
G-10	MM-II
G-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-2	MM-II
H-3	MM-II
H-4	MM-II
H-5	MM-II
H-6	MM-II
H-7	MM-II
H-8	MM-II
H-9	MM-II
H-10	MM-II
H-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-2	MM-II
I-3	MM-II
I-4	MM-II
I-5	MM-II
I-6	MM-II
I-7	MM-II
I-8	MM-II
I-9	MM-II
I-10	MM-II
I-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-2	MM-II
J-3	MM-II
J-4	MM-II
J-5	MM-II
J-6	MM-II
J-7	MM-II
J-8	MM-II
J-9	MM-II
J-10	MM-II
J-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-2	MM-II
K-3	MM-II
K-4	MM-II
K-5	MM-II
K-6	MM-II
K-7	MM-II
K-8	MM-II
K-9	MM-II
K-10	MM-II
K-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: LIMA
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
L-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-2	MM-II
L-3	MM-II
L-4	MM-II
L-5	MM-II
L-6	MM-II
L-7	MM-II
L-8	MM-II
L-9	MM-II
L-10	MM-II
L-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: MIKE
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
M-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-2	MM-II
M-3	MM-II
M-4	MM-II
M-5	MM-II
M-6	MM-II
M-7	MM-II
M-8	MM-II
M-9	MM-II
M-10	MM-II
M-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: NOVEMBER
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
N-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-2	MM-II
N-3	MM-II
N-4	MM-II
N-5	MM-II
N-6	MM-II
N-7	MM-II
N-8	MM-II
N-9	MM-II
N-10	MM-II
N-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: OSCAR
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
O-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-2	MM-II
O-3	MM-II
O-4	MM-II
O-5	MM-II
O-6	MM-II
O-7	MM-II
O-8	MM-II
O-9	MM-II
O-10	MM-II
O-11	MM-II

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
WHITEMAN AIR FORCE BASE, MISSOURI

	ICBM Type MM-II
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
ELLSWORTH MISSILE COMPLEX, SOUTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type MM-II
Deployed ICBMs	150
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150

Launcher Group: ALPHA
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
A-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-2	MM-II
A-3	MM-II
A-4	MM-II
A-5	MM-II
A-6	MM-II
A-7	MM-II
A-8	MM-II
A-9	MM-II
A-10	MM-II
A-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: BRAVO
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers:
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers:
B-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-2	MM-II
B-3	MM-II
B-4	MM-II
B-5	MM-II
B-6	MM-II
B-7	MM-II
B-8	MM-II
B-9	MM-II
B-10	MM-II
B-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-2	MM-II
C-3	MM-II
C-4	MM-II
C-5	MM-II
C-6	MM-II
C-7	MM-II
C-8	MM-II
C-9	MM-II
C-10	MM-II
C-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-2	MM-II
D-3	MM-II
D-4	MM-II
D-5	MM-II
D-6	MM-II
D-7	MM-II
D-8	MM-II
D-9	MM-II
D-10	MM-II
D-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-2	MM-II
E-3	MM-II
E-4	MM-II
E-5	MM-II
E-6	MM-II
E-7	MM-II
E-8	MM-II
E-9	MM-II
E-10	MM-II
E-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-2	MM-II
F-3	MM-II
F-4	MM-II
F-5	MM-II
F-6	MM-II
F-7	MM-II
F-8	MM-II
F-9	MM-II
F-10	MM-II
F-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-2	MM-II
G-3	MM-II
G-4	MM-II
G-5	MM-II
G-6	MM-II
G-7	MM-II
G-8	MM-II
G-9	MM-II
G-10	MM-II
G-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-2	MM-II
H-3	MM-II
H-4	MM-II
H-5	MM-II
H-6	MM-II
H-7	MM-II
H-8	MM-II
H-9	MM-II
H-10	MM-II
H-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-2	MM-II
I-3	MM-II
I-4	MM-II
I-5	MM-II
I-6	MM-II
I-7	MM-II
I-8	MM-II
I-9	MM-II
I-10	MM-II
I-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-2	MM-II
J-3	MM-II
J-4	MM-II
J-5	MM-II
J-6	MM-II
J-7	MM-II
J-8	MM-II
J-9	MM-II
J-10	MM-II
J-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-2	MM-II
K-3	MM-II
K-4	MM-II
K-5	MM-II
K-6	MM-II
K-7	MM-II
K-8	MM-II
K-9	MM-II
K-10	MM-II
K-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **LIMA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
L-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-2	MM-II
L-3	MM-II
L-4	MM-II
L-5	MM-II
L-6	MM-II
L-7	MM-II
L-8	MM-II
L-9	MM-II
L-10	MM-II
L-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **MIKE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
M-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-2	MM-II
M-3	MM-II
M-4	MM-II
M-5	MM-II
M-6	MM-II
M-7	MM-II
M-8	MM-II
M-9	MM-II
M-10	MM-II
M-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **NOVEMBER**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
N-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-2	MM-II
N-3	MM-II
N-4	MM-II
N-5	MM-II
N-6	MM-II
N-7	MM-II
N-8	MM-II
N-9	MM-II
N-10	MM-II
N-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **OSCAR**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
O-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-2	MM-II
O-3	MM-II
O-4	MM-II
O-5	MM-II
O-6	MM-II
O-7	MM-II
O-8	MM-II
O-9	MM-II
O-10	MM-II
O-11	MM-II

Maintenance Facility:
ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type
	MM-II
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
MINOT MISSILE COMPLEX, NORTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type
	MM-III
Deployed ICBMs	150
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150

Launcher Group: **ALPHA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
A-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-2	MM-III
A-3	MM-III
A-4	MM-III
A-5	MM-III
A-6	MM-III
A-7	MM-III
A-8	MM-III
A-9	MM-III
A-10	MM-III
A-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **BRAVO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
B-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-2	MM-III
B-3	MM-III
B-4	MM-III
B-5	MM-III
B-6	MM-III
B-7	MM-III
B-8	MM-III
B-9	MM-III
B-10	MM-III
B-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-2	MM-III
C-3	MM-III
C-4	MM-III
C-5	MM-III
C-6	MM-III
C-7	MM-III
C-8	MM-III
C-9	MM-III
C-10	MM-III
C-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-2	MM-III
D-3	MM-III
D-4	MM-III
D-5	MM-III
D-6	MM-III
D-7	MM-III
D-8	MM-III
D-9	MM-III
D-10	MM-III
D-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-2	MM-III
E-3	MM-III
E-4	MM-III
E-5	MM-III
E-6	MM-III
E-7	MM-III
E-8	MM-III
E-9	MM-III
E-10	MM-III
E-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-2	MM-III
F-3	MM-III
F-4	MM-III
F-5	MM-III
F-6	MM-III
F-7	MM-III
F-8	MM-III
F-9	MM-III
F-10	MM-III
F-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-2	MM-III
G-3	MM-III
G-4	MM-III
G-5	MM-III
G-6	MM-III
G-7	MM-III
G-8	MM-III
G-9	MM-III
G-10	MM-III
G-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-2	MM-III
H-3	MM-III
H-4	MM-III
H-5	MM-III
H-6	MM-III
H-7	MM-III
H-8	MM-III
H-9	MM-III
H-10	MM-III
H-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-2	MM-III
I-3	MM-III
I-4	MM-III
I-5	MM-III
I-6	MM-III
I-7	MM-III
I-8	MM-III
I-9	MM-III
I-10	MM-III
I-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-2	MM-III
J-3	MM-III
J-4	MM-III
J-5	MM-III
J-6	MM-III
J-7	MM-III
J-8	MM-III
J-9	MM-III
J-10	MM-III
J-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-2	MM-III
K-3	MM-III
K-4	MM-III
K-5	MM-III
K-6	MM-III
K-7	MM-III
K-8	MM-III
K-9	MM-III
K-10	MM-III
K-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **LIMA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
L-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-2	MM-III
L-3	MM-III
L-4	MM-III
L-5	MM-III
L-6	MM-III
L-7	MM-III
L-8	MM-III
L-9	MM-III
L-10	MM-III
L-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **MIKE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
M-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-2	MM-III
M-3	MM-III
M-4	MM-III
M-5	MM-III
M-6	MM-III
M-7	MM-III
M-8	MM-III
M-9	MM-III
M-10	MM-III
M-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **NOVEMBER**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
N-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-2	MM-III
N-3	MM-III
N-4	MM-III
N-5	MM-III
N-6	MM-III
N-7	MM-III
N-8	MM-III
N-9	MM-III
N-10	MM-III
N-11	MM-III

Launcher Group: **OSCAR**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
O-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-2	MM-III
O-3	MM-III
O-4	MM-III
O-5	MM-III
O-6	MM-III
O-7	MM-III
O-8	MM-III
O-9	MM-III
O-10	MM-III
O-11	MM-III

Maintenance Facility:
MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type MM-III
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
GRAND FORKS MISSILE COMPLEX, NORTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type MM-III
Deployed ICBMs	150
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150

Launcher Group: **ALPHA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
A-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-1	MM-III
A-2	MM-III
A-3	MM-III
A-4	MM-III
A-5	MM-III
A-6	MM-III
A-7	MM-III
A-8	MM-III
A-9	MM-III
A-10	MM-III

Launcher Group: **BRAVO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
B-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-11	MM-III
B-12	MM-III
B-13	MM-III
B-14	MM-III
B-15	MM-III
B-16	MM-III
B-17	MM-III
B-18	MM-III
B-19	MM-III
B-20	MM-III

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-21	MM-III
C-22	MM-III
C-23	MM-III
C-24	MM-III
C-25	MM-III
C-26	MM-III
C-27	MM-III
C-28	MM-III
C-29	MM-III
C-30	MM-III

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-31	MM-III
D-32	MM-III
D-33	MM-III
D-34	MM-III
D-35	MM-III
D-36	MM-III
D-37	MM-III
D-38	MM-III
D-39	MM-III
D-40	MM-III

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-41	MM-III
E-42	MM-III
E-43	MM-III
E-44	MM-III
E-45	MM-III
E-46	MM-III
E-47	MM-III
E-48	MM-III
E-49	MM-III
E-50	MM-III

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-1	MM-III
F-2	MM-III
F-3	MM-III
F-4	MM-III
F-5	MM-III
F-6	MM-III
F-7	MM-III
F-8	MM-III
F-9	MM-III
F-10	MM-III

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-11	MM-III
G-12	MM-III
G-13	MM-III
G-14	MM-III
G-15	MM-III
G-16	MM-III
G-17	MM-III
G-18	MM-III
G-19	MM-III
G-20	MM-III

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-21	MM-III
H-22	MM-III
H-23	MM-III
H-24	MM-III
H-25	MM-III
H-26	MM-III
H-27	MM-III
H-28	MM-III
H-29	MM-III
H-30	MM-III

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-31	MM-III
I-32	MM-III
I-33	MM-III
I-34	MM-III
I-35	MM-III
I-36	MM-III
I-37	MM-III
I-38	MM-III
I-39	MM-III
I-40	MM-III

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-41	MM-III
J-42	MM-III
J-43	MM-III
J-44	MM-III
J-45	MM-III
J-46	MM-III
J-47	MM-III
J-48	MM-III
J-49	MM-III
J-50	MM-III

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-1	MM-III
K-2	MM-III
K-3	MM-III
K-4	MM-III
K-5	MM-III
K-6	MM-III
K-7	MM-III
K-8	MM-III
K-9	MM-III
K-10	MM-III

Launcher Group: **LIMA**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
L-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-11	MM-III
L-12	MM-III
L-13	MM-III
L-14	MM-III
L-15	MM-III
L-16	MM-III
L-17	MM-III
L-18	MM-III
L-19	MM-III
L-20	MM-III

Launcher Group: **MIKE**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
M-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-21	MM-III
M-22	MM-III
M-23	MM-III
M-24	MM-III
M-25	MM-III
M-26	MM-III
M-27	MM-III
M-28	MM-III
M-29	MM-III
M-30	MM-III

Launcher Group: **NOVEMBER**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
N-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-31	MM-III
N-32	MM-III
N-33	MM-III
N-34	MM-III
N-35	MM-III
N-36	MM-III
N-37	MM-III
N-38	MM-III
N-39	MM-III
N-40	MM-III

Launcher Group: **OSCAR**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
O-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-41	MM-III
O-42	MM-III
O-43	MM-III
O-44	MM-III
O-45	MM-III
O-46	MM-III
O-47	MM-III
O-48	MM-III
O-49	MM-III
O-50	MM-III

Maintenance Facility:
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

	ICBM Type MM-III
Non-Deployed ICBMs	2
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
MALMSTROM MISSILE COMPLEX, MONTANA

	ICBM Type MM-II	MM-III
Deployed ICBMs	150	50
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	150	50

Launcher Group: **ALPHA**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
A-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
A-2	MM-II
A-3	MM-II
A-4	MM-II
A-5	MM-II
A-6	MM-II
A-7	MM-II
A-8	MM-II
A-9	MM-II
A-10	MM-II
A-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **BRAVO**

Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE

Other Launch Control Centers
B-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
B-2	MM-II
B-3	MM-II
B-4	MM-II
B-5	MM-II
B-6	MM-II
B-7	MM-II
B-8	MM-II
B-9	MM-II
B-10	MM-II
B-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **CHARLIE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
C-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
C-2	MM-II
C-3	MM-II
C-4	MM-II
C-5	MM-II
C-6	MM-II
C-7	MM-II
C-8	MM-II
C-9	MM-II
C-10	MM-II
C-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **DELTA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
D-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
D-2	MM-II
D-3	MM-II
D-4	MM-II
D-5	MM-II
D-6	MM-II
D-7	MM-II
D-8	MM-II
D-9	MM-II
D-10	MM-II
D-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **ECHO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
E-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
E-2	MM-II
E-3	MM-II
E-4	MM-II
E-5	MM-II
E-6	MM-II
E-7	MM-II
E-8	MM-II
E-9	MM-II
E-10	MM-II
E-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **FOXTROT**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
F-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
F-2	MM-II
F-3	MM-II
F-4	MM-II
F-5	MM-II
F-6	MM-II
F-7	MM-II
F-8	MM-II
F-9	MM-II
F-10	MM-II
F-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **GOLF**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
G-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
G-2	MM-II
G-3	MM-II
G-4	MM-II
G-5	MM-II
G-6	MM-II
G-7	MM-II
G-8	MM-II
G-9	MM-II
G-10	MM-II
G-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **HOTEL**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
H-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
H-2	MM-II
H-3	MM-II
H-4	MM-II
H-5	MM-II
H-6	MM-II
H-7	MM-II
H-8	MM-II
H-9	MM-II
H-10	MM-II
H-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **INDIA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
I-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
I-2	MM-II
I-3	MM-II
I-4	MM-II
I-5	MM-II
I-6	MM-II
I-7	MM-II
I-8	MM-II
I-9	MM-II
I-10	MM-II
I-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **JULIET**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
J-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
J-2	MM-II
J-3	MM-II
J-4	MM-II
J-5	MM-II
J-6	MM-II
J-7	MM-II
J-8	MM-II
J-9	MM-II
J-10	MM-II
J-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **KILO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
K-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
K-2	MM-II
K-3	MM-II
K-4	MM-II
K-5	MM-II
K-6	MM-II
K-7	MM-II
K-8	MM-II
K-9	MM-II
K-10	MM-II
K-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **LIMA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
L-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
L-2	MM-II
L-3	MM-II
L-4	MM-II
L-5	MM-II
L-6	MM-II
L-7	MM-II
L-8	MM-II
L-9	MM-II
L-10	MM-II
L-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **MIKE**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
M-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
M-2	MM-II
M-3	MM-II
M-4	MM-II
M-5	MM-II
M-6	MM-II
M-7	MM-II
M-8	MM-II
M-9	MM-II
M-10	MM-II
M-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **NOVEMBER**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
N-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
N-2	MM-II
N-3	MM-II
N-4	MM-II
N-5	MM-II
N-6	MM-II
N-7	MM-II
N-8	MM-II
N-9	MM-II
N-10	MM-II
N-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **OSCAR**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
O-1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
O-2	MM-II
O-3	MM-II
O-4	MM-II
O-5	MM-II
O-6	MM-II
O-7	MM-II
O-8	MM-II
O-9	MM-II
O-10	MM-II
O-11	MM-II

Launcher Group: **PAPA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
P-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
P-1	MM-III
P-2	MM-III
P-3	MM-III
P-4	MM-III
P-5	MM-III
P-6	MM-III
P-7	MM-III
P-8	MM-III
P-9	MM-III
P-10	MM-III

Launcher Group: **QUEBEC**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
Q-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
Q-11	MM-III
Q-12	MM-III
Q-13	MM-III
Q-14	MM-III
Q-15	MM-III
Q-16	MM-III
Q-17	MM-III
Q-18	MM-III
Q-19	MM-III
Q-20	MM-III

Launcher Group: **ROMEO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
R-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
R-21	MM-III
R-22	MM-III
R-23	MM-III
R-24	MM-III
R-25	MM-III
R-26	MM-III
R-27	MM-III
R-28	MM-III
R-29	MM-III
R-30	MM-III

Launcher Group: **SIERRA**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
S-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
S-31	MM-III
S-32	MM-III
S-33	MM-III
S-34	MM-III
S-35	MM-III
S-36	MM-III
S-37	MM-III
S-38	MM-III
S-39	MM-III
S-40	MM-III

Launcher Group: **TANGO**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
T-0

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
T-41	MM-III
T-42	MM-III
T-43	MM-III
T-44	MM-III
T-45	MM-III
T-46	MM-III
T-47	MM-III
T-48	MM-III
T-49	MM-III
T-50	MM-III

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA

	ICBM Type	
	MM-II	MM-III
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0	0
Training Models of Missiles	1	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0	4*
Silo Training Launchers	1	1

* - Capable of loading MM-II or MM-III missiles

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NONE

ICBM BASE FOR RAIL-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NONE

ICBM LOADING FACILITIES:
NONE

Name/Location _____

	ICBM Type	
	PK For Rail-Mobile Launcher	A For Road-Mobile Launcher
Non-Deployed ICBMs	____	____
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	____	____

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:
THIOKOL CORPORATION, STRATEGIC OPERATIONS
PROMONTORY, UTAH

	ICBM Type
	PK
Non-Deployed ICBMs (Returned)	0

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NONE

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:
OASIS COMPLEX, UTAH

	ICBM Type		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK
Non-Deployed ICBMs	18	74	0
Training Models of Missiles	0	1	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NONE

Name/Location _____

	ICBM Type	
	PK For Rail-Mobile Launcher	A For Road-Mobile Launcher
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	____	____

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH

	ICBM Type		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK
Non-Deployed ICBMs	24	41	10
Training Models of Missiles	1	3	1
Engineering Models of Silos	Number 3		

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NONE

TEST RANGES:
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

	ICBM Type			
	MM-II	MM-III	PK	SICBM
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0	2	1	1
Training Models of Missiles	0	0	2	2
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0	4*	0	0
Transporter-Loaders	—	—	—	———
Mobile Test Launchers	—	—	1	———

Fixed Test Launchers:	Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
	LF7	MM-II
	LF23	MM-II
	LF24	MM-II
	LF6	MM-III
	LF4	MM-III
	LF10	MM-III
	LF21	MM-III
	LF25	MM-III
	LF26	MM-III
	LF9	MM-III
	LF2	PK
	LF5	PK
	LF8	PK

Soft-Site Launchers
1

TRAINING FACILITIES:
NONE

STATIC DISPLAYS:
NONE

Name/Location ———	ICBM Type	Number
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	———	———
ICBM Static Displays	———	———
Launch Canister Static Displays	———	———

CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:
NONE

* Capable of loading MM-II or MM-III missiles.

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	ICBM Type				
	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18	SS-19
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	326	40	47	308	300
Deployed ICBMs	326	40	47	308	300
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	326	40	47	308	300
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	—	—
Non-Deployed ICBMs at Test Ranges	0	0	0	4	2
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	—	—
Test Launchers	2	8	4	10	2
Training Launchers	6	2	1	7	6
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs at Training Facilities	—	—	—	—	—
Transporter-Loaders for ICBMs for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	—	—
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	0	0	0	0	0
ICBM Static Displays	0	0	0	0	0
Launch Canister Static Displays	0	0	0	0	0

	ICBM Type			Total
	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25	
Deployed ICBMs and Their Associated Launchers	56	33	288	1398
Deployed ICBMs	56	33	288	1398
Deployed Launchers of ICBMs	56	33	288	1398
Non-Deployed ICBMs for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	4	56	60
Non-Deployed ICBMs at Test Range	0	4	5	15
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	10	17	27
Test Launchers	8	9	5	48
Training Launchers	0	0	0	22
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs at Training Facilities	—	0	9	9
Transporter-Loaders for ICBMs for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	——	——
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	0	0	0	0
ICBM Static Displays	0	0	0	0
Launch Canister Static Displays	0	0	0	0

	Total Number
Storage Facilities for ICBMs and Repair Facilities for ICBMs	5

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
BERSHET'

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Deployed ICBMs	60
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	60

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **BERSHET'-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

MAINTENANCE FACILITY: **BERSHET'**

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
TEYKOVO

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Deployed ICBMs	26
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	26

Launcher Group: **TEYKOVO-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11

Launcher Group: **TEYKOVO-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **TEYKOVO-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **TEYKOVO-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11

Maintenance Facility: TEYKOVO

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Non-Deployed ICBMs	10
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
KRASNOYARSK

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Deployed ICBMs	40
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	40

Launcher Group: **KRASNOYARSK-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **KRASNOYARSK-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **KRASNOYARSK-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **KRASNOYARSK-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Maintenance Facility:
KRASNOYARSK

	ICBM Type SS-11
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
DROVYANAYA

	ICBM Type SS-11
Deployed ICBMs	50
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	50

Launcher Group: **DROVYANAYA-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **DROVYANAYA-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **DROVYANAYA-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **DROVYANAYA-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **DROVYANAYA-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
DROVYANAYA

	ICBM Type SS-11
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	1
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
YASNAYA

	ICBM Type SS-11
Deployed ICBMs	90
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	90

Launcher Group: YASNAYA-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: YASNAYA-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: YASNAYA-3
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: YASNAYA-4
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: YASNAYA-5
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **SVOBODNYY-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **SVOBODNYY-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **SVOBODNYY-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

Launcher Group: **SVOBODNYY-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-11
2	SS-11
3	SS-11
4	SS-11
5	SS-11
6	SS-11
7	SS-11
8	SS-11
9	SS-11
10	SS-11

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
SVOBODNY

	ICBM Type
	SS-11
Non-Deployed ICBMs	6
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
YOSHKAR-OLA

	ICBM Type
	SS-13
Deployed ICBMs	40
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	40

Launcher Group: **YOSHKAR-OLA-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-13
2	SS-13
3	SS-13
4	SS-13
5	SS-13
6	SS-13
7	SS-13
8	SS-13
9	SS-13
10	SS-13

Launcher Group: **YOSHKAR-OLA-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-13
2	SS-13
3	SS-13
4	SS-13
5	SS-13
6	SS-13
7	SS-13
8	SS-13
9	SS-13
10	SS-13

Launcher Group: **YOSHKAR-OLA-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-13
2	SS-13
3	SS-13
4	SS-13
5	SS-13
6	SS-13
7	SS-13
8	SS-13
9	SS-13
10	SS-13

Launcher Group: **YOSHKAR-OLA-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
NONE
Other Launch Control Centers
1

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-13
2	SS-13
3	SS-13
4	SS-13
5	SS-13
6	SS-13
7	SS-13
8	SS-13
9	SS-13
10	SS-13

Maintenance Facility:
YOSHKAR-OLA

	ICBM Type
	SS-13
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	4
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
VYPOLZOVO

	ICBM Type
	SS-17
Deployed ICBMs	47
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	47

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17
4	SS-17
5	SS-17
6	SS-17
7	SS-17
8	SS-17
9	SS-17
10	SS-17

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17
4	SS-17
5	SS-17
6	SS-17
7	SS-17
8	SS-17
9	SS-17
10	SS-17

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17
4	SS-17

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17
4	SS-17
5	SS-17
6	SS-17
7	SS-17
8	SS-17
9	SS-17
10	SS-17

Launcher Group: **VYPOLZOVO-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-17
2	SS-17
3	SS-17
4	SS-17
5	SS-17
6	SS-17
7	SS-17
8	SS-17
9	SS-17
10	SS-17

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
VYPOLZOVO

	ICBM Type
	SS-17
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
DOMBAROVSKIY

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	64
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	64

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18
7	SS-18
8	SS-18
9	SS-18
10	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-7**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-8**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-9**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DOMBAROVSKIY-10**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
DOMBAROVSKIY

	ICBM Type SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	6
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	3
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
KARTALY

	ICBM Type SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	46
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	46

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18
7	SS-18
8	SS-18
9	SS-18
10	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **KARTALY-7**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

MAINTENANCE FACILITY KARTALY

	ICBM Type SS-18
Non-deployed ICBMs	4
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	1
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
DERZHAVINSK

	ICBM Type SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	52
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	52

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18
7	SS-18
8	SS-18
9	SS-18
10	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-3
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-4
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-5
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-6
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: DERZHAVINSK-7
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **DERZHAVINSK-8**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
DERZHAVINSK

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	3
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
ALEYSK

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	30
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	30

Launcher Group: **ALEYSK-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ALEYSK-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ALEYSK-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ALEYSK-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ALEYSK-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
ALEYSK

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	4
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
ZHANGIZ-TOBE

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	52
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	52

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18
7	SS-18
8	SS-18
9	SS-18
10	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-7**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: **ZHANGIZ-TOBE-8**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
ZHANGIZ-TOBE

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	2
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
UZHUR

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Deployed ICBMs	64
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	64

Launcher Group: UZHUR-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18
7	SS-18
8	SS-18
9	SS-18
10	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-3
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-4
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-5
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-6
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-7
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-8
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-9
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Launcher Group: UZHUR-10
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-18
2	SS-18
3	SS-18
4	SS-18
5	SS-18
6	SS-18

Maintenance Facility:
UZHUR

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
KHMEL'NITSKIY

	ICBM Type
	SS-19
Deployed ICBMs	90
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	90

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-3
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-4
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-5
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-6
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-7
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-8
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KHMEL'NITSKIY-9
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

MAINTENANCE FACILITY:
KHMEL'NITSKIY

	ICBM Type
	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs	11
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	1
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM BASE FOR SILO LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
KOZEL'SK

	ICBM Type
	SS-19
Deployed ICBMs	60
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	60

Launcher Group: KOZEL'SK-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KOZEL'SK-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KOZEL'SK-3
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KOZEL'SK-4
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: KOZEL'SK-5
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **KOZEL'SK-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Maintenance Facility:
KOZEL'SK

	ICBM Type
	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs	4
Training Models of Missiles	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	3
Silo Training Launchers	1

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
PERVOMAYSK

	ICBM Type	
	SS-19	SS-24
Deployed ICBMs	40	46
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	40	46

Launcher Group: **PERVOMAYSK-1**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24
7	SS-24
8	SS-24
9	SS-24
10	SS-24

Launcher Group: **PERVOMAYSK-2**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24
7	SS-24
8	SS-24
9	SS-24
10	SS-24

Launcher Group: **PERVOMAYSK-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **PERVOMAYSK-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **PERVOMAYSK-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: PERVOMAYSK-6
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24
7	SS-24
8	SS-24
9	SS-24
10	SS-24

Launcher Group: PERVOMAYSK-7
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24
7	SS-24
8	SS-24
9	SS-24
10	SS-24

Launcher Group: PERVOMAYSK-8
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24

Launcher Group: PERVOMAYSK-9
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Maintenance Facility:
PERVOMAYSK

	ICBM Type	
	SS-19	SS-24
Non-Deployed	4	0
Training Models of Missiles	1	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2	2
Silo Training Launchers	1	0

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
TATISHCHEVO

	ICBM Type	
	SS-19	SS-24
Deployed ICBMs	110	10
Deployed Silo Launchers of ICBMs	110	10

Launcher Group: TATISHCHEVO-1
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: TATISHCHEVO-2
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-3**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-4**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-5**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-6**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-7**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-8**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-24
2	SS-24
3	SS-24
4	SS-24
5	SS-24
6	SS-24
7	SS-24
8	SS-24
9	SS-24
10	SS-24

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-9**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-10**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: **TATISHCHEVO-11**
Silos Used as Launch Control Centers
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

Launcher Group: TATISHCHEVO-12
Silo Used as Launch Control Center: No
1
Other Launch Control Centers
NONE

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
1	SS-19
2	SS-19
3	SS-19
4	SS-19
5	SS-19
6	SS-19
7	SS-19
8	SS-19
9	SS-19
10	SS-19

MAINTENANCE FACILITY: TATISHCHEVO

	ICBM Type	
	SS-19	SS-24
Non-Deployed ICBMs	4	0
Training Models of Missiles	1	0
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	2	1
Silo Training Launchers	1	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs: LIDA

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	27
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	27
DEPLOYMENT AREA: LIDA 55,809 km²	
RESTRICTED AREA: LIDA-1 0.33 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structure for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: LIDA-2 0.37 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: LIDA-3 0.28 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
MAINTENANCE FACILITY: LIDA	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	____
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs: MOZYR'

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	27
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	27
DEPLOYMENT AREA: MOZYR' 106,200 km²	
RESTRICTED AREA: MOZYR'-1 0.32 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: MOZYR'-2 0.14 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: MOZYR'-3 0.25 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structure for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
MAINTENANCE FACILITY: MOZYR'	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	____
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:

TEYKOVO	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	36
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	36

DEPLOYMENT AREA: TEYKOVO
110,300 km²

RESTRICTED AREA: TEYKOVO-1
0.31 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: TEYKOVO-2
0.27 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: TEYKOVO-3
0.23 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: TEYKOVO-4
0.16 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

MAINTENANCE FACILITY: TEYKOVO

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	———
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:

YOSHKAR-OLA	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	18
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	18

DEPLOYMENT AREA: YOSHKAR-OLA
120,400 km²

RESTRICTED AREA: YOSHKAR-OLA-1
0.24 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: YOSHKAR-OLA-2
0.27 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

MAINTENANCE FACILITY: YOSHKAR-OLA

Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	———
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
YUR'YA

	ICBM Type SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	45
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	45

DEPLOYMENT AREA: YUR'YA 118,800 km²

RESTRICTED AREA: YUR'YA-1 0.27 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: YUR'YA-2 0.37 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: YUR'YA-3 0.42 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: YUR'YA-4 0.39 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

	ICBM Type SS-25
RESTRICTED AREA: YUR'YA-5 0.44 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

MAINTENANCE FACILITY: YUR'YA

Non-Deployed ICBMs	1
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	——
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
NIZHNIY TAGIL

	ICBM Type SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	45
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	45

DEPLOYMENT AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL 88,800 km²

RESTRICTED AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL-1 0.27 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL-2 0.32 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL-3 0.18 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

RESTRICTED AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL-4 0.37 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

	ICBM Type SS-25
RESTRICTED AREA: NIZHNIY TAGIL-5 0.19 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
MAINTENANCE FACILITY: NIZHNIY TAGIL	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	2
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	2
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	———
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs: NOVOSIBIRSK	ICBM Type SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	27
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	27
DEPLOYMENT AREA: NOVOSIBIRSK 114,100 km²	
RESTRICTED AREA: NOVOSIBIRSK-1 0.32 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: NOVOSIBIRSK-2 0.26 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: NOVOSIBIRSK-3 0.31 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
MAINTENANCE FACILITY: NOVOSIBIRSK	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	———
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM BASE FOR ROAD-MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs: KANSK	ICBM Type SS-25
Deployed ICBMs	27
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	27
DEPLOYMENT AREA: KANSK 111,500 km²	
RESTRICTED AREA: KANSK-1 0.29 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: KANSK-2 0.20 km²	
Deployed ICBMS	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
RESTRICTED AREA: KANSK-3 0.18 km²	
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
MAINTENANCE FACILITY: KANSK	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	———
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
IRKUTSK — ICBM Type SS-25

Deployed ICBMs	36
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	36

Deployment Area: IRKUTSK 115,800 km²

Restricted Area: IRKUTSK-1 0.17 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

Restricted Area: IRKUTSK-2 0.17 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

Restricted Area: IRKUTSK-3 0.17 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

Restricted Area: IRKUTSK-4 0.19 km²

Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9

Maintenance Facility: IRKUTSK — ICBM Type SS-25

Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMS	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	——
Road-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
KOSTROMA — ICBM Type SS-24

Rail Garrison: KOSTROMA

Rail Entrance/Exit	1
Parking Sites	4
Deployed ICBMs	12
Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	12
Trains of Standard Configuration	4
Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	2

Maintenance Facility: KOSTROMA

Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs/ Launch-Associated Railcars	1/2
Training Models of Missiles	0
Rail-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs: BERSHET'	ICBM Type SS-24
Rail Garrison: BERSHET'	
Rail Entrance/Exit	1
Parking Sites	4
Deployed ICBMs	9
Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	9
Trains of Standard Configuration	3
Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1
Maintenance Facility: BERSHET'	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs/ Launch-Associated Railcars	0/0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Rail-Mobile Training Launchers	0

ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs: KRASNOYARSK	ICBM Type SS-24
Rail Garrison: KRASNOYARSK	
Rail Entrance/Exit	1
Parking Sites	4
Deployed ICBMs	12
Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	12
Trains of Standard Configuration	4
Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1
Maintenance Facility:KRASNOYARSK*	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs/ Launch-Associated Railcars	0/0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Rail-Mobile Training Launchers	0

* Under construction

ICBM LOADING FACILITIES:
NONE

Name/Location _____	ICBM Type	
	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs	____	____
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	____	____

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:

VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
VOTKINSK, RSFSR

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs (Returned)	0

PAVLOGRAD MACHINE PLANT
PAVLOGRAD, UKRAINIAN SSR

	ICBM Type	
	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher
Non-Deployed ICBMs (Returned)	0	0

SOUTHERN MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
DNEPROPETROVSK, UKRAINIAN SSR

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs (Returned)	0

M.V. KHRUNICHEV MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
MOSCOW, RSFSR

	ICBM Type
	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs (Returned)	0

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:

BARRIKADY PLANT
VOLGOGRAD, RSFSR

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs (Returned)	0

YURGA MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
YURGA, RSFSR

	ICBM Type
	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs (Returned)	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:

KOLOSOVO

	ICBM Type	
	SS-11	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs	23	17
Training Models of Missiles	3	0

MIKHAYLENKI

	ICBM Type		
	SS-11	SS-17	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs	4	14	46
Training Models of Missiles	0	2	1

SUROVATIKHA

	ICBM Type	
	SS-17	SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs	86	12
Training Models of Missiles	1	0

PIBAN'SHUR

	ICBM Type	
	SS-17	SS-18
Non-Deployed ICBMs	1	27
Training Models of Missiles	0	0

KHRIZOLITOVYY

	ICBM Type			
	SS-13	SS-18	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs	21	31	6	36
Training Models of Missiles	0	0	1	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:

NONE

Name/Location _____

	ICBM Type	
	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	____	____

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR ICBMs:
NONE

Name/Location	ICBM Type A	ICBM Type B	ICBM Type C
Non-Deployed ICBMs	____	____	____
Training Models of Missiles	____	____	____

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR MOBILE LAUNCHERS OF ICBMs:
BATAYSK

	ICBM Type SS-25
Non-Deployed Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0

TEST RANGES:
PLESETSK

	ICBM Type SS-13	ICBM Type SS-24 For Silo Launchers	ICBM Type SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launchers	ICBM Type SS-25
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0	0	4	5
Training Models of Missiles	0	0	0	1
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0	0	—	—
Transporter-Loaders	—	—	—	____
Mobile Test Launchers	—	—	9	5

FIXED TEST LAUNCHERS:

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
12-1	SS-13
12-2	SS-13
12-3	SS-13
12-4	SS-13
12-5	SS-13
12-6	SS-13
12-7	SS-13
12-8	SS-13
22-1	SS-24
22-2	SS-24
22-3	SS-24
22-4	SS-24
22-5	SS-24
22-6	SS-24
22-7	SS-24
22-8	SS-24

Soft-Site Launchers
NONE

TEST RANGES:

LENINSK

	ICBM Type			
	SS-11	SS-17	SS-18	SS-19
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0	0	4	2
Training Models of Missiles	0	0	0	0
ICBM Emplacement Equipment	0	0	3	2
Transporter-Loaders	—	—	—	—
Mobile Test Launchers	—	—	—	—

FIXED TEST LAUNCHERS:

Silo Launchers	ICBM Type
10-1	SS-11
10-2	SS-11
16-1	SS-17
16-2	SS-17
16-3	SS-17
16-4	SS-17
18-1	SS-19
18-2	SS-19
20-1	SS-18
20-2	SS-18
20-3	SS-18
20-4	SS-18
20-5	SS-18
20-6	SS-18
20-7	SS-18
20-8	SS-18
20-9	SS-18
20-10	SS-18

Soft-Site Launchers
NONE

TRAINING FACILITIES:

POMERKI

	ICBM Type
	SS-18
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—
Training Models of Missiles	1
Transporter-Loaders	—
Mobile Training Launchers	—
Silo Training Launchers	1

TRAINING FACILITIES:

SERPUKHOV

	ICBM Type	
	SS-13	SS-25
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	1
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—
Training Models of Missiles	0	2
Transporter-Loaders	—	——
Mobile Training Launchers	—	0
Silo Training Launchers	1	—

BALABANOVO

	ICBM Type			
	SS-17	SS-18	SS-19	SS-25
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	1
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—	—	—
Training Models of Missiles	1	1	2	1
Transporter-Loaders	—	—	—	——
Mobile Training Launchers	—	—	—	0
Silo Training Launchers	0	0	1	—

GORYACHIY KLYUCH

	ICBM Type
	SS-25
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—
Training Models of Missiles	3
Transporter-Loaders	——
Mobile Training Launchers	0
Silo Training Launchers	—

NONE

TRAINING FACILITIES:

ROSTOV

	ICBM Type	
	SS-19	SS-24 For Silo Launcher
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	—
Training Models of Missiles	3	1
Transporter-Loaders	—	—
Mobile Training Launchers	—	—
Silo Training Launchers	1	0

PERM

	ICBM Type	
	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	3
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0	—
Training Models of Missiles	0	3
Transporter-Loaders	—	———
Mobile Training Launchers	0	0
Silo Training Launchers	—	—

NONE

PLESETSK

	ICBM Type	
	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	—	3
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0	—
Training Models of Missiles	0	3
Transporter-Loaders	—	———
Mobile Training Launchers	0	0
Silo Training Launchers	—	—

NONE

STATIC DISPLAYS:
NONE

Name/Location	ICBM Type	Number
ICBM Launcher Static Displays	____	____
ICBM Static Displays	____	____
ICBM Canister Static Displays	____	____

CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:

LESNAYA	ICBM Type
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	____

SARNY	
Non-Deployed ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Non-Deployed Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	0
Training Models of Missiles	0
Transporter-Loaders	____

ANNEX B.
SLBMs AND SLBM LAUNCHERS

For each Party, the numbers of deployed SLBMs and their associated launchers, non-deployed SLBMs, non-deployed launchers of SLBMs, as well as data on related facilities, are as follows:

(a) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	SLBM Type			
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17	SS-N-18
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	192	280	12	224
Deployed SLBMs	192	280	12	224
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	192	280	12	224
Test Launchers	0	1	0	0
SLBM Static Displays	0	0	0	0

	SLBM Type		Total
	SS-N-20	SS-N-23	
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	120	112	940
Deployed SLBMs	120	112	940
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	120	112	940
Test Launchers	1	1	3
SLBM Static Displays	0	0	0

	Total Number
Storage Facilities for SLBMs and Repair Facilities for SLBMs	3

SUBMARINE BASE:
NERPICH'YA

	SLBM Type
	SS-N-20
Deployed SLBMs	120
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	120
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

	Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type
	SS-N-20
Submarine Type:	
Typhoon	6/120

SUBMARINE BASE:

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

YAGEL'NAYA

	SLBM Type				
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17	SS-N-18	SS-N-23
Deployed SLBMs	96	64	12	48	0
Deployed Launchers	96	64	12	48	0
Non-Deployed SLBMs	3	0	0	14	31

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

	Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type			
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17	SS-N-18
Submarine Type:				
Yankee I	6/96			
Delta II		4/64		
Yankee II			1/12	
Delta III				3/48

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

OLEN'YA

	SLBM Type	
	SS-N-18	SS-N-23
Deployed SLBMs	32	112
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	32	112
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0	0

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

	Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type	
	SS-N-18	SS-N-23
Submarine Type:		
Delta III	2/32	
Delta IV		7/112

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

OSTROVNOY

	SLBM Type
	SS-N-8
Deployed SLBMs	108
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	108
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0

SUBMARINE BASE:

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type

Submarine Type:	SS-N-8
Delta I	9/108

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

RYBACHIY

	SLBM Type		
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
Deployed SLBMs	48	36	144
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	48	36	144
Non-Deployed SLBMs	56	40	142

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type

Submarine Type:	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
Yankee I	3/48		
Delta I		3/36	
Delta III			9/144

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

PAVLOVSKOYE

	SLBM Type		
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
Deployed SLBMs	48	72	0
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	48	72	0
Non-Deployed SLBMs	83	85	5

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type

Submarine Type:	SS-N-6	SS-N-8
Yankee I	3/48	
Delta I		6/72

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

SLBM LOADING FACILITIES:

OKOL'NAYA

	SLBM Type
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0
	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	1

SEVERODVINSK

	SLBM Type
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0
	Number
Storage Crane	0
Missile Tenders	0

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:

ZLATOUST MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
ZLATOUST, RSFSR

	SLBM Type		
	A	B	C
Non-Deployed SLBMs (Returned)	____	____	____

KRASNOYARSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
KRASNOYARSK, RSFSR

	SLBM Type		
	A	B	C
Non-Deployed SLBMs (Returned)	____	____	____

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR BALISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES:

NONE

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:

OKOL'NAYA

	SLBM Type			
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18	SS-N-23
Non-Deployed SLBMs	3	34	10	15
	Number			
Storage Cranes	0			
Missile Tenders	0			

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:

REVDA

	SLBM Type				
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17	SS-N-18	SS-N-23
Non-Deployed SLBMs	82	18	5	57	35

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

NENOKSA

	SLBM Type
	SS-N-20
Non-Deployed SLBMs	31

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:

NONE

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type		
	A	B	C
Non-Deployed SLBMs	____	____	____

TEST RANGES:

NENOKSA

	SLBM Type		
	SS-N-8	SS-N-20	SS-N-23
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0	0	0

Test Launchers:

Soft-Site Launchers	
1	
2	
3	
Other Launchers (Designator)	SLBM Type
NONE	____
	____

TRAINING FACILITIES:

NONE

SLBM STATIC DISPLAYS:

NONE

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type	Number
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

SLBM CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:

PASHINO

	SLBM Type		
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-18
Non-Deployed SLBMs	88	146	1

SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:

"SEVER" PRODUCTION COMBINE
SEVERODVINSK, RSFSR

	SLBM Type
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	0

"ZVEZDA" FAR EASTERN PLANT
BOL'SHOY KAMEN'
PRIMORSKIY KRAY, RSFSR

	SLBM Type
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	0

(b) United States of America

	SLBM Type			Total
	Poseidon	Trident I	Trident II	
Deployed SLBMs and Their Associated Launchers	192	384	96	672
Deployed SLBMs	192	384	96	672
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	192	384	96	672
Test Launchers	0	0	0	0
SLBM Static Displays	0	0	0	0

	Total Number
Storage Facilities for SLBMs and Repair Facilities for SLBMs	2

SUBMARINE BASE:
POLARIS MISSILE FACILITY ATLANTIC
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

	SLBM Type	
	Poseidon	Trident I
Deployed SLBMs	192	192
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	192	192
Non-Deployed SLBMs	113	56

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type		
	Poseidon	Trident I
Submarine Type:		
Lafayette, James Madison, and Benjamin Franklin	12/192	12/192

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	3

STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITY ATLANTIC
KING'S BAY, GEORGIA

	SLBM Type
	Trident II
Deployed SLBMs	96
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	96
Non-Deployed SLBMs	11

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type	
	Trident II
Submarine Type:	
Ohio	4/96

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITY PACIFIC
SILVERDALE, WASHINGTON

	SLBM Type	
	Poseidon	Trident I
Deployed SLBMs	0	192
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	0	192
Non-Deployed SLBMs	66	29

SUBMARINE BASE:

Ballistic Missile Submarines Based at this Submarine Base:

	Number of Submarines/Aggregate Number of Launchers by SLBM Type	
	Poseidon	Trident I
Submarine Type:		
Ohio	0	8/192

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

SLBM LOADING FACILITIES:
NONE

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:
HERCULES AEROSPACE COMPANY,
MISSILES, ORDNANCE AND SPACE GROUP,
BACCHUS WORKS,
MAGNA, UTAH

	SLBM Type
	Trident II
Non-Deployed SLBMs (Returned)	0

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES:
GENERAL DYNAMICS CORPORATION,
ELECTRIC BOAT DIVISION
GROTON, CONNECTICUT

	SLBM Type		
	Poseidon	Trident I	Trident II
Deployed SLBMs	0	0	0
Deployed Launchers of SLBMs	0	0	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:
NAVAL WEAPONS CENTER
CHINA LAKE, CALIFORNIA

	SLBM Type
	Trident I
Non-Deployed SLBMs	2

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:
TEKOI TEST FACILITY
GOSHUTE INDIAN
RESERVATION, UTAH

	SLBM Type Trident II
Non-Deployed SLBMs	0

	Number
Storage Cranes	0
Missile Tenders	0

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR SLBMs:
NONE

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type A	 B	 C
Non-Deployed SLBMs			

TEST RANGES:
NONE

TRAINING FACILITIES:
TRIDENT TRAINING FACILITY BANGOR
SILVERDALE, WASHINGTON

	SLBM Type Trident I
Training Models of Missiles	1

SUBMARINE TRAINING FACILITY
CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA

	SLBM Type Poseidon	 Trident I
Training Models of Missiles	1	1

NAVAL GUIDED MISSILE SCHOOL DAM NECK
VIRGINIA BEACH, VIRGINIA

	SLBM Type Poseidon	 Trident I
Training Models of Missiles	4	1

TRIDENT TRAINING FACILITY
KING'S BAY, GEORGIA

	SLBM Type Trident II
Training Models of Missiles	1

SLBM STATIC DISPLAYS:
NONE

Name/Location _____	SLBM Type	Number
	_____	_____
	_____	_____

SLBM CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:
NONE

SLBM LAUNCHER CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES:
NONE

ANNEX C.
HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS

For each Party, the numbers of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, as well as data on related facilities, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

	Bomber Type			Former Heavy Bomber Type	Total
	B-52	B-1	B-2		
Deployed Heavy Bombers	479	95	0	—	574
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	189	0	0	—	189
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	290	95	0	—	385
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0	0	0	—	0
Test Heavy Bombers	6	2	1	—	9
Training Heavy Bombers	0	0	0	—	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Converted for Use as Ground Trainers	0	0	0	0	0
Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays	0	0	0	0	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	27
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	27
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs*	7

* NOTE: Multiple categories of heavy bombers were based at this air base on 1 September 1990.

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
CARSWELL AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52H
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	26
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	26
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

EAKER AIR FORCE BASE, ARKANSAS

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	15
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of This Memorandum	15
Former Heavy Bombers	0

FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52H
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	26
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	26
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of This Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

GRIFFISS AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	14
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of This Memorandum	14
Former Heavy Bombers	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
K.I. SAWYER AIR FORCE BASE, MICHIGAN

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52H
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	19
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	19
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of This Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52H
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	22
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	22
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

WURTSMITH AIR FORCE BASE, MICHIGAN

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	19
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	19
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
McCONNELL AIR FORCE BASE, KANSAS

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type B-1
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	17
Former Heavy Bombers	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:

GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-1
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	18
Former Heavy Bombers	0

DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-1
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	30
Former Heavy Bombers	0

ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH DAKOTA	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-1
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	30
Former Heavy Bombers	0

LORING AIR FORCE BASE, MAINE	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	21
Former Heavy Bombers	0

CASTLE AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	21
Former Heavy Bombers	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs*	13
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 10 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	11
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 150, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of This Memorandum	2

* Note: Multiple categories of heavy bombers were based at this air base on 1 September, 1990.

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS:
NONE

Name/Location _____

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type		
	A	B	C
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	____	____	____
Former Heavy Bombers	____	____	____

AIR BASE FOR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
NONE

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
NORTHROP PLANT
PALMDALE, CALIFORNIA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	B-2
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
NONE

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA

Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility	B-52G	B-52H	B-1

KELLY AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS

Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility	B-52G	B-52H

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
ROCKWELL PLANT
PALMDALE, CALIFORNIA

Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility: B-1

HEAVY BOMBER FLIGHT TEST CENTERS:
EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type		
	B-52	B-1	B-2
Test Heavy Bombers	6	2	1

TRAINING FACILITIES:
NONE

HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS CONVERTED FOR USE AS GROUND TRAINERS:
NONE

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
Name/Location _____	_____	_____
	_____	_____

HEAVY BOMBER AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBER STATIC DISPLAYS:
NONE

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
Name/Location _____	_____	_____
	_____	_____

CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBER AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, ARIZONA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type				
	B-52C	B-52D	B-52E	B-52F	B-52G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	—	—	—	—	8*
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	29	91	49	58	14
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	—	—	—	—	—
Test Heavy Bombers	—	—	—	—	—
Training Heavy Bombers	—	—	—	—	—
Former Heavy Bombers	—	—	—	—	—

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	Bomber Type		Former Heavy Bomber Type	Total
	Bear	Blackjack	Bison	
Deployed Heavy Bombers	147	15	—	162
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	84	15	—	99
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	63	0	—	63
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0	0	—	0
Test Heavy Bombers	8	6	—	14
Training Heavy Bombers	11	0	—	11
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0	34	34
Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Converted for Use as Ground Trainers	0	0	0	0
Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays	0	0	0	0

* - Heavy bombers counted as being over the 150 limit.

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMS:

UZIN

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Bear H16
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	21
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 8 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	21
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 180, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

MOZDOK

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Bear H16
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	22
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 8 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	22
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 180, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

SEMIPALATINSK

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bear H6	Bear H16
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	27	13
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 8 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	27	13
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 180, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
PRILUKI

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Blackjack
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	13
Heavy Bombers Attributed with 8 Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	13
Heavy Bombers in Excess of 180, Attributed with the Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Specified for Such Heavy Bombers in Section I of this Memorandum	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS OTHER THAN LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs:
UKRAINKA

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bear B	Bear G
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	15	46
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0

AIR BASE FOR HEAVY BOMBERS EQUIPPED FOR NON-NUCLEAR ARMAMENTS:
NONE

Name/Location _____

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type		
	A	B	C
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	____	____	____
Former Heavy Bombers	____	____	____

AIR BASE FOR FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
ENGEL'S

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bison A	Bison B
Former Heavy Bombers	31	3

PRODUCTION FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
KUYBYSHEV AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION COMBINE
KUYBYSHEV, RSFSR

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Bear H16
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	1
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0
Test Heavy Bombers	1
Training Heavy Bombers	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

KAZAN' AIRCRAFT PRODUCTION COMBINE
KAZAN', RSFSR

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Blackjack
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	2
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

STORAGE FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
UZIN

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bear A	Bear B
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	1	1
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0

REPAIR FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:
BELAYA TSERKOV'

Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility	Bear

RYAZAN'

Types of Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers Normally Repaired at this Facility	Bison A

HEAVY BOMBER FLIGHT TEST CENTERS:
ZHUKOVSKIY

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bear	Blackjack
Test Heavy Bombers	7	6

TRAINING FACILITIES:
RYAZAN'

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
	Bear T
Training Heavy Bombers	11

HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS CONVERTED FOR USE AS GROUND TRAINERS:
NONE

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
Name/Location: _____	_____	_____
	_____	_____

HEAVY BOMBER AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBER STATIC DISPLAYS:
NONE

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	Number
Name/Location: _____	_____	_____
	_____	_____

CONVERSION OR ELIMINATION FACILITIES FOR HEAVY BOMBERS AND FORMER HEAVY BOMBERS:

UZIN

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

ENGEL'S

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0

BELAYA TSERKOV'

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	Bear G	Bear H16
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	0	5
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	3	0
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear ALCMs	0	0
Test Heavy Bombers	0	0
Training Heavy Bombers	0	0
Former Heavy Bombers	0	0

RYAZAN'	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type Bison A
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs	—
Deployed Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range ALCMs	—
Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments	—
Test Heavy Bombers	—
Training Heavy Bombers	—
Former Heavy Bombers	4

ANNEX D.
SPACE LAUNCH FACILITIES

For each Party, the numbers of ICBMs and SLBMs at space launch facilities and the data on space launch facilities are as follows:

(a) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	Total
ICBMs and SLBMs at Space Launch Facilities	1

Space Launch Facilities:
LENINSK-1

ICBMs and SLBMs at Space Launch Facilities	1
Launchers that Have Contained or Launched ICBMs or SLBMs	2

(b) United States of America

	Total
ICBMs and SLBMs at Space Launch Facilities	0

Space Launch Facilities:
NONE

ANNEX E.
ELIMINATED FACILITIES

For each Party, those facilities formerly declared in this Memorandum that, in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section IX of the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination, are considered eliminated for the purposes of the Treaty and whose elimination has been notified in accordance with paragraph 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol are as follows:

(a) United States of America

Former Function of Facility
NONE
Name/Location_____

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Former Function of Facility
NONE
Name/Location_____

ANNEX F.
ICBM AND SLBM TECHNICAL DATA

In addition to ICBM and SLBM technical data, the Parties shall provide, as a category of data for this Annex, the following classification of each existing type of ICBM and SLBM:

Classification A: Assembled ICBMs in launch canisters.
Classification B: Assembled ICBMs or SLBMs without launch canisters.
Classification C: ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported in stages.

(a) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(I) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles:

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type			
	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18
Missile:				
Classification	A	C	A	A
Number of Stages	2	3	2	2
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	17.0	19.7	20.9	29.1 (28.5)[1]
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	2.0	1.84	2.25	3.0
Launch Weight[2] (MT)	50.1	51.0	71.1	211.1
Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister:				
With Front Section (meters)	19.5	—	21.6	35.7 (38.9)[1]
Without Front Section[3] (meters)	19.5	—	21.6	30.5
Length of Launch Canister Body[4] (meters)	19.5	—	21.6	29.7
Diameter of Launch Canister Body (Without Protruding Elements) (meters)	2.9	—	2.5	3.5

[1] Depending upon variant of type.
[2] Given as reference data; determined through calculation.
[3] As received from manufacturing plant.
[4] Without additional canister part (skirt) containing front section.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type			
	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18
Missile Stages:				
First Stage				
Length (meters)	13.4	9.2	14.9	22.3
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)*	XX.X	X.X	XX.X	XX.X
Diameter (meters)	2.0	1.84	2.25	3.0
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Liq	Liq
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage[1] (MT)	40.0	34.5	59.0	161.5
Second Stage				
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	1.49	2.1	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Liq	Liq
Third Stage				
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	1.00	—	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	Sol	—	—

* Data will be provided when a new type of ICBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an ICBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of ICBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

[1] Given as reference data, determined through calculation.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type			
	SS-19	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Missile:				
Classification	A	A	A	A
Number of Stages	2	3	3	3
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	21.1	18.8	19.0	18.5
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	2.5	2.4	2.4	1.80
Launch Weight[1] (MT)	105.6	104.5	104.5	45.1

[1] Given as reference data, determined through calculation.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type			
	SS-19	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister:				
With Front Section (meters)	24.3	22.4	22.6	22.3
Without Front Section[3] (meters)	20.0	19.4	19.6	20.0
Length of Launch Canister Body[4] (meters)	19.4	18.9	18.9	20.0
Diameter of Launch Canister Body (Without Protruding Elements) (meters)	2.9	2.7	2.7	2.0

[3] As received from manufacturing plant.
[4] Without additional canister part (skirt) containing front section.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type			
	SS-19	SS-24 For Silo Launcher	SS-24 For Rail-Mobile Launcher	SS-25
Missile Stages:				
First Stage				
Length (meters)	17.2	9.5	9.7	8.1
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)	XX.X*	X.X*	X.X*	7.4
Diameter (meters)	2.5	2.4	2.4	1.80
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Sol	Sol
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage[5] (MT)	86.3	52.5	53.7	27.8
Second Stage				
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—	1.55
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Sol	Sol
Third Stage				
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—	1.34
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	Sol	Sol	Sol

* Data will be provided when a new type of ICBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an ICBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of ICBMs of existing or previously declared new types.
[5] Given as reference data; determined through calculation.

Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, as Well as Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Support Equipment for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item SS-25	
Road-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs (in Transport Position, Without Missile):		
Length (meters)	17.3	(18.4)[3]
Height (meters) (without protruding elements)	3.0[4]	
Width (meters)	3.1[5]	
Transporter-Loader (in Transport Position, Without Missile): NONE		
Length (meters)	XX.X	
Height (meters)	X.X	
Width (meters)	X.X	
Fixed Structure for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:		
Length (meters) (along the foundation)	30.4	
Height (meters)	7.2[6]	
Width (meters) (along the foundation)	8.1	
Number of Spaces for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs	1	

[3] Depending upon version of an item.
[4] Height may vary insignificantly, depending upon soil compactness, tire pressure, etc.
[5] Not including disk plates fastened on both sides, which protrude in transport position and which are removed and used for ground support during missile launch preparation.
[6] Height may vary insignificantly, depending upon construction tolerances during assembly of the structure and upon how tightly roofs are closed.

Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, as Well as Trains of Standard Configuration and Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item SS-24
Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs (in Transport Position, Without Missile):	
Length (meters)	23.6
Height (meters)	5.0
Width (meters)	3.2
Train of Standard Configuration:	
Number of Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs/ Number of Launch-Associated Railcars	3/6

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item
	SS-24
Fixed Structure for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:	
Length (meters)	462.0
Height (meters)	10.4
Width (meters)	9.2

Support Equipment for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment (in Transport Position, Without Missile):

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item			
	SS-11	SS-13	SS-17	SS-18
Length[9] (meters)	19.2	15.0	18.8	21.6
Height (meters)	3.4	4.4	3.4	4.4
Width (meters)	3.1	3.1	3.3	3.4

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item	
	SS-19	SS-24
Length[9] (meters)	18.8	26.8
Height (meters)	3.4	5.7
Width (meters)	3.3	4.1

[9] Without prime mover.

(II) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles:

	SLBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17
Missile:			
Classification	B	B	B
Number of Stages	1	2	2
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	7.1	13.0	10.6
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	1.50	1.80	1.54
Launch Weight[1] (MT)	14.2	33.3	26.9

[1] Given as reference data; determined through calculation.

	SLBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	SS-N-6	SS-N-8	SS-N-17
Missile Stages:			
First Stage			
Length (meters)	7.1	9.3	6.3
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)*	X.X	X.X	X.X
Diameter (meters)	1.50	1.80	1.54
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Liq	Sol
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage[2] (MT)	13.5	25.7	17.5
Second Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	Liq	Sol
Third Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	—	—

* Data will be provided when a new type of SLBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an SLBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of SLBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

[2] Given as reference data, determined through calculation.

	SLBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	SS-N-18	SS-N-20	SS-N-23
Missile:			
Classification	B	B	B
Number of Stages	2	3	3
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	14.1	16.0	14.8
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	1.80	2.4	1.90
Launch Weight[2] (MT)	35.3	90.0(84.0)[10]	40.3
Missile Stages:			
First Stage			
Length (meters)	9.3	9.5	7.3
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)*	X.X	X.X	X.X
Diameter (meters)	1.80	2.4	1.90
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Liq
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage[2] (MT)	25.7	52.8	22.3

* Data will be provided when a new type of SLBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an SLBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of SLBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

[2] Given as reference data, determined through calculation.

[10] Indicates launch weight with launcher components; figure in parentheses indicates launch weight after these components have been jettisoned.

	SLBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	SS-N-18	SS-N-20	SS-N-23
Second Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Liq	Sol	Liq
Third Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	2.3	1.85
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	Sol	Liq

(b) United States of America

(i) Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles:

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK For Silo Launcher
Missile:			
Classification	C	C	C
Number of Stages	3	3	3
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	14.9	14.6	17.1
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	1.68	1.68	2.4
Launch Weight (MT)	32.7	35.0	88.0
Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister:			
With Front Section (meters)	—	—	—
Without Front Section (meters)	—	—	—
Length of Launch Canister Body (meters)	—	—	—
Diameter of Launch Canister Body (Without Protruding Elements) (meters)	—	—	—

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK For Silo Launcher
Missile Stages:			
First Stage			
Length (meters)	7.0	7.0	8.4
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)*	X.X	X.X	7.4
Diameter (meters)	1.68	1.68	2.3
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Sol	Sol	Sol
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage (MT)	22.9	22.9	48.8
Second Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	1.39	1.39	2.4
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Sol	Sol	Sol
Third Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	0.97	1.33	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Sol	Sol	Sol

* Data will be provided when a new type of ICBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an ICBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of ICBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type PK* For Rail-Mobile Launcher
Missile:	
Classification	X
Number of Stages	X
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	XX.X
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	X.X
Launch Weight (MT)	XX.X
Total Length of Missile as a Unit with Launch Canister:	
With Front Section (meters)	XX.X
Without Front Section (meters)	XX.X
Length of Launch Canister Body (meters)	XX.X
Diameter of Launch Canister Body (Without Protruding Elements) (meters)	X.X

* Peacekeeper has not been deployed in a mobile mode.

	ICBM Type and Variant of a Type PK* For Rail-Mobile Launcher
Missile Stages:	
First Stage	
Length (meters)	X.X
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)**	X.X
Diameter (meters)	X.X
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	——
Weight of a Fully Loaded Stage (MT)	XX.X
Second Stage	
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	X.X
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	——
Third Stage	
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	X.X
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	——

* Peacekeeper has not been deployed in a mobile mode.
** Data will be provided when a new type of ICBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an ICBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of ICBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, as Well as Fixed Structures for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs and Support Equipment for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item A For Road-Mobile Launcher
Road-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs (in Transport Position, Without Missile): NONE	
Transporter-Loader (in Transport Position, Without Missile): NONE	
Length (meters)	XX.X
Height (meters)	X.X
Width (meters)	X.X
Fixed Structure for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs: NONE	

Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs, as Well as Trains of Standard Configuration and Fixed Structures for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item
	PK
	For Rail-Mobile Launcher
Rail-Mobile Launcher of ICBMs*	
(in Transport Position, Without Missile):	
Length (meters)	26.5
Height (meters)	4.8
Width (meters)	2.8
Train of Standard Configuration:	
Number of Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs/ Number of Launch-Associated Railcars	X/X

Fixed Structure for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
NONE

* Exists as a prototype only.

Support Equipment for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
ICBM Emplacement Equipment*
(in Transport Position, Without Missile):

	ICBM Type and Version of an Item		
	MM-II	MM-III	PK
Length (meters)	18.8	18.8	15.7
Height (meters)	3.9	3.9	4.4
Width (meters)	2.9	2.9	3.8

* Emplacement equipment dimensions are without prime mover.

(II) Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles:

	SLBM Type and Variant of a Type		
	Poseidon	Trident I	Trident II
Missile:			
Classification	C	C	C
Number of Stages	2	3	3
Length of Assembled Missile Without Front Section (meters)	10.4	10.4	13.6
Maximum Diameter of Missile Airframe (Without Stabilizers, Raceways, Lug Guides, or Other Protruding Elements) (meters)	1.88	1.88	2.1
Launch Weight (MT)	29.5	32.3	57.7
Missile Stages:			
First Stage			
Length (meters)	4.5	4.5	7.1
Length Used for Confirming a New Type (meters)*	X.X	X.X	X.X
Diameter (meters)	1.88	1.88	2.1
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Sol	Sol	Sol
Weight of Fully Loaded Stage (MT)	19.1	19.1	39.4
Second Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	—	—
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	Sol	Sol	Sol
Third Stage			
Diameter (if Different from First Stage) (meters)	—	0.76	0.81
Type of Propellant (Liq/Sol)	—	Sol	Sol

* Data will be provided when a new type of SLBM is declared, for the purpose of confirming a change in the stage length of an SLBM of a new type in comparison with the stage length of SLBMs of existing or previously declared new types.

ANNEX G.
HEAVY BOMBER TECHNICAL DATA

(a) United States of America

	Type	Date
Date Heavy Bomber of Each Type Initially Based at an Air Base	B-52G	1 NOV 58
	B-52H	8 MAY 61
	B-1	7 JUL 85
Types of Heavy Bombers from Which Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Have Been Flight-Tested	B-52	
	B-1	

(i) **Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:**

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	B-52G	B-52H
Type of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which a Heavy Bomber Is Equipped	AGM-86B	AGM-129 AGM-86B
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which Any Heavy Bomber of This Type and Variant of a Type Is Actually Equipped	12	20
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried on External Attachment Joints	12	12
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried in Internal Weapons Bays	0	8
Launchers of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:		
External Launcher:		
Pylon		
Length (meters)	12.5	12.5
Height (meters)	1.52	1.52
Maximum Number on Heavy Bomber	2	2

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type	
	B-52G	B-52H
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried on Each Pylon	6	6
Number of Attachment Joints on Pylon for Attaching It to Heavy Bomber	2	2
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Pylon to Heavy Bomber, Measured on Pylon or Heavy Bomber (meters)	3.4	3.4
Number of Attachment Joints on Pylon for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to It		2 2
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Pylon, Measured on Pylon (meters)	0.76	0.76
Distinguishing Features of Pylon	NONE	NONE
Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Launcher Located in Internal Weapons Bays:		
Length (meters)	—	6.8
Distinguishing Features of Launcher	—	NONE
Maximum Number on Heavy Bomber	—	1
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which Launcher Is Equipped	—	8
Dimensions of Weapons Bays (meters)		
First Bay		
Length	8.5	8.5
Width	2.1	2.1
Height	2.1	2.1

Distinguishing features between variants of a type of heavy bomber within the category of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

— B-52G is equipped with four 50 cal tail-mounted machineguns, as compared to 20mm gatling gun found on B-52H.

— B-52G is equipped with turbojet engines with a straight cowling profile, as compared to the turbofan-equipped B-52H, which has a forward engine cowling that is clearly larger.

— B-52G has no horizontally mounted antennas on the side of the aft fuselage, as compared to the B-52H.

— B-52G has wing strakelets.

(ii) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, technical data for which are listed in subparagraph (i):

(1) Differences between B-52G heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-52G heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs does not have wing strakelets.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— The underwing pylon attachment joints on the B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will accommodate only one conventional stores pylon on each wing. The type of pylon attachment joint and the space between the pylon attachment joints (3.57 meters) precludes attachment of the pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay of the B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs has not been converted to accommodate the common strategic rotary launcher used with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(2) Differences between B-52G heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-52H heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs is equipped with four 50 cal tail-mounted machineguns, as compared to the 20mm gatling gun found on the B-52H.

— B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs has a turbojet engine with a straight cowling profile, as compared to the turbofan-equipped B-52H, which has a forward engine cowling that is clearly larger.

— B-52G has no horizontally mounted antennas on the side of the aft fuselage, as compared to the B-52H.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— The underwing pylon attachment joints on the B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs will accommodate only one conventional stores pylon on each wing. The type of pylon attachment joint and the space between the pylon attachment joints (3.57 meters) precludes attachment of the pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay of the B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs has not been converted to accommodate the common strategic rotary launcher used with long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(3) Differences between B-1 heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 test heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— B-1 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs has no large vertical blade antenna on top of the fuselage near the mid-wing.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— For the B-1 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs, there are seven external pylon attachment joints on each side of the fuselage (near the weapons bays), which are covered by a process equivalent to welding. There is one additional attachment joint on each side of the fuselage, which also serves as an aircraft jacking point and which will not be covered by a process equivalent to welding.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay bulkhead between the forward and intermediate bays on the B-1 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs has not been moved and remains as it was produced. The weapons bay doors are all of equal length, 4.56 meters. The weapons bay size is insufficient to load a long-range nuclear ALCM. (B-1 test heavy bomber weapons bay and associated doors are 6.81 meters in length to accommodate long-range nuclear ALCMs.)

(iii) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, of a Type from None of Which a Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Has Been Flight-Tested:

Recognition features of B-2 heavy bombers:

— The B-2 planform is of a flying wing design.

— The B-2 has no rudder or vertical stabilizer.

— The B-2 is equipped with tricycle landing gear.

(iv) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments:
NONE

Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph **(i)** or **(ii)**:

(1) Differences between ___ heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments and ___ heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

(Externally observable distinguishing features of fuselage, wing, landing gear, airplane air refueling devices, machinegun and cannon armament, and other structural differences may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

(Distinguishing features of joints for attaching non-nuclear armaments and external launchers (pylons) to airplane may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

(Distinguishing features of launcher of non-nuclear armaments, internal weapons bays, and joints for attaching launcher to airplane and non-nuclear armaments to launcher may be listed.)

(v) Training Heavy Bombers:
NONE

Differences that make training heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph **(i)**, **(ii)**, or **(iv)**:

(1) Differences between ___ training heavy bomber and ___ heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

(Externally observable distinguishing features of fuselage, wing, landing gear, airplane air refueling devices, machinegun and cannon armament, and other structural alterations may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

(Distinguishing features confirming absence or removal (elimination) of joints for attaching external launchers (pylons) to airplane may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

(Distinguishing features of bay confirming absence or removal (elimination) of launcher for armaments or distinguishing features confirming that door cannot be used for installing armaments may be listed.)

(vi) Former Heavy Bombers:
NONE

Differences that make former heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iv), or (v):

(1) Differences between ___ former heavy bomber and ___ heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

(Externally observable distinguishing features of fuselage, wing, landing gear, airplane air refueling devices, machinegun and cannon armament, and other structural alterations may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

(Distinguishing features confirming absence or removal (elimination) of joints for attaching external launchers (pylons) to airplane may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

(Distinguishing features of bay confirming absence or removal (elimination) of launcher for armaments or distinguishing features confirming that door cannot be used for installing armaments may be listed.)

(2) Recognition features of ___ former heavy bombers, for which type of airplane no heavy bombers exist:

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	Type	Date
Date Heavy Bomber of Each Type Initially Based at an Air Base	Bear	APR 56
	Blackjack	APR 87
Types of Heavy Bombers from Which Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Have Been Flight-Tested	Bear	
	Blackjack	

(l) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type		
	Bear H6	Bear H16	Blackjack
Type of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which a Heavy Bomber Is Equipped	AS-15 A	AS-15 A	AS-15 B
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which Any Heavy Bomber of This Type and Variant of a Type Is Actually Equipped	6	16	12
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried on External Attachment Joints	0	10	0
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried in Internal Weapons Bays	6	6	12
Launchers of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:			
External Launcher:			
Pylon			
Length (meters)	—	6.2	—
Height (meters)	—	1.32(1.65[1])	—
Maximum Number on Heavy Bomber	—	4	—
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs Carried on Each Pylon	—	2(3[2])	—
Number of Attachment Joints on Pylon for Attaching It to Heavy Bomber	—	2	—
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Pylon to Heavy Bomber, Measured on Pylon or Heavy Bomber (meters)	—	3.4	—
Number of Attachment Joints on Pylon for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to It	—	2	—
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Pylon, Measured on Pylon (meters)	—	2.3	—
Distinguishing Features of Pylon	—	NONE	—
Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Launcher Located in Internal Weapons Bays:			
Length (meters)	6.6	6.6	6.6
Distinguishing Features of Launcher	Rotary type with external suspension of missiles		

[1] Height of second pylon as counted from fuselage on wing is indicated in parentheses.

[2] Maximum number of long-range nuclear ALCMs carried on second pylon as counted outward from fuselage on wing is indicated in parentheses.

	Bomber Type and Variant of a Type		
	Bear H6	Bear H16	Blackjack
Maximum Number on Heavy Bomber	1	1	2
Maximum Number of Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs for Which Launcher Is Equipped	6	6	6
Dimensions of Weapons Bays (meters)			
First Bay			
Length[1]	7.5	7.5	11.3
Width[1]	1.78	1.78	1.92
Height	2.9	2.9	2.4
Second Bay			
Length[1]	—	—	11.3
Width[1]	—	—	1.92
Height	—	—	2.4

Distinguishing features between variants of a type of heavy bomber within the category of heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

The absence of external attachment joints for armaments under the wing is a feature distinguishing the Bear H6 variant of a type of heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs from the Bear H16 heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

[1] Dimensions along edge of door indicated.

(ii) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, technical data for which are listed in subparagraph (I):

(1) Differences between Bear A heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and Bear H6 and Bear H16 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— There are three twin-mounted guns on the top and bottom of the fuselage and in the tail section. Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes have one twin-mounted tail gun.

— The primary landing gear struts are tilted toward the tail section of the airplane. The primary landing gear struts on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes are tilted toward the nose section of the airplane.

— There is no in-flight refueling probe. There is such a probe on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— There are no attachment joints for armaments under the wing/fuselage.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay is not equipped for a rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs and is distinguishable from the weapons bay on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes by the following: the length (along the edge of the door) is

7.44 meters, the width (along the edge of the door) is 1.67 meters, and the height (at the front edge of the door) is 2.23 meters.

— Two bomb racks for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are located in the weapons bay. A bomb rack is distinguishable from a pylon or rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs by the distance between the joints for attaching the nuclear armaments onto the bomb rack, which is 0.48 meters.

(2) Differences between Bear B heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and Bear H6 and Bear H16 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— There are three twin-mounted guns on the top and bottom of the fuselage and in the tail section. Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes have one twin-mounted tail gun.

— The primary landing gear struts are tilted toward the tail section of the airplane. The primary landing gear struts on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes are tilted toward the nose section of the airplane.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— There are no attachment joints for armaments under the wing/fuselage.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay is not equipped for a rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs and is distinguishable from the weapons bay on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes by the following: the length (along the edge of the door) is 14.2 meters.

— One beam-type rack for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs is located in the weapons bay. The rack is distinguishable from a rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs by the distance between the supports for attaching nuclear armaments onto the rack, which is 3.76 meters.

(3) Differences between Bear G heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs and Bear H6 and Bear H16 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— There are two twin-mounted guns on the top and bottom of the fuselage. Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes have one twin-mounted tail gun.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— One pylon for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs is located under each wing. This pylon is distinguishable from a pylon for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the distance between the joints for attaching the pylon to the wing of the heavy bomber (4.7 meters), and the distance between the joints for attaching nuclear armaments onto the pylon.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— The weapons bay is not equipped for a rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs and is distinguishable from the weapons bay on Bear H6 and Bear H16 airplanes by the following: the length (along the edge of the door) is 12.0 meters.

— One beam-type rack for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs is located in the weapons bay. The rack is distinguishable from a pylon or rotary launcher of long-range nuclear ALCMs by the distance between the supports for attaching nuclear armaments onto the rack, which is 2.7 meters.

(iii) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs, of a Type from None of Which a Long-Range Nuclear ALCM Has Been Flight-Tested:
NONE

Recognition features of ____ heavy bombers:

(iv) Heavy Bombers Equipped for Non-Nuclear Armaments:
NONE

Differences that make heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph **(I)** or **(II)**:

(1) Differences between ___ heavy bomber equipped for non-nuclear armaments and ___ heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

(Externally observable distinguishing features of fuselage, wing, landing gear, airplane air refueling devices, machinegun and cannon armament, and other structural differences may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

(Distinguishing features of joints for attaching non-nuclear armaments and external launchers (pylons) to airplane may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

(Distinguishing features of launcher of non-nuclear armaments, internal weapons bays, and joints for attaching launcher to airplane and non-nuclear armaments to launcher may be listed.)

(v) Training Heavy Bombers:

Differences that make training heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph **(I)**, **(II)**, or **(IV)**:

(1) Differences between Bear T training heavy bomber and heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

— The Bear T training heavy bomber is a modification of the Bear A heavy bomber type and has the following distinctive external distinguishing features: there are three twin-mounted guns on the top and bottom of the fuselage and in the tail section; there is no in-flight refueling probe; a red band has been applied around the fuselage in front of the stabilizer.

— Bear H6 and Bear H16 heavy bombers have one twin-mounted tail gun.

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— There are no external attachment joints for armaments or external pylon attachment joints for carrying any "air-to-surface" armaments.

— Bear H16 and Bear G heavy bombers have external joints for attaching pylons to the bomber and joints for attaching armaments onto the pylon.

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

— There is no weapons bay. The doors of the weapons bay have been sealed shut, precluding placement in the bay of any "air-to-surface" armaments.

— Bear H6, Bear H16, Bear B, Bear G, and Bear A heavy bombers have one weapons bay.

(vi) Former Heavy Bombers:

Differences that make former heavy bombers distinguishable from heavy bombers of this type equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments, technical data and distinguishing features for which are listed in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iv), or (v):
NONE

(1) Differences between ___ former heavy bomber and ___ heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments or non-nuclear armaments:

Externally Observable Distinguishing Features:

(Externally observable distunguishing features of fuselage, wing, landing gear, airplane air refueling devices, machinegun and cannon armament, and other structural alterations may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

(Distinguishing features confirming absence or removal (elimination) of joints for attaching external launchers (pylons) to airplane may be listed.)

Distinguishing Features of Weapons Bay:

(Distinguishing features of bay confirming absence or removal (elimination) of launcher for armaments or distinguishing features confirming that door cannot be used for installing armaments may be listed.)

(2) Recognition features of Bison A former heavy bombers, for which type of airplane no heavy bombers exist:

Features making it possible to identify Bison A former heavy bomber:

External Observable Features:

— The Bison A former heavy bomber is a modification of the Bison[1] heavy bomber and has the following distinctive external features: four turbojet engines located on the wings—two engines on each side of the fuselage; bicycle-type landing gear struts (two primary landing gear struts located under the fuselage, aligned with the airplane) and two underwing landing gear struts located on the wing tips.

Features Under Wing/Fuselage:

— There are no external attachment joints for armaments or external pylon attachment joints for carrying any "air-to-surface" armaments.

Features of Weapons Bay:

— The doors of the weapons bay have been sealed shut and cannot be opened, precluding placement in the bay of "air-to-surface" armaments. A propellant tank has been installed inside the weapons bay, and airplane air refueling equipment is housed there. There is a hatch for trailing the hose and cone for in-flight refueling of airplanes.

[1] There are no Bison type heavy bombers.

ANNEX H.
LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCM TECHNICAL DATA

(a) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(I) Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

	ALCM Type and Variant of a Type	
	AS-15 A	AS-15 B
Maximum Assembled Missile Length (meters)	6.0	6.0
Maximum Missile Fuselage Cross-Section Measurement (meters)	0.51	0.77
Fully Extended Wingspan (meters)	3.1	3.1
Number of Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Launcher	2	2
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Launcher (meters)	2.3	2.3
Other Distinguishing Features of Long-Range Nuclear ALCM	NONE	NONE

(b) United States of America

(I) Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

	ALCM Type and Variant of a Type	
	AGM-86B	AGM-129
Maximum Assembled Missile Length (meters)	6.4	6.4
Maximum Missile Fuselage Cross-Section Measurement (meters)	0.64	0.74
Fully Extended Wingspan (meters)	3.6	3.1
Number of Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Launcher	2	2
Distance Between Joints for Attaching Long-Range Nuclear ALCM to Launcher (meters)	0.76	0.76
Other Distinguishing Features of Long-Range Nuclear ALCM	NONE	NONE

ANNEX I.
OTHER DATA REQUIRED BY THE TREATY

1. For each Party, the static displays in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty that are not subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(a) of Article IV of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America

	ICBM Type	Number
ICBM Launcher Static Displays:		
NONE		
ICBM Static Displays:		
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE MUSEUM, CALIFORNIA	PK	1
NORTON AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	PK	1
	MM-III	1
VANDENBERG AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	MM-III	1
F.E. WARREN AIR FORCE BASE, WYOMING	PK	1
	MM-III	1
USAF MUSEUM WRIGHT PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO	MM-III	1
MALMSTROM AIR FORCE BASE, MONTANA	MM-III	1
	MM-II	1
WHITEMAN AIR FORCE BASE, MISSOURI	MM-II	1
USAF ACADEMY, COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	MM-III	1
GRAND FORKS AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA	MM-III	1
THIOKOL CORPORATION, STRATEGIC OPERATIONS PROMONTORY, UTAH	PK	1
PATRICK AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA	MM-II	1
AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, WASHINGTON, D.C	MM-III	1
SOUTH DAKOTA AIR AND SPACE MUSEUM, SOUTH DAKOTA	MM-II	1
MINOT AIR FORCE BASE, NORTH DAKOTA	MM-II	1
ICBM Launch Canister Static Displays:		
NONE		

SLBM Static Displays:

	SLBM Type	Number
STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITY ATLANTIC KING'S BAY, GEORGIA	Trident II	1
POLARIS MISSILE FACILITY ATLANTIC CHARLESTON, SOUTH CAROLINA	Poseidon Trident I	1 1
STRATEGIC WEAPONS FACILITY PACIFIC SILVERDALE, WASHINGTON	Trident I	1
THIOKOL CORPORATION, STRATEGIC OPERATIONS PROMONTORY, UTAH	Poseidon Trident I	1 1

Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays:

	Bomber Type	Number
MAXWELL AIR FORCE BASE, ALABAMA	B-52D	1
K I SAWYER AIR FORCE BASE, MICHIGAN	B-52D	1
SOUTHWEST AEROSPACE MUSEUM FORT WORTH, TEXAS	B-52D	1
PIMA AIR MUSEUM TUCSON, ARIZONA	B-52D B-52A B-52G	1 1 1
LACKLAND AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	B-52D	1
USS ALABAMA MEMORIAL PARK MOBILE, ALABAMA	B-52D	1
US AIR FORCE ACADEMY COLORADO SPRINGS, COLORADO	B-52D	1
ROBINS AIR FORCE BASE, GEORGIA	B-52D	1
McCONNELL AIR FORCE BASE, KANSAS	B-52D	1
ANDERSEN AIR FORCE BASE, GUAM	B-52D	1
YPSILANTI, MICHIGAN	B-52D	1
EDWARDS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	B-52D	1
CASTLE AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	B-52D	1
BARKSDALE AIR FORCE BASE, LOUISIANA	B-52D	1
FAIRCHILD AIR FORCE BASE, WASHINGTON	B-52D	1

Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays:

	Bomber Type	Number
DYESS AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	B-52D	1
KELLY AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	B-52D	1
TINKER AIR FORCE BASE, OKLAHOMA	B-52D	1
TRAVIS AIR FORCE BASE, CALIFORNIA	B-52D	1
UNITED STATES AIR FORCE MUSEUM	B-52D	1
WRIGHT-PATTERSON AIR FORCE BASE, OHIO	B-1	1
CHANUTE AIR FORCE BASE, ILLINOIS	B-52B	1
LOWRY AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO	B-52B	1
KIRTLAND AIR FORCE BASE, NEW MEXICO	B-52B	1
STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND MUSEUM, BELLEVUE, NEBRASKA	B-52B	1
MARCH AIR FORCE BASE MUSEUM, CALIFORNIA	B-52D	1
ELLSWORTH AIR FORCE BASE, SOUTH DAKOTA	B-52D	1
DAVIS-MONTHAN AIR FORCE BASE, ARIZONA	B-52D	1
OKLAHOMA CITY, OKLAHOMA	B-52F	1
ORLANDO, FLORIDA	B-52D	1
OFFUTT AIR FORCE BASE, NEBRASKA	B-52G	1
SHEPPARD AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	B-52D	1
HILL AIR FORCE BASE, UTAH	B-52G	1
EGLIN AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA	B-52G	1
GRIFFISS AIR FORCE BASE, NEW YORK	B-52G	1
WHITEMAN AIR FORCE BASE, MISSOURI	B-52D	1

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	ICBM Type	Number
ICBM Launcher Static Displays:		
NONE		
ICBM Static Displays:		
BALABANOVO	SS-11	4
	SS-13	2
	SS-25	4
	SS-17	3
	SS-19	4
	SS-18	4
	SS-24	2
ICBM Launch Canister Static Displays:		
BALABANOVO		
	SS-11	3
	SS-25	2
	SS-17	2
	SS-19	4
	SS-18	2
SLBM Static Displays		
NONE		

Heavy Bomber and Former Heavy Bomber Static Displays:

	Bomber Type	Number
UZIN	Bear A	1
MOZDOK	Bear A	1
SEMIPALATINSK	Bear A	1
MONINO	Bear A	1
	Bison	1
SYZRAN'	Bison B	1
RYAZAN'	Bison B	1
ZHUKOVSKIY	Bison B	1
UKRAINKA	Bison B	1

2. For each Party, the heavy bombers and former heavy bombers converted for use as ground trainers in existence at the time of signature of the Treaty that are not subject to the limitations provided for in subparagraph 7(b) of Article IV of the Treaty are as follows:

(a) United States of America

	Bomber Type	Number
LOWRY AIR FORCE BASE, COLORADO	B-52F	1
	B-1	1
SHEPPARD AIR FORCE BASE, TEXAS	B-52G	3
ROME AIR DEVELOPMENT CENTER ROME, NEW YORK	B-52G	1
	B-1	1

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

	Bomber Type	Number
MONINO	Bear H	1

3. For each Party, the facilities subject to continuous monitoring are as follows:

(a) United States of America

THIOKOL CORPORATION,
STRATEGIC OPERATIONS,
PEACEKEEPER STAGE FINAL ASSEMBLY FACILITY
PROMONTORY, UTAH

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

VOTKINSK MACHINE BUILDING PLANT
VOTKINSK, RSFSR

PAVLOGRAD MACHINE PLANT
PAVLOGRAD, UKRAINIAN SSR

4. For each Party, the monitored facilities are as follows:

(a) United States of America
NONE

Name/Location _____

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NONE

Name/Location _____

5. For each Party, all production and storage locations of solid rocket motors for the first stage of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

THIOKOL STRATEGIC OPERATIONS,
PROMONTORY, UTAH

THIOKOL SPACE OPERATIONS,
PROMONTORY, UTAH

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

BIYSK

PAVLOGRAD

KAMENSK-SHAKHTINSKIY

6. For each Party, the testing locations of solid rocket motors for the first stage (with or without nozzles attached) of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs, subject to the limitations contained in paragraph 10 of Article IV of the Treaty, are as follows:

(a) United States of America

THIOKOL TEST AREA (SOLID ROCKET MOTOR TESTING)
PROMONTORY, UTAH

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

KRASNOARMEYSK (SOLID ROCKET MOTOR TESTING)

PAVLOGRAD (SOLID ROCKET MOTOR TESTING)

7. For each Party, the locations where static testing occurs for first stages of ICBMs or SLBMs not subject to the limitations contained in subparagraph 1(a) of Article IV of the Treaty, for missiles that are maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters pursuant to subparagraphs 3(b) and 3(c) of Article III of the Treaty, as applicable, are as follows:

(a) United States of America
NONE

Name/Location _____

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
NONE

Name/Location _____

8. To each Party, ICBMs, SLBMs, submarines, heavy bombers, former heavy bombers, other airplanes, ALCMs, and, where applicable, variants referred to in the Treaty and its Annexes, Protocols, and Memorandum are known as follows:

(a) in the United States of America	(b) in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
ICBMs	
Minuteman II (MM-II)	Minuteman II
Minuteman III (MM-III)	Minuteman III
Peacekeeper (PK)	MX
SICBM	Midgetman
SS-11	RS-10
SS-13	RS-12
SS-17	RS-16
SS-18	RS-20
SS-19	RS-18
SS-24	RS-22
SS-25	RS-12M
SLBMs	
Poseidon	Poseidon
Trident I	Trident I
Trident II	Trident II
SS-N-6	RSM-25
SS-N-8	RSM-40
SS-N-17	RSM-45
SS-N-18	RSM-50
SS-N-20	RSM-52
SS-N-23	RSM-54
Submarines	
Lafayette	Lafayette
James Madison	James Madison
Benjamin Franklin	Benjamin Franklin
Ohio	Ohio
Delta I	Murena
Delta II	Murena-M
Delta III	Kal'mar
Delta IV	Del'fin
Typhoon	Typhoon
Yankee I	Navaga
Yankee II	Navaga-M
Heavy Bombers	
B-52	B-52
B-52A	B-52A
B-52B	B-52B
B-52C	B-52C
B-52D	B-52D

Heavy Bombers

B-52E	B-52E
B-52F	B-52F
B-52G	B-52G
B-52H	B-52H
B-1	B-1
B-1A	B-1A
B-1B	B-1B
B-2	B-2
B-2A	B-2A
Bear	Tu-95
Bear A	Tu-95M
Bear B	Tu-95K
Bear G	Tu-95K22
Bear H	Tu-95MS
Bear H6	Tu-95MS6
Bear H16	Tu-95MS16
Bear T	Tu-95U
Blackjack	Tu-160

Former Heavy Bombers

Bison	3M
Bison A	3MS-2
Bison B	M-4

ALCMs

AGM-86B	AGM-86B
AGM-129	AGM-129
AS-15 A	RKV-500A
AS-15 B	RKV-500B

Other Airplanes

C-5	C-5
C-9	C-9
C-130	C-130
C-141	C-141
T-43	T-43
An-124	An-124
Il-62	Il-62
Il-76	Il-76
Il-96	Il-96
Bear D	Tu-95RTs
Bear F	Tu-142
Bear J	Tu-142

9. For each Party, the points of entry for inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities are as follows:

(a) United States of America:

(i) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Washington, D.C.:

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Whiteman Missile Complex, Missouri; Grand Forks Missile Complex, North Dakota

Submarine Base:
Polaris Missile Facility Atlantic, Charleston, South Carolina; Strategic Weapons Facility Atlantic, King's Bay, Georgia

Training Facilities:
Submarine Training Facility, Charleston, South Carolina; Naval Guided Missile School Dam Neck, Virginia Beach, Virginia; Trident Training Facility, King's Bay, Georgia

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Griffiss Air Force Base, New York; K.I. Sawyer Air Force Base, Michigan; Wurtsmith Air Force Base, Michigan; Barksdale Air Force Base, Louisiana; Eaker Air Force Base, Arkansas; Carswell Air Force Base, Texas

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Loring Air Force Base, Maine; McConnell Air Force Base, Kansas; Grand Forks Air Force Base, North Dakota

(ii) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry San Francisco, California:

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
F.E. Warren Missile Complex, Wyoming; Malmstrom Missile Complex, Montana; Ellsworth Missile Complex, South Dakota; Minot Missile Complex, North Dakota

Production Facilities for ICBMs:
Thiokol Corporation, Promontory, Utah

Storage Facilities for ICBMs:
Oasis Complex, Utah

Repair Facilities for ICBMs:
Hill Air Force Base, Utah

Test Ranges:
Vandenberg Air Force Base, California

Submarine Base:
Strategic Weapons Facility Pacific, Silverdale, Washington

Storage Facilities for SLBMs:
Naval Weapons Center, Cluna Lake, California; Tekoi Test Facility, Goshute Indian Reservation, Utah

Training Facilities:
Trident Training Facility Bangor, Silverdale, Washington

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Fairchild Air Force Base, Washington; Minot Air Force Base, North Dakota

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Castle Air Force Base, California; Dyess Air Force Base, Texas; Ellsworth Air Force Base, South Dakota

Conversion or Elimination Facilities for Heavy Bombers and Former Heavy Bombers:
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base, Arizona

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

(1) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Moscow:

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Bershet', Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Vypolzovo, Dombarovskiy, Kartaly, Derzhavinsk, Khmel'nitskiy, Kozel'sk, Pervomaysk, Tatishchevo

ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Lida, Mozyr', Teykovo, Yoshkar-Ola, Yur'ya, Nizhniy Tagil

ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Kostroma, Bershet'

Storage Facilities:
Kolosovo, Mikhaylenki, Surovatikha, Piban'shur, Khrizolitovyy, Okol'naya, Revda, Nenoksa, Uzin

Test Ranges:
Plesetsk, Leninsk, Nenoksa

Training Facilities:
Serpukhov, Balabanovo, Pomerki, Goryachiy Klyuch, Rostov, Perm', Plesetsk, Ryazan'

Conversion or Elimination Facilities:
Lesnaya, Sarny

Production Facilities:
Votkinsk, Pavlograd

Repair Facilities for Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Bataysk

Submarine Base:
Nerpich'ya, Yagel'naya, Olen'ya, Ostrovnoy

SLBM Loading Facilities:
Okol'naya, Severodvinsk

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Uzin, Mozdok, Priluki

Air Base for Former Heavy Bombers:
Engel's

(II) Inspection sites and facilities subject to continuous monitoring or monitored facilities associated with point of entry Ulan Ude:

ICBM Base for Silo Launchers of ICBMs:
Krasnoyarsk, Drovyanaya, Yasnaya, Svobodnyy, Aleysk, Zhangiz-Tobe, Uzhur

ICBM Base for Road-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Novosibirsk, Kansk, Irkutsk

ICBM Base for Rail-Mobile Launchers of ICBMs:
Krasnoyarsk

Conversion or Elimination Facilities:
Pashino

Submarine Base:
Rybachiy, Pavlovskoye

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Semipalatinsk

Air Base for Heavy Bombers Equipped for Nuclear Armaments Other than Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:
Ukrainka

10. For each Party, the routes for flights of inspection airplanes to points of entry are as follows:

a. For flights of inspection airplanes of the United States of America to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY	ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY
To Moscow: G.T. SORLA, Ventspils, Belyy, Gagarin, Sheremet'yevo	Same as inbound
To Ulan Ude: G.T. SQUID, Yedinka, Yekimchan, Bomnak G.T. LEMUR G.T. NALIM, Vitim G.T. RAMIS, Kirensk G.T. PIKET, Bratsk G.T. DOMOR, Osa, Irkutsk, Bol'shoye Goloustnoye, Mukhino	Same as inbound

b. For flights of inspection airplanes of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the United States of America:

ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY	ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY
To WASHINGTON, D.C. (Dulles International Airport): Canadian routing to DAVES J585 STOOL J150 HTO SAX J228 LRP V143 ROBRT AML	Radar Vectors ENO 271R SWANN V268 BROSS 00D235R OOD J42 RBV J62 ACK

ROUTE TO POINT OF ENTRY	ROUTE FROM POINT OF ENTRY
To SAN FRANCISCO, California (Travis Air Force Base): 5600N/17200E NUKKS SPY CDB A342 REDOO ENI PYE SUU	Radar Vectors SUU PYE ENI REDOO A342 CDB SPY NUKKS 5600N/17200E

11. Ports of the United States of America where special purpose submarines are based are as follows:
NONE

Name/Location _____

12. For each Party, the facilities subject to suspect-site inspection are as follows:

(a) United States of America

OGDEN

SACRAMENTO

MAGNA

(b) Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

ZLATOUST

BERSHET'

PETROPAVLOVSK

ANNEX J.
OTHER REQUIREMENTS

1. The Parties shall provide, as a category of data, geographic coordinates relating to the data contained in this Memorandum. All geographic coordinates provided for in this Memorandum shall be expressed in latitude and longitude to the nearest minute, except in cases where two or more locations are within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, and are of the same type or have the same appearance; in such cases, the latitude and longitude shall be expressed to include seconds. Geographic coordinates for silos used as launch control centers, other launch control centers, and silo launchers of ICBMs located in a silo launcher group at an ICBM base shall be expressed to the nearest minute. In specifying geographic coordinates, each Party shall use the system of coordinates commonly employed by it.

2. The geographic coordinates for training facilities specified in Annex A to this Memorandum and for test ranges shall be specified as follows:

(a) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a single area of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected by straight or curved lines to delineate boundaries, shall be specified using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.

(b) If such a training facility or a test range comprises a number of non-contiguous areas, the geographic coordinates of the reference point for the entire training facility or test range shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum and shall be specified on the site diagram. In addition, for each of its separate areas of less than ten square kilometers, the geographic coordinates of its reference point shall be specified on the site diagram, but if such an area is ten square kilometers or greater, the geographic coordinates of points on its perimeter, connected as described in subparagraph (a) of this paragraph, shall be specified.

3. If coordinates of two or more locations are specified as provided for in paragraph 1 of this Annex, but the other Party considers that these locations have the same appearance, notification thereof shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 7 of Section I of the Notification Protocol. In this case, the Party providing the coordinates shall, within 15 days, provide clarifying information permitting the other Party to differentiate between the locations within one minute of latitude and longitude of each other, or provide their coordinates to include seconds of sufficient accuracy to differentiate between the locations.

4. The Parties shall provide site diagrams for each facility at which baseline data inspections, data update inspections, new facility and suspect-site inspections may be conducted, and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring, in accordance with the following:

(a) No later than 30 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide site diagrams for each facility listed in this Memorandum at which baseline data inspections and data update inspections may be conducted, and at which suspect-site inspections may be conducted, and for each facility subject to continuous monitoring.

(b) Thereafter, for each new facility provided for in this paragraph, each Party shall provide site diagrams.

All such site diagrams shall be drawn to scale and shall include boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances/exits, facility reference points with geographic coordinates, and scale of the site diagram.

5. For ICBM bases, the following site diagrams shall be provided:

ICBM base for silo launchers of ICBMs — a site diagram of the entire ICBM base and a site diagram of the maintenance facility.

ICBM base for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs — a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the maintenance facility, and a site diagram of each restricted area.

ICBM base for rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs — a site diagram of the entire ICBM base, a site diagram of the rail garrison and a site diagram of the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is located outside the rail garrison. If the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison, the site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall not be required, and in this case the maintenance facility shall be shown on the site diagram for the rail garrison, and a separate site diagram of the maintenance facility shall not be required.

Each site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall be drawn in a simplified form. Such a simplified site diagram shall consist of the following:

For each group of silo launchers of ICBMs, only its name or designation shall be required to be specified, and the location of each silo launcher of ICBMs shall be depicted;

For each restricted area, its name or designation shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of each such restricted area shall be depicted;

For each rail garrison, its name shall be specified, and the reference point, location and designation of each parking site, each rail entrance/exit, and connecting rail lines shall be depicted.

For each maintenance facility, its name shall be specified, and the reference point and approximate boundary of the maintenance facility shall be depicted.

In addition, the name of the entire ICBM base, reference point with geographic coordinates for the entire ICBM base, and the network of major roads that connect the maintenance facility with the groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, the restricted areas, or the rail garrisons shall be depicted on a simplified site diagram. In

all other respects, each simplified site diagram of the entire ICBM base shall meet all requirements set forth in subparagraphs 9(a) and 9(b)(i) of this Annex.

6. Site diagrams of deployment areas shall not be required. The boundaries of deployment areas shall be defined by straight lines connecting points on the terrain, the geographic coordinates of which shall be provided pursuant to this Memorandum. Site diagrams of restricted areas shall show the road network connecting fixed structures for road-mobile launchers of ICBMs. Site diagrams for rail garrisons shall show all rail lines, rail entrances/exits, and parking sites within the rail garrison, and the maintenance facility if the maintenance facility is within the rail garrison. Site diagrams of rail garrisons need not have boundaries shown. If the boundaries of a rail garrison are not shown, the site diagram of such a rail garrison shall be drawn to include all parking sites and rail entrances/exits, as well as all rail lines and associated structures that are large enough to contain items of inspection, except for those structures where reentry vehicles are stored.

7. The site diagrams of facilities associated with SLBM launchers shall show the fixed piers and wharves at these facilities.

8. Site diagrams for air bases for heavy bombers and former heavy bombers shall depict runways and taxiways. Additionally, parking areas, revetments, shelters, hangars, and all locations where heavy bombers are parked or maintained shall be depicted on the site diagram.

9. For site diagrams of facilities provided pursuant to this Memorandum, the following requirements are established:

(a) All site diagrams shall meet the following requirements:

(i) The title of a site diagram shall provide the name and function of the facility depicted on the site diagram as it appears in this Memorandum, reference point geographic coordinates of this facility provided pursuant to this Memorandum, and the day, month, and year that the diagram was prepared. A site diagram that does not depict the entire facility, but only a portion of that facility, shall include the above-mentioned title for the entire facility and an additional sub-title with similar information for that portion of the facility. The information shall be provided in both English and Russian.

(ii) The facility reference point, as specified by geographic coordinates provided pursuant to this Memorandum or on the facility site diagram, shall be indicated on the site diagram by a "+" sign and by the letters "RP" (Reference Point) near that sign.

(iii) An arrow indicating the orientation of the facility relative to geographic (true) north shall be included on the site diagram.

(iv) The cartographic projection method used as the basis for a site diagram shall provide an undistorted view of the facility.

(v) The site diagram shall be drawn so that the depicted facility fills approximately 80 percent of either the vertical or horizontal dimension of a page. At a minimum, a page must be 21 x 27.9 centimeters. The site diagram shall include a bar scale, showing the scale of the site diagram in meters or kilometers, and a numerical ratio 1:S, where "S" is the number indicating the factor of reduction used in depicting on the site diagram the actual measurements taken in the field.

(vi) Symbols shall be used to draw site diagrams to represent, for example, the boundaries of the facility, road and rail entrances and exits, structures, and roads. A list of the symbols used, with a clear explanation of what is represented by them, shall be included by the Parties on the front or reverse side of each site diagram, or one copy of such a list shall be included with each exchange of site diagrams between the Parties.

(b) Site diagrams of facilities, except those required for continuous monitoring activities, shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) Facility boundaries shall be shown on the site diagram that, at a minimum, enclose the structures used for, and the area associated with, items declared at that facility, as well as the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility. The boundaries shall be clearly delineated by using, where possible, man-made or natural features such as roads, fences, railroad tracks, or rivers.

(ii) The network of major roads within the facility shall be shown on the site diagram, but if the facility consists of two or more non-contiguous areas, the network of major roads connecting these separate areas shall also be shown.

(iii) At a minimum, all structures used for items declared at that facility, and the structures used to contain the support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility on the site diagram. Additionally, all structures that are intended for, and are large enough to be used for, items or support equipment declared at that facility shall be shown within the boundary of that facility, except those structures the entrances of which are not large enough to permit passage of such items or support equipment. If such structures are below ground, the entrances shall be marked and an outline of the below-ground structure shall be shown on the site diagram. Structures shown on the site diagram shall be in the shape of the area occupied by them or the area covered by the roofs of those structures and shall be accurately shown in proper scale and orientation to other structures and features shown on the site diagram.

(iv) In case of construction of additional structures at facilities or elimination of the existing structures specified in subparagraph (b) (iii) of this paragraph, no updating of site diagrams provided pursuant to this Memorandum shall be required. During pre-inspection procedures, a member of the in-country escort shall provide the inspectors a copy of the site diagram, updated to show changes in such structures and all other structures that are large enough to contain items and support equipment subject to inspection at that facility, except those

structures the entrances of which are too small to permit passage of such items or support equipment. This process shall constitute an official update of site diagrams.

(c) Site diagrams for facilities subject to continuous monitoring shall meet the following additional requirements:

(i) The outer perimeter of such a facility shall be delineated by a single, continuous line drawn on the site diagram.

(ii) The proposed boundary of the perimeter continuous monitoring area shall be delineated by a dashed line.

(iii) Additionally, the portal and all road exits and personnel exits shall be depicted.

(iv) Finalized site diagrams of such a facility shall be prepared following completion of the engineering survey.

10. Photographs of assembled ICBMs; assembled SLBMs; first stages of ICBMs; first stages of SLBMs; launch canisters for assembled ICBMs; mobile launchers of ICBMs; fixed structures for mobile launchers of ICBMs; support equipment; long-range nuclear ALCMs; and heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection of, as applicable, all types, categories, variants, and versions that are specified in this Memorandum shall be appended to this Memorandum. In addition, photographs of the distinguishing features of heavy bombers and former heavy bombers, specified in Annex G to this Memorandum, shall be provided during distinguishability exhibitions. All photographs shall meet the following requirements:

(a) All photographs shall be taken using black and white film.

(b) All photographs shall be taken with adequate lighting. The use of flash and lighting equipment shall be allowed.

(c) The object being photographed shall contrast with the background in the photograph.

(d) All photographs shall be of high definition and in focus.

(e) For each object, one photograph, at least 18 by 24 centimeters, including 1.5 centimeter borders, shall be provided. For objects other than heavy bombers, all photographs shall be taken at the same level as the object being photographed with the camera placed perpendicular to the longitudinal axis of the object. Road-mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be photographed without tarpaulins or covers. In this connection, ICBM launchers mounted on a trailer or semi-trailer shall be photographed both with and without prime movers. A road-mobile launcher of ICBMs shall be photographed both with and without a missile, in a transport position. For rail-mobile launchers of ICBMs, photographs of railcars (flatcars) shall be provided. For heavy bombers and former heavy bombers subject to inspection, the photographs shall be taken from the front right-hand side, at an angle of 30-45° to the longitudinal axis of the heavy bomber. These photographs shall show the heavy bomber with the maximum number of nuclear armaments for which it is externally equipped.

(f) The object that is being photographed shall fill at least 80 percent of the photograph (not including borders) in either horizontal or vertical aspect.

(g) A reference gauge shall be included in each photograph together with the object. The gauge shall have alternating half-meter sections in black and white. It must be long enough to provide accurate scaling and must be placed against the object or in close proximity to it. If a reference gauge with sections of a different length is used, the length of these sections (increments) shall be specified on the label on the photograph.

(h) Each photograph shall be labeled in both English and Russian to include the type and variant of a type of object photographed, as they are specified in this Memorandum.

11. For each base or facility specified in Annexes A, B, and C to this Memorandum, each Party shall provide data on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber of a type and variant of a type based or stored at that base or facility, according to paragraphs 1, 2, and 3 of Section I of the Notification Protocol.

12. Each Party shall:

(a) For each measurement of the dimensions of items specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum, specify all values to the nearest 0.01 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is less than two meters and to the nearest 0.1 meter if the value of the dimension being measured is two or more meters.

(b) For variants, specify separately technical data for all variants of a type specified in Annexes F, G, and H to this Memorandum.

13. For the purposes of confirming the type of ICBM or SLBM, the length of an assembled ICBM or SLBM without its front section shall be the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle of the first stage to:

(a) the place where the missile joins the front section, or

(b) the forward point of the missile if the front section is inside the missile airframe or its reentry vehicles are inside the missile airframe.

14. For the purposes of the Treaty that are unrelated to confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM, first stage length shall be:

(a) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as assembled missiles in launch canisters or without launch canisters, the distance from the edge of the main engine nozzle to the edge of the ICBM or SLBM airframe where the first stage separates during flight.

(b) For ICBMs or SLBMs maintained, stored, and transported as stages, the distance from the lower edge of the main engine nozzle to the place where the first stage, in the form in which it exits the production facility, joins the rest of the missile airframe.

15. For purposes of confirming a new type of ICBM or SLBM on the basis of a change in the length of the first stage (with or without a change in throw-

weight), the length of the first stage shall be:

(a) For solid-propellant first stages, the distance from the point where the aft end dome of the motor case joins with the nozzle to the upper point of the forward end dome of the motor case.

(b) For liquid propellant first stages, the distance from the aft end of the propellant tank nearest the main engine nozzle to the forward end of the propellant tank farthest from the main engine nozzle.

16. For purposes of measuring the diameter of stages of ICBMs and SLBMs, the diameter shall be the maximum external diameter of the stage excluding protruding elements.

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON EARLY EXHIBITIONS OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS RELATING TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty,

Recognizing the advantages of providing each Party the opportunity, prior to the commencement of baseline data inspections, to conduct exhibitions and inspections for the purposes provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty, in accordance with the procedures provided in the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities Relating to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Inspection Protocol,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

Each Party shall conduct exhibitions, and shall have the right during such exhibitions by the other Party to conduct inspections, as provided for in paragraphs 11 and 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

The exhibiting Party shall provide necessary assistance to the inspectors in the conduct of inspections during such exhibitions.

ARTICLE II

The exhibitions and inspections provided for in Article I of this Agreement shall be conducted at locations chosen by the exhibiting Party on dates agreed upon through diplomatic channels. These exhibitions and inspections shall be completed no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty. Except as provided for in Articles III and IV of this Agreement, such exhibitions and inspections shall be carried out in accordance with the procedures provided for in the Inspection Protocol, including the provisions concerning inspection reports and non-disclosure of information obtained as a result of these exhibitions and inspections.

An inspection team conducting an inspection during exhibitions in accordance with this Agreement shall include no more than 15 inspectors.

ARTICLE III

1. No less than 30 days prior to each exhibition, the inspecting Party shall provide to the exhibiting Party, for the purpose of such exhibition, a list of its proposed inspectors, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals, and a list of its proposed aircrew members, which shall consist of no more than 25 individuals. The list of proposed inspectors and list of proposed aircrew members for each exhibition shall not be considered to be the lists provided in fulfillment of the obligations under the Agreement Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Early Exchange of Lists of Inspectors, Monitors, and Aircrew Members of July 31, 1991. However, if the exchange of lists of proposed inspectors and aircrew members takes place in accordance with the aforementioned Agreement prior to such exhibitions, inspectors and aircrew members may be chosen from these lists for the purposes of such exhibitions. The lists for each exhibition shall contain first name, patronymic or middle name, and last name; day, month, and year of birth; city, state or oblast, and country of birth; and passport number, if available, for each inspector and aircrew member proposed.

2. For each exhibition, the exhibiting Party shall notify the inspecting Party, no less than 10 days prior to each exhibition, of its agreement with, or objection to, the designation of each inspector and aircrew member proposed in connection with the exhibition. The exhibiting Party may object to an individual on the list only in accordance with paragraph 6 of Section II of the Inspection Protocol. The exhibiting Party shall provide visas and, where necessary, such other documents to each individual to whom it has agreed as may be required to ensure that each such inspector or such aircrew member may enter and remain in its territory throughout the in-country period established for the exhibition.

ARTICLE IV

Arrangements for air transportation in connection with each exhibition shall be made in accordance with the provisions provided for in Section IV of the Inspection Protocol, except as provided for below:

(a) Diplomatic clearance numbers for airplanes transporting the inspectors, and airplane routings to and from the point of entry, shall be provided by the exhibiting Party no less than 30 days prior to each exhibition.

(b) Points of entry under this Agreement shall be: for the United States of America, Washington, D.C., and for the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

ARTICLE V

The exhibiting Party shall treat with due respect the inspectors and aircrew members of the inspecting Party in its territory in connection with the conduct of these exhibitions and inspections, and shall take all appropriate steps to prevent any attack on the person, freedom, and dignity of such persons.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on the Parties under the Treaty.

ARTICLE VII

This Agreement shall enter into force on the date of its signature, and shall terminate upon completion of the exhibitions and inspections provided for herein. The termination of this Agreement shall not prejudice the validity of the information obtained as a result of such exhibitions and inspections, and contained in the inspection reports, for the exercise of the rights of the Parties and the fulfillment of the obligations of the Parties under the Treaty after its entry into force.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, on July 31, 1991, in duplicate, each in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JAMES A. BAKER, III

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF THE SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

A.A. BESSMERTNYKH

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE EARLY EXCHANGE OF LISTS OF INSPECTORS, MONITORS, AND AIRCREW MEMBERS PROPOSED FOR INSPECTIONS AND CONTINUOUS MONITORING ACTIVITIES CONDUCTED PURSUANT TO THE TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE REDUCTION AND LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Desiring to facilitate the implementation of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, including the Protocol Regarding Inspections and Continuous Monitoring Activities, hereinafter referred to as the Protocol,

Recognizing the advantages of providing both Parties ample time to review the lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members in order to inform the other Party of agreement with, or objection to, the names on such lists within the time period provided for in the Treaty,

Considering their common interest in providing a mechanism for an exchange of such lists prior to entry into force of the Treaty,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

On a date agreed upon by the Parties, which shall be no later than 30 days before entry into force of the Treaty, each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members as provided for in Section II of the Protocol. The date of exchange of such lists shall be agreed upon by the Parties through diplomatic channels.

ARTICLE II

Each Party shall have the right to amend the lists of its proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members, provided that each Party may make a change to these lists no more than one time within any 21-day period commencing from the date of exchange of such lists. With each change, the number of inspectors whose names are entered in the list of inspectors shall not exceed 30, the number of monitors whose names are entered in the list of monitors shall not exceed 25, and the number of aircrew members whose names are entered in the list of aircrew members shall not exceed 25. The lists of proposed inspectors, monitors, and aircrew members shall constitute the initial lists provided for in paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol, upon entry into force of the Treaty.

ARTICLE III

Each Party shall provide to the other Party the lists required by Article I of this Agreement, and amendments to such lists, through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

ARTICLE IV

This Agreement shall not be construed to prejudice the rights of the Parties in any way or to impose additional obligations on

the Parties under the Treaty except as stated in Articles I and II of this Agreement.

ARTICLE V

This Agreement shall enter into force upon signature, and shall terminate upon entry into force of the Treaty.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Moscow, in two copies, on July 31, 1991, in the English and Russian languages, both texts being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JAMES A. BAKER, III

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

A.A. BESSMERTNYKH

AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON RECIPROCAL ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR STRATEGIC EXERCISES

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

Affirming their desire to reduce and ultimately eliminate the risk of outbreak of nuclear war, in particular as a result of misinterpretation, miscalculation, or accident,

Believing that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought,

Recognizing the necessity to promote the increase of mutual trust and the strengthening of strategic stability,

Acknowledging the importance of exchanging advance notification of major strategic exercises on the basis of reciprocity,

Reaffirming their obligations under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987,

Have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE I

On the basis of reciprocity, each Party shall notify the other Party no less than 14 days in advance about the beginning of one major strategic forces exercise which includes the participation of heavy bomber aircraft to be held during each calendar year.

ARTICLE II

1. Each Party shall provide to the other Party the notifications required by Article I through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers established by the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of September 15, 1987.

2. The notifications required by Article I shall be provided no less than 14 days prior to the date in Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) during which the relevant exercise will commence.

ARTICLE III

The Parties shall undertake to hold consultations, as mutually agreed, to consider questions relating to implementation of the provisions of this Agreement, as well as to discuss possible amendments thereto aimed at furthering the implementation of the objectives of this Agreement. Amendments shall enter into force in accordance with procedures to be agreed upon.

ARTICLE IV

This Agreement shall not affect the obligations of either Party under other agreements.

ARTICLE V

1. This Agreement shall be of unlimited duration.

2. This Agreement may be terminated by either Party upon 12 months written notice to the other Party.

ARTICLE VI

This Agreement shall enter into force on January 1, 1990, and notifications pursuant to this Agreement shall commence with the calendar year 1990.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF the

undersigned, being duly authorized by their respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

DONE at Jackson Hole, Wyoming, in duplicate, this 23rd day of September, 1989, in the English and Russian languages, each text being equally authentic.

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA:

JAMES A. BAKER, III

FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

E. A. SHEVARDNADZE

LETTERS SIGNED BY U.S. AND SOVIET REPRESENTATIVES

PHASED REDUCTIONS OF HEAVY ICBMs

July 30, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I am instructed to state the following:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

If this statement is acceptable, I propose that this letter, together with your response, be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the Soviet Union and United States.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 30, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the United States of America, I am authorized to state that the United States accepts the formal assurances set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads as follows:

In connection with the agreement on the phasing of the reductions of strategic offensive arms reached within the framework of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet Union provides formal assurances to the effect that, in the course of implementing the reductions in accordance with paragraph 2 of Article II of the Treaty, the number of deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall be reduced evenly during all phases. In order to implement this assurance in the most effective manner, it is agreed that deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers shall be reduced by no less than 22 each year until the limits on the aggregate numbers for deployed heavy ICBMs and their associated launchers and for warheads attributed to deployed heavy ICBMs, as provided for in paragraph 1 of Article II of the Treaty, are reached.

Reductions of launchers of heavy ICBMs shall be implemented by means of elimination in accordance with the procedures specified in Section II of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty.

The United States agrees that this response, together with your letter, shall be included in the official records of the negotiations in the form of statements reflecting the official positions of the United States and Soviet Union.

This reply, together with your letter, shall constitute an agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Yuon K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

Moscow, July 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary,

On behalf of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I should like to confirm that the provisions set forth in the letter signed on July 30, 1991 by our ambassador concerning the stage-by-stage reduction of deployed heavy ICBMs in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are legally binding.

Respectfully,

[s]Bessmertnykh

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the U.S.
Moscow

BEAR D

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to inform you of the following. From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the Tu-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carriet beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under the proposed agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.

(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 60 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.

(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Yuri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept your proposal that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on airplanes designated by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as Tu-95RTs, which are known to the United States of America as Bear D.

I have the honor to acknowledge the information set forth in your letter of this date, the substantive portion of which reads:

From the outset, Tu-95RTs airplanes were tested, equipped, and configured exclusively for maritime operations.

These airplanes have not been and are not heavy bombers, nor have they been equipped with air-to-surface weapons or undergone conversion. Tu-95RTs airplanes have external features distinguishing them from heavy bombers of the TU-95 type: they have no bomb bays, no external carrier beams to suspend or carry aerial bombs or missiles, and no equipment necessary for control of such weapons. Other differences characteristic of these airplanes are the additional three-dimensional radomes of the surface situation surveillance equipment under the fuselage and on the sides of the airplane. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics currently has 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes, which are based only at naval air bases.

Under this Agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

(a) No later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall provide photographs for the purpose of aiding in the identification of Tu-95RTs airplanes, and shall conduct, concurrently with a distinguishability exhibition of heavy bombers and long-range nuclear ALCMs, an exhibition of one Tu-95RTs airplane, displaying its distinguishing features. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall bear all costs for the stay of the group of visitors.

(b) The United States of America shall have the right to request the exhibition of all the other 36 Tu-95RTs airplanes. Such exhibition shall be conducted by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at two airfields (in the European and Asian parts of the country) no later than 240 days after signature of the Treaty and no later than 66 days after the request. The United States of America shall bear all costs for the transportation and stay of the group of visitors, which shall include no more than 10 persons. The currency of payment shall be agreed between the sides before the visit.

(c) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be based at facilities where heavy bombers or former heavy bombers are based, that is, at air bases for heavy bombers, air bases for former heavy bombers, heavy bomber flight test centers, or training facilities for heavy bombers.

(d) The 37 Tu-95RTs airplanes shall not be considered to be former heavy bombers, and shall not be accountable under the 75 aggregate limit on heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, training heavy bombers, and former heavy bombers pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 3(a) of Article IV of the Treaty.

(e) The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has no plans to continue production of Tu-95RTs airplanes. In case of the production of such airplanes, they would be treated as former heavy bombers under the Treaty. As such, each new airplane would be subject to inspection to confirm that it is not equipped for air-to-surface weapons.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the terms set forth above. This agreement shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, except for subparagraphs (a) and (b) which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty and shall remain in force for 240 days. Upon entry into force of the Treaty, the other subparagraphs of this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

B-1

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.

(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.

(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept your proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the distinguishability of heavy bombers of the type designated by the United States of America as, and known to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics as, B-1, pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs are distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by a bomb bay configuration involving a bulkhead that, without change, does not permit a long-range nuclear ALCM to be loaded internally.

(b) B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be made distinguishable from B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs by the covering, using a process equivalent to welding, of all but the two pylon attachment joints that serve as jacking points for the airplane.

(c) The two extra sets of B-1 heavy bomber attachment joints, for which no unique pylons exist, shall not be considered in determining the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a B-1 heavy bomber is actually equipped. These attachment joints have not been used to mount armaments, and the United States of America has no plans for them to be used to mount armaments. These attachment joints shall be covered by a process equivalent to welding, and shall remain covered in the event that a B-1 heavy bomber is later converted into a heavy bomber equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(d) The unique equipment required to move the weapons bay bulkhead in B-1 heavy bombers and the equipment required to load B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs onto such heavy bombers shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs.

(e) All B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs shall be subject to inspection during the period provided for baseline data inspections.

(f) B-1 pylons for long-range nuclear ALCMs and B-1 rotary launchers that carry long-range nuclear ALCMs shall not be located at air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs or air bases for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for non-nuclear armaments, except for such items on visiting heavy bombers for which notification is provided in accordance with paragraph 2 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty.

(g) Provided that no deployed B-1 heavy bombers are equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, there shall be no requirement for the United States of America to provide technical characteristics for such heavy bombers in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty. The United States of America shall, however, provide distinguishing features for B-1 heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs. In the event that the United States of America converts B-1 heavy bombers into heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, then technical characteristics for such heavy bombers would be provided. Although the United States of America has no B-1 heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs, the United States of America shall exhibit a B-1 test heavy bomber that is equipped with long-range nuclear ALCMs during appropriate distinguishability exhibitions pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty.

(h) Similar provisions shall apply, as appropriate, to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested, but some of which are not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

SILO LAUNCH CONTROL CENTERS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear
and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on conversion and elimination of launch control centers in connection with the obligation of the Parties, pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, not to convert silos used as launch control centers into silo launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

In cases of elimination of a group or groups of silo launchers of ICBMs, each Party shall:

(a) eliminate the launch control centers that are associated with the eliminated silo launchers, including silos used as launch control centers, by any method of its choice;

(b) convert those launch control centers by any method of its choice, for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty; or

(c) retain such launch control centers for their original purposes.

If a Party that possesses a silo used as a launch control center decides to convert it for other purposes not inconsistent with the Treaty by a method that involves opening the silo, that Party shall provide a notification to the other Party no less than 30 days in advance of initiation of such conversion through the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers or through diplomatic channels.

The Party that receives such a notification shall have the right to conduct a visit to the silo being converted in order to confirm that it is not being converted into a silo launcher of ICBMs pursuant to paragraph 11 of Article V of the Treaty. The Parties shall agree within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, established pursuant to Article XV of the Treaty, on the timing and procedures for conducting such a visit.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Yuri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

LAUNCH CANISTERS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, in connection with the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either *in situ* or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of such a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Yourn K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador,

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, in connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that upon entry into force of the Treaty:

(a) In accordance with the existing practice in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, unfinished launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, which are empty tubes, shall be transported from locations where they are manufactured only to final assembly facilities for such ICBMs. Launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs assembled as a unit with a missile without a front section shall have external differences from such unfinished launch canisters.

(b) With respect to launch canisters for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs remaining after launches, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics shall proceed as follows. A launch canister remaining after the launch of an ICBM for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall either remain for an indefinite period of time in the open at the launch site, that is, at a test range or an ICBM base, with the front end open, or shall be eliminated. Elimination of such a launch canister shall be carried out in the open either *in situ* or at a conversion or elimination facility in accordance with the procedures provided for in paragraph 5 of Section I of the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty. Elimination of each such launch canister shall be subject to verification by national technical means of verification. If the elimination is to be carried out at a conversion or elimination facility, then such a launch canister shall be transported to such a facility directly from the relevant test range or ICBM base, and a notification of the movement of the launch canister for ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs shall be provided in accordance with paragraph 1 of Section II of the Protocol on Notifications Relating to the Treaty. After the elimination of a launch canister has been completed, the remains of such a launch canister shall remain in the open for no less than 45 days and afterwards may be removed and used for any purpose.

(c) Notifications shall not be provided in connection with the above-mentioned operations involving launch canisters, except for notifications of their movement to conversion or elimination facilities. Data on the number of empty launch canisters shall not be specified in the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America
to the Negotiations on
Nuclear and Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

ENGINEERING SITE SURVEYS

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree as follows:

No later than 60 days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;

(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring systems; and

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Ambassador Yuriy K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the Negotiations
on Nuclear and Space Arms

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to accept the proposal, set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments to ensure effective engineering site surveys conducted at facilities subject to continuous monitoring under the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter known as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree as follows:

No later than (60) days after signature of the Treaty, each Party shall provide through diplomatic channels the following information on such facilities, including data on logistical resources and local topography:

(a) a plan of the facility perimeter showing the location of the portal and exits;

(b) diagrams of underground utilities, including cabling, in the proposed perimeter continuous monitoring area;

(c) locations of proposed termination point(s) for water, sewage, and electrical supply lines;

(d) data on power supply fluctuations, including maximum, minimum, and average voltage; data on maximum, minimum, and average kilowatts of power; data on maximum, minimum, and average time (in milliseconds) of electrical power disruptions in the perimeter continuous monitoring area over a period of seven consecutive days;

(e) whether the electrical current to be supplied is one-phase or three-phase;

(f) a short description of the topography of the area in which the facility subject to continuous monitoring is located and of the available logistical resources for the construction and installation of the perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system; and

(g) statistical data giving the maximum, minimum, and average number of vehicles exiting the portal and the road exits on an hourly and daily basis.

Each Party shall, whenever possible, provide additional information necessary to establish a perimeter and portal continuous monitoring system, when that Party receives a request for such information.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on the date of signature of the Treaty, and shall remain in force for a 12 month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and
Space Arms

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

PROVIDING PHOTOGRAPHS

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the United States of America, I have the honor to propose an agreement between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments would agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.

(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.

(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

If the foregoing is acceptable, this letter together with your reply shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement, or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Sincerely,

[s]
Ambassador Linton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and
Space Arms

Ambassador Yoon K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)
POSEIDON first stage
TRIDENT I first stage
TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs AGM-86B
B-52H equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs AGM-129
B-52G equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs AGM-86B
B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear ALCMs
B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear ALCMs
B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs
Long range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B
Long range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section
SS-13 first stage
second and third stages as a unit
SS-17 in launch canister without front section
SS-18 in launch canister without front section
as a unit without front section and without self-contained dispersing mechanism (outside launch canister)
first stage
SS-19 in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section
(for silo launcher) first stage
SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section
(for rail-mobile launcher) first stage
SS-25 in launch canister without front section
first stage

Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"
Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs
Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers
Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear T training heavy bomber
Bison A former heavy bomber
AS-15 Mod A long range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister) first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

*To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
**To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage

*To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

July 31, 1991

Ambassador Lutton F. Brooks
Head of Delegation of the
United States of America to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and Space Arms

Dear Mr. Ambassador:

On behalf of the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, I have the honor to accept the proposal set forth in your letter of this date, that an agreement be concluded between our Governments on the provision of photographs of items subject to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty.

Under this agreement, our Governments shall agree that:

(a) Photographs of items listed in Annex 1 to this letter be exchanged prior to signature of the Treaty.

(b) In connection with paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty, photographs of items listed in Annex 2 to this letter be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty.

(c) Photographs of items listed in Annex 3 to this letter be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial technical exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features. Such photographs shall be in addition to those required under paragraph 4 of Section XIV and paragraph 10 of Section XV of the Protocol on Inspections Relating to the Treaty.

(d) The criteria for producing the photographs of items on the lists shall be the criteria provided for in paragraph 10 of Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of the Data Base Relating to the Treaty.

(e) The Parties shall have the right to raise, within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, questions concerning the provision of photographs pursuant to this agreement.

This reply together with your letter shall constitute an agreement between the Governments of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America, which shall enter into force on this date and shall remain in force for a 12-month period, unless, before the expiration of this period:

(a) a Party communicates to the other Party its decision to terminate this agreement; or

(b) the Treaty enters into force. In such event, this agreement shall remain in force as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Prior to entry into force of the Treaty, the Parties may agree to extend this agreement for additional periods, subject to the same conditions specified in subparagraphs (a) and (b) of this paragraph.

Mr. Ambassador, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

Ambassador Youri K. Nazarkin
Head of Delegation of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics to the
Negotiations on Nuclear and
Space Arms

Annex 1

List of photographs to be provided prior to signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
B-1 unique support equipment, pylons, and rotary launchers

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBM Emplacement Equipment
Driver Training Vehicles
Launch-Associated Support Vehicles
Launch-Associated Railcars

Annex 2

List of photographs to be exchanged on the date of signature of the Treaty:

For the United States of America:

ICBMs and Their Associated Systems:

MMII without front section and without SCDM
MMIII without front section and without SCDM
MMII first stage
MMIII first stage
PK first stage
PK second stage
PK third stage
PK SCDM

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

POSEIDON as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT I as a unit with front section (inert missile)
TRIDENT II as a unit with front section (inert missile)
POSEIDON first stage
TRIDENT I first stage
TRIDENT II first stage

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52H equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-129
B-52G equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs-AGM-86B
B-52G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-1B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
B-2 equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs of a type that does not include the category heavy bombers equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-86B
Long-range nuclear ALCM AGM-129

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11 in launch canister without front section
SS-13 first stage
second and third stages as a unit
SS-17 in launch canister without front section
SS-18 in launch canister without front section
as a unit without front section and without self- contained dispensing mechanism (outside launch canister)
first stage
SS-19 in launch canister without front section
SS-24 (for silo launcher) in launch canister without front section
(for silo launcher) first stage
SS-24 (for rail-mobile launcher) in launch canister without front section
(for rail-mobile launcher) first stage
SS-25 in launch canister without front section
first stage
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "A"
Road-mobile launcher of SS-25 ICBMs without missile, version "B"
Rail-mobile launcher of SS-24 ICBMs
Fixed structure for road-mobile launchers
Fixed structure for rail-mobile launchers

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems:

SS-N-6 as a unit without front section
SS-N-8 as a unit with front section
SS-N-18 as a unit with front section
SS-N-20 as a unit with front section
SS-N-23 as a unit with front section

Heavy Bombers and Long Range Nuclear ALCMs:

Blackjack equipped for AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H6 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear H16 equipped for AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear G equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear B equipped for nuclear armaments other than long-range nuclear ALCMs
Bear T training heavy bomber
Bison A former heavy bomber

AS-15 Mod A long-range nuclear ALCM
AS-15 Mod B long-range nuclear ALCM

Annex 3

List of photographs to be provided after signature of the Treaty either during an elimination or during the initial exhibitions in the course of confirming technical data and distinguishing features:

For the United States of America:

Heavy Bombers and Long-Range Nuclear ALCMs:

B1-B equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs

For the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:

ICBMs and their Associated Systems:

SS-11* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
first stage
SS-17* as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
first stage
SS-19* as a unit without front section and without SCDM (outside launch canister)
first stage
SS-24** (for silo launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-24** (for rail-mobile launcher) as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)
SS-25** as a unit without front section (outside launch canister)

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*To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile and first stage during elimination no later than one year after signature of the Treaty.
**To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the missile during initial exhibitions.

SLBMs and Their Associated Systems: *

SS-N-8 first stage
SS-N-18 first stage
SS-N-20 first stage
SS-N-23 first stage

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*To be provided as part of the confirmation of dimensions of the first stage during elimination.

CERTAIN CORRESPONDENCE RELATED TO THE TREATY

THIRD COUNTRY BASING

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Minister:

Our strategic arms control negotiators in Geneva have continued the discussions which Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and I began in New York last year on prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I believe a solution to this problem is possible, and would like to offer some concrete thoughts on how this issue could be resolved.

Let me remind you of the many steps that we have already taken to meet your concerns.

First, we have agreed to your proposal to ban the basing of strategic offensive arms outside national territory. That ban will take effect immediately upon entry into force of the START Treaty.

Second, while we do not regard our operations in Holy Loch, Scotland as basing, we are prepared to commit that ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty.

Third, I can reaffirm our commitment, which I gave to Foreign Minister Shevardnadze orally, that no arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines, such as that currently in Holy Loch, will be carried out in the future.

Finally, I can formally reaffirm that the United States does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory.

But, as I explained in New York, we cannot accept a Provision in the START Treaty for inspections outside national territory. At the same time, with respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject, incorporated in the Agreed Statement Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following paragraph thereof:

> The Parties agreed that ... the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions should occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits.

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I believe that, with the clarifications and assurances in this letter and your response, the Agreed Statement and the relevant Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

His Excellency
Aleksandr Bessmertnykh,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics,
Moscow.

ALCMs WITH MULTIPLE WEAPONS

December 6, 1990

Dear Eduard,

Our arms control experts have been discussing the subject of long-range air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with multiple weapons. As you recall, we agreed in May to ban long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. I understand from my experts that the Soviet side believes such a ban must be extended to include long-range non-nuclear ALCMs as well.

As I have told you in the past, we cannot permit the START Treaty to limit our conventional capabilities. In our view, the recent events in the Gulf underscore the importance of preserving non-nuclear options. At the same time, I would like to address your concerns over the possible circumvention of a ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, let me make the following points:

First, under the START Treaty, the United States will comply with its obligation not to produce, test, or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMS with multiple weapons.

Second, in abiding by this obligation, the United States will not produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring the capability in the future to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor would the United States convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

Third, any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons which might be deployed would, of course, be distinguishable from long-range nuclear ALCMs in accordance with the procedures, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections, which are now being worked out in Geneva for distinguishing long-range nuclear ALCMs from long-range non-nuclear ALCMs.

Finally, in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty, each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to any questions raised by the other side's compliance with its Treaty obligation to ban long-range nuclear ALCM with multiple weapons.

July 31, 1991

Dear Mr. Secretary:

I agree that your letter of this date provides a basis for solving the problem of prohibiting the basing of strategic offensive arms in third countries. I accept the proposals which you made in that letter.

We note that the arrangement which you have in Holy Loch, Scotland will be terminated and that all your ballistic missile submarines will be withdrawn from Holy Loch within five months after entry into force of the Treaty. For our part, I would like to state that, as we have indicated in the past, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics does not base strategic offensive arms outside its national territory, and does not carry out any arrangement involving ballistic missile submarines similar to that currently existing in Holy Loch, and commits itself not to carry out such arrangements in the future.

With respect to our Agreed Statement on this subject incorporated in the appropriate Annex to the Treaty, I can cite the following provision:

"The Parties agree that ... the Parties have the obligation, if concerns arise under this Agreed Statement, to discuss any ambiguity and, if necessary, to provide each other with information to resolve concerns. Such discussions could occur through diplomatic channels, as well as in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties do not rule out the possibility that clarifications provided in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission might, in certain cases, include inspections or visits."

In this connection, the sides should use, as appropriate, relevant procedures provided for in the Treaty or measures worked out by the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission under the provisions of Article XV of the Treaty.

I agree that, with the clarifications and assurances contained in your letter and this response, the Agreed Statement and the agreed Treaty provisions, all questions associated with third country basing have been resolved to our mutual satisfaction.

Mr. Secretary, please accept the renewed assurances of my highest consideration.

[s]
Alexander A. Bessmertnykh
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics

His Excellency
Mr. James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State of the
United States of America

* As written, should be "XV".

Naturally, these assurances are premised on the assumption that the Soviet side interprets its obligations toward the United States under the Treaty with regard to long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons in the same way.

I believe that these points should alleviate your concerns. You should feel free to share them with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to meet with you to finalize this or any other issues.

Eduard, with these responses, and with the constructive steps your side took recently in Moscow on ALCMs, we should be able to resolve all remaining ALCM issues. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
New York

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear James,

In response to your letter on long-range ALCMs with multiple weapons, please allow me to inform you that desiring to rapidly reach agreement on the START Treaty, we are ready to accept the solution, which you propose in your letter. For its part the Soviet Union will adhere to the following:

Under the START Treaty, the USSR will comply with the obligation not to produce, test or deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Under this obligation, neither the Soviet Union, nor the United States will produce, test or deploy long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons for the purpose of acquiring in the future the capability to deploy long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Nor will the Soviet Union convert any long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons into long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Any such action by either side would be inconsistent with its Treaty obligations.

The START Treaty must contain provisions on how to distinguish long-range nuclear and long-range non-nuclear ALCMs, including appropriate exhibitions and inspections. As I understand it, the two sides agree that those provisions be applied to long-range non-nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons. Thus, each side would be confident that the other side is complying with the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

Finally, I note our common understanding that in accordance with Article XII* of the START Treaty each side will be obliged to meet within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission to respond to questions raised by the other side regarding ambiguity or concerns related to the other sides compliance with its Treaty obligations regarding the ban on long-range nuclear ALCMs with multiple weapons.

In conclusion, I would like to express my satisfaction with the solution we have found to this problem. I hope that an equally constructive and mutually acceptable solution will be found for all other outstanding questions related to the preparation of the START Treaty for signature.

There is not much time left until that signing, therefore it is very important that everything necessary be done now to conclude this historic agreement.

Respectfully,

[s]
E. Shevardnadze

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

* As written, should be "XV"

TACIT RAINBOW

May 19, 1990

Dear Eduard,

I have just finished meeting with my arms control experts, who tell me that we are still some distance from completing an overall agreement on the question of air-launched cruise missiles because of continuing differences over the issue of Tacit Rainbow. In particular, my experts have reported your concerns and the three elements of your proposal.

I have had an opportunity to study your ideas, and am persuaded that Tacit Rainbow need not be an obstacle to resolving the ALCM issue. In this message, I would like to give you a response that I believe offers a constructive means of resolving this matter. Let me make the following points:

First, the December 31, 1988 cutoff date to distinguish between current and future ALCMs is of course acceptable to me. This makes clear (as President Gorbachev agreed) that Tacit Rainbow will be treated as a future non-nuclear ALCM — which it is — and will thus be subject to the provisions in the Treaty that will enable both sides to distinguish between nuclear and non-nuclear ALCMs.

Second, I am able to confirm that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, and as such would be covered by our proposals of May 12, 1990 on how the START Treaty would identify non-nuclear ALCMs and distinguish them from nuclear ALCMs. In particular, I want to draw your attention to the language we proposed in the Notification Annex* we recently presented in Geneva. (A copy is attached.) Under this provision we would formally notify you at least six months in advance that Tacit Rainbow is a non-nuclear ALCM, would tell you about its distinguishing features and would propose a date on which you could come for an exhibition of this missile.

We have no plans to convert Tacit Rainbow to a nuclear ALCM. But if a non-nuclear ALCM were ever converted to a nuclear ALCM, that missile would then become subject to all of the START Treaty restrictions on nuclear long-range ALCMs.

Third, on your concern about range. I am advised that its range is less than 800 km. As you know Tacit Rainbow only became an issue when we considered accepting your proposal for a 600 km ALCM range threshold. Under our preferred position of 800 km, Tacit Rainbow was not an issue.

I believe that these points are responsive to your questions. You should feel free to share these points with your colleagues if you think this would be helpful. Of course, I am ready to come over to meet with you now to finalize this and any other issues.

Eduard, I would like to conclude by reminding you that you gave me every reason to believe that if I could move to your position on ALCM range, we would finally put the ALCM issue behind us. Let's do so now.

Sincerely,

[s]
James A. Baker, III

The Honorable Eduard Shevardnadze,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of the,
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, Moscow.

* as written. Should read "Protocol".

RELOCATION OF HEAVY ICBM SILOS

[No Date]

Dear Mr. Secretary,

I received information from the head of our START Delegation in Geneva that the US Delegation had been instructed by Washington to suspend work which involves introducing changes into the Treaty in accordance with the agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York. In this context, the US side refers to the fact that allegedly I, in my conversation with you, said that the Soviet side did not intend to construct new silo launchers for heavy missiles.

I believe there is a misunderstanding here. In this connection, I would like to once again set forth the Soviet position, on the basis of which agreement was reached in New York. The essence of the matter is that in modernizing its heavy ICBMs the Soviet Union will construct new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs simultaneously with the elimination of such silo launchers, i.e., staying within the 154 limit. Thus, the Soviet side does not have plans of constructing an additional number (in excess of 154) of heavy ICBM silo launchers.

I wish to emphasize that our position is part of the New York agreement on heavy ICBMs, which we reaffirm in its entirety.

In conclusion, I would like once again to assure you, Mr. Secretary, that our meetings and discussions have given me a feeling of profound satisfaction, and express confidence that our useful dialogue and contacts will be continued in the interests of our two countries.

Respectfully,

[s]
D. Yazov
Minister of Defense of the USSR
Marshal of the Soviet Union

The Honorable
Richard Cheney
Secretary of Defense
of the United States
Washington, D.C.

Moscow, December 6, 1990

Dear Sirs,

In view of the doubts you had with regard to the issue of constructing new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs - in the context of the broader agreement on heavy ICBMs reached in New York in October 1990 - we deem it expedient to provide the following additional clarifications.

First of all, we would like to reiterate with full clarity that under that agreement new silo launchers for heavy ICBMs would be constructed solely for replacing silo launchers of heavy ICBMs eliminated according to the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which means that their number will remain within the Treaty limits. As we understand it, you may have a question as to what would require such construction. An answer to this question should be sought in situations which might arise in real life.

We hope you agree with us that such accidents unfortunately cannot be fully ruled out, where - in particular, due to long period of operation of silo launchers - their further operation would be impossible. Incidentally, this has been taken into account in the Protocol on Conversion or Elimination Procedures to the START Treaty, which as the two sides have already agreed upon, provides for a special procedure for notifying and removing from Treaty accountability strategic offensive arms, including ICBM silo launchers, in case of their accidental loss or disablement beyond repair. Naturally each side would have the right in such cases to compensate for the systems removed from accountability - within the appropriate Treaty limits. This of course, applies to heavy ICBMs as well. At least for this reason, the possibility to construct new silo launchers for them should not be precluded.

Also, situations must not be ruled out where it would be necessary to relocate silo launchers, including those for heavy ICBMs, which means that they would be closed in one area of the country and constructed in another, for non-military considerations, particularly in connection with the internal political developments that are taking place in our country. Relocations of silo launchers might be required either during or after the period of reductions under the Treaty. A timely consideration of non-military factors by simply changing our current plans is difficult to realize.

At present we have no plans to relocate silo launchers for heavy ICBMs. Although such relocation, if required in the future, would incur additional great expenses and would be a hard step to take, we cannot, as you may understand, exclude such a possibility.

We hope these additional explanations remove completely the misunderstanding that has arisen and make it possible, at least, to reaffirm the New York agreements on heavy ICBMs and finally close this issue.

Respectfully,

[s] E. Shevardnadze [s] D. Yazov

His Excellency
James A. Baker, III
Secretary of State
United States of America
Washington, D.C.

His Excellency
Richard B. Cheney
Secretary of Defense
United States of America

JOINT STATEMENTS : EXCHANGED AT THE FINAL PLENARY (JULY 29)

JOINT STATEMENT ON NEW MISSILE PRODUCTION TECHNOLOGY PROCESSES

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that:

(a) Procedures for elimination of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs specified in the Protocol on Procedures Governing the Conversion or Elimination of the Systems Subject to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms have been agreed upon taking into account the fact that, in manufacturing stages for such missiles, both Parties currently use the technology of casting the solid propellant directly in the case of the solid rocket motor so that the cured propellant cannot be removed non-destructively.

(b) If in the future either Party begins to produce stages of ICBMs for mobile launchers of ICBMs, employing so-called "insertable cartridges" or any other technology that allows non-destructive removal of solid propellant from motor cases, that Party shall inform the other Party thereof at the next session of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission. The Parties shall decide within the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission what, if any, additional verification and elimination procedures are necessary, taking into account the new technology for manufacturing missiles.

JOINT STATEMENT REGARDING DATA UPDATES WITH RESPECT TO CATEGORIES OF DATA CONTAINED IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, for any facility or item not listed in the Memorandum of Understanding under paragraph 1 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, a notification, in accordance with paragraph 1, 2, or 3 of Section I of the Notifications Protocol Relating to this Treaty, shall be provided according to the complete list of the appropriate categories of data set forth in the Memorandum of Understanding or in the Agreement on Exchange of Geographic Coordinates and Site Diagrams Relating to the Treaty, regardless of the Party to which such categories pertain. In this connection, due consideration shall be given to those changes that may be made in the above-mentioned categories of data pursuant to the relevant procedure provided for in the Memorandum of Understanding.

JOINT STATEMENT ON COSTS RELATED TO THE CONVENING OF A SESSION OF THE JCIC ON THE TERRITORY OF ONE OF THE PARTIES

July 29, 1991

In connection with paragraph 3 of Section II, Section VI, and paragraph 1 of Section VIII of the Protocol on the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission Relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that if they decide to convene a session of the Commission on the territory of one of the Parties, questions that may arise concerning the settlement of costs that may be incurred in connection with such a session shall be resolved prior to the convening of that session.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE BAN ON SUPPORT EQUIPMENT AT ELIMINATED FACILITIES

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that, with respect to the ban on support equipment at eliminated facilities in Paragraph 27 of Article V of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, support equipment includes, but is not limited to, ICBM emplacement equipment, training models of missiles, transporter-loaders of mobile ICBMs, storage cranes, launch-associated support vehicles, and driver training vehicles.

JOINT STATEMENT ON NARROW DIRECTIONAL BEAMING

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the ban on broadcasting telemetric information from ICBMs or SLBMs using narrow directional beaming, pursuant to subparagraph 2(c) of Article X of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, is established in order to ensure near-omnidirectional radiation of broadcast signals.

JOINT STATEMENT ON THE TERM "TON"

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the English words "metric ton" and the Russian word "ton" mean 1,000 kilograms.

JOINT STATEMENT ON CHARTER FLIGHTS

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that in order to facilitate the conduct of inspections and continuous monitoring activities pursuant to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, questions concerning the use of chartered flights, if necessary for the transport of inspectors, monitors, equipment for the conduct of inspections, and equipment and supplies for the conduct of continuous monitoring activities shall be considered in the framework of the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING CURRENCY OF PAYMENT FOR COSTS RELATING TO IMPLEMENTATION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The Parties note that the issue of currency of payment for costs relating to implementation of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms is not yet resolved and shall be deferred, without prejudice to the position of either Party, for

subsequent consideration in a broader context with respect to both the Treaty and to other U.S.- Soviet agreements in the area of arms limitations.

JOINT STATEMENT CONCERNING INTERPRETIVE DATA

July 29, 1991

The Parties understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraphs 1(a) and 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol relating to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms are necessary to verify compliance with provisions of the Treaty.

The Parties also understand that the interpretive data specified in subparagraph 1(b) of Section II of the Telemetry Protocol shall not apply to parameters not specified in that subparagraph.

JOINT STATEMENT ON WEAPON STORAGE AREAS

July 29, 1991

The Parties agree that the formulation "weapon storage area" as used in the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms means a location, shown on a site diagram, for the long-term and short-term storage of nuclear and non-nuclear armaments. Such locations shall be depicted on site diagrams of facilities subject to inspection pursuant to subparagraph 14(f) of Section VII of the Inspection Protocol.

JOINT STATEMENT ON EXCHANGE OF SITE DIAGRAMS

July 29, 1991

Recognizing the importance of the exchange of site diagrams to guarantee reciprocal rights in respect to suspect site inspections pursuant to Article XI of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities listed in Annex I to the Memorandum of Understanding on the Establishment of a Data Base Relating to this Treaty that are subject to suspect site inspection shall meet the criteria in Annex J to the Memorandum of Understanding. The Parties agree that facilities or portions of facilities that are involved in the production of solid rocket motors shall not be subject to inspection. The Parties agree that the site diagrams for facilities subject to suspect site inspection shall be exchanged no later than 30 days after the date of signature of the Treaty.

JOINT STATEMENT IN CONNECTION WITH PROCEDURES FOR CONFIRMING LAUNCH WEIGHT

July 29, 1991

The sides understand that, in accordance with paragraph 10 of Section XIV of the Inspection Protocol, they assume the obligation to agree within the JCIC on procedures for weighing or determining by other means the weight of ICBMs or SLBMs with the purpose of confirming the launch weight of ICBMs or SLBMs of a new type declared on the basis of a change in launch weight before the beginning of deployment of any such new type of ICBM or SLBM. The Parties further understand that they are obligated to negotiate such procedures in good faith, and without efforts to artificially hinder agreement on such procedures so as not to delay the deployment of such an ICBM or SLBM.

OTHER STATEMENTS

UNILATERAL STATEMENT BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING THE B-2 HEAVY BOMBER

JULY 29, 1991

The United States of America makes the following statement concerning its plans with respect to the B-2 heavy bomber. This statement will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and will be politically binding.

The United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long-range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight-tested from a B-2 heavy bomber.

The United States of America recognizes that the first flight test of a long-range ALCM from a B-2 heavy bomber will require that : B-2 heavy bombers be exhibited pursuant to paragraph 12 of Article XI of the Treaty; B-2 heavy bombers be subject to inspection pursuant to the provisions of the Treaty; and all other provisions of the Treaty that pertain to heavy bombers of a type from any of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested apply to B-2 heavy bombers.

The United States of America recognizes that requirements under the Treaty referred to in this statement will also apply with equal force to heavy bombers, both of the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, of any new type from none of which a long-range nuclear ALCM has been flight-tested.

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The United States of America, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The United States of America declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

STATEMENT OF POLICY BY THE UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS CONCERNING ENCRYPTION AND JAMMING

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, as a gesture of its goodwill and recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, declares its intention not to use encryption and not to use jamming during flight tests of ICBMs and SLBMs beginning 120 days after signature of the Treaty. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics declares its intention to continue this goodwill restraint for one year or until entry into force of the Treaty, whichever is sooner.

U.S. STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the U.S. side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The U.S. Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON CONSULTATIONS RELATING TO THE RELEASE TO THE PUBLIC OF DATA AND OTHER INFORMATION

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side understands that, pursuant to paragraph 6 of Article VIII of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, hereinafter referred to as the Treaty, the Parties shall hold consultations on the release to the public of data and other information provided pursuant to Article VIII of the Treaty or received otherwise in fulfilling the obligations provided for in the Treaty. In this connection, the Soviet side agrees that it intends to follow, on the basis of reciprocity, the precedent established by the Agreement between the Governments of the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A. and through an exchange of notes between the Embassy of the U.S.A. in the U.S.S.R. and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. dated April 20-23, 1990, concerning the release to the public of information which is contained in notifications provided pursuant to the Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles of December 8, 1987, including data updates with respect to the categories of data contained in the Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the Treaty of December 8, 1987. The Soviet Side further understands that such consultations shall be concluded prior to entry into force of the Treaty.

U.S. STATEMENT ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side has taken note of the Soviet side's statement and believes that such information would be helpful in discussing compliance concerns when and if such concerns are considered in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE ON LAUNCH-ASSOCIATED SUPPORT VEHICLES AND DRIVER TRAINING VEHICLES

July 29, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has vehicles in its inventory that resemble launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles. In the event that a compliance concern arises because of the presence of such a vehicle at an eliminated facility, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will either provide information on the features of such vehicles that distinguish them, by national technical means of verification, from launch-associated support vehicles and driver training vehicles, or provide clarification about what the vehicle is and the reason for its presence at the eliminated facility.

U.S. STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, except with the United Kingdom. The United States attaches great importance to the role played by the United Kingdom's independent nuclear deterrent in helping maintain world peace. As a result, the United States has, for many years, helped maintain and modernize that deterrent. This is what we have referred to as "the existing pattern of cooperation" between the United States and the United Kingdom. It currently includes agreement by the United States to sell the United Kingdom the Trident II weapons system. In this regard, the United States endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

SOVIET STATEMENT ON NON-CIRCUMVENTION OF THE START TREATY

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side takes note of the statement, made by the United States in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms concluded between the USSR and the U.S., to the effect that the United States has no existing patterns of cooperation involving the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the START Treaty, except with the United Kingdom.

It also notes the statement made by the U.S. side to the effect that the existing pattern of cooperation between the United States of America and the United Kingdom in the area of strategic offensive arms currently consists of the provision by the United States of Trident-II SLBMs to the United Kingdom. The Soviet Union also takes into account the fact that the United States of America endorses the statement made by U.K. Foreign Secretary Hurd that "the British strategic force will remain a minimum one in no way comparable to the nuclear forces of the Soviet Union and the United States."

If the United States were to alter its existing pattern of cooperation with the United Kingdom on strategic offensive arms in such a way that the terms and purposes of the START Treaty would be circumvented and the strategic balance altered, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider its supreme interests jeopardized. In that case, in accordance with Article XVII of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics would consider that it has the right to withdraw from the Treaty.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING PATTERNS OF COOPERATION

July 31, 1991

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics hereby confirms that it does not have existing commitments or patterns of cooperation that include the transfer of strategic offensive arms subject to the limitations of the Treaty on the Strategic Offensive Arms.

U.S. STATEMENT ON THE SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

Paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol describes the method for determining the throw-weight of "ICBMs or SLBMs, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles." The U.S. side understood that this method for determining throw-weight was negotiated specifically to address design characteristics that are unique to the RSM-54 SLBM, known to the U.S. side as the SS-N-23. However, the Soviet side now asserts that the throw-weight of the SS-N-23 should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of the Throw-weight Protocol. The Soviet side also informed the U.S. side that the accountable throw-weight of the SS-N-23, 2800 kg, was determined on the basis of the 1(b) method.

While the U.S. side believes the SS-N-23 is of 1(a), not 1(b), design; for purposes of calculating throw-weight, the U.S. side accepts the SS-N-23 as a type 1(b) SLBM. However, the U.S. side stresses that this acceptance is without prejudice to our right to contest in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission the throw-weight values of any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporates a design similar to the SS-N-23, if such throw-weight values are based on the 1(b) method.

SOVIET STATEMENT ON THE SLBM SS-N-23

July 29, 1991

In connection with the U.S. Statement on the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54) the Soviet side confirms that the throw-weight of that missile should be determined on the basis of the method described in paragraph 1(b) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol to the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, since in terms of its design the SLBM SS-N-23 does not belong to missiles, the final stage of which executes a procedure for dispensing reentry vehicles.

In this connection, the Soviet side states that there is no ground for raising an issue related to determining the throw-weight pursuant to paragraph 1(a) of Section I of the Throw-weight Protocol for any new type of ICBM or SLBM or modified existing type of ICBM or SLBM that incorporated a design similar to the SLBM SS-N-23 (RSM-54).

U.S. STATEMENT ON ATTACHMENT JOINTS

July 29, 1991

With respect to the inclusion of the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs in Annex G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding, the attachment joints used on bombers belonging to the United States of America are of a design that allows the attachment of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear weapons. In the U.S. view, such armament attachment joints are inappropriate for use as specified features that make heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs distinguishable from heavy bombers belonging to the United States of America not equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs. Further, since such armament attachment joints are installed on airplanes belonging to the United States of America other than heavy bombers, their presence is not sufficient to consider an airplane to be a heavy bomber.

SOVIET STATEMENT CONCERNING THE PURPOSES OF INCLUSION IN THE MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING OF DATA ON THE DISTANCE BETWEEN JOINTS FOR ATTACHING LONG-RANGE NUCLEAR ALCMs

July 29, 1991

The Soviet side makes the following statement concerning the purposes of inclusion in the Memorandum of Understanding of data on the distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs.

Noting the importance of verification of the provisions of the Treaty relating to counting the number of warheads attributed to heavy bombers, the Soviet side states that the technical data "distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCMs to pylon, measured on pylon" and "distance between joints for attaching long-range nuclear ALCM to launcher" are included in Annexes G and H to the Memorandum of Understanding in order to confirm the number of long-range nuclear ALCMs for which a heavy bomber of a type, category, and, if applicable, variant, is equipped.

The Soviet side agrees that, since the design of attachment joints used on heavy bombers of the United States of America is such that it permits the suspension of a variety of nuclear and non-nuclear arms, joints for attaching weapons shall be considered as a non-mandatory distinguishing feature for categories of heavy bombers listed in Sections (ii) and (iii) of Annex G to the Memorandum of Understanding.

U.S. STATEMENT ON UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES

July 29, 1991

The U.S. side believes that construction of any additional underground structures adjacent to waters in which ballistic missile submarines operate and comparable in size and configuration to the ones located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara Inlet, the Yagel'naya Submarine Base, and the Pavlovskoye Submarine Base, would raise concerns regarding compliance with the obligation provided for in Article V, paragraph 26 of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms. For its part, the United States does not have such underground structures, does not plan to construct and will not construct any such underground structures while the START Treaty remains in force. The U.S. side proceeds from the premise that the Soviet side will exercise similar restraint.

UNILATERAL STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE REGARDING UNDERGROUND STRUCTURES ADJACENT TO WATERS IN WHICH BALLISTIC MISSILE SUBMARINES OPERATE

July 29, 1991

Since the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics has underground structures located in the immediate vicinity of the Ara inlet (Kola peninsula), the Yagel'naya submarine base (Kola peninsula), and the Pavlovskoye submarine base (Primorskiy kray), in connection with the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and in order to settle the issue of these underground structures once and for all, the Soviet side states that these underground structures have no adits that make them accessible to waterborne craft of any displacement from adjacent waters and that the Soviet Union has no plans to construct and will not construct such adits as long as the Treaty remains in force. Effective verification of this shall be ensured by national technical means.

The Soviet side proceeds from the premise that the United States of America does not have and will not construct similar underground structures as long as the Treaty remains in force.

Statements on the relationship of START and ABM read at a meeting between U. S. Ambassador Brooks and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991.

STATEMENT BY THE U.S. SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS

While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to withdraw from the START Treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START Treaty and submitting it to the United States Senate for advice and consent to ratification with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the START Treaty based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties. Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement. Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

STATEMENT BY THE SOVIET SIDE AT THE U.S.-SOVIET NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS CONCERNING THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS AND COMPLIANCE WITH THE TREATY BETWEEN THE U.S AND THE USSR ON THE LIMITATION OF ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE SYSTEMS

In connection with the Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the following:

This Treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with the Treaty between the U.S and the USSR on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.

The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV of this Treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or related to its material breach.

Statements exchanged at a meeting between U.S. Ambassador Brooks and Soviet Ambassador Nazarkin on July 27, 1991.

STATEMENT OF THE U.S. SIDE CONCERNING THE STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE ON THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE

The U.S. side notes the statement of the Soviet side and believes that the concern it expresses about the impact of the new Tri-service Standoff Attack Missile (TSSAM) on the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) is totally unfounded.

The TSSAM is a non-nuclear, short range cruise missile that is not subject to START and that will have no impact on the integrity, stability, or durability of that agreement. The U.S. side stands by the Houston Agreement, which emphasized that the United States of America has no plans to equip deployed B-2 heavy bombers for long range nuclear ALCMs until such an ALCM has been flight tested from a B-2 heavy bomber. The TSSAM is not a long-range nuclear ALCM, and the Treaty is clear that its potential use on a B-2 would in no way imply that a B-2 is equipped for long-range nuclear ALCMs or alter the status of the B-2 under START.

The U.S. believes that no START provisions will apply based on the potential equipage of the B-2 with TSSAM.

STATEMENT OF THE SOVIET SIDE CONCERNING THE INFORMATION OF THE U.S. SIDE ABOUT THE TSSAM CRUISE MISSILE FOR INCLUSION IN THE NEGOTIATING RECORD

The Soviet side is gravely concerned over the plans to develop and mass produce in the United States of America a new TSSAM cruise missile, which follows from the information about the cruise missile presented by the U.S. side at the START negotiations on June 14, 1991.

The concern of the Soviet side is due to the fact that deployment of large numbers of such missiles will have adverse implications for the durability of the START Treaty, confidence in its integrity and stability that it provides.

Among our concerns is the fact that the multi-purpose suspension jounts will be used for that missile on B-52 and B-2 heavy bombers, as follows from the explanations provided by the U.S. side. Because of that, in case of testing of TSSAM missiles from a B-2 heavy bomber the bomber might be used as a carrier of long-range nuclear ALCMs. Our concern increases in view of the fact that under certain circumstances B-2 heavy bombers are not subject to exhibitions and inspections.

The Soviet side reserves the right to return the these questions subsequently.

DECLARATIONS

DECLARATION of the United States of America Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

July 31, 1991

The United States of America, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the United States of America for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The United States of America will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The United States of America will provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The United States of America will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The United States of America will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the United States of America will also provide the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification."

DECLARATION of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Regarding Its Policy Concerning Nuclear Sea-Launched Cruise Missiles

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the value of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and in the interests of enhancing stability and confidence, will provide the United States of America with annual declarations concerning the deployments of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles planned by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics for the duration of the Treaty. This declaration and subsequent annual declarations will be politically binding.

The first such declaration and all subsequent declarations are provided on the understanding that the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make comparable declarations. The first such declaration will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty. Subsequent declarations will be provided annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will specify the maximum number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles for each of the following five years that the Treaty is in force.

The number of deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles declared during the term of the Treaty will not exceed 880 in any one year.

Cruise missiles other than nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles will not be included in the declarations.

Declarations will apply to nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles of a range greater than 600 kilometers.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will provide the United States of America information on which particular types of surface ships and submarines are capable of carrying deployed nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles. Such information will be confidential and will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will not produce or deploy sea-launched cruise missiles armed with two or more nuclear weapons.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will make these declarations for the duration of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and invites the United States of America to make comparable declarations. These declarations may be supplemented by any cooperative measures that may be agreed upon by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America in the future.

For the duration of the Treaty, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics will also provide the United States of America annually confidential information on the number of nuclear sea-launched cruise missiles with a range of between 300 and 600 kilometers, deployed on surface ships and submarines. This information will be provided on the date of entry into force of the Treaty and annually thereafter.

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America will continue to seek, as stated in the 1987 Washington Summit Joint Statement, "mutually acceptable and effective methods of verification."

DECLARATION by the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics Concerning the Tu-22M Medium Bomber

July 31, 1991

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, recognizing the importance of the Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, and acting in the interest of strengthening stability and enhancing confidence, makes the following declaration concerning its plan with respect to the Tu-22M bomber, which is known to the United States as the Backfire. This declaration will remain in force for the duration of the Treaty and will be politically binding.

The Tu-22M airplane is a medium bomber and is not a strategic offensive arm. At the same time, taking into account the need to remove all concerns standing in the way of the agreements, the Soviet side declares that it will not give the Tu-22M airplane the capability of operating at intercontinental distances in any manner, including by in-flight refueling.

The Soviet Union will not have more than 300 Tu-22M airplanes at any one time, not including naval Tu-22M airplanes. The number of naval Tu-22M airplanes will not exceed 200.

In view of the fact that there must be no constraints in the START Treaty on arms that are not strategic offensive arms, Tu-22M airplanes will not be subject to that Treaty.